

# China South Asian Relations 1947-1980

*Vol. 1: India.*

*edited by*  
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# Contents

List of Appendices	xxxv
Preface	xxxvii
Pinyin equivalents of Chinese names	xl
DOCUMENTS	

## India, 1947-1980

1 Radio broadcast of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice President of the Interim National Government of India, 7 September 1946 (Extract)	3
2 "Internationalism and nationalism," article by Liu Shao-chi, November 1948 (Extracts)	3
3 Annual Report of India's Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations for the year 1948-49, 24 February 1949 (Extract)	4
4 Peking Radio broadcast, 1 July 1949	5
5 Article by Yang Kang in <i>World Culture</i> , 1949 (Extract)	5
6 Article by Chang Chi-cheng in <i>World Culture</i> , 19 August 1949 (Extract)	5
7 Peking Radio broadcast, 2 September 1949 (Extract)	5
8 Article by Hu Chin in <i>World Culture</i> , 9 September 1949 (Extract)	6
9 "The Nehru Government cannot explain away the plot to annex Tibet," article by Chinese jurist Ho Hsu-ching, in <i>People's Daily</i> as broadcast by Peking Radio, 13 September 1949 (Extracts)	6
10 "India and Anglo-American imperialism," article in <i>World Culture</i> , 16 September 1949 (Extracts)	7
11 "An exposure of imperialist intrigues for aggression in Tibet," article in <i>New Construction</i> (Shanghai), 22 September 1949 (Extract)	10
12 Mao Tse-tung's message to the Communist Party of India, 19 October 1949	10
13 Memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister	

Nehru and US Ambassadors Warren R. Austin and Philip C. Jessup of the US delegation at the United Nations, 19 October 1949 (Extracts)	10
14 "American imperialism lays hands on a new slave," commentary by Ssu Mu in <i>World Culture</i> on Nehru's visit to the United States, 28 October 1949 (Extracts)	11
15 Letter of Deputy Premier Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 3 November 1949 (Extracts)	13
16 Article by Wang Yu in <i>World Culture</i> , 2 December 1949 (summary)	14
17 Letter of Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to Premier Jawaharlal Nehru about recognition of China, 6 December 1949 (Extract)	14
18 Prime Minister Nehru's reply to Patel's letter of 6 December, 6 December 1949	15
19 Article by Hu Chin in <i>World Culture</i> , 9 December 1949 (Extract)	16
20 Appeal to women in Asia and elsewhere issued by Asian Women's Conference held in Peking, 10-16 December 1949 (Extract)	16
21 Press communique on India's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, 30 December 1949	17
22 Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry regarding "Goodwill Missions" of Lhasa Authorities, 20 January 1950 (Extracts)	17
23 Annual Report of India's Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1949-50, 2 March 1950 (Extract)	18
24 Article by the Editorial Board of the <i>Observer Magazine (Kwan Cha)</i> , 11 April 1950 (Extracts)	18
25 Peking Radio broadcast, 13 May 1950 (Extract)	19
26 "The Constitutions of India and China," article by Mervyn Jones in <i>Eastern World</i> reprinted in <i>China Weekly Review</i> (Shanghai), 1 July 1950 (Extracts)	20
27 Statement by Indian representative B.N. Rau in the UN General Assembly, 19 September 1950 (Extracts)	20
28 Another statement by Indian representative B.N. Rau in the General Assembly, 19 September 1950 (Extracts)	21
29 Announcement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry regarding UN General Assembly's refusal to allow the Chinese delegate to join the General Assembly, 25 September 1950 (Extracts)	23
30 Indian memorandum to China on the question of Tibet, 21 October 1950	23
31 Indian note to China on the question of Tibet,	



28 October 1950	25
32 Chinese reply to the memorandum and note of India on the question of Tibet, 30 October 1950	26
33 Indian note to China on the question of Tibet, 1 November 1950	27
34 Letter from Deputy Premier Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 November 1950 (Extracts)	29
35 A note by the States Ministry of India on new problems of internal security caused by Chinese occupation of Tibet, November 1950 (Extracts)	35
36 Proclamation on Tibet issued jointly by the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee and the People's Liberation Army Southwest Military Command, 9 November 1950	37
37 Cable of Tibetan Kashag (Cabinet) to the United Nations Secretary-General, 11 November 1950 (Extracts)	38
38 Chinese note to India on the question of Tibet, 16 November 1950	39
39 Prime Minister Nehru's note on China and Tibet forwarded to Vallabhbhai Patel, 18 November 1950 (Extracts)	41
40 Statement by Indian representative Jam Saheb of Nawanagar in the General Committee of the UN General Assembly, 24 November 1950	47
41 Nehru's speech in the Foreign Affairs debate in the Indian Parliament, 6 December 1950 (Extract)	48
42 Nehru's reply to the debate in Indian Parliament, 7 December 1950 (Extract)	49
43 Tsao Po-han's book <i>How do the U.S. imperialists invade Southeast Asia</i> , published by People's Press, Peking, December 1950 (Extracts)	49
44 Mao Tse-tung's speech at Indian Embassy reception in Peking, 26 January 1951	51
45 Seventeen-point agreement between the Government of China and the Local Government of Tibet on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, 23 May 1951 (Extract)	51
46 Statement by Chou En-lai at a banquet given in honour of the first Indian goodwill mission, September-October 1951 (Extracts)	53
47 Speech by Hsia Yen, Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Peace Committee, at a reception given in honour of the visiting Indian goodwill mission, 21 October 1951 (Extract)	54

- 48 Statement by Indian representative Vijaya Laxmi Pandit in the UN General Assembly, 11 November 1952 (Extract) 55
- 49 Letter of Lee Sang Cho, Representative of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, to Gen. K.S. Thimayya, Chairman, Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), 20 October 1953 (Extracts) 55
- 50 Lee Sang Cho's letter to Chairman, NNRC, 27 December 1953 (Extracts) 56
- 51 Letter from Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh-huai, Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers, to General K.S. Thimayya, Chairman, NNRC, 7 January 1954 (Extracts) 57
- 52 Lee Sang Cho's letter to Chairman, NNRC, 22 January 1954 (Extracts) 59
- 53 Lee Sang Cho's letter to Chairman, NNRC, 20 February 1954 (Extracts) 59
- 54 Statement by Li Chi Po, Leader of the Chinese delegation to the ECAFE session in Ceylon and Secretary, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 3 March 1954 60
- 55 India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, 29 April 1954 61
- 56 Exchange of notes on the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, 29 April 1954 64
- 57 *People's Daily* commentary on Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, 30 April 1954 (Extracts) 67
- 58 Chou En-lai answers questions of *The Hindu* correspondent, K.S. Shelvankar, 23 June 1954 (Extracts) 68
- 59 Nehru's speech at the banquet given in honour of Chou En-lai, 26 June 1954 (Extract) 69
- 60 Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet, 26 June 1954 69
- 61 "Sino-Indian unity for peace in the Far East and the whole world," *People's Daily* editorial, 26 June 1954 (Extracts) 70
- 62 Chou En-lai's statement at a press conference in New Delhi, 27 June 1954 (Extracts) 72
- 63 Joint statement by the Prime Ministers of India and China, 28 June 1954 73
- 64 Chinese note to India, 17 July 1954 75
- 65 Chou En-lai's Report on Foreign Affairs made at the 33rd session of the Central People's Government Council, 11 August 1954 (Extracts) 75
- 66 Indian note to China, 27 August 1954 76

67 Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government delivered to the First Session of the First National People's Congress, 23 September 1954 (Extracts)	77
68 Trade agreement between China and India, 14 October 1954	77
69 Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet given in honour of Premier Nehru, 20 October 1954 (Extracts)	80
70 Chou En-lai's message of greetings on Nehru's birthday, 13 November 1954	81
71 "Mr. Nehru's visit to China," article by Chen Han-seng, Vice Chairman of the China-India Friendship Association, 16 November 1954 (Extracts)	81
72 Chou En-lai's message to Nehru on Indian National Day, 24 January 1955	82
73 Chou En-lai's speech at India's National Day reception in Peking, 26 January 1955 (Extracts)	83
74 Communique on handing over of the Indian communication facilities in Tibet to China, 1 April 1955 (Extract)	83
75 Article by Feng Chih-tan in <i>People's Daily</i> , 11 April 1955 (Extracts)	83
76 Observer's commentary in <i>People's Daily</i> on Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union, 10 June 1955 (summary)	84
77 Chou En-lai's speech on the Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy delivered at the Second Session of the First National People's Congress, 30 July 1955 (Extract)	85
78 Chou En-lai's interview with Japanese press delegation, 17 August 1955 (Extract)	85
79 <i>People's Daily</i> commentary on India's fight for Goa, 24 August 1955 (Extracts)	86
80 Observer's commentary in <i>People's Daily</i> on Dulles' allegation that Goa and Macao are "Portuguese provinces," 11 December 1955 (Extract)	86
81 <i>People's Daily</i> editorial welcoming Soviet-Indian joint statement of 13 December 1955, 16 December 1955 (Extracts)	87
82 Chou En-lai's speech at a reception given by Indian Ambassador R.K. Nehru, 26 January 1956 (Extract)	88
83 <i>People's Daily</i> editorial on India's National Day anniversary, 26 January 1956 (Extracts)	89
84 Chou En-lai's Political Report at the Second Session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 30 January 1956 (Extracts)	91

85	President Rajendra Prasad's address to the Indian Parliament, 15 February 1956 (Extracts)	91
86	Chou En-lai's address to the Third Session of the First National People's Congress, 28 June 1956 (Extract)	92
87	Letter of India's Permanent Representative Arthur S. Lall to the UN Secretary-General requesting inclusion of an item on representation of China in the UN on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, 10 November 1956	92
88	Chou En-lai's press conference in Calcutta, 9 December 1956 (Extract)	94
89	Chou En-lai's press conference in Dacca, 29 December 1956 (Extract)	94
90	Chou En-lai's report on visits to eleven countries in Asia and Europe given to the Third Session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 5 March 1957 (Extracts)	94
91	Letter of India's Permanent Representative Arthur S. Lall to the UN Secretary-General proposing item on representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly, 13 September 1957 (Extract)	95
92	Chou En-lai's report to the Fifth Session of the First National People's Congress, 7 February 1958 (Extracts)	96
93	Foreword by Ting Hsi-lin, President of the Sino-Indian Friendship Association, to a book <i>A Short History of Sino-Indian Friendship</i> by Chin Keh-mu, June 1958 (Extracts)	97
94	Chinese note to India, 10 July 1958 (Extracts)	97
95	Letter from India's Permanent Representative Arthur S. Lall to the UN Secretary-General proposing an item on the representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly, 14 July 1958 (Extracts)	98
96	Indian note to China, 2 August 1958 (Extracts)	99
97	Indian note to China, 8 August 1958 (Extracts)	100
98	Indian note to China, 21 August 1958	100
99	Indian note to China, 18 October 1958 (Extracts)	101
100	Chinese reply to Indian note of 21 August 1958, 3 November 1958 (Extracts)	102
101	Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 14 December 1958 (Extracts)	103
102	Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 14 December 1958, 23 January 1959 (Extracts)	105
103	Paper by Yi Li-yu, Member of Editorial Board of <i>World</i>	

	<i>Culture (Shih Chieh Chih Shih)</i> at a joint conference of the Editorial Boards of <i>International Affairs</i> (Moscow) and <i>World Culture</i> , January 1959 (Extracts)	108
104	Proclamation of the Tibet Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army regarding the revolt in Tibet, 20 March 1959 (Extract)	109
105	Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 22 March 1959 (Extracts)	110
106	Order of the State Council of China proclaimed by Chou En-lai, 28 March 1959 (Extracts)	112
107	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on developments in Tibet, 30 March 1959 (Extract)	113
108	Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet welcoming Panchen Erdeni, 14 April 1959 (Extracts)	114
109	Observer's commentary in <i>People's Daily</i> on Sino-Indian friendship, 15 April 1959 (Extracts)	115
110	Dalai Lama's statement in Tezpur (India), 18 April 1959 (Extract)	115
111	Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Second National People's Congress, 18 April 1959 (Extracts)	117
112	Speech on Tibet by Panchen Erdeni Chuji Geltseng, Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of Tibet, at the First Session of the Second National People's Congress, 22 April 1959 (Extracts)	118
113	Article in <i>People's Daily</i> , 25-26 April 1959 (Extracts)	119
114	Statement made by Foreign Secretary of India to the Chinese Ambassador, 26 April 1959 (Extracts)	121
115	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on the situation in Tibet, 27 April 1959 (Extracts)	122
116	Resolution on the Question of Tibet adopted at the First Session of Second National People's Congress, 28 April 1959 (Extracts)	124
117	"The revolution in Tibet and Nehru's philosophy," commentary by the Editorial Department of <i>People's Daily</i> , 6 May 1959 (Extracts)	125
118	Statement made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary of India, 16 May 1959	132
119	Statement by the official Spokesman of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 30 June 1959	137
120	Letter from India's Permanent Representative C.S. Jha to the UN Secretary-General proposing an item on the representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly, 13 July 1959 (Extract)	137

121	Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 22 March 1959, 8 September 1959 (Extracts)	138
122	Dalai Lama's appeal to the Secretary General of United Nations, 9 September 1959	140
123	Chou En-lai's report on the Sino-Indian boundary question at the enlarged session of the NPC Standing Committee, 11 September 1959 (Extracts)	142
124	Nehru's reply to the debate in Lok Sabha, 12 September 1959 (Extract)	143
125	Foreign Minister Chen Yi's speech at the NPC Standing Committee meeting, 13 September 1959 (Extracts)	144
126	Speech by Chu Teh, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, at the closing session of the NPC Standing Committee, 13 September 1959 (Extracts)	145
127	Resolution of the NPC Standing Committee on the Sino-Indian boundary question, 13 September 1959	146
128	Nehru's reply to Chou En-lai's letter of 8 September 1959, 26 September 1959 (Extracts)	147
129	Statement by Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon in the UN General Assembly on the question of Tibet, 21 October 1959 (Extracts)	151
130	United Nations General Assembly resolution on the question of Tibet, 21 October 1959	153
131	Chinese Government statement on UN General Assembly resolution on the question of Tibet, 23 October 1959 (Extracts)	154
132	Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 26 September 1959, 7 November 1959 (Extracts)	155
133	Nehru's reply to Chou En-lai's letter of 7 November 1959, 16 November 1959 (Extract)	156
134	Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha, 8 December 1959 (Extracts)	160
135	Chou En-lai's letter to Nehru, 17 December 1959 (Extract)	161
136	President Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament, 8 February 1960 (Extract)	164
137	Foreword by Indian Minister G.B. Pant to Congress Party publication entitled <i>India-China Border Problem</i> , 4 March 1960 (Extract)	165
138	<i>People's Daily</i> editorial on Khrushchov's visit to India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, 6 March 1960 (Extract)	166
139	Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1959-60, March 1960 (Extracts)	167

140	Speech by Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, at the National People's Congress, 9 April 1960 (Extracts)	169
141	Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the Second Session of the Second National People's Congress, 10 April 1960 (Extract)	169
142	Finance Minister Morarji Desai's discussions with Chou En-lai, April 1960 (Extract)	170
143	Joint communique of the Prime Ministers of India and China, 25 April 1960	170
144	Chou En-lai's written statement at the press conference in New Delhi outlining six points of proximity, 25 April 1960 (Extracts)	171
145	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 26 April 1960 (Extracts)	173
146	<i>People's Daily</i> editorial commenting on Sino-Indian talks and Chou En-lai's six points, 27 April 1960 (Extracts)	175
147	Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha, 29 April 1960 (Extract)	176
148	Nehru's statement in the UN General Assembly, 3 October 1960 (Extract)	176
149	Statement by Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon in the UN General Assembly, 3 October 1960 (Extracts)	177
150	Report of the Indian officials on their statements and comments made during the meetings of the officials of the Governments of India and China on the boundary question, 12 December 1960 (released February 1961) (Extracts)	178
151	Report of the Chinese officials on their statements and comments made during the meetings of the officials of the Governments of China and India on the boundary question, 12 December 1960 (released February 1961) (Extract)	180
152	Indian note to China, 30 December 1960 (Extract)	181
153	President Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament, 14 February 1961 (Extract)	182
154	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 15 February 1961 (Extracts)	183
155	Chinese reply to Indian note of 30 December 1960, 21 February 1961 (Extracts)	183
156	Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1960-61, February 1961 (Extracts)	184

157	Statement by Government of Burma on India's objection regarding Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty, March 1961	185
158	Message of greetings from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Communist Party of India on the convocation of its 6th Congress, April 1961 (Extracts)	186
159	"India and foreign aid," article by Hsiao Leng in <i>Peking Review</i> , 10 November 1961 (Extracts)	187
160	Chinese note to India, 3 December 1961	188
161	Indian reply to Chinese note of 3 December 1961, 15 December 1961 (Extract)	188
162	Statement of the Chinese Government in support of India's recovery of Goa, 19 December 1961	190
163	Commentary by Hsiao Leng in <i>Peking Review</i> on election results in India, 23 March 1962 (Extracts)	191
164	President Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament, 18 April 1962 (Extract)	192
165	Hsinhua commentary on the Report of the Chinese and Indian officials on the boundary question, 28 April 1962 (Extracts)	193
166	Nehru's statement regarding China-Pakistan boundary negotiations, 7 May 1962 (Extracts)	196
167	Indian note to Pakistan, 10 May 1962 (Extracts)	197
168	Indian note to China, 10 May 1962 (Extract)	197
169	Indian note to China, 14 May 1962 (Extract)	199
170	Chinese reply to Indian note of 10 May 1962, 31 May 1962 (Extracts)	200
171	Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1961-62, May 1962 (Extracts)	201
172	Chinese reply to Indian note of 14 May 1962, 2 June 1962 (Extracts)	203
173	Chinese Foreign Ministry statement criticizing India's role in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 9 June 1962 (Extracts)	204
174	Indian reply to Chinese note of 31 May 1962, 30 June 1962 (Extracts)	204
175	Indian note to China, 22 August 1962 (Extracts)	206
176	Chinese reply to Indian note of 22 August 1962, 13 September 1962 (Extracts)	207
177	Nehru's broadcast to the nation on Chinese aggression, 22 October 1962 (Extracts)	208
178	Statement of the Chinese government putting forward three-point proposal, 24 October 1962 (Extracts)	208



179	Indian government reaction to the three-point Chinese proposal of 24 October 1962, 24 October 1962	210
180	Statement by Indian representative B.N. Chakravarti in the UN General Assembly, 26 October 1962	212
181	Nehru's message to Heads of Governments on Chinese aggression, 27 October 1962 (Extracts)	213
182	"More on Nehru's philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian boundary question," commentary by the Editorial Department of <i>People's Daily</i> , 27 October 1962 (Extracts)	214
183	Morarji Desai's views on Chinese invasion, October 1962 (Extract)	223
184	Resolution of the Communist Party of India on Chinese aggression, 1 November 1962 (Extracts)	224
185	Resolution adopted by Lok Sabha on the Chinese aggression, 14 November 1962	225
186	Memorandum of the Government of India (attached to Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai) describing implications of three-point Chinese proposal, 14 November 1962	225
187	Chou En-lai's letter to leaders of Asian and African countries, 15 November 1962 (Extracts)	230
188	"Why the Nehru Government of India has to date refused to enter into peaceful negotiations," <i>Red Flag</i> editorial, 16 November 1962 (Extracts)	235
189	Chinese Government statement announcing taking of three measures by China, 21 November 1962 (Extracts)	237
190	Chinese clarifications to Indian Foreign Secretary on the points in their statement of 21 November 1962, 26 November 1962 (Extracts)	239
191	Chinese clarifications to Indian Deputy Secretary on the points in their statement of 21 November 1962, 26 November 1962 (Extract)	241
192	Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 1 December 1962	242
193	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 10 December 1962 (Extracts)	246
194	Colombo Conference proposals of six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic) for the border settlement between India and China, 12 December 1962 (released on 19 January 1963)	247
195	"Workers of all countries, unite to oppose our common enemy," <i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 15 December 1962 (Extract)	248
196	Indian note to China, 31 December 1962	249

197	Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 1 January 1963 (Extract)	250
198	Clarifications given by the representatives of the Colombo Powers to the Government of India, 13 January 1963	250
199	Chou En-lai's letter to Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon giving Chinese interpretation of the Colombo Conference proposals, 19 January 1963 (Extract)	251
200	Vice-Premier Chen Yi's statement on Sino-Indian boundary question, 21 January 1963 (Extract)	253
201	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha regarding Colombo Conference proposals, 23 January 1963 (Extracts)	253
202	Nehru's reply to the debate in Lok Sabha on Colombo Conference proposals, 25 January 1963 (Extracts)	257
203	Nehru's letter to the Prime Minister of Ceylon, 26 January 1963 (Extracts)	259
204	"Welcome the efforts of the Colombo Conference to promote direct negotiations between China and India," <i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 28 January 1963 (Extracts)	259
205	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on the visit of US-Commonwealth mission to India, 8 February 1963 (Extract)	260
206	Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's television interview to Karlsson, correspondent of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation, 17 February 1963 (Extracts)	261
207	Chinese note to India, 21 February 1963 (Extracts)	262
208	Article in <i>Kuangming Jihpao</i> analyzing the US aggressive dispositions in Southeast Asia, 21 February 1963 (Extract)	263
209	"Whence the differences? A reply to Thorez and other comrades," <i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 27 February 1963 (Extracts)	263
210	Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha, 5 March 1963 (Extract)	265
211	Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 5 March 1963 (Extract)	266
212	Chinese note to India, 14 March 1963 (Extracts)	267
213	"Air umbrella and alliance," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 15 March 1963 (Extracts)	268
214	Indian reply to Chinese note of 14 March 1963, 26 March 1963 (Extracts)	269
215	Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1962-63, March 1963 (Extracts)	271
216	"What kind of stuff is Nehru's much advertised 'socialism'," <i>Red Flag</i> commentary, 1 April 1963 (Extracts)	273

217	Indian note to China, 3 April 1963 (Extract)	275
218	"Changing India," article by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in <i>Foreign Affairs</i> (New York), April 1963 (Extracts)	276
219	Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 5 March 1963, 20 April 1963 (Extracts)	280
220	Nehru's reply to Chou En-lai's letter of 20 April 1963, 1 May 1963 (Extracts)	281
221	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 7 May 1963 (Extract)	283
222	"Satrap of imperialism," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 17 May 1963 (Extracts)	284
223	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on India, 24 May 1963 (Extract)	284
224	"A perspective into the 'non-alignment policy' Nehru advertised," article by Lieh Tung in <i>World Culture</i> , 25 May 1963 (Extracts)	285
225	<i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 27 May 1963 (Extract)	287
226	"Can rumour-mongering save Nehru," article by Chung Ho-min in <i>Peking Review</i> , 14 June 1963 (Extracts)	287
227	<i>People's Daily</i> commentary on India's attitude on the International Commission in Laos, 16 June 1963 (Extracts)	288
228	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on use of "Mainland China" by Indian Government, 28 June 1963 (Extract)	289
229	"Indian reactionaries in the anti-China chorus," Observer's commentary in <i>People's Daily</i> , 16 July 1963 (Extracts)	289
230	"A grave step taken by the Indian Government to menace the peace of Asia," <i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 28 July 1963 (Extracts)	290
231	Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 16 August 1963	292
232	Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 August 1963 (Extract)	292
233	"No one can save the Indian reactionaries from their political bankruptcy," <i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 22 August 1963 (Extracts)	293
234	"Behind Nehru's anti-China policy," article by Hsu Ching-lin in <i>Red Flag</i> , September 1963 (Extracts)	295
235	Chinese reply to Indian notes of 3 April 1963 and 6 September 1963, 9 October 1963 (Extracts)	296
236	Indian reply to Chinese note of 9 October 1963, 16 October 1963 (Extracts)	298

- 237 Chinese protest against an Indian MP's visit to Taiwan, 31 October 1963 (Extracts) 302
- 238 "The truth about how the leaders of the C.P.S.U. have allied themselves with India against China," article by the Editorial Department of *People's Daily*, 8 November 1963 (Extracts) 302
- 239 "Soviet shot in the arm," *Peking Review* commentary, 8 November 1963 (Extract) 308
- 240 Observer's commentary in *People's Daily* denouncing US-Indian collusion against China, 11 November 1963 (Extracts) 308
- 241 *Peking Review* commentary on US-Indian joint air exercise, 15 November 1963 (Extract) 309
- 242 *Peking Review* commentary on India's increasing military cooperation with the United States, 27 December 1963 (Extracts) 309
- 243 Indian note to China, 13 January 1964 (Extract) 310
- 244 Statement by Indian representative M.C. Chagla in the UN Security Council, 5 February 1964 (Extract) 311
- 245 "Struggle of the CPSU for the solidarity of the world Communist movement," speech by M.A. Suslov at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, 14 February 1964 (Extract) 311
- 246 Statement by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister without Portfolio, in the debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, 19 February 1964 (Extract) 312
- 247 Lal Bahadur Shastri's statement in the debate in Rajya Sabha on Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1964 (Extract) 312
- 248 Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 29 February 1964 (Extract) 313
- 249 Opening speech by Swaran Singh, Indian Minister for Food and Agriculture, at the Preparatory Meeting of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, 10 April 1964 (Extract) 313
- 250 Statement by Vice Premier Chen Yi at the preparatory meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference held in Jakarta, 10-15 April 1964 (summary) 313
- 251 Nehru's press conference in New Delhi, 22 May 1964 (Extract) 314
- 252 "India aids U.S. 'two China's' plot," *Peking Review* commentary, 3 July 1964 (Extracts) 314
- 253 "Non-alignment today," article by Deputy Minister

of External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, in <i>Indian and Foreign Review</i> , 1 September 1964 (Extract)	315
254 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Lok Sabha, 25 September 1964 (Extracts)	315
255 Statement by Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri at the Conference of Non-aligned Nations, Cairo, 7 October 1964 (Extracts)	316
256 Statement of the Chinese government on the Sino-Indian border question, 9 October 1964 (Extracts)	317
257 "Sheep's head and dog's meat," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on India's policy of "double alignment," 16 October 1964 (Extracts)	319
258 Prime Minister Shastri's letter to Chou En-lai commenting on nuclear explosion by China and the Chinese proposal of a summit conference, 27 November 1964 (Extracts)	320
259 Premier Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Third National People's Congress, 21-22 December 1964 (Extracts)	322
260 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's statement in Lok Sabha, 24 December 1964 (Extract)	323
261 Statement by the Spokesman of India's Ministry of External Affairs on Chou En-lai's speech at the National People's Congress, 31 December 1964 (Extracts)	323
262 "New Delhi reaction strips off mask," article by <i>People's Daily</i> Commentator, 17 January 1965 (Extracts)	324
263 Indian note to China, 12 February 1965 (Extracts)	325
264 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1964-65, March 1965 (Extract)	326
265 "Expose the essence of India's 'new proposal' on Vietnam," Observer's commentary in <i>People's Daily</i> , 9 May 1965 (Extracts)	329
266 "What Shastri's Soviet trip reveals," Observer's commentary in <i>People's Daily</i> , 27 May 1965 (Extracts)	330
267 "Non-aligned India's double alignment," article by Shih Yen in <i>Peking Review</i> , 13 August 1965 (Extracts)	332
268 "India's food crisis and U.S. food aid," article by Chih Yi in <i>Peking Review</i> , 20 August 1965 (Extracts)	333
269 Vice Premier Chen Yi's press conference in Karachi, 4 September 1965 (Extract)	333
270 "Indian schemes to sabotage Afro-Asian solidarity, against imperialism fail," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 5 November 1965 (Extracts)	333
271 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Parlia-	

- ment, 10 November 1965 (Extracts) 334
- 272 "Refutation of the new leaders of the C.P.S.U. on 'united action'," article by the Editorial Departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, 11 November 1965 (Extract) 335
- 273 *People's Daily* Commentator on the Indian-Canadian report on Laos, 12 December 1965 (Extracts) 336
- 274 Statement by the Indian representative Zakaria in the UN General Assembly on the question of Tibet, 14 December 1965 (Extracts) 337
- 275 Chinese protest note to India, 2 January 1966 (Extract) 340
- 276 "Confessions concerning the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration pursued by the new leaders of the C.P.S.U.," article by *Red Flag* Commentator, 11 February 1966 (Extracts) 340
- 277 "The face of an accomplice," *People's Daily* commentary, 15 February 1966 (Extract) 341
- 278 Ting Chuan's commentary on Indian food crisis in *Peking Review*, 11 March 1966 (Extracts) 341
- 279 *Peking Review* news report on Indo-Japanese consultations, 11 March 1966 342
- 280 *Peking Review* report on the Mizo revolt, 18 March 1966 (Extract) 342
- 281 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1965-66, March 1966 (Extract) 343
- 282 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's speech at a reception in New York, 1 April 1966 (Extract) 344
- 283 *Peking Review* commentary on alleged provocation by India in creating "two Chinas," 8 April 1966 (Extracts) 345
- 284 *Peking Review* commentary on Mrs. Gandhi's visit to USA and USSR, 15 April 1966 346
- 285 Chinese note to India, 4 May 1966 (Extracts) 347
- 286 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha on Chinese thermo-nuclear explosion, 10 May 1966 (Extracts) 348
- 287 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's press conference in New Delhi, 19 May 1966 (Extract) 349
- 288 Indian reply to Chinese note of 2 January 1966, 30 May 1966 (Extracts) 349
- 289 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet arms aid to India, 3 June 1966 (Extracts) 350
- 290 Vice-Premier Chen Yi's speech on the occasion of Sino-Korean Friendship Treaty anniversary condemning US-Soviet-Indian "plot" to force peace talks

through Bombing," 12 July 1966 (Extracts)	351
291 Press statement issued on behalf of the Bhutan Government by its trade adviser in Calcutta, 3 October 1966	351
292 Hsinhua statement on Bhutan, 27 October 1966 (Extracts)	352
293 <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on New Delhi summit conference of India, Yugoslavia, and UAR, 4 November 1966 (Extracts)	353
294 <i>Peking Review</i> report on famine in India, 9 December 1966 (Extracts)	353
295 <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Soviet loan to India, 16 December 1966 (Extracts)	354
296 Address by President S. Radhakrishnan to the Indian Parliament, 18 March 1967 (Extract)	355
297 "Indian reactionaries ugly anti-China force," article by <i>People's Daily</i> Commentator, 24 March 1967 (Extract)	355
298 <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on 1967 General Elections in India, 24 March 1967 (Extracts)	355
299 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's reply to Lok Sabha debate on President's Address, 5 April 1967 (Extract)	356
300 "U.S.-Soviet pawn against China," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on the new Indian Government, 28 April 1967 (Extracts)	357
301 "Dange's plot to sabotage Indian people's revolution will surely fail," commentary in <i>Peking Review</i> , 9 June 1967 (Extracts)	358
302 Chinese Foreign Ministry note to Indian <i>Charge d'Affaires ad interim</i> in China, 12 June 1967 (Extract)	358
303 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1966-67, June 1967 (Extracts)	359
304 Statement by Foreign Minister M.C. Chagla in Lok Sabha, 14 June 1967 (Extracts)	361
305 Chagla's statement in Lok Sabha regarding treatment of Indian diplomats by China, 15 June 1967 (Extracts)	362
306 Statement by Swaran Singh, India's Minister of Defence, in Parliament on Chinese explosion of hydrogen bomb, 21 June 1967 (Extract)	363
307 <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on essence of Soviet aid to India, 30 June 1967 (Extracts)	363
308 "Spring thunder over India," <i>People's Daily</i> editorial, 5 July 1967 (Extracts)	364
309 Foreign Minister Chagla's statement in Lok Sabha, 14 July 1967 (Extracts)	365

- 310 "Historical lessons of Telengana uprising," article by *People's Daily Commentator*, 3 August 1967 (Extract) 366
- 311 "Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari fly still higher," article by *People's Daily Commentator*, 7 August 1967 (Extracts) 366
- 312 Statement by Indian Ambassador to France, C.S. Jha, at the International Diplomatic Seminar, Klesheim, Salzburg, August 1967 (Extracts) 366
- 313 *Peking Review* commentary on the Naga and Mizo rebellion movement, 1 September 1967 (Extracts) 368
- 314 "The Indian food crisis and armed revolution," article by *People's Daily Commentator*, 5 September 1967 (Extracts) 369
- 315 "Indian reactionaries have miscalculated again," article by *People's Daily Commentator* on border incident, 14 September 1967 (Extracts) 370
- 316 "Soviet revisionism is one of the biggest foreign exploiters in India," commentary in *Peking Review*, 29 September 1967 (Extracts) 370
- 317 Statement by the Minister of Defence Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 14 November 1967 371
- 318 "India 'Non-Congress Governments' on the rocks," commentary by Observer in *People's Daily*, 5 December 1967 (Extracts) 372
- 319 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement in Lok Sabha debate on Foreign Affairs, 22 December 1967 (Extract) 373
- 320 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 23 December 1967 (Extracts) 374
- 321 "Public sector' of Indian economy is scourge of the people," commentary in *Peking Review*, 25 December 1967 (Extracts) 375
- 322 "Historic turning point in the Indian revolution," article in *Peking Review*, 12 January 1968 (Extracts) 376
- 323 "What Kosygin was up to in India," article by *People's Daily Commentator*, 5 February 1968 (Extracts) 376
- 324 Address by President of India to the joint session of both Houses of Indian Parliament, 12 February 1968 (Extract) 378
- 325 "Let the peasants revolutionary storm in India strike harder," article by *People's Daily Commentator*, 26 February 1968 (Extract) 378
- 326 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1967-68, March 1968 (Extracts) 378



327	Statement by Minister B.R. Bhagat in Lok Sabha, 4 April 1968 (Extract)	379
328	Statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Lok Sabha, 5 April 1968 (Extracts)	380
329	Indian note to China, 19 April 1968 (Extract)	380
330	Statement by Minister B.R. Bhagat in Rajya Sabha, 13 May 1968 (Extracts)	381
331	Commentary in <i>Peking Review</i> on the Nagas and Mizos rebellion in India, 28 June 1968 (Extracts)	382
332	"Jackdaw in peacock feathers," <i>People's Daily</i> commentary, 10 August 1968	383
333	"U.S.-Indian collusion: plotting anti-China alliance," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 16 August 1968 (Extracts)	384
334	"Soviet revisionism carries out social-imperialism economic exploitation in India," commentary in <i>Peking Review</i> , 8 November 1968 (Extracts)	385
335	Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's replies to questions at a press conference, 1 January 1969 (Extracts)	386
336	"Indian reaction beset with deepening political-economic crisis," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 31 January 1969 (Extracts)	389
337	"Parliamentary road in India—a fiasco," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 31 January 1969 (Extracts)	389
338	Address by President Zakir Hussain to the Indian Parliament, 17 February 1969 (Extract)	390
339	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Soviet Defence Minister Grechko's visit to India, 21 March 1969 (Extracts)	390
340	Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1968-69, March 1969 (Extract)	391
341	Defence Minister Lin Piao's Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1 April 1969 (Extracts)	392
342	Statement by Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh in Lok Sabha, 8 April 1969 (Extracts)	392
343	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Soviet support for the Communist Party of India, 16 May 1969 (Extracts)	396
344	Indian note to China, 25 June 1969	397
345	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Japan, 4 July 1969	398
346	Statement by Foreign Minister of India in Lok Sabha, 22 July 1969	400
347	"India—A vivid specimen of how Soviet revisionists push social-imperialism," article by Chang Ou in	

- Peking Review*, 25 July 1969 (Extracts) 401
- 348 "Infighting within Indian ruling circles," *Peking Review* commentary, 15 August 1969 (Extracts) 401
- 349 "India revolutionary armed struggle surges forward," *Peking Review* commentary, 31 October 1969 (Extracts) 402
- 350 *Peking Review* commentary on the factional struggle inside the Congress Party, 7 November 1969 (Extracts) 403
- 351 President V.V. Giri's address to the Indian Parliament, 20 February 1970 (Extract) 404
- 352 "Indian reactionaries heading for collapse at quicker tempo," *Peking Review* commentary, 27 February 1970 (Extracts) 404
- 353 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1969-70, March 1970 (Extract) 405
- 354 Extracts from *India and Nepal: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy* by Shriman Narayan, former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, 1970 406
- 355 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's reply to the Rajya Sabha debate on Foreign Affairs, 26 August 1970 (Extract) 408
- 356 "Peasants armed struggle led by Communist Party of India (M-L) develops steadily," *Peking Review* commentary, 25 September 1970 (Extracts) 409
- 357 Statement by Indian representative S. Sen in the UN General Assembly on Chinese representation in the UN, 20 November 1970 (Extracts) 409
- 358 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1970-71, April 1971 (Extracts) 410
- 359 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 20 July 1971 (Extracts) 411
- 360 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's speech at the All India Congress Committee session at Simla, 8 October 1971 (Extract) 412
- 361 Statement by Indian delegate Samar Sen in the UN First Committee on the admission of China, 22 October 1971 414
- 362 Statement by the Indian representative Samar Sen in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 27 October 1971 (Extract) 415
- 363 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's message of greetings to Chou En-lai on the restoration of legitimate right of China in the UN, 27 October 1971 416
- 364 Statement by the representative of India, Samar Sen, in the UN General Assembly welcoming Chinese

delegation to UN, 15 November 1971 (Extracts)	416
365 Chou En-lai's interview with Neville Maxwell, 5 December 1971	417
366 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's interview on CBS Television (USA), 20 December 1971 (Extract)	418
367 "U.S.-Soviet scramble for hegemony in Southeast Asian subcontinent and Indian Ocean," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 14 January 1972 (Extracts)	419
368 "Soviet revisionism's neo-colonialism in India," <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 21 January 1972 (Extracts)	420
369 President V.V. Giri's address to the joint session of both Houses of Indian Parliament, 13 March 1972 (Extracts)	420
370 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Rajya Sabha on reference to Jammu and Kashmir in Sino-American joint communique, 14 March 1972	421
371 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1971-72, April 1972 (Extracts)	422
372 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 26 April 1972 (Extracts)	423
373 Statement by the Chinese representative Wang Junsheng in the UN Economic and Social Council, 27 July 1972 (Extracts)	424
374 Statement by the Observer for India, N.P. Jain, in the UN Economic and Social Council, 27 July 1972 (Extracts)	425
375 Statement by the Chinese representative Wang Junsheng in the UN Economic and Social Council, 27 July 1972	426
376 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement on India-China relations in Lok Sabha, 16 August 1972 (Extracts)	426
377 "India and the world," article by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in <i>Foreign Affairs</i> , October 1972 (Extracts)	431
378 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's reply to the Rajya Sabha debate on international situation, 30 November 1972 (Extracts)	432
379 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's speech in the Lok Sabha debate on international situation, 7 December 1972 (Extracts)	434
380 <i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Indo-Pak relations, 5 January 1973 (Extract)	436
381 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's address to the Nepal	

- Council of World Affairs, Kathmandu, 9 February 1973 (Extract) 437
- 382 President V.V. Giri's address to the joint session of Indian Parliament, 19 February 1973 (Extract) 437
- 383 *Peking Review* commentary on "India's forcibly taking over administration of Sikkim," 20 April 1973 (Extracts) 437
- 384 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1972-73, April 1973 (Extracts) 438
- 385 Interview with Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister, by a group from the Australian National University, 14 June 1973 (Extract) 438
- 386 *Peking Review* commentary on New Delhi Agreement between Pakistan and India, 14 September 1973 (Extracts) 439
- 387 Peking Radio commentary on Soviet aid to India, 26 November 1973 439
- 388 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet revisionist "disinterested aid," 30 November 1973 (Extracts) 440
- 389 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Rajya Sabha debate on international situation, 6 December 1973 (Extract) 441
- 390 "India's food crisis," article by Kuo Chih in *Peking Review*, 15 February 1974 (Extracts) 441
- 391 "Ruthless plunder of India by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism," *Peking Review* commentary, 29 March 1974 (Extracts) 442
- 392 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1973-74, March 1974 (Extract) 443
- 393 *Peking Review* report on Tripartite Agreement between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, 19 April 1974 443
- 394 "Who's 'fishing in troubled waters'?", commentary by Hsinhua correspondent, 18 May 1974 (Extract) 444
- 395 "India's economy in serious trouble," *Peking Review* commentary, 21 June 1974 (Extracts) 445
- 396 "Intolerable bullying," article by *People's Daily* Commentator, 3 July 1974 (abridged) 446
- 397 Commentary by *Hsinhua* correspondent on the "constitution" for Sikkim, 13 July 1974 (Extracts) 447
- 398 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Rajya Sabha initiating debate on international situation, 30 July 1974 (Extract) 448
- 399 Swaran Singh's reply to the Rajya Sabha debate on international situation, 1 August 1974 (Extract) 448

400	<i>People's Daily</i> commentator on India's "annexation" of Sikkim, 3 September 1974 (Extracts)	448
401	Article in <i>People's Daily</i> , 8 September 1974 (Extract)	449
402	Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on Sikkim, 11 September 1974	450
403	<i>Peking Review</i> report on Bhutan, 20 September 1974	451
404	Speech by Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in the UN General Assembly, 2 October 1974 (Extract)	451
405	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on "India's expansion in South Asia with the backing of Soviet social-imperialism," 22 November 1974 (Extracts)	452
406	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary condemning India for damaging Nepal's interests, 3 January 1975	455
407	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Grechko's India trip, 7 March 1975 (Extracts)	456
408	Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1974-75, March 1975 (Extract)	457
409	"Naked annexation," <i>People's Daily</i> commentary on Sikkim, 13 April 1975 (Extracts)	458
410	"Indira Gandhi's Government: fierce features fully exposed," article by Jen Ku-ping in <i>Peking Review</i> , 4 July 1975	458
411	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on India, 8 August 1975 (Extracts)	460
412	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on famine in India, 15 August 1975 (Extracts)	461
413	Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on border incident with India, 3 November 1975	462
414	"India's act of tyranny," <i>People's Daily</i> commentary, 19 February 1976	463
415	"The truth about Soviet-Indian 'economic cooperation,'" <i>Peking Review</i> commentary, 19 March 1976 (Extracts)	464
416	Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1975-76, March 1976 (Extract)	464
417	Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan's statement in Lok Sabha on relations with China, 15 April 1976	465
418	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on India's national election, 25 March 1977 (Extracts)	466
419	Premier Hua Kuo-feng's congratulatory message to Premier Morarji Desai on his assumption of office, 30 March 1977	466
420	Chinese commentary entitled, "Indian General Election	

- and Soviet setback in South Asia," 8 April 1977 (Extracts) 467
- 421 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha, 29 June 1977 (Extract) 469
- 422 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1976-77, June 1977 (Extract) 469
- 423 "Superpowers' economic expansion in India," article by Chih Shi-ya in *Peking Review*, 1 July 1977 (Extracts) 470
- 424 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's interview with Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 21 July 1977 (Extract) 473
- 425 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's message to Neelam Sanjiva Reddy congratulating him on his assumption of the office of President of India, 27 July 1977 473
- 426 Chinese protest to India for extending support to Dalai Lama, 4 August 1977 (summary) 473
- 427 Vajpayee's statement to the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, 30 September 1977 (Extract) 474
- 428 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's message to Indian Prime Minister Desai expressing sympathy over India's suffering from cyclone in its southern coasts, 4 December 1977 474
- 429 President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy's address to Parliament, 20 February 1978 (Extract) 474
- 430 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's report at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, 26 February 1978 (Extract) 475
- 431 Vice President B.D. Jatti's speech at the luncheon given in honour of Wang Pin-nan, President of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 13 March 1978 (Extract) 475
- 432 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's statement in Lok Sabha on Chinese delegation's visit to India, 16 March 1978 476
- 433 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1977-78, March-April 1978 (Extract) 477
- 434 Inaugural address by Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the seminar held by the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 13 May 1978 (Extract) 478
- 435 Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha on reported construction of Karakoram Highway, 21 July 1978 479
- 436 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's interview on his forthcoming China visit, 22 July 1978 (Extracts) 481

437	A.B. Vajpayee's interview with Japanese correspondents in New Delhi, 13 August 1978 (Extracts)	481
438	Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha on his visit to Japan, 22 August 1978 (Extracts)	482
439	<i>Peking Review</i> commentary on Soviet attempts to harm Sino-Indian relations, 6 October 1978	482
440	Prime Minister Morarji Desai's news conference at Ahmedabad, 23 October 1978 (Extracts)	483
441	Indian notification on import and export trade with Tibet Region of China, 7 November 1978	484
442	Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha on Sino-Indian relations, 23 November 1978 (Extract)	484
443	Premier Hua Guofeng's message to Prime Minister Morarji Desai on India's Republic Day, 26 January 1979	485
444	Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's interview with PTI correspondent, 11 February 1979 (Extracts)	485
445	Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement on his arrival at Beijing airport, 12 February 1979 (Extract)	487
446	Statement by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the banquet given in honour of Vajpayee, 13 February 1979 (Extract)	488
447	Atal Bihari Vajpayee's speech at the banquet, 13 February 1979 (Extracts)	489
448	Statement by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping at a press interview with Indian journalists, 14 February 1979 (Extract)	496
449	Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's statement at a meeting with Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee, 14 February 1979 (Extracts)	497
450	Xinhua report on Sino-Indian talks, 15 February 1979	497
451	Premier Hua Guofeng's statement at a meeting with Foreign Minister Vajpayee, 15 February 1979 (Extracts)	498
452	A.B. Vajpayee's speech at the return banquet given by him in honour of Huang Hua in Peking, 15 February 1979 (Extracts)	498
453	Huang Hua's speech at the banquet, 15 February 1979 (Extracts)	499
454	Statement on Sino-Vietnamese conflict issued by Indian Prime Minister's Office, 18 February 1979	500
455	President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy's address before Parliament, 19 February 1979 (Extract)	500

- 456 Xinhua correspondent Zhou Cipu's commentary on Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visit to China, 19 February 1979 500
- 457 Foreign Minister Vajpayee's statement in Rajya Sabha on reported attack by China on Vietnam, 20 February 1979 504
- 458 Foreign Minister Vajpayee's statement in Parliament on his visit to China, 21 February 1979 506
- 459 *Beijing Review* report on increases in India's industrial and agricultural production, 23 February 1979 513
- 460 Statement by Indian representative Jaipal in the UN Security Council on Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 24 February 1979 513
- 461 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's television interview on Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 27 February 1979 (summary) 517
- 462 Chinese Ambassador's representation to India's External Affairs Ministry on Soviet Premier Kosygin's attack on China during his stay in India, 13 March 1979 517
- 463 Indo-Soviet joint communique, 15 March 1979 (Extract) 518
- 464 Vajpayee's statement at a New Delhi television interview, 16 March 1979 (Extracts) 518
- 465 Vajpayee's interview with Kewal Varma, correspondent of *Sunday* (Calcutta), 18 March 1979 (Extracts) 519
- 466 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1978-79, 21 March 1979 (Extracts) 523
- 467 Statement by Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee at the opening of the National Seminars on Contemporary China and Japan organized by the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, University of Delhi, April 1979 (Extracts) 524
- 468 Vice-Foreign Minister He Ying's interview with S. Nihal Singh, correspondent of *The Statesman*, 6 April 1979 (Extracts) 524
- 469 *Beijing Review* report on Communist Party of India (M-L) protest against Soviet support for Vietnamese aggression, 6 April 1979 525
- 470 Statement by Chinese Ambassador Chen Zhao-yuan at the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, New Delhi, 12 April 1979 (Extracts) 526
- 471 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's interview to the London business monthly, *Director*, May 1979 (Extracts) 527
- 472 "India Press exposes Soviet exploitation of India," commentary in *Beijing Review*, 15 June 1979 (Extracts) 527



473 Premier Hua Guofeng's message of greeting to Charan Singh on his assumption of the office of Prime Minister of India, 31 July 1979	528
474 "India: political unrest," <i>Beijing Review</i> commentary, 3 August 1979 (Extracts)	528
475 "India: unstable political situation," <i>Beijing Review</i> commentary, 21 September 1979 (Extracts)	529
476 Premier Hua Guofeng's message of greetings to Mrs. Indira Gandhi on her assumption of the office of Prime Minister of India, 15 January 1980	529
477 Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's statement in Rajya Sabha on the supply of arms aid to Pakistan by the United States and China in the wake of Russian intervention in Afghanistan, 24 January 1980 (Extract)	530
478 Speech by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the Indian Embassy reception on India's Independence Day, 26 January 1980 (Extracts)	530
479 Speech by India's <i>Charge d'Affaires</i> , Ranjit Sethi, at the reception, 26 January 1980 (Extracts)	531
480 Xinhua commentary on Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko visit to India, 14 February 1980 (Extracts)	531
481 Another Xinhua commentary on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to India, 16 February 1980	532
482 "India-Pakistan talks: mutual understanding of great significance," article by <i>People's Daily</i> commentator, February 1980	533
483 Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao's answers to questions in Rajya Sabha, 21 March 1980 (Extracts)	535
484 Chinese Ambassador Shen Jian's speech at a reception given in his honour by the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, New Delhi, 15 April 1980 (Extracts)	536
485 Press release on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's meeting with Chairman Hua Guofeng issued in New Delhi, 9 May 1980	536
486 Speech by Chinese Ambassador Shen Jian at a reception given by India-China Friendship Association in New Delhi, 17 May 1980 (Extracts)	537
487 Statement by Shankar Bajpai, Ambassador-designate to China, at a news conference, 30 May 1980 (Extracts)	537
488 Speech by Ji Xianlin, Vice-President of Beijing University and a noted historian, at a seminar on South Asian studies in Beijing, 12 June 1980 (Extracts)	538
489 Interview of Wang Bing Nan, President of the Association of Chinese People's Friendship with Foreign	

- Countries, to Krishan Kumar, editor of New Delhi's defence journal *Vikrant*, 19 June 1980 (Extracts) 539
- 490 Speech by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Han Nianlong, at the banquet given in honour of Eric Gonsalves, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 20 June 1980 (Extracts) 541
- 491 Eric Gonsalves' speech at the banquet, 20 June 1980 (summary) 541
- 492 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's interview with Krishan Kumar, editor of New Delhi's defence journal *Vikrant*, 21 June 1980 (Extracts) 542
- 493 Xinhua report on Vice Premier Ji Pengfei's meeting with Eric Gonsalves, Secretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 23 June 1980 544
- 494 Commentary by Xinhua correspondent Zhou Cipu on Sino-Indian relations, 24 June 1980 544
- 495 Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong's interview with *Sun*, 24 June 1980 547
- 496 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1979-80, June 1980 (Extracts) 547
- 497 Statement by Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha on China's initiative, 2 July 1980 549
- 498 Statement of the Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on India's recognition of Heng Samrin regime of Kampuchea, 9 July 1980 550
- 499 *People's Daily* commentary on India's decision to recognize Heng Samrin regime, 9 July 1980 550
- 500 Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao's answer to a question on Tibet in Lok Sabha, 17 July 1980 551
- 501 Statement by Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha, 17 July 1980 (Extract) 552
- 502 Statement by Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha, 31 July 1980 552
- 503 Statement by the Spokesman of India's Ministry of External Affairs on the postponement of Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to India, 6 August 1980 553
- 504 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's reply to a question in Rajya Sabha, 7 August 1980 (Extract) 554
- 505 Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's statement in Rajya Sabha on postponement of Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to India, 7 August 1980 (Extracts) 555
- 506 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's message to Zhao Ziyang on his assuming the office of Prime Minister of China, 14 September 1980 555

507	Interview of Tan Zhen-lin, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, to the United News of India (UNI), 18 October 1980 (Extracts)	556
508	Vice-Foreign Minister Han Nianlong's interview with Press Trust of India, 14 November 1980 (Extracts)	556
	Sources of Documents	557
	Appendices	575
	Index	587



# List of Appendices

1 Exchange of Visits between China and India, 1949-1980	577
2 Agreements Signed between China and India, 1951-1980	584
3 China Trade with India, 1947 to 1978-79	586



# Preface

This is a documentary study designed as a complementary volume to a similar study entitled *Soviet-South Asian Relations, 1947-1978* published in 1978. A third study, *US-South Asian Relations, 1947-1981*, is scheduled for publication in 1982. The three together constitute a trilogy on Great Power involvement in South Asia.

As an immediate neighbour of South Asia China has taken considerable interest in the region since 1949 for political, security, and economic reasons. Initially the objective of China was to forestall Western, primarily American, attempts to encircle it by means of a series of military bases on its periphery. In the 1960s China sought through diplomacy to eliminate the influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Subsequently, as its differences with the Soviet Union widened beyond all possibility of a *rapprochement*, it concentrated on neutralizing Soviet moves in the region, particularly in India. It focussed its efforts primarily on Pakistan. It developed wide-ranging relations—economic, political, and military—with Pakistan and sought to cultivate close political and economic relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh as well. The idea was not only to offset close Indo-Soviet ties but also to reduce Indian influence and undermine the Indian position in the region.

However, since the late 1970s, in view of the increasing Soviet threat to its security, China has sought to improve relations with India. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (December 1979) has further heightened its interest in cultivating friendly relations with the countries of South Asia.

The study deals with the political, economic, and military facets of China's relations with South Asia—India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. It contains 973 basic documents from Chinese official sources, available in both

English and Chinese, as well as important statements by Government leaders of the countries of South Asia bearing on their attitudes towards China. A few of the documents are translations from the Chinese language. The study provides the full texts of all important trade, economic, and cultural agreements and joint communiques. In the case of other documents it presents only the essential and significant portions and severely excludes all undue repetitions and digressions. It also includes statements and interviews by Government dignitaries, and significant articles, editorials, and commentaries published in the Chinese Press. Besides, it contains a judicious selection from the authentic source material available in the publications of the countries of South Asia and in those of the United Nations.

As regards the Sino-Indian border question, the study has had to be very selective in view of the enormity of the mass of published material. The Government of India has, for instance, brought out as many as fourteen White Papers, and Government spokesmen have made numerous statements in the Indian Parliament. The Chinese side too has come out with long and repetitive articles and commentaries in support of its stand. The study, therefore, provides only those portions which are important on account of their obvious bearing on the political relations between the two countries, and which help in understanding the basic issues involved. In the case of the bulky report of Indian and Chinese officials, only the summaries of the views of the two Governments are given.

Collection of data for the appendices included in the study has by no means been an easy task. The lists of bilateral visits (political, economic, cultural, and military) and agreements and the data on economic aid, trade, loans and credits, and arms supplies owe their present form to a determined scouring of diverse sources, including Chinese periodicals, magazines, and books and the newspapers and journals of the various South Asian countries, as also the reports of the Governmental Departments, Ministries, and agencies concerned. The correctness of the details has been ensured by carefully cross-checking them with those appearing in official sources, and only those considered wholly reliable have been retained. Every care has been taken to ensure that the picture presented in the study is



as authentic and complete as possible in the circumstances. It is hoped that the appendices would prove to be of immense use to the researcher.

The study seeks to make accessible under one cover information that is otherwise to be had in widely scattered sources and by no means easy to come by. The most comprehensive of its kind so far, it should constitute an extremely useful reference work of permanent value to all scholars and students of political science and international politics, contemporary China, Chinese foreign policy, and South Asian studies.

21 December 1980

R.K. JAIN

# Pinyin equivalents of Chinese names

From the beginning of 1979 the Chinese State Council decided to go over wholly to the pinyin method of 'romanising' Chinese characters. Pinyin equivalents have, therefore, been used in documents after 1979.

Chang Chun-chiao  
Chang Tsai-chien  
Chao Tzu-yang  
Chi Peng-fei  
Chiang Ching  
Chiang Kai-shek  
Chiao Kuan-hua  
Chou En-lai  
Chungking  
Han Nien-lung  
Hsinhua  
Hua Kuo-feng  
Kao Kang  
Kuomintang  
Li Hsien-nien  
Lin Piao  
Liu Shao-chi  
Mao Tse-tung  
Peking  
Teng Hsiao-ping  
Wang Hung-wen  
Yeh Chien-ying

Zhang Chunqiao  
Zhang Caiqian  
Zhao Ziyang  
Ji Pengfei  
Jiang Qing  
Jiang Jieshi  
Jiao Guanhua  
Zhou Enlai  
Chongqing  
Han Nianlong  
Xinhua  
Hua Guofeng  
Gao Gang  
Guomindang  
Li Xiannian  
Lin Biao  
Liu Shaoqi  
Mao Zedong  
Beijing  
Deng Xiaoping  
Wang Hongwen  
Ye Jianying

# India, 1947-1980



**1 Radio broadcast of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim National Government of India, 7 September 1946 (Extract)**

China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour, has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure and grow. We earnestly hope that her present troubles will end soon and a united and democratic China will emerge playing a great part in the furtherance of world peace and progress.

**2 "Internationalism and nationalism," article by Liu Shao-chi, November 1948 (Extracts)**

In such colonial and semi-colonial countries as China, India, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Viet-Nam, Burma, Egypt, etc., bourgeois nationalism inevitably developed. This was because the national bourgeoisie in these countries has interests antagonistic in the first place to those of imperialism, and in the second place to those of the domestic backward feudal forces. Moreover, these feudal forces unite with imperialism in restricting and hampering the development of the national bourgeoisie. Therefore, the national bourgeoisie in these countries is revolutionary in a certain historical period and to a certain degree. . . .

Therefore, the proletariat, with the aim of overthrowing the rule of the imperialism and the feudal forces, should collaborate with this bourgeois nationalism which plays a definitely anti-imperialist and anti-feudal role provided, as Lenin said, that these allies do not hinder us in educating and organising the peasantry and the broad masses of the exploited people in a revolutionary spirit. . . .

Of course, the communists in colonial and semi-colonial countries such as India, Burma, Siam, the Philippines, Indonesia Indo-China, South Korea, etc., must for the sake of their national interests. . . adopt a firm and irreconcilable policy against national betrayal by the reactionary section of the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, which has already surrendered to imperialism. If this were not done, it would be a grave mistake.

On the other hand, the Communists in these countries should enter into an anti-imperialist alliance with that section of the national bourgeoisie which is still opposing imperialism and which does not oppose the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses of the people. Should the Communists fail to do so in earnest, should they to the contrary, oppose or reject such an alliance, it would also constitute a grave mistake. Such an alliance must be established in all sincerity even if it should be of an unreliable, temporary and unstable nature.

**3 Annual report of India's Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations for the year 1948-49, 24 February 1949 (Extract)**

We have an Embassy in Nanking and Consulates General in Shanghai and Kashgar. This Embassy has done a great deal to promote the age-old friendship between India and China.

Arrangements have been made in cooperation with other diplomatic representatives to protect Indians in different cities during the current hostilities. At the end of the World War we were faced with a major problem in China; Indians in the employment of the Shanghai Municipal Council as guards and menials were thrown out of employment when the Municipal Council was taken over by the Chinese. Most of them were destitute. At our instance a large number of them were repatriated to India. Their claims on the Shanghai Municipal Council have not yet been met but efforts to reach an early settlement continue. A Sino-Indian Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation is under consideration. Pending conclusion of a Sino-Indian Air Agreement temporary authorisation has been given for a Chinese Service to India for a limited period.

*Sinkiang (China)*: On the 21st of December 1948, an Indian Consulate-General was, for the first time, established at Kashgar. It is our main window into Central Asia. Moreover there are colonies of Indian residents in all the oases of Southern Sinkiang. Some time ago lands belonging to the Indian merchants were unjustly confiscated by the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang. We have asked for the restoration of these confiscated lands, or for the payment of compensation.

**4 Peking Radio broadcast, 1 July 1949**

Instead of leading its countrymen to struggle for national liberation and free the people as early as possible from the colonial yoke of slavery, the Indian Government cold-bloodedly murdered the people fighting for real national independence and better living conditions and mercilessly repressed democratic movements. Indian women were not spared from these outrages. Such actions of the Indian Government are really the acts of an accomplice of British and American imperialism.

**5 Article by Yang Kang in *World Culture*, 1949 (Extract)**

Anglo-American rivalry for India is an old story. This struggle has been carried to great limits recently with America's attempts to win India's goodwill by all possible means. Nehru is now placed between great powers. He has attended the British Commonwealth Conference and agreed to suspend purchases from the US, his sister is making frantic appeals for American aid. This is one of the reasons why the US is proceeding with the Pacific Union without much regard to the susceptibilities of Britain.

**6 Article by Chang Chi-cheng in *World Culture*, 19 August 1949 (Extract)**

Because the people's revolution in China is about to achieve complete victory, the struggle against imperialism on the part of peoples of Indonesia and other oppressed nations in south-east Asia will be encouraged. The imperialists consider it necessary, therefore, to construct in advance a dyke against this surging force. And this dyke is to consist of support for 'nationalism' against 'Communism.' In India it is support for Nehru. And in Indonesia it is the putting up of this 'Indonesian nationalism' represented by the Soekarno-Hatta regime for the annihilation of the real people's revolutionary forces of Indonesia.

**7 Peking Radio broadcast, 2 September 1949 (Extract)**

On July 8 the Tibetan local authorities expelled the Han people

and KMT (Kuomintang) personnel in Tibet under the instigation of British and American imperialism and their stooge, the Indian Nehru Government.

The purpose of this 'anti-communist incident' enacted by British, American and Indian reactionaries working hand in glove with the Tibetan reactionary authorities is an attempt not only to prevent the Tibetan people from attaining liberation at a time when the People's Liberation Army is about to liberate all China, but also to deprive Tibet of independence and freedom. . . .

**8 Article by Hu Chin in *World Culture*, 9 September 1949  
(Extract)**

Following the second world war, American imperialism, in the wake of its operations for the seizure of markets in the Far East (including India), began to participate in aggression against Tibet. American imperialism sent spies to Tibet and attempted through the hands of the higher strata of the country, to assume actual control of Tibet. Today, British imperialism has become a hireling of American imperialism, and India is in effect in the control of American imperialism. These two powers have now joined their forces in their efforts to oppose, impede and sabotage the over-all liberation of the Chinese people. . . .

British imperialism, and its running dog India, through their officially controlled publications, have declared in unison that Tibet never acknowledged China's suzerainty over it, and that Britain never acknowledged China's claim that Tibet is a part of China.

**9 "The Nehru Government cannot explain away the plot to annex Tibet," article by Chinese Jurist Ho Hsu-ching in *Peoples Daily* as broadcast by Peking Radio, 13 September 1949 (Extracts)**

The Nehru Government spokesman claims that the Chinese Communist Party had no grounds for accusing the British and American imperialists of plotting with their lackey, the Indian Government, to encroach on Tibet. The accusation of the Chinese Communist Party is based on the following facts:



“The expelling of the Han people and Han Lamas, and the closing down of Han schools by Tibetan authorities on July 8, lays bare an international plot. On July 27 the official news agency of the Nehru Government announced that Tibet had never recognised Chinese suzerainty. On the same day, British authoritative circles told the United Press that if China attempted to force her rule on Tibet, Tibet could seek British intervention.

“It was certainly not without reason that the official news agency of the Nehru Government announced on July 27 that Tibet had never recognised Chinese suzerainty. Following this argument, suzerainty over Tibet should logically fall into the pocket of the Nehru Government.

“The Nehru Government cannot deny that it has sent men to Lhasa. The *New York Times* reported from New Delhi on August 8 that the spokesman of the Indian Foreign Ministry announced that night that Bhutan had become a protectorate of India. Since the Nehru Government has announced its suzerainty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognised Chinese suzerainty, will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet?

“Suzerainty stands for the dark vassal state system, the protective system, and is another name for foreign oppression and enslavement. . . . The Nehru Government has no legal right to announce its protectorate over Bhutan. The United Nations should examine the matter. . . .

“Nehru and company are openly engineering a cleavage between the different peoples in China, undermining their unity, and interfering in China’s internal affairs by declaring in the name of a foreign country that Tibet has never recognised Chinese suzerainty. This is a grave unlawful act. . . .”

#### 10 “India and Anglo-American imperialism,” article in *World Culture*, 16 September 1949 (Extracts)

The fact that the Anglo-American imperialist designs for the annexation of Tibet are being carried out through the hands of Nehru, of India, is specially of great educational significance to the peoples of China and of Southeast Asia.

“The India, of Nehru, attained ‘dominion status’ only two years ago, and is not even formally independent, in the fullest

sense of the word. But Nehru, riding behind the imperialists whose stooge he is, actually considers himself the leader of the Asian peoples. Into his slavish and bourgeois reactionary character has now been instilled the beastly ambition for aggression, and he thinks that his role as a hireling of imperialism makes him an imperialist himself. He has announced that Bhutan is an Indian protectorate, and now proceeds to declare that 'Tibet has never acknowledged China's suzerainty' in order to carry out his plot to create incidents in Tibet.

"Under the long standing influence of British imperialism, the bourgeoisie of India, of whom Nehru is the representative, have learned the ways of the imperialists, and are harbouring intentions against Tibet and Sikkim as well as Bhutan. Furthermore Nehru, to curry favours with his masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, is placing himself fully at their disposal, and shamelessly holds himself as the pillar of the anti-communist movement in Asia." . . .

As a rebel against the movement for national independence, as a blackguard, who undermines the progress of the people's liberation movement, and as a loyal slave of imperialism, Nehru has already been made the substitute of Chiang Kai-shek by the imperialists. . . .

"Nehru's betrayal of the national independence movement and of the people's liberation movement, like that of Chiang Kai-shek who preceded him, once more testifies to the truth of Lenin's analysis of the various classes. Lenin said: 'The bourgeoisie are never stable in their support of the revolution, being selfish and cowardly. As a group, the bourgeoisie cannot avoid turning away from revolution to counter-revolution, to dictatorship.' Nehru has set his heart wholly on following in the footsteps of Anglo-American imperialism, and is pursuing a domestic and foreign policy, which betrays his country, and undermines the interest of his people. It is no different from the policy pursued by Chiang Kai-shek for 20 odd years. . . .

In his assumption of the role of the vanguard in the international gamble against the peoples of Asia, Nehru has committed a series of malicious intrigues, all following the victorious march of the liberation movement of the Chinese people. As early as in the days prior to India's 'independence,' Nehru had called a Pan-Asian conference. In 1948, when Chang Chun

visited Japan and the talk of a Pacific Union was in the air, India and other British Dominions also stirred up the so-called South-East Asian Union in support of the move of Chang Chun. . . . Early in 1949, Nehru called another Asian conference in New Delhi, outwardly with the motive of mediating in the Indonesian dispute, but actually for undertaking a preliminary discussion of south-east Asian alliance. On February 28, 1949, Nehru, nominally to mediate in the Burmese civil war, called a conference of the British Dominions, the real purpose of which was to discuss the strengthening of measures for the anti-Communist alliance in south-east Asia. In March 1949, Anthony Eden, Conservative British leader, under the supervision of the head of the Asiatic Affairs Section of the US State Department, called a secret meeting in New Delhi to discuss the 'propaganda' activities of Anglo-American imperialism against the peoples of Asia. And so on up to the recent act of Nehru in serving as the hireling of Anglo-American imperialism in the attempt to invade Tibet, New Delhi has consistently served as the centre of imperialist intrigues for the obstruction and undermining of the people's liberation movements of Asia. The spearheads of these malicious intrigues are directed against the great struggle put up by the peoples of China, Viet Nam, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. . . .

"The decadence of Nehru proves that nationalism he blabs about is only the nationalism of the bourgeoisie, and it does not even go so far as the nationalism of the bourgeoisie of the West in the early days of the capitalist revolution. This is because this nationalism of Nehru cannot even achieve complete national independence, and sells itself to imperialism as soon as it is given a little concession by the latter.

"Only the Communist Party and the proletariat and peasantry under its leadership will fight to the last. Only then will complete independence and liberation be achieved and the nation delivered from feudalism and imperialism. The victory of the Chinese people has brought dawn to the oppressed peoples of Asia and sealed the fate of Nehru and betrayers of his ilk. The Chiang Kai-sheks of India, Burma, Indonesia and others of their ilk must march on the same road to death as Chiang Kai-shek himself has already done."

**11 “An exposure of imperialist intrigues for aggression in Tibet,” article in *New Construction* (Shanghai), 22 September 1949 (Extract)**

Their [Britain and America] thoughts now turn to Nehru, of India. They hope to use India as their Asian base to resist the new democracies of Asia. Tibet is the natural barrier to India. They have earmarked Tibet, like Taiwan, as part of their defence system. To preserve their rule over India, they must control Tibet. This is the real purpose of imperialism.

**12 Mao Tse-tung’s message to the Communist Party of India, 19 October 1949**

I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and People’s Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind.

**13 Memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Nehru and US Ambassadors Warren R. Austin and Philip C. Jessup of the US delegation at the United Nations, 19 October 1949 (Extracts)**

The Prime Minister said . . . the situation in China did not represent a real danger to India in the sense of external aggression which India was already strong enough to withstand but was a danger in the degree to which Communist victories in neighbouring countries encouraged the Communists in India and led others to believe in the possibility of their success . . .

It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that the objective should be to divert the Communists away from Moscow leadership as quickly as possible . . . it was Nehru’s belief that Russia in any event could not long dominate China and that a situation “stronger than a Titoism” would grow up.

**14 “American imperialism lays hands on a new slave,” commentary by Ssu Mu in *World Culture* on Nehru’s visit to the United States, 28 October 1949 (Extracts)**

The lavish honors accorded Nehru by the US surpass those extended to Quirino but this is not surprising . . . .

India, where Nehru is ruler, has a population of 340 millions, is rich in resources, and is near the Soviet Union. The man [Nehru] himself is also masquerading as a ‘nationalist’, which places him politically on a higher plane than Quirino.

While Nehru has appealed through the American Congress for aid to India in the form of machinery, technical and economic assistance, India is not without attraction for American business . . .

With the economic crisis growing more imminent in the United States, and with China lost as the hunting ground of American imperialist exploitation because of the victory of the Chinese people, the covetous eyes of Wall Street naturally turn toward India, the country with 470 millions. The *London Daily Telegraph* on September 29 reported that the Americans are planning to invest in Indian railways and other industrial enterprises. In accordance with his plan for assistance to the under-developed nations, Truman is said to be considering assistance to India to facilitate its electrification, and the development of its irrigation systems. It is anticipated that the International Bank, controlled by the United States, which has already lent India US \$34,000,000 to date, will extend further loans of US \$10,000,000 to assist in the agricultural development of that country. The Indian Information Service, on the other hand, reported that new loans from the International Bank might reach the total of US \$37,000,000. There seems no doubt, that Nehru will devour the bait handed out by Truman in his so-called ‘fourth plan’ of helping under-developed countries.”

Truman’s request to both India and Pakistan [in India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir] to abide by the UN Commission’s recommendations was “open interference with Asia’s internal affairs” and that Nehru considered rejecting Trumans’ overtures last August when they were made . . .

The most important objective of Truman’s current summons to Nehru to visit him is the desire to lay hands on a new stooge

to replace Chiang Kai-shek, whose end has already arrived. The victory of the Chinese people can no longer be checked. This victory, moreover, will produce far-reaching repercussions on the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole. In the face of this threat, American imperialism is anxious to seek a comparatively more efficient hireling as the tool to check the daily rising forces for the liberation of the Asian peoples. Since in American eyes it seems bad taste to sponsor Japan who is after all still an enemy, and since Quirino is too incapable to assume the important role expected of such a stooge, Nehru has naturally become the favoured choice . . . .

In his address before the American Congress, Nehru has already openly expressed his willingness to accept the role of Principal Slave of American imperialism in the Far East in the campaign against Communism . . . It is likely that Acheson suggested to Nehru that India not exhibit "undue haste" over the question of recognition of New China.

Of course Nehru has been known to have advised the Americans to adopt a realistic attitude toward New China, but such must be considered only a gesture to raise his own status, and cannot be expected to produce any influence over his present mission to sell out the India nation to American imperialism.

As a result of the many talks between Nehru and Truman and Acheson, certain developments have taken place. "American imperialism has presented him [Nehru] with an effortless gift by making India a member of the UN Security Council. And prior to Nehru's visit to the United States, the Indian delegation to the Far Eastern Commission actually suggested the abrogation of all Japanese indemnity payments. Nehru's allegiance to his new found master, American imperialism, is now beyond doubt. After this audience with the overlord, Nehru's loyalty to the American imperialist cause is all the more consolidated.

Nehru's collusion with American imperialism will only aggravate the conflicts between American and British imperialism, and expose the true face of Nehru himself as a slave of foreign masters. The struggle of the Indian people against imperialism and against despotism will only become all the more strengthened.

**15 Letter of Deputy Premier Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 3 November 1949 (Extracts)**

In China, the resistance of the Nationalists to the progress of Communist armies has been rapidly collapsing. . . . The Communist victories in China are creating another problem. That is the question of the recognition of the new regime and of the repercussions on the constitution of the Security Council . . . Both in regard to China and Indo-China, it is quite clear that India's attitude will have a far-reaching effect on the attitude of other countries. The British and the Americans have already told us so. There is, however, a vital difference between the two countries. In China, we have a regime which seems to have established itself in the public mind. In Indo-China, there is a puppet regime installed against democratic forces.

The situation in Burma continues to be unsatisfactory. There is no sign yet that the civil war is nearing its end or that Government forces are definitely on the top of the insurgents. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth countries have decided to support the present Burmese Government, as no alternative Government capable of restoring law and order is in sight. Talks will shortly open in Rangoon about the grant of financial assistance to the Burmese Government. Our Ambassador will be associated with such talks, but we have already made it clear to the UK Government that our capacity to participate in any loan which may ultimately be decided upon must be strictly limited. There is no evidence yet that the Communist victories in China are influencing the situation in the north of Burma. But such victories will undoubtedly encourage the forces of disorder in neighbouring countries and will encourage subversive elements in fomenting troubles which they can exploit to their political advantage. We have to guard against these forces and have to be more vigilant as the Communist armies in China march down south. Our eyes must, therefore, inevitably rest on our eastern and north-eastern frontiers. We cannot afford to relax in our efforts to seal off those frontiers against suspects and ill-disposed foreigners. Tibet is likely to be another source of anxiety in the coming months. China has never given up its claims of suzerainty over Tibet. Hitherto, however, the preoccupations of the Nationalist forces and the domestic quarrel between the Com-

munist and the Nationalists have prevented any expansion south or westwards into Tibet. With the liquidation of the Nationalists, however, it is more than likely that the Communists will turn their eyes towards Tibet, and try to establish a regime, either Communistic or in sympathy with Communists. In either event, the situation cannot but be a matter of serious concern to us.

**16 Article by Wang Yu in *World Culture*, 2 December 1949  
(Summary)**

It charged that the Government of India “resort to the use of cruel force to suppress, detain and slaughter the peace-loving people as a sign of their practice of democracy.” It described, the Government of India’s desire to abolish landlordism and its claim to have abolished the princely states as fake. . . Under the leadership of the Communist Party of India, the peasants of Hyderabad started an armed revolt, expelled the brutal princes and created a rule by labourers and peasants. More than 2,500 villages were liberated and more than 100,000 *mou* of land were given away to landless peasants. In the area covering 13,000 sq. miles 5,000,000 workers took their fate in their own hands. The Central Government of India, however, despatched a large army to the aid of the former ruler of Hyderabad, in a punitive campaign against the peasants. All terrorist measures are being resorted to for the punishment of those taken prisoners. . . In their efforts to prevent the people from coming into their own, the rulers of India have concentrated their attention on the vanguard of the people—the Communist Party of India. Ever since independence, 25,000 Indian Communists, labour union leaders, workers, warriors and peasants have been added to the prison cells of India.

**17 Letter of Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to Premier Jawaharlal Nehru about recognition of China, 6 December 1949 (Extract)**

It seems your intention is to recognise China soon after the UNO session ends, even if it means that others are not ready by then or are prepared to do so. My own feeling is that we do not stand to gain anything substantial by giving a lead in the matter and that, while recognition must come sooner or later,



if we are somewhat late in the company of others, it would be worthwhile delaying a bit. After all, whether as Members of the Commonwealth or as Members of the UNO, if we can act in mutual concert, it is better to do so than to act alone or even with one or two other powers.

I have seen the Canadian reply to your message. They would also like to wait until the Colombo consultations are over. I feel myself that, if we can do so without sacrificing any essential principle or point of our foreign policy, we might as well do so.

In case, however, you feel that we must recognise China earlier than others, I feel that we might have a discussion in the Cabinet. After all, in such an important matter, it is only fair to our Cabinet colleagues that we take them into confidence.

### **18 Prime Minister Nehru's reply to Patel's letter of 6 December, 6 December 1949**

The UN session ends within a week. There was no intention of recognising the new regime in China immediately after the session. But roughly the date given by us to the Commonwealth Governments has been by Christmas time. You might have noticed that the answers in the House of Commons went a little beyond what I have said. In this matter the UK Government is anxious to recognise China early and even before some of the Commonwealth countries. During all our discussions in London and elsewhere, it was recognised by others that it might be desirable for India to accord recognition earlier than some of the others, but in consultation with them. Our advisers are of opinion that it would be definitely harmful to recognise them after the Commonwealth countries have done so. It would mean that we have no policy of our own, but follow the dictates of other countries. Burma is anxious to recognise and is being held back by us.

Canada entirely agreed with our viewpoint when we discussed it and indeed supported it before the USA. But because of the USA, they felt that they might wait a little, even though the UK might not.

The exact date does not matter. But it is rather important that this should be done before the Colombo Conference. We

are as a matter of fact in continuous consultation with the ambassadors here as well as their respective countries and are acting in concert with most of them and there is no feeling on their part that we are acting independently.

If you like, I shall put it up before the Cabinet. But the date depends on so many factors that it will have to be left open. Most members of the Cabinet have hardly followed these intricate conversations and consultations. But as you are interested, I shall of course consult you before taking any action.

**19 Article by Hu Chin in *World Culture*, 9 December 1949  
(Extract)**

The reactionary Nehru Government naturally follows in the wake of its British masters in the exhibition of anxiety over Tibet . . . “efforts are being made to give great importance to the north and north-east frontiers of India. . . .the fate of the decadent imperialists in Asia can no longer be saved by a handful of quislings like Nehru, Thakin Nu, Bao Dai and Hatta, betrayers of their respective countries. . . in India, the anti-imperialist [Communist] movement continues to gain strength.”. . .

*The Observer* (Shanghai), said on April 11, 1950: “It is on India that America has pinned her real hope. That is why the US is giving priority to India in its Point Four and other schemes of assistance.”

**20 Appeal to women in Asia and elsewhere issued by Asian Women’s Conference held in Peking, 10-16 December 1949  
(Extract)**

Amita Devi, the delegate from India, said the women’s movement there forms a part of the “general struggle of the Indian people for real independence.”. . .

After the war, when “the AIWC, many of whose leaders became ministers, governors and ambassadors in the present satellite government, took a positive stand against the tide of the democratic women’s movement,” women began to leave the organization, and in November 1948, following a visit to India by a WIDF commission, an All-India women’s convention was held in Calcutta under the auspices of the West Bengal Women’s

Self-Defense League and the foundation laid for the formation of a "broad-based All-India women's organization." . . .

"The government of India is actually ruled by the representatives of half a dozen plutocratic families who control between them the greater part of the native industry, banks and newspapers. These men and their gigantic trusts are directly linked up with Anglo-American big business. . .

"This betrayal of the government has resulted in a rapid deterioration in the material condition of the masses. . .

"While the whole of India is faced with famine, 50 per cent of the financial expenditure of the government has been greased to the maintenance of police and military.

"Against these monumental crimes of the Indian government, the people of India have risen. . .

## **21 Press communique on India's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, 30 December 1949**

In October last, the Government of India received a communication from the Foreign Minister to the Government of the People's Republic of China, expressing their desire to enter into diplomatic relations with India on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual interests and mutual respect for sovereign and territorial rights. Having considered this communication and taken note of subsequent developments, the Government of India have intimated to the new Government of China their willingness to establish diplomatic relations with them.

## **22 Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry regarding "Good Will Missions" of Lhasa Authorities, 20 January 1950 (Extracts)**

Tibet is the territory of the People's Republic of China. This is a fact which is known to everybody in the world and which has never been denied by anybody. Since this is the case, the Lhasa authorities, of course, have no right to arbitrarily send out any "mission" and still more, to prove Tibet's "independence".

Since the "independence" of Tibet has to be publicized to the government of the United States, Britain, India and Nepal,

and has to be announced by the United Press of America, it is not difficult to see that, if the content of such news is not a United Press fabrication, it is at most merely a puppet show directed by American imperialism and its accomplices who are invading Tibet. . . .

If . . . the Lhasa authorities send representatives to Peking to negotiate on the question of peaceful settlement of Tibet, then such representatives will be received. If this is not the case, if the Lhasa authorities violate the will of the Tibetan people, if they obey the orders of the imperialist aggressors and send out illegal "missions" to engage in splitting and traitorous activities, then the Central People's Government of China will not tolerate such traitorous actions of the Lhasa authorities. Any country receiving such illegal "missions" will be regarded as harbouring hostile intentions towards the People's Republic of China.

**23 Annual Report of India's Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1949-50, 2 March 1950 (Extract)**

The Government of India accorded *de jure* recognition to the new Government of China on the 30th December 1949 and agreement has been reached with the Chinese People's Government to establish diplomatic relations. Discussions on preliminary and procedural matters, connected with the establishment of diplomatic missions, are now being conducted by the Indian Charge d'Affaires in China with the new Government.

Sinkiang was taken over peacefully by the Central People's Government of China on the 26th September 1949. This has resulted in an influx of about 700 refugees into India. Transit facilities are being afforded to them; and the Indian Red Cross has also given them relief.

**24 Article by the Editorial Board of the *Observer Magazine* (Kwan Cha), 11 April 1950 (Extracts)**

The United States, fearing that the emergence of the new China will lead to similar movements elsewhere in Asia, is planning to establish an "anti-Communist zone for the encirclement and blockade of China". . . .

The zone will extend from the Aleutian Islands to India, covering South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, The Philippines, Indo-China, Siam, Indonesia and Burma.

America's hostility to new China "was most concretely expressed in the 'recognition' issue" when it attempted to line up Britain and France in a common front to "boycott the Chinese people." This plan failed because Britain's trade interests and India's adjacent geographical position led those countries to early recognition of the new government. More recently, the US again "manifested her hostility" over the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. . . .

In the southern Pacific, a "Southeast Asia Alliance" is in the making which will be under the "nominal leadership of India, outwardly British, but actually loyal to America." While the British countries are somewhat cool to this scheme, "the American dollar is expected finally to work the trick" through military aid and Point Four Program assistance to the countries in Southeast Asia. . . .

### **25 Peking Radio broadcast, 13 May 1950 (Extract)**

The American Government and the reactionary clique of the Indian Government are now conspiring an imperialistic expansion into a territory under the authority of the Chinese Government—namely, the Province of Tibet.

According to a despatch from New Delhi, the American Ambassador to New Delhi, Mr Loy Henderson, has reached an agreement with the Indian Government. They agreed that the US Government would send weapons such as rifles, machine guns, and so forth, to Calcutta. From Calcutta the weapons would be carried into Tibet over the mountain roads.

The agreement also says that the weapons and other war materials from the US Government will be exempted from inspections inside Indian territory. The weapons will be entrusted to an American mission which is fully equipped.

These American imperialists and their fellow conspirators are attempting to prevent the peoples' forces from liberating Tibet and to convert the territory into a colonial domain.

**26 "The Constitutions of India and China," Article by Mervyn Jones in *Eastern World* reprinted in *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), 1 July 1950 (Extracts)**

Shanghai Editors Note: A comparison of the two (constitutions) indicates that the Chinese Common Program, with its concern over social and economic rights, will hold more appeal for the rest of Asia.

The emergence of independent India and of Communist China are obviously the foremost events of our decade in Asia, and some would say in the world. But our comparison (of the two constitutions) is apt and instructive in another sense. The Indian constitution, phrase and spirit, is the latest of that long line of documents which stem from the Philadelphia of 1776, which emphasize individual liberty at the expense of social welfare and neat, stable government at the expense of dynamic change. The Chinese Common Program, though it has specifically Chinese features, is the most important derivative of the Constitution of the USSR. So these sober articles are weapons in the dramatic conflict for the soul of Asia. On one side stand the ideas of Rousseau and Washington which Pandit Nehru learned at Harrow, on the other the ideas of Marx and Lenin which Mao Tse-tung meditated and adopted in the years of preparation at Yen-an.

**27 Statement by Indian representative B.N. Rau in the UN General Assembly, 19 September 1950 (Extracts)**

My delegation has given notice of a draft resolution, copies of which have, I believe, already been circulated to all members of the United Nations. The draft resolution [A/1365] reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Noting that the Republic of China is a Member of the United Nations and of various organs thereof,

"Considering that the obligations of a member under the Charter of the United Nations can not be carried out except by a Government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, actually exercises control over the territory of that Member and commands the obedience of its people.

"Recognizing that the Central Government of the People's

Republic of China is the only such government functioning in the Republic of China as now constituted.

“Decides that the aforesaid Central Government through its Head, or its Minister for Foreign Affairs, or its accredited representatives as the case may be, shall be entitled to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly and

“Recommends that the other organs of the United Nations adopt similar resolutions.”

I am well aware that it is unusual, not to say unprecedented, for the General Assembly to deal with a resolution at so early stage, but the circumstances are also unprecedented.

I understand that two sets of credentials have been received from two different authorities in respect of the Republic of China. . .

Which of two governments claiming to represent the Republic of China is the government entitled to issue credentials? This is a question which has been engaging the attention of various organs of the United Nations for the last eight or nine months without receiving a final answer, and it is not to be expected that the Credentials Committee would be able to answer it. In all probability the Credentials Committee would report that this important and difficult question had arisen and then leave it to the General Assembly to decide under rule 29 of our rules of procedure. . .

The question is one relating to credentials—that is to say, whether the credentials emanate from the proper sources, from the right government—and should therefore, be disposed of without delay. In the view to my delegation it should be dealt with as early as possible and a decision arrived at while the atmosphere of the General Assembly is calm and the temperature not too high.

## **28 Another statement by Indian representative B.N. Rau in the General Assembly, 19 September 1950 (Extracts)**

India recognized the new Central People's Government of China towards the end of last year and, ever since then, it has consistently followed the logical consequences of that recognition. . . Our advocacy of the claims of new China to be represented in the United Nations and its organs began a long time

ago, began before the present Korean conflict and is in no way connected with it.

Why did we recognise the new Government of China ? For a variety of reasons, the main reason being that, according to the best of our knowledge and information, it is a sound and stable government. . .

The Republic of China is a Member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council, and as such that Republic has a number of obligations laid upon it by the Charter of the United Nations. Who is to fulfil them? A State cannot fulfil obligations except through some government, and obviously only a government exercising effective control over the territory and the people of the Republic of China can fulfil the obligation laid upon the Republic of China. That seems to us to be self-evident and, so far as India is aware, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China is the only government that exercises this control. Therefore, that is the government that can discharge China's duties and obligations under the Charter.

But how can we require the fulfilment of these obligations and yet deny that government its rights under the Charter, one of which is the right to be represented in the United Nations? To deny rights and, in the same breath, to insist on obligations is clearly illogical and inconsistent.

The question is sometimes asked how can we possibly seat here the representative of a puppet communist government? There is a double fallacy here. According to our information, and we have quite good sources of information so far as the new Government of China is concerned, that government is a national coalition representing all sections of the nation, including some members of the Kuomintang, pledged to work a common programme of democratic advance. In our view, it is an independent government. . .

Let us assume that the new Government of China is a communist government. Surely, the United Nations is a world organization to which there is room for different systems of government, with different policies and ideals. The United Nations was not intended to be a group of nations all thinking one way and excluding everybody else. So long as a nation of 475 million people remains outside a world organization that orga-



nization cannot be regarded as fully representative.

India has historical and almost immemorial ties of culture and friendship with China. For us, situated as we are and where we are, the friendship of China is desirable and natural. We wish to do everything possible to promote the friendly relations that now prevail between us, because we feel that a free and independent China marching with India will be the most effective stabilizing factor in Asia.

It is for these reasons that I commend my draft resolution to the favourable consideration of the General Assembly.

**29 Announcement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry regarding UN General Assembly's refusal to allow the Chinese delegate to join the General Assembly, 25 September 1950 (Extracts)**

The Chinese people warmly welcome the efforts made by Indian and Russian delegates at the U.N. General Assembly. The proposal by Indian and Russian delegates at the U.N. General Assembly is completely right and legal. U.N. General Assembly objection to the proposal by Indian and Russian delegates refusing our delegate to join U.N. and other organisations belonging to U.N. is completely without reason and completely illegal. Chinese people cannot accept this resolution which has destroyed the U.N. Charter . . .

At the same time we point out some countries have announced their willingness to establish diplomatic relations with China—although they have supported the Indian proposal to invite the Chinese delegation to join the United Nations, but they refused to support the Russian proposal to expel the illegal “delegate” of Kuomintang reactionary remnant group. The Chinese people continuously and closely watch these countries attitude in the United Nations for the contradictory attitude in words and deeds.

**30 Indian memorandum to China on the question of Tibet, 21 October 1950**

The Central People's Government are fully aware of the views of the Government of India on the adjustment of Sino-Tibetan

relations. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat that their interest is solely in a peaceful settlement of the issue. My Government are also aware that the Central People's Government have been following a policy of negotiations with the Tibetan authorities. It has, however, been reported that some military action has taken place or is about to take place, which may affect the peaceful outcome of these negotiations.

The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs. The Central People's Government must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering round to the admission of China into that organisation before the close of the present session. The Government of India feel that military action on the eve of a decision by the Assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations and the Security Council.

At the present time when international situation is so delicate, any move that is likely to be interpreted as a disturbance of peace may prejudice the position of China in the eyes of the world. The Government of India's firm conviction is that one of the principal conditions for the restoration of a peaceful atmosphere is the recognition of the position of the People's Republic of China, and its association with the work of the United Nations. They feel that an incautious move at the present time, even in a matter which is within its own sphere, will be used by those who are unfriendly to China to prejudice China's case in the United Nations and generally before neutral opinion. The Government of India attach the highest importance to the earliest settlement of the problem of Chinese representation in international organization and have been doing everything in their power to bring it to a successful conclusion. They are convinced that the position of China will be weakened if through military action in Tibet those who are opposed to China's admission are now given a chance to misrepresent China's peaceful aims.

The Government of India feel that the time factor is

extremely important. In Tibet there is not likely to be any serious military opposition, and any delay in settling the matter will not, therefore, affect Chinese interests or a suitable final solution. The Government of India's interest in this matter is, as we have explained before, only to see that the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations is not again postponed due to causes which could be avoided and further that, if possible, a peaceful solution is followed where military action may cause unrest and disturbance on her own borders.

**31 Indian note to China on the question of Tibet, 28 October 1950**

We have seen with great regret reports in newspapers of official statement made in Peking to the effect that "People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet". We have received no, repeat no, intimation of it from your Ambassador here or from our Ambassador in Peking. We have been repeatedly assured of the desire of the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. In the interview which India's Ambassador had recently with the Vice-Foreign Minister, the latter while reiterating the resolve of the Chinese Government to "liberate" Tibet had expressed continued desire to do so by peaceful means. We informed the Chinese Government through our Ambassador of the Decision of the Tibetan Delegation to proceed to Peking immediately to start negotiations. This Delegation actually left Delhi yesterday (25th). In view of these facts, the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable. We realise there has been delay in Tibetan Delegation proceeding to Peking. This delay was caused in the first instance by inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong, for which the Delegation was in no way responsible. Subsequently, the Delegation came back to Delhi because of the wishes of the Chinese Government that preliminary negotiations should first be conducted in Delhi, with the Chinese Ambassador. Owing to lack of knowledge on the part of the Tibetan Delegation of dealing with other countries and the necessity of obtaining instructions from their government, who in turn had to consult their assemblies, certainly further delay took place. The Govern-

ment of India do not believe any foreign influence hostile to China has been responsible for the delay in the Delegation's departure.

Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there will naturally be fear on part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and, in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interests of China or of peace. The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of the friendly and disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problems of their relations with Tibet by force instead of by the slower and more enduring methods of peaceful approach.

### **32 Chinese reply to the memorandum and note of India on the question of Tibet, 30 October 1950**

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear: Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory, the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government. The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed the hope that the problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations, and it welcomes, therefore, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations. Yet the Tibetan Delegation, under outside instigation has intentionally delayed the date of its departure to Peking. The Central People's Government, however, has not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peaceful negotiations, and whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated.

In particular, the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilize as an excuse the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory Tibet, and threatens to obstruct the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations organisation, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries towards China.

Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence expresses its deep regret.

### **33 Indian note to China on the question of Tibet, 1 November 1950**

The Government of India have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese Government's reply that the Government of India's representation to them was affected by foreign influences hostile to China and categorically repudiate it. At no time has any foreign influences been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet. In this, as other matters, the Government of India's policy has been entirely independent and directed solely towards a peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

2. The Government of China are equally mistaken in thinking that the Tibetan Delegation's departure to Peking was delayed by outside instigation. In their previous communications the Government of India have explained at some length the reasons why the Tibetan Delegation could not proceed to Peking earlier. They are convinced that there has been no possibility of foreign instigation.

3. It is with no desire to interfere or to gain any advantage that the Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations, adjusting legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy

within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. Tibetan autonomy is a fact, which, judging from reports that they have received from the Indian Ambassador in China and also from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognise and foster. The Government of India's repeated suggestions that Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations were not, as the Chinese Government seem to suggest, unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.

4. Wedded as they are to ways of peace, the Government of India had been gratified to learn that the Chinese Government was also desirous to effect a settlement in Tibet through peaceful negotiations. Because of this the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to send their Delegation to Peking, and were glad that this advice was accepted. In the interchange of the communications which had been taking place between the Government of India and the Government of China, the former had received repeated assurances that a peaceful settlement was aimed at. In the circumstances, the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when they learnt that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against a peaceful people. There has been no allegation that there has been any provocation or any resort to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence there is no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step involving an attempt to impose a decision by force, could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments, the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan Delegation to proceed to Peking, unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.

5. Every step that the Government of India have taken in recent months has been to check the drift to war all over the world. In doing so, they have often been misunderstood and criticised, but they have adhered to their policy regardless of the displeasure of great nations. They cannot help thinking early operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have

greatly added to the tensions to the world and to the drift towards general war, which they are sure the Government of China also wish to avoid.

6. The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear that they have no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet and they do not seek any novel privileged position for themselves or for their nationals in Tibet. At the same time they have pointed out that certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations. These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and the maintenance of post and telegraph office on the trade route up to Gyantse. For protection of this trade route a small military escort has been stationed at Gyantse for over 40 years. The Government of India are anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interests of India and Tibet, and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. The personnel at the Lhasa Mission and the agencies at Gyantse and Yatung have accordingly been instructed to stay at their posts.

7. It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests. Recent developments in Tibet have affected these friendly relations and interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regret. In conclusion the Government of India can only express their earnest hope that the Chinese Government will still prefer the methods of peaceful negotiations and settlement to a solution under duress and by force.

**34 Letter from Deputy Premier Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 November 1950 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government have tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during

the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as friends of China the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them," this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the case of Chinese entry into the UNO and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UNO. In spite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism, perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of



our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

3. In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about our frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans or Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that communism is no shield against imperialism and that the Communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological

expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and in the north-east, a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

4. Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern or north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Darjeeling [area] and tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communications, they are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited at a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even the Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly

in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgment, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

5. Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. . . Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting Communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc. from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese Communists and through them to other foreign Communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated Communist pockets in Telengana and Warangal we may have to deal with Communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on Communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the methods by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problems of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred. . .

6. It is, of course, impossible for me to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below, some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.

- (a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal

security.

- (b) An examination of our military position and such re-disposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
- (c) An appraisal of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of these new threats.
- (d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we should be making our defence position perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
- (e) The question of Chinese entry into UNO. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UNO virtually to outlaw China in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
- (f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontiers. This would include the whole of the border, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
- (g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the States flanking those areas, such as UP, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
- (h) Improvement of our communications, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
- (i) Policing and intelligence of frontier posts.
- (j) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyantse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
- (k) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.

5. These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider questions of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g. we might have to consider whether we should not enter

into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem for China and, therefore, might claim its first attention.

6. I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.

**35 A note by the States Ministry of India on new problems of internal security caused by Chinese occupation of Tibet, November 1950 (Extracts)**

Soviet Russia now feels that India will be more swayed by the influence of China than of Russia and Mao Tse-tung will make a better leader for the Indian masses than even Stalin can. It is with this object that the Peking Liaison Bureau was established last year, that Mao Tse-tung has been given a dominating voice in the affairs of India and the Far East and that the Indian Communists have been told by numerous Communist publications, as well as by the Cominform, in clear unambiguous words, to follow the China way to victory. If therefore the occupation of Tibet by the Communist forces gives to world Communism any strategical and tactical advantage of furthering the cause of Communism in India, all such advantages will be exploited legally and illegally to the fullest extent without any consideration for international conventions even though the Chinese Government may continue to remain superficially in the friendliest terms with the Indian Government. And the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communists does open up vast possibilities for creating internal disorders and disruptions within India.

Up till now India's northern frontier from Ladakh in the west to the Sadiya Hill Tracts in the east has been free from any dangers of external invasion or from even any subversive movements fostered by external forces. With Tibet as a weak and

autonomous country, giving many facilities to India which no other independent country would give, India could rightly feel absolutely secure about its northern frontier and this sense of security was reflected in the past in all the policies followed with respect to this northern frontier and actions taken for its security in these areas and on the understanding that no danger would come to India from the north very little security measures have been taken which in the altered circumstances will be found to be completely inadequate.

With an aggressive Chinese Communist Government in Tibet, intent on furthering the creed of International Communism in India and holding the belief that world Communism and so Communism in China can never be safe unless India becomes a Communist country and following the basic Communist creed that the International proletariat (which in other words means the Soviet and the Chinese Governments) must assist the peoples of all colonial countries (which include India) in their fight for national liberation (which in India means the overthrow of the Nehru Government), every method will be adopted to disrupt the integrity of India and what will be more opportune and easy than to foster trouble in these frontier areas where India's administrative control is not strong and where her cultural influence is less.

With China on India's long unguarded frontier, the Indian Communists will be in a good position to get help by way of supply to arms, by the infiltration of trained agents and by direct contact with the Chinese Communists. The Indian Communists have been badly mauled during the last 2½ years and they are passing through a difficult period and there is definite information that they are wanting direct guidance from foreign Communists. So far attempts to make such contacts have to a great extent been countered by Governmental action, but with China strongly entrenched in Tibet it will be extremely difficult to stop this contact. With the commencement of trouble in the frontier areas where India's armed forces will have to be moved, more Telengana struggles will be launched in India itself so as to dissipate India's armed forces by wide dispersal.

**36 Proclamation on Tibet issued jointly by the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee and the People's Liberation Army Southwest Military Command, 9 November 1950**

With serious concern for the people of Tibet, who have suffered long years of oppression under the American and British imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary government, Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Central People's Government and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh of the People's Liberation Army ordered the PLA troops to enter Tibet for the purpose of assisting the Tibetan people to free themselves from oppression forever.

“All the Tibetan people, including all lamas, should now create a solid unity to give the PLA adequate assistance in ridding Tibet of imperialist influence and establishing regional self-government for the Tibetan people. They should, at the same time, build fraternal relations, on the basis of friendship and mutual help, with other nationalities within the country and together construct a new Tibet within New China.

“With the entry of the PLA into Tibet, the life and property of Tibetan lamas and people will be protected. Freedom of religious belief will be safeguarded, and lama temples will be protected. Assistance will be rendered to the Tibetan people in the direction of developing their educational, agricultural, pastoral, industrial and commercial enterprises, and their living conditions will be improved. No change will be made in the existing administrative and military system of Tibet. The existing Tibetan troops will become a part of the national defence forces of the People's Republic of China. All lamas, officials and chieftains may remain at their posts. Matters relating to reforms in Tibet will be handled completely in accordance with the will of the Tibetan people and by means of consultation between the Tibetan people and the Tibetan leaders. Pro-imperialist and KMT officials, concerning whom there is definite evidence that they had severed relations with the imperialists and KMT and who will not carry out any sabotage or put up resistance, may remain at their posts irrespective of their history.

### **37 Cable of Tibetan Kashag (Cabinet) to the United Nations Secretary-General, 11 November 1950 (Extracts)**

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese have hurled threats of liberating Tibet and have used devious methods to intimidate and undermine the Government of Tibet. Tibet recognizes that it is in no position to resist. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government.

It is unfortunate that the Tibetan Mission to China was unable to leave India through no fault of its own but for want of British visas which were required for transit through Hong-kong. At the kind intervention of the Government of India, the Chinese People's Republic condescended to allow the Tibetan Mission to have preliminary negotiation with the Chinese Ambassador to India, who arrived in New Delhi only in September. While these negotiations were proceeding in Delhi, Chinese troops, without warning or provocation, crossed the Dre Chu river, which has for long been the boundary of Tibetan territory, at a number of places on 7 October 1950. In quick succession places of strategic importance such as Demar, Kamto, Tunga, Tshame, Rimochegotyu, Yakalo and Markham, fell to the Chinese. Tibetan frontier garrisons in Kham, which were maintained not with any aggressive design, but as a nominal protective measure, were all wiped out. Communist troops converged in great force from five directions on Chamdo, the capital of Skham, which fell soon after. Nothing is known of the fate of a Minister of Tibetan Government posted there. . . .

The armed invasion of Tibet for the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical force is a clear case of aggression. As long as the people of Tibet are compelled by force to become a part of China against their will and consent, the present invasion of Tibet will be the grossest instance of the violation of the weak by the strong. We therefore appeal through you to the Nations of the world to intercede in our behalf and restrain Chinese aggression.



**38 Chinese note to India on the question of Tibet, 16 November 1950**

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in its past communications with the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet, has repeatedly made it clear that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory, the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government. According to the provisions of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the regional autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty. This point has been recognised by the Indian Government in its aide memoire to the Chinese Government dated August 26 this year. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights, and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China sincerely hopes that the Chinese People's Liberation Army may enter Tibet peacefully to perform the sacred task of liberating the Tibetan people and defending the frontiers of China. It has, therefore, long since welcomed the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet, which has remained in India, to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peace negotiations. Yet the said delegation, obviously as a result of continued outside obstruction, has delayed its departure for Peking. Further, taking advantage of the delay of the negotiations, the local authorities of Tibet have deployed strong armed forces at Changtu of Sikang Province in the interior of China, in an attempt to prevent the Chinese People's Liberation Army from liberating Tibet. On August 31, 1950, the Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikkar that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sikang according to set plans, and expressed the hope that the Indian Government would assist the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet so that it might arrive in Peking in mid-September to begin peace negotiations. In early and middle September, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires Shen Chien and later Ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien both in person told the said delegation that it was imperative that it should hasten to Peking within September, otherwise the said delegation would bear the responsibilities and be held responsible for all the consequences resulting from the delay. In mid-October, the Chinese Ambassador Yuan again informed the Indian Government of this. Yet still, owing to outside instigation, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet fabricated various pretexts and remained in India. Although the Chinese Government has not given up its desire of settling the problem of Tibet peacefully, it can no longer continue to put off the set plan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to proceed to Tibet. And the Liberation of Changtu further proved that through the instrument of Tibetan troops, foreign forces and influences were obstructing the peaceful settlement of the problem of Tibet. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations, and regardless of whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, no foreign intervention will be permitted. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the liberation of the Tibetan people are also decided.

In showing its friendship with the Government of the Republic of India, and in an understanding of the desire of the Indian Government to see the problem of Tibet settled peacefully, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has kept the Indian Government informed of its efforts in this direction. What the Chinese Government cannot but deeply regret is that the Indian Government, in disregard of the facts, has regarded a domestic problem of the Chinese Government—the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet—as an international dispute calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

The Government of the Republic of India has repeatedly

expressed its desire of developing Sino-Indian friendship on the basis of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and of preventing the world from going to war. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is exactly aimed at the protection of the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty of China. And it is on this question, that all those countries who desire to respect the territory and the sovereignty of China should first of all indicate their attitude towards China. In the meantime, we consider that what is now threatening the independence of nations and world peace is precisely the forces of the imperialist aggressors. For the sake of the maintenance of national independence and the defence of world peace, it is necessary to resist the forces of these imperialist aggressors. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is thus an important measure to maintain Chinese independence, to prevent the imperialist aggressors from dragging the world towards war, and to defend world peace.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes the renewed declaration of the Indian Government that it has no political or territorial ambitions in China's Tibet and that it does not seek any new privileged position. As long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels.

### **39 Prime Minister Nehru's note on China and Tibet forwarded to Vallabhbhai Patel, 18 November 1950 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government having replied to our last note, we have to consider what further steps we should take in this matter. There is no immediate hurry about sending a reply to the Chinese Government. But we have to send immediate instructions to Shri B.N. Rau as to what he should do in the event of Tibet's appeal being brought up before the Security Council or the General Assembly.

2. The content of the Chinese reply is much the same as their previous notes, but there does appear to be a toning down and an attempt at some kind of a friendly approach.

3. It is interesting to note that they have not referred specifically to our mission [at] Lhasa or to our trade agents or military escort at Gyantse etc. We had mentioned these especially in our last note. There is an indirect reference, however, in China's note. At the end, this note says. . . . This clearly refers to our trade agents and others in Tibet. We had expected a demand from them for the withdrawal of these agents etc. The fact that they have not done so has some significance.

4. Stress is laid in China's note on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, which we are reminded, we have acknowledged, on Tibet being an integral part of China's territory and therefore a domestic problem. It is however again repeated that outside influences, have been at play obstructing China's mission in Tibet. . . .

5. All this is much the same as has been said before, but it is said in a somewhat different way and there are repeated references in the note to China desiring the friendship of India.

6. It is true that in one of our messages to the Chinese Government we used "sovereignty" of China in relation to Tibet. In our last message we used the word "suzerainty." After receipt of the last China's note, we have pointed out to our Ambassador that "suzerainty" was the right word and that "sovereignty" had been used by error.

7. It is easy to draft a reply to the Chinese note, pressing our viewpoint and countering some of the arguments raised in the Chinese note. But before we do so we should be clear in our own minds as to what we are aiming at, not only in the immediate future but from a long-term view. It is important that we keep both these viewpoints before us. In all probability China, that is present-day China, is going to be our close neighbour for a long time to come. We are going to have a tremendously long common frontier. It is unlikely, and it would be unwise to expect, that the present Chinese Government will collapse, giving place to another. Therefore, it is important to pursue a policy which will be in keeping with this long-term view.

8. I think it may be taken for granted that China will take

possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally unlikely that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do so. If so, what can we do to help in the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy and at the same time avoiding continuous tension and apprehension on our frontiers?

9. The Chinese note has repeated that they wish the Tibetan people to have what they call "regional autonomy and religious freedom". This autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy verging independence which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so. But it is reasonable to assume from the very nature of Tibetan geography, terrain and climate, that a large measure of autonomy is almost inevitable. It may of course be that this autonomous Tibet is controlled by communist elements in Tibet. I imagine however that it is, on the whole more likely that what will be attempted will be a pro-communist China administration rather than a communist one.

10. If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricate problems arise and each one of these problems will be inter-related with others. Even the question of defence of India assumes a different shape and cannot be isolated from other world factors. I think that it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors. In peace, such an invasion would undoubtedly lead to world war. China, though internally big, is in a way amorphous and easily capable of being attacked on its sea coasts and by air. In such a war China would have its main front in the South and East and it will be fighting for its very existence against powerful enemies. It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild venture across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatly weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule out any major attack on India by China. I think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there is far too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our sense of perspective and world strategy and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we might have is likely to fail.

11. While there is, in any opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory if there is no obstruction to this happening. We must therefore take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between these precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack.

12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it would weaken our general defence position. There are limits beyond which we cannot go, at least for some years, and a spreading out of our army on distant frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view.

13. In spite of our desire to settle the points at issue between us and Pakistan, and developing peaceful relations with it, the fact remains that our major possible enemy is Pakistan. This has compelled us to think of our defence mainly in terms of Pakistan's aggression. If we begin to think of, and prepare for, China's aggression in the same way, we would weaken considerably on the Pakistan side. We might well be got in a pincer movement. It is interesting to note that Pakistan is taking a great deal of interest, from this point of view, in developments in Tibet. Indeed it has been discussed in the Pakistan Press that the new danger from Tibet to India might help them to settle the Kashmir problem according to their wishes. Pakistan has absolutely nothing in common with China or Tibet. But if we fall out completely with China, Pakistan will undoubtedly try to take advantage of this, politically or otherwise. The position of India thus will be bad from a defence point of view. We cannot have all the time two possible enemies on either side of India. This danger will not be got over, even if we increase our defence forces or even if other foreign countries help us in arming. The measure of safety that one gets by increasing the defence apparatus is limited by many factors. But whatever that measure of safety might be, strategically we would be in an unsound position and the burden of this will be very great on us. As it is, we are facing enormous difficulties, financial, economic, etc.

14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naive. It may mean that in certain circumstances. Those circumstances would depend upon many factors, which I need not go into here. The danger really is not from military invasion but from infiltration of men and ideas. The ideas are there already and can only be countered by other ideas. Communism is an important element in the situation. But, by our attaching too great importance to it in this context, we are likely to misjudge the situation from other and more important angles.

15. In a long-term view, India and China are two of the biggest countries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certain expansive tendencies, because of their vitality. If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as a whole. It would affect our future for a long time. If a position arises in which China and India are inveterately hostile to each other, like France and Germany, then there will be repeated wars bringing destruction to both. The advantage will go to other countries. It is interesting to note that both the UK and the USA appear to be anxious to add to the unfriendliness of India and China towards each other. It is also interesting to find that the USSR does not view with favour any friendly relations between India and China. These are long-term reactions which one can fully understand, because India and China at peace with each other would make a vast difference to the whole set-up and balance of the world. Much of course depends upon the development of either country and how far communism in China will mould the Chinese people. Even so, these processes are long-range ones and in the long run it is fairly safe to assume that hundreds of millions of people will not change their essential characteristics.

16. These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we should be prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection that we should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not got that, then both our present and our future are imperilled and no distant power can save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons. If this is so, then we should fashion our

present policy accordingly.

17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and good for India. As far as I can see, this can only be done on the diplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India and China worse.

18. What then should be our instructions to B. N. Rau? From the messages he has sent us, it appears that no member of the Security Council shows any inclination to sponsor Tibet's appeal and that there is little likelihood of the matter being considered by the Council. We have said that [we] are not going to sponsor this appeal, but if it comes up we shall state our viewpoint. This viewpoint cannot be one of full support of the Tibetan appeal, because that goes far and claims full independence. We may say that whatever might have been acknowledged in the past about China's sovereignty or suzerainty, recent events have deprived China of the right to claim that. There may be some moral basis for this argument. But it will not take us or Tibet very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet. No outsider will be able to help her and China, suspicious and apprehensive of these tactics, will make sure of much speedier and fuller possession of Tibet than she might otherwise have done. We shall thus not only fail in our endeavour but at the same time have really a hostile China on our doorstep.

19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet's appeal. I would personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly. If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that neither the UK nor the USA, nor indeed any other power is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in is embarrassing China



Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest we fail.

20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibet's appeal in the UN. Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spite of our not wishing this, what then? I would suggest that our representative should state our case as moderately as possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to their desire that the Sino-Tibetan question should be settled peacefully and that Tibet's autonomy should be respected and maintained. Any particular reference to an article of the Charter of the UN might tie us up in difficulties and lead to certain consequences later, which may prove highly embarrassing for us. Or a resolution of the UN might just be a dead letter, which also will be bad.

21. If my general argument is approved, then we can frame our reply to China's note accordingly.

**40 Statement by Indian representative Jam Saheb of Nawanagar in the General Committee of the UN General Assembly, 24 November 1950**

*The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar* (India) said his Government had given careful study to the problems raised by the proposal of El Salvador to place the question of the invasion of Tibet by foreign forces on the General Assembly agenda. That was a matter of vital interest to both China and India. The Committee was aware that India, as a neighbour of both China and Tibet, with both of which it had friendly relations, was the country most interested in settlement of the problem. That was why the Indian Government was particularly anxious that it should be settled peacefully.

He had no desire to express an opinion on the difficulties which had arisen between China and Tibet, but would point out that, in the latest note received by his Government, the Peking Government had declared that it had not abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties by peaceful means. It would seem that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo; a town some 480 kilometers from Lhasa. The Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement

could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China.

His delegation considered that the best way of obtaining that objective was to abandon, for the time being, the idea of including that question in the agenda of the General Assembly. That was why he supported the United Kingdom representative's proposal that consideration of the request for inclusion should be adjourned.

#### **41 Nehru's speech in the Foreign Affairs debate in the Indian Parliament, 6 December 1950 (Extract)**

Ever since the People's Government of China talked about the liberation of Tibet, our Ambassador told them, on behalf of the Government of India, how we felt about it. We expressed our earnest hope that the matter would be settled peacefully by China and Tibet. We also made it clear that we had no territorial or political ambitions in regard to Tibet and that our relations were cultural and commercial. We said that we would naturally like to preserve these relations and continue to trade with Tibet because it did not come in the way of either China or Tibet. We further said that we were anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy it has had for at least the last forty years. We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet. We pointed out all this in a friendly way to the Chinese Government. In their replies, they always said that they would very much like to settle the question peacefully but that they were, in any event, going to liberate Tibet. From whom they were going to liberate Tibet is, however, not quite clear. They gave us to understand that a peaceful solution would be found, though I must say that they gave us no assurance or guarantee to the effect. On the one hand, they said they were prepared for a peaceful; on the other, they talked persistently of liberation.

We had come to believe that the matter would be settled by peaceful negotiations and were shocked when we heard that the Chinese armies were marching into Tibet. Indeed, one can hardly talk about war between China and Tibet. Tibet is not in a position to carry on war and, obviously, Tibet is no

threat to China. It is said that other countries might intrigue in Tibet. I cannot say much about it because I do not know.

**42 Nehru's reply to the debate in Indian Parliament,  
7 December 1950 (Extract)**

Prof. Ranga seems to have been displeased at my occasional reference to Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Please note that I used the word suzerainty, not sovereignty. There is a slight difference, though not much. I was telling the House about a historical fact; I was not discussing the future. It is a historical fact and in the context of things it is perfectly true that we have repeatedly admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet just as we have laid stress on Tibet's autonomy. But apart from this historical or legal or constitutional argument or even the argument that Mr. Gautam raised about buffer states and the like which, if I may say so, is not much of an argument, though it may be his desire and my desire. The real point to be made is that it is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over an area outside its own immediate range. That is to say, since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments. That, I think, is a valid point. Whether, the people of Tibet are strong enough to assert their rights or not, is another matter. Whether we are strong enough or any other country is strong enough to see that this is done is also another matter. But it is a right and proper thing to say and I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese Government that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet, surely, according to any principles, the principles, they proclaim and the principles I uphold, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else.

**43 Tsao Po-han's book *How do the U.S. Imperialists invade Southeast Asia*, published by People's Press, Peking,  
December 1950 (Extracts)**

The U.S. imperialists bait is sweet; Nehru will sooner or later swallow it up.

Nehru's visit to America was actually to seek political support and economic and military aid from the U.S., he wanted to swallow up Truman's poisonous medicine of Point Four Programme. In his speech to the American Congress, Nehru asked America to help India with machinery and to extend to her technical and economic aid. The aid he demanded most likely also included (i) the U.S. sending food to India and (ii) the hope that the U.S. imperialists would grant India loans to buy goods from the U.S.

The "aid" Nehru asked from the U.S. included not only economic aid, but political and military aid to suppress the Indian people's struggle for genuine national independence, democracy and freedom.

In his speech at the American Congress, Nehru said: "When freedom is threatened, justice is endangered, or aggression occurs, India cannot remain neutral, and also will not remain neutral." He also said: "Without seeking it, India has become the leader of Asia." His meaning was that since the U.S. imperialists had the mind to elevate him, he would volunteer to serve them as their No. 1 anti-Communist lackey in Asia.

Recently, on the problems of China's representative and the Korean War at the United Nations, it seemed that Nehru did not follow the U.S. imperialists and acted very gracefully (beautifully): however, in regard to the problems of liberation of our Tibet, he used many pretexts to interfere into our domestic affairs, and thereby revealed his fox tail. . . .

The armed revolt in Hyderabad was victorious and a people's government was established on a land of 13,000 square miles.

The Indian ruling class speak of peace and democracy but actually they suppress by cruel means the people who defend peace and demand democracy. Since Nehru headed the Government, about 20 or 30 thousands of Indian Communists, trade union leaders, workers, fighters and peasants were imprisoned, and many were slaughtered. Peasants that revolted were often burned alive.

India is internally in imminent danger; famine, starvation, and bloody revolts occur everywhere. The Indian ruling class suppress the enraged people by force, and thereby only make the situation more acute. . . .

**44 Mao Tse-tung's speech at Indian Embassy reception in Peking, 26 January 1951**

India is a great country and the Indians are a wonderful people. For milleniums a close friendship has existed between China and India and the peoples of these two countries. Today, in marking the national Indian holiday, we hope that these two countries, China and India, will continue to exert joint efforts in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

The peoples of all countries desire peace, and very few people want war. China, the Soviet Union, and all peace-loving countries and peoples have joined in the struggle for the preservation of peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

On the occasion of India's national holiday, I greet all the Indian people and their President and send them my very best wishes.

**45 Seventeen-point agreement between the Government of China and the local government of Tibet on measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, 23 May 1951 (Extract)**

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People's Republic of China.

2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defense.

3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

4. The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of the

Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

8. Tibetan troops shall be recognised by stages into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the People's Republic of China.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step, and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reforms they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government shall conduct the centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work.

Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local Government of Tibet; various districts and leading monasteries; the name-list shall be drawn up after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and the various quarters concerned, and shall be submitted to the Central People's Government for appointment.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall be provided by the Central People's Government. The Local Government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it.

**46 Statement by Chou-En-lai at a banquet given in honour of the first Indian goodwill mission, September-October 1951 (Extracts)**

Those who maintain that unity among the Asian peoples is a threat to peace, are precisely the American and allied imperialists who are threatening peace in Asia today by building military bases on our continent, rearming Japan and attempting to extend their aggressive war. The Chinese believe that if the peoples of China, India, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Viet Nam, Pakistan and other Asian peoples, including the Japanese people, strengthen their unity in the common fight for peace, they will surely be able to resist American aggression and aggression from other imperialist countries. The Chinese believe that such strengthening of the unity among the Asian peoples in the common cause of peace will contribute to the unity of the peoples of the world and not be any hindrance to it. Since we call for unity among the Asian peoples only for

the purpose of safeguarding world peace and opposing aggressive wars, how can such a noble purpose possibly constitute a threat to world peace?" . . .

I think that, since we are nations which either had suffered from imperialist oppression, or are still suffering from it; . . . We should be able to understand each other better. The Indonesian Delegate should, therefore, be able to realise how deeply sympathetic the Chinese nation, which has stood up after having been oppressed for a long time, is toward the oppressed peoples of the world and, especially, toward the peoples of Asia. We do not deny that, in the feudal era of our history, our ancestors had started aggression against our brother countries in Asia, such as Korea and Viet Nam, but that was a mistake committed in the feudal times. That was a crime of the feudal rulers of China. All this we have already disavowed. We have driven out the imperialists and overthrown the feudal forces. The new People's China of today can and will absolutely do no such thing. I believe that those of you who are present this evening, including our friends from Indonesia, have noticed here in Peking and will further notice when you are visiting other places, how enthusiastic the Chinese people are in welcoming you. New China opposes aggression and will certainly not start aggression against others. Finally, let me remind you that the imperialists are spreading rumours to the effect that China will start aggression against others. Their purpose is to create disunity among us. But can you believe them? They hope to instigate conflicts and mutual suspicion among us in order to facilitate their aggression. Let us, all peace-loving peoples, therefore, unite and bear in mind a common saying: 'beware of pickpockets.'

**47 Speech by Hsia Yen, Vice-Chairman of the Shanghai Peace Committee, at a reception given in honour of the visiting Indian goodwill mission, 21 October 1951 (Extract)**

In the past 100 years owing to obstructions created by foreign imperialism, there had been no opportunity for the full development of friendship between the Chinese people and the peoples of India, Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan, as well as for the interflow of economic and cultural forces. Today the



world is changed. The obstructions which kept us apart have been wiped out from China. Hence we are able to meet each other happily and can talk intimately with each other and candidly exchange the experiences in our struggles. For there is no force in the world which can hinder the unity and friendship of the peoples of Asia. The unity and friendship of the 1,000 million Asian people is the guarantee for peace in Asia and the world. The period when Asia was under darkness is now gone for ever. The peoples of Asia are asserting themselves and are united.

We thank you heartily for having brought to us the friendship and love of South-Eastern Asian peoples. We hope you will take with you back the friendship and love of the people of Shanghai and of the whole of China for the people of your countries.

**48 Statement by Indian representative Vijaya Laxmi Pandit in the UN General Assembly, 11 November 1952 (Extract)**

With respect to the larger problem in the Far East, our position is well known. I must, however, restate the view of my Government, namely, that the Central People's Government of China should be brought into the United Nations. Until the issue of Chinese representation is settled in accordance with the actual facts of the situation, our discussions here must continue to be unreal. On such problems as, for example, the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the absence of the representatives of China, in our view, is a serious limitation. We hope that renewed thought will be given to this matter.

**49 Letter of Lee Sang Cho, Representative of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to Gen. K.S. Thimayya, Chairman, Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), 20 October 1953 (Extracts)**

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force has not taken any effective measure to remove the secret agents of Chiang and Rhee or to readjust the set-up of the prisoners of war. The Indian Custodian Force has not even taken any action against the instigators. This is not all.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force have, on the contrary, recognized the chieftains of the secret agents of Chiang and Rhee as representatives of the prisoners of war, allowed them to openly hold meetings, widened their sphere of action, and connived at their illicit activities.

Owing to this erroneous policy adopted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force, the captured personnel of our side, though in the custody of the Indian Custodian Force, are still under the reign of terror of the secret agents of Chiang and Rhee and are incessantly subjected to persecution and murder by the secret agents. . . .

Under the custody of the Indian Custodian Force, the desire of our captured personnel to apply for repatriation is still being openly and flagrantly suppressed by secret agents; the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is fully aware that those captured personnel of our side who asked for repatriation had to risk their lives to escape from the terrorist grip of the secret agents. . . .

The secret agents of Chiang and Rhee with their organization and reign of terror are obstructing our captured personnel from attending the explanation. Obviously, such a state of affairs is inseparable from the policy of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force of maintaining the organization of the secret agents and conniving at the activities of the secret agents. This erroneous policy of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force is dissatisfactory to us. We firmly request the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force to break up the organization of the secret agents and to prohibit their activities. Otherwise, the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Rules of Procedure Governing Explanations and Interviews could not be implemented at all. . . .

**50 Lee Sang Cho's letter to Chairman, NNRC, 27 December 1953 (Extracts)**

Owing to the fact that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has never taken effective measures to break the control

of the secret agents over the prisoners of war and to guarantee the necessary conditions for the explanation work, the explanation work of the Korean and Chinese side was neither started as scheduled nor was it conducted uninterruptedly. In the ninety-day period upto December 23, the Korean and Chinese side was able to conduct the explanation work only for ten days and the number of the prisoners of war who have been explained to is less than 15% of the total number of the prisoners of war. The prerequisites for Paragraph 11 of the Terms of Reference have therefore been destroyed in their entirety. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has not only failed to take necessary measures to ensure ninety days of explanation work, but, on the contrary, under the pretext that the provision of Paragraph 11 of the Terms of Reference is mandatory, unreasonably proclaimed the termination of the explanation work only three days after it was resumed as a result of the efforts of the Korean-Chinese side. This is utterly in disregard of fact and is a wilful mutilation of terms? This is absolutely unconvincing. . . .

Obviously, the adoption of the decision of the termination of the explanation work by those members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission who are in a majority is not in keeping with the impartial position of neutral nations in upholding justice. . . .

**51 Letter from Kim Il-Sung, Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army and Peng Teh-huai, Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers to General K.S. Thimayya, Chairman, NNRC, 7 January 1954 (Extracts)**

The Commission has refused under various pretexts to adopt any effective measures to apply sanctions against the secret agents who have used violence to disrupt explanations, intimidate and murder the prisoners of war who request repatriation. Not only this, the Commission has even recognized as the "representatives" of the prisoners of war the secret agents who have murdered the prisoners of war, and thus all the work of the commission has to be carried out in accordance with the will of the secret agents. By so doing, the commission has in substance given protection and support to the terroristic reign of the

secret agents in the prisoner of war camp and thereby given a free hand to the secret agents to disrupt the explanation work and to intimidate and murder the prisoners of war who desire repatriation. From this it is apparent that the United Nations Command side should of course be held chiefly responsible for the disruption of the Terms of Reference and for the failure of the Commission to accomplish its task, but that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission itself cannot but also share a certain responsibility. The Interim Report fails to admit this frankly. On the contrary, it has on the one hand advanced a number of arguments to defend the so-called inability to use force and on the other hand charged that the explanation plan of the Korean and Chinese side was "not feasible" because the Korean and Chinese side failed to change its explanation plan according to the will of the secret agents. We consider this unsatisfactory. We have also noted the statement made by Czechoslovak and Polish members on this Interim Report. . . .

We insist that the ninety-day explanation period should be made up for, that the question of those prisoners of war who have not yet exercised their right to be repatriated should be submitted to the Political Conference for disposition within thirty days after it is convened, and that before the realization of these steps, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force should continue to discharge their unfinished legitimate functions. This means that explanations to the prisoners of war should be resumed at once, that the segregation of the prisoners of war should be effected, that the organizations for violence of the secret agents should be broken up, that all secret agents should be eliminated, and that the custody of prisoners of war should be continued after the ninety-day explanation period is made up for pending a disposition by the Political Conference.

Only by holding to the impartial stand of neutral nations can the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission win the whole-hearted support of men of justice throughout the world, and only thus can it be possible to make the United Nations Command side withdraw from its unreasonable and insolent position. We hope that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force will not fail such an expectation.

**52 Lee Sang Cho's letter to Chairman, NNRC, 22 January 1954  
(Extracts)**

1. We resolutely oppose your restoring to the United Nations Command the captured personnel of our side who have not yet exercised their right to be repatriated. . . . Your action has facilitated the forcible retention of the captured personnel of our side by the United Nations Command; the terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has thus been completely wrecked. We are resolutely opposed to such an action of yours. We hereby lodge with you a strong protest.

2. The arguments which you employed to support this unilateral and illegal action of yours are untenable. . . .

3. We cannot agree to your decision that the Indian Custodian Force will withdraw its custody from the Songgong-ni prisoner of war camp after the midnight of Jan. 22, 1954. . . . The question of the continuance of custody of the prisoner of war camp at Songgong-ni should not be subjected to, neither does it allow of any unilateral settlement. Before this question is settled through an agreement, you must bear the whole responsibility for any such situation as the abduction and dispersion of the prisoners of war currently held in custody in the Songgong-ni prisoner of war camp.

**53 Lee Sang Cho's letter to Chairman, NNRC, 20 February  
1954 (Extracts)**

Disregarding the rightful opposition of the Polish and Czechoslovak members, the Indian, Swedish and Swiss members on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission finally adopted a resolution on February 18, 1954 to dissolve the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at 2400 hours, February 21, 1954. . . .

The NNRC was formed by agreement between the two sides exactly with a view to ensuring that all prisoners of war have the right to be repatriated following an armistice. But the overwhelming majority of the Korean and Chinese captured personnel was not given the opportunity to be repatriated, and, nevertheless, were forcibly retained by the United Nations Command. However, the NNRC was declared to be dissolved even under these circumstances; the inspirer of such an action

will have to answer to history for all the serious consequences arising therefrom.

Against this, I am instructed to lodge a strong protest with you.

**54 Statement by Li Chi Po, leader of the Chinese delegation to the ECAFE session in Ceylon and Secretary, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 3 March 1954**

The U.S. Government is actively working for a U.S.-Pakistan military alliance, which will bring the menace of war to the South and South-east Asian region". Such were the concrete steps taken by the U.S. Government to perpetuate her policy of expansion and aggression through her policy of making "Asians fight Asians," and to attempt to maintain international tension. This could not but arouse indignation and resistance amongst the people of Asia and the whole world.

While working for the cause of defending peace in the Far East and the world, the Chinese were constantly aware of the tremendous force which the Indian people could wield in that aspect. They knew that the Indian people had made great efforts for the ending of the Korean War. They also fully realised that the friendship and affection of the Indian people towards people of China were of great significance to the defence of world peace. Everybody knew that China and India had the biggest population in the world and together formed one-third of the population of the world. That was an objective fact of extreme importance; for after all, the destiny of humanity was not to be decided by atomic or hydrogen bombs but by the will of the people. An important and historic responsibility now rested upon the people of two countries—India and China. Thus, the advancement of friendship, co-operation and unity between the people of the two countries would have a great effect in the cause of defence of world peace, "Let us join . . . in common effort to work for the consolidation and development of our valuable friendship, cooperation and unity, and on this basis strive for our common interest of world peace."

**55 India-China agreement on trade and intercourse between  
Tibet Region of China and India, 29 April 1954<sup>1</sup>**

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India.

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

- (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- (2) mutual non-aggression,
- (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
- (4) equality and mutual benefit, and
- (5) peaceful co-existence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries: . . .

who, having examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

*Article I*

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

- (1) The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.
- (2) The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom

<sup>1</sup> Ratified by both Governments on 3 June 1954.

from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communications in code.

### *Article II*

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

- (1) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.
- (2) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima-Khargo, (4) Gyanima-Chakra, (5) Rampura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Puling-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

### *Article III*

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

- (1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.
- (2) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.
- (3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do



so in accordance with custom.

*Article IV*

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

- (1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

*Article V*

For travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passport issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other Party except as provided in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Article.

- (1) Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border check-post of the other Party.
- (2) Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.
- (3) Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own

country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border checkpoints of the other Party.

- (4) Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkpoints of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.
- (5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.
- (6) Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

#### *Article VI*

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

#### **56 Exchange of notes on the agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, 29 April 1954**

##### **(a) Indian Ambassador N. Raghavan's note to Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu:**

In the course of our discussions regarding the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India, which has been happily concluded today, the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of India and the Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as follows:

- (1) The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months from date of exchange of the present notes the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China. The Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

(2) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes.

(3) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the twelve (12) rest houses of the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall continue as rest houses.

(4) The Government of China agrees that all buildings within the compound walls of the Trade Agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China may be retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land within its Agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And the Government of India agrees that the Trade Agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands from the Indian side for the use of the Agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of China will render every possible assistance for housing the Indian Trade Agency at Gartok. The Government of India will also render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese Trade Agency at New Delhi.

(5) The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung.

If there are godowns and buildings of the Government of India on the above-mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if Indian traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned

lands so that there is a need to continue leasing lands, the Government of China agrees to sign contracts with the Government of India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by the said godowns, buildings or stores and pertaining thereto.

(6) The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

(7) The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

(8) The hospitals of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel of the Indian Trade Agencies.

(9) Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other country.

(10) The Government of China agrees, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims along the route from Pulanchung (Taklakot) to Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar); and the Government of India agrees to place all possible facilities in India at the disposal of pilgrims.

(11) Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

(12) The three Trade Agencies of each Party may function throughout the year.

(13) Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations in places under the jurisdiction of the other Party.

(14) Traders of both countries may carry on normal trade in accordance with local regulations at places as provided in Article II of the Agreement.

(15) Disputes between traders of both countries over debts and claims shall be handled in accordance with local laws and regulations.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of India I hereby agree that the present Note along with Your Excellency's reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present Notes.

**(b) Chang Han-fu's reply:**

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I hereby agree to Your Excellency's note, and your note along with the present note in reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments, which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present notes.

**57 *People's Daily* commentary on Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, 30 April 1954 (Extracts)**

Relations between China and India in the Tibet Region of China were remnants left by British aggression against China in the past and therefore not the responsibility of the Government of India. With the founding of the People's Republic of China, the prerogatives which the British Government had obtained by unequal treaties wrung from defunct Chinese Governments no longer existed. So it was necessary for China and India to establish their relations in the Tibet Region of China on a new basis by negotiations . . . .

China has been developing trade and cultural intercourse between the two countries in accordance with her consistent policy of establishing good neighbourly relations and peaceful co-existence. The successful conclusion of the Agreement provides further proof of the Chinese people's profound friendship for the Indian people and their desire for friendly co-operation.

In the negotiations, the Indian Government was pleased to withdraw completely the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in the Tibet Region of China. Furthermore, it was pleased to hand over to the Chinese Government the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment in the region. This respect for China's sovereignty on the part of the Indian Government corresponds to the common interests and the traditional friendship of the Chinese and Indian peoples.

China and India are two neighbouring Great Powers. For many centuries, a traditional intimate relationship between the Chinese people in Tibet and the Indian people has existed in their economic and social life, communications and other res-

pects. Relations between the traders of the two countries, the comings and goings of the inhabitants in the border districts of the two countries to visit friends and relatives or to carry on petty trade and border crossings of porters and muleteers, have been constant and brisk.

All these traditional and normal relations have been given official recognition in the Agreement just signed and the notes exchanged. A system of reasonable arrangements has been provided for normal trade relations between the traders of both countries. This meets the practical requirements of the peoples of the two countries and also creates favourable conditions for developing their trade relations.

The Chinese Government, correctly safeguarding freedom of religious belief, respects the customs of the Tibetans. At the same time, it is ready to accord facilities to Indian pilgrims journeying to the Tibet Region of China according to their customs. Provisions are made in the Agreement regarding pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries.

**58 Chou En-lai answers questions of *The Hindu* correspondent, K.S. Shelvankar, 23 June 1954 (Extracts)**

The Chinese people are very glad to have such a neighbouring State as India which is so devoted to the cause of peace agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India . . . not only has strengthened the relations between the two great States, China and India, but also has set a good example of co-operation among the Asian States. We are confident that on this new basis, co-operation between China and India in international affairs will further develop, and the friendship between the peoples of the two States will be increasingly strengthened. This will be significant for the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world . . . .

The Chinese people respect the life-long devotion of Gandhi and his struggle for national independence. Such a life-long struggle has a profound influence on the Chinese people.

**59 Nehru's speech at the banquet given in honour of Chou En-lai,  
26 June 1954 (Extract)**

Both China and India have their particular and individual backgrounds. Each has her own special cultural inheritance. In many ways they are different, and they have grown according to their own genius. Yet in spite of these differences, we have been good neighbours and friends and have not come into conflict with each other during the millennia of history.

This is the witness of the past, and as we stand on the fine edge of the present in this turbulent world of ours, we can learn a lesson from that past, which will help us in the present and in the future. Both our countries have recently succeeded in achieving our will. We achieved our freedom under different circumstances and by different methods. Our great leader and master Mahatma Gandhi led us by peaceful methods through travail and many bitter experiences to freedom. China's course was differently fashioned.

**60 Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet, 26 June 1954**

Between China and India there has existed for 2000 years a traditional friendship. And this friendship between the people of our two countries has made a new development in recent years as the result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The Chinese Government and people attach great importance to their friendship with the Indian Government and people. The relations between our two countries are being further strengthened with each passing day, and cultural and economic ties are on the increase. In particular the agreement concluded in April of this year between China and India on trade and intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India not only has resulted in further improvement in Sino-Indian friendship, but also given expression to the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence between our two countries,

thus furnishing a good example of solving problems between nations by means of negotiation.

China and India are both peace-loving nations. The Chinese people feel very happy to have such a neighbour as India which is devoted to the cause of peace. India has made valuable contributions to the efforts to bring about an armistice in Korea. India has constantly been interested in the strivings for the termination of the Indo-China war, and has untiringly supported the efforts made at the Geneva Conference to restore peace in Indo-China. It is very obvious that this position of India is of great significance for safeguarding peace in Asia.

All the peoples of Asia want peace. The menace to the peace of Asia comes now from outside. But, Asia today is no longer the Asia of yesterday. The age when outside forces could decide at will the fate of Asia has gone forever. We are confident that the unity of all peace-loving nations and peoples of Asia will frustrate the schemes of the war instigators. I hope that China and India will cooperate even more closely for the noble aim of safeguarding peace in Asia.

**61 "Sino-Indian unity for peace in the Far East and the whole world," *People's Daily* editorial, 26 June 1954 (Extracts)**

China and India have a total population of nearly one thousand million. They have long common borders and both are great Asian nations with long histories and civilisations. Being peace-loving peoples, they have never made war upon each other. Throughout the ages, close economic and cultural relations and profound friendship have developed between the two peoples.

Ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China, friendship between the two countries has been growing on a new basis. They have not only established friendly diplomatic relations but have developed economic and cultural interchange. With ever increasing contacts, the bonds of friendship between the two peoples have grown closer everyday.

The Chinese Government and people have always valued and treasured the friendship and unity between the Chinese and Indian peoples. . . .

Clearly these principles [five principles] are the basis of



peaceful coexistence and friendly relations among all countries. The ever-deepening friendship between China and India on this basis is beneficial to the peaceful development and prosperity of the two countries and conforms to their interests and desires.

China and India are both concerned with peace in Asia and in the whole world. This is most clearly seen in their approach to the Korean question.

Tremendous efforts were made by China to bring about the Korean armistice and for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question at the Geneva Conference. India also made a great contribution to the achievement of the Korean armistice and presided over the work of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea. . . .

Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in various statements on the Indo-China question to the Indian House of the People both before and after the opening of the Geneva Conference, also expressed deep concern over the restoration of peace in Indo-China. During the Geneva Conference, great efforts were made by Indian diplomat Krishna Menon at Geneva to the same end.

All this, together with other international activities of the Governments and peoples of the two countries, has clearly contributed greatly to the promotion of peace in Asia and in the whole world.

Aggressive American designs on Asia are now growing with each day. The U.S. is sparing no effort to form aggressive alliances in Asia, to split Asia into hostile blocs, so as to facilitate aggression, control of the continent and the launching of war there. Peace in Asia and the security of the Asian peoples are under serious threat.

It is the common desire of the Asian peoples to safeguard Asian peace and security. Both China and India shoulder a solemn responsibility for this noble end. . . .

The defence of peace and security in Asia is a common concern of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the eager desire of all Asian peoples. This desire can be realized and world peace promoted if there is sincere unity between the Asian countries.

The Chinese people are glad to have such a great neighbour

so devoted to peace as India. . . . The relations between the two countries have set a good example for friendly relations among Asian countries.

There is no doubt that the meeting of the two Prime Ministers in New Delhi will deepen the mutual understanding between the two countries and strengthen their cooperation in international affairs. The development and consolidation of the traditional friendship of the nearly one thousand million people of the two countries will contribute tremendously to the maintenance of peace in Asia and the whole world.

## **62 Chou En-lai's statement at a press conference in New Delhi, 27 June 1954 (Extracts)**

. . . If these principles [Five Principles] are applied in a wider sphere in Asia, then danger of war would recede and the possibility of cooperation among Asian nations would increase. . . .

Revolution cannot be exported; at the same time, outside interference with the common will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted.

If all the nations of the world put their mutual relations on the basis of these principles, intimidation and aggression by one nation against another would not happen, and peaceful co-existence of all nations of the world would be turned from a possibility into a reality. . . .

It is my view that in order to seek common measures for the maintenance of peace and security in Asia, it is desirable for the appropriate responsible persons of the principal Asian countries to meet occasionally to consult each other. . . .

It is my opinion that in order to strengthen and develop the relations between China and India, we must exert our efforts in different ways. Between China and India there has existed for 2000 years a traditional friendship. . . .

The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. . . . provides a new basis for strengthening and developing the relations between our two countries.

On this new basis, close cooperation and constant contacts between the Governments and peoples of our two countries for the cause of world peace, and the development of economic

relations and interchange of culture between the two countries will make it possible to continuously strengthen and develop the relations between our two countries.

It was said that the present volume of trade between our two countries is relatively small. I think that in the spirit of supplying the wants of each other and rendering assistance to each other and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, ways can be found for expanding the volume of trade. . . .

**63 Joint statement by the Prime Ministers of India and China,  
28 June 1954**

His Excellency Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, came to Delhi at the invitation of His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of India. He stayed here for three days. During this period the two Prime Ministers discussed many matters of common concern to India and China. In particular they discussed the prospects of peace in South East Asia and the developments that had taken place in the Geneva Conference in regard to Indo-China. The situation in Indo-China was of vital importance to the peace of Asia and the world and the Prime Ministers were anxious that the efforts that were being made at Geneva should succeed. They noted with satisfaction that some progress had been made in the talks at Geneva in regard to an armistice. They earnestly hoped that these efforts will meet with success in the near future and that they would result in a political settlement of the problems of that area.

2. The talks between the Prime Ministers aimed at helping, in such ways as were possible, the efforts at peaceful settlement that were being made in Geneva and elsewhere. Their main purpose was to arrive at a clearer understanding of each other's point of view in order to help the maintenance of peace, both in co-operation with each other and with other countries.

3. Recently India and China have come to an agreement in which they laid down certain principles which should guide the relations between the two countries. These principles are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;

2. Non-aggression;
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence.

4. The Prime Ministers recognised that different social and political systems exist in various parts of Asia and the world. If, however, the above-mentioned principles are accepted and acted upon and there is no interference by any one country with another, these differences should not come in the way of peace or create conflicts. With the assurance of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country and of non-aggression, there would be peaceful co-existence and friendly relations between the countries concerned. This would lessen the tension that exists in the world today and help in creating a climate of peace.

5. In particular, the Prime Ministers hoped that these principles would be applied to the solution of the problems in Indo-China where the political settlement should aim at the creation of free, democratic, unified and independent States, which should not be used for aggressive purposes or be subjected to foreign intervention. This will lead to a growth of self-confidence in these countries as well as to friendly relations between them and their neighbours. The adoption of the principles referred to above will also help in creating an area of peace which, as circumstances permit, can be enlarged, thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world.

6. The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as the other countries of Asia.

7. These conversations were held with a view to help in bringing about a greater understanding of the problems of Asia.

and to further a peaceful and co-operative effort, in common with the other countries of the world, in solving these and like problems.

The Prime Ministers agreed that their respective countries should maintain close contacts so that there should continue to be full understanding between them. They appreciated greatly the present opportunity of meeting together and having a full exchange of ideas leading to a clearer understanding and co-operation in the cause of peace.

**64 Chinese note to India, 17 July 1954**

According to a report received from the Tibet Region of China, over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on 29 June 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ali Area of the Tibet Region of China. (Wu-Je is about one day's journey from the Niti Pass). The above happening is not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India, and the spirit of the Joint Communique issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India. It is hoped that the Government of India would promptly investigate the matter, and order the immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops in question from the above-mentioned territory of the Tibet Region of China. We shall appreciate it if you will let us know at the earliest opportunity the results of steps which you are to take in the above matter.

**65 Chou En-lai's report on foreign affairs made at the 33rd session of the Central People's Government Council, 11 August 1954 (Extracts)**

A Chinese-Indian Joint Statement and a Chinese-Burmese Joint Statement were issued on June 28 and 29, 1954 respectively. In these two joint statements, the three governments unanimously agree to take the five principles . . . as the basic principles to guide the relations between China and India and between China and Burma. We are of the opinion that these five principles with respect to peaceful coexistence should likewise be applied to relations between various nations and in international relations generally. . . .

We believe that if these five principles win support from more countries, even the fears and apprehensions prevailing between nations which have been antagonistic to each other would give place to a sense of security of mutual confidence; in that case it would be possible to establish more and wider areas of peace in Asia, and to prevent these areas from being reduced to hotbeds for the aggressive circles of the United States to make war and organize antagonistic military blocs. In line with this policy, the Central People's Government will make unremitting efforts for the establishment of collective peace in Asia.

### **66 Indian note to China, 27 August 1954**

We have made thorough enquiries regarding the allegation made by the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy on 17th July and repeated again on 13th August about a report that a unit of 33 Indians attached to the local garrison in U.P. (India) had intruded into the Tibet region of China. As previously mentioned to the Chinese Counsellor, our further investigations have confirmed that the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is south-east of Niti Pass and is in Indian territory. None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of the Niti Pass, as verbally mentioned by the Chinese Counsellor.

On the other hand, we have received reports that some of the Tibetan officials tried to cross into our territory in Hoti Plain and it is requested that such entry without proper documents is not in conformity with the Agreement signed between India and China regarding Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China, nor in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India and the spirit of the joint communique issued recently by the Prime Ministers of India and China. It is hoped that the Government of China will instruct the local authorities in Tibet not to cross into Indian territory as we have instructed our authorities not to cross into Tibetan territory.

**67 Chou En-lai's report on the Work of the Government  
delivered to the first session of the First National People's  
Congress, 23 September 1954 (Extracts)**

The People's Republic of China has always attached importance to peaceful co-operation with the Southeast Asian countries and other neighbouring states, and to the efforts made in the cause of peace by such a large Asian country as India. In June 1954, the Chinese and Indian Premiers and the Chinese and Burmese Premiers held separate talks and unanimously affirmed in their respective joint statements that the five principles . . . should be the basic principles guiding relations between China and India and between China and Burma. We believe that the friendly relations between our country and the Republic of Indonesia can also be extended on the basis of these fundamental principles. We also hold that the same five principles for peaceful coexistence should apply likewise to relations between our country and Ceylon, Pakistan and other Asian countries, as well as to international relations in general.

**68 Trade agreement between China and India, 14 October 1954**

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, animated by the common desire to develop trade between the two countries and to strengthen further the friendship that already exists between the Governments and the peoples of India and China have, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, reached agreements as follows:

*Article I*

The two contracting parties being desirous of adopting all appropriate measures for the expansion of trade between the two countries agree to give the fullest consideration to all suggestions for the promotion of such trade.

*Article II*

The two contracting parties agree that all commercial transactions between the two countries shall be carried out in accordance with the Import, Export and Foreign Exchange

Regulations in force from time to time in their respective countries.

### *Article III*

The two contracting parties agree to accord, subject to the laws and regulations of the two countries for the time being in force, facilities for the import and export of the commodities mentioned in the attached Schedules "A" and "B". [not printed]

### *Article IV*

The present agreement will not preclude the two contracting parties from facilitating trade in commodities not mentioned in the attached Schedules "A" and "B".

### *Article V*

The Trade between the Republic of India and the Tibet Region of the People's Republic of China will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China signed in Peking on the 29th April 1954.

### *Article VI*

The Government of the Republic of India agree that on request by the Government of the People's Republic of China, they will subject to the regulations in force, accord reasonable facilities for the entry into the Port of Calcutta and subsequent movement to the Tibet Region of the People's Republic of China, of such commercial goods as cannot be obtained in India. These facilities will be accorded only to goods of Chinese origin.

### *Article VII*

All commercial and non-commercial payments between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China may be effected in Indian rupees or in pounds sterling as may be mutually convenient. For the purpose of facilitating such payments, the People's Bank of China will open one or more account(s) with one or more commercial bank(s) in India authorised to deal in Foreign Exchange to be called account(s) "A". In addition, the People's Bank of China will, if necessary,



open another account with the Reserve Bank of India to be called account "B". All payments between the two countries will be made through account (s) "A". Account "B" will be used only for replenishing the balance (s) in Account (s) "A" whenever necessary. Payments to be made by residents of India to residents of the People's Republic of China will be effected by crediting the amounts of such payments to the above-mentioned account(s) "A". Payments to be made to residents of India by residents of the People's Republic of China will be effected by debiting the said account(s) "A". The account(s) "A" will be replenished as and when necessary by one of the following methods, namely:

- (i) by transfer of funds from another account "A" of the People's Bank of China with another commercial bank, or from account "B" with the Reserve Bank of India;
- (ii) by sale of sterling to the bank concerned. Account "B" will be replenished by either sale of sterling to the Reserve Bank of India or by transfer of pounds from account (s) "A".

2. Article VIII of this Agreement covers the following payments:

- (i) Payments for the commodities imported or exported under the present Agreement;
- (ii) Payments connected with commercial transactions and covering insurance, freight (in case of shipments of goods by the ships of either country) port charges, storage and forwarding expenses and bunkering;
- (iii) Payments for distribution of films, for incomes and expenses of culture performances and other exhibitions;
- (iv) Payments of expenses on account of tours of delegations of commercial, cultural, social or official nature;
- (v) Payments for the maintenance of the Embassy, Consulates and Trade Agencies of the Republic of India in China and for the maintenance of the Embassy, Consulates and Trade Agencies of the People's Republic of China in India;
- (vi) Other non-commercial payments on which agreement is reached between the Reserve Bank of India and the People's Bank of China.

3. Any balances on the credit side of the account(s) "A" or Account "B" maintained by the People's Bank of China will be convertible on demand into sterling at any time at the usual Banks' selling rate for sterling as fixed from time to time by the Indian Exchange Banks' Association. The above mentioned balances will be convertible into sterling even after the expiry of this Agreement.

4. Payments for border trade between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, however, will be settled according to the customary practice.

#### *Article VIII*

The two contracting parties agree to consult with each other on questions that may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Agreement.

#### *Article IX*

This Agreement will come into force from the date of its signature and will remain valid for a period of two years.

This Agreement can be extended or renewed by negotiation between the two contracting parties to be commenced three months prior to its expiry.

#### **69 Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet given in honour of Premier Nehru, 20 October 1954 (Extracts)**

India and China are both Great Powers of Asia . . . For more than two thousand years, there have been maintained close cultural and economic ties between India and China, and history has left no record of war whatsoever between our two countries . . . We believe that the peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation between China and India will certainly facilitate the gradual realisation of the peaceful coexistence among other Asian countries and countries of the world . . . In his speech in the Indian Parliament on September 29 this year, Prime Minister Nehru pointed out that "the whole approach of the Manila treaty is not only wrong but dangerous." This wrong and dangerous approach is not yet given up, and there is even the danger that it will be extended to areas outside Southeast Asia. We hold that this situation is the source of the uneasiness in Asia. . . .

As a result of the Geneva Conference, there arises the possibility of the materialization of the idea of establishing an area of peace in Southeast Asia initiated by Prime Minister Nehru. But the conclusion of the Manila treaty goes directly against this idea. In his speech in the Indian Parliament on September 16 this year, Prime Minister Nehru said: "India's policy is to try to develop an area of peace in Asia and elsewhere if possible." It is obvious that this policy of establishing and extending an area of peace is in keeping with the interests of the people of India as well as those of the other Asian peoples. We welcome this proposition of Prime Minister Nehru's, and are ready to work, together with India, in a common effort to overcome difficulties, and to establish and extend an area of peace in Asia. The Chinese Government and people treasure very much their friendship and cooperation with the Government and people of India. . . .

We hope that the established friendship between China and India will be further strengthened and developed so that the Chinese-Indian relations will be a model for the peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems and ideologies of the whole world.

**70 Chou En-lai's message of greetings on Nehru's birthday,  
13 November 1954**

On the occasion of your 65th birthday, please accept these well-known Chinese items—a pair of spotted deer, a pair of red-crested cranes and 100 gold fish of 20 different species—which I send through you to the Indian children. I hope that they will like these gifts which symbolise the friendship between our two peoples, just as the Chinese children like Asa [the elephant Prime Minister Nehru presented to the Chinese children].

When these gifts reach Delhi they will be presented by the Chinese Embassy in India.

**71 "Mr. Nehru's visit to China," article by Chen Han-seng  
Vice-Chairman of the China-India Friendship Association,  
16 November 1954 (Extracts)**

Since 1949, when the Chinese people became their own masters,

Mr. Nehru, as Prime Minister of the Republic of India, has done much to promote closer relations between China and India, and to further the cause of world peace which the Chinese people treasure and do all in their power to defend and consolidate. The Indian Government was among the first to establish diplomatic relations with our country following the founding of the People's Republic. Mr. Nehru has also frequently spoken out to demand that no obstructions should be placed in the way of China taking her rightful place in discussion of international affairs. More recently, India helped to bring about the armistice in Korea. During the Geneva negotiations, India, with the other Colombo Conference Powers, made significant contributions towards restoration of peace in Indo-China, and now she is helping to supervise it as a participant in the International Commission. It was an historic occasion when the Indian Prime Minister and Premier Chou En-lai, during the latter's visit to India last June, jointly announced five principles of peaceful coexistence as a basis for relations between the two countries. . . .

Seen in the context of the insidious attempts of the United States to split the Asian countries into two antagonistic groups, to sow distrust among nations, to stir up and extend international war, the "large measure of agreement" reached between China and India is undoubtedly of great international significance. It is a blow against the Washington trouble-makers. It will encourage all peace-loving people.

**72 Chou En-lai's message to Nehru on Indian National Day,  
24 January 1955**

On the occasion of the fifth National Day of the Republic of India, I extend warm and sincere greetings to the Government of the Republic of India and to you. The friendly cooperation between China and India will be constantly consolidated and developed on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence jointly enunciated by India and China. May the Republic of India become ever more prosperous and achieve new successes in establishing and expanding the peace area and in safeguarding peace in Asia and the world.

**73 Chou En-lai's speech at India's National Day reception in Peking, 26 January 1955 (Extracts)**

I am deeply convinced that the relations between our two countries will be increasingly closer and that there will be more frequent cultural and economic exchanges between our two countries.

1954 was also a year in which China and India closely cooperated with each other in the cause of peace. The Governments of China and India have made joint efforts towards the restoration of peace in Indo-China. The five principles of peaceful co-existence jointly advocated by China and India not only are the basic principles guiding the relations between China and India, but also have become an important factor in establishing and enlarging the area of peace and in safeguarding the peace of Asia and the world . . . .

China always attaches importance to the efforts made by India in safeguarding the peace of Asia and the world, and is ready to increase its co-operation with India in order to attain this common goal. . . .

**74 Communique on handing over of the Indian communication facilities in Tibet to China, 1 April 1955 (Extract)**

The People's Republic of China and the Republic of India agree that from the date of 1st April 1955, the entire postal, telegraph and public telephone services with their equipment and the rest houses with their equipment operated by the Government of India in the Tibet Region of China, are handed over by the Government of India to the Government of China and become the possessions of the Government of China. Both sides agree that the price for all the rest houses with their equipment is rupees three lakhs and sixteen thousand and eight hundred and twenty-eight only and the Government of China paid the total amount to the Government of India, on 31st March 1955.

**75 Article by Feng Chih-tan in *People's Daily*, 11 April 1955 (Extracts)**

U.S. "aid" to Asian countries is intended for military aggres-

sion, economic exploitation and colonialist expansion. . .

Large quantities of surplus ammunition in the hands of U.S. magnates have been one of the motives behind the U.S. Government's offers of "military aid." The dumping of surplus commodities and agricultural products constitutes the major part of U.S. "economic aid" in Asia. Due to the growing crisis of overproduction of farm products, the U.S. President has laid special emphasis in his recent foreign aid programme report on 'a broad surplus disposal programme,' which means in effect the dumping of large quantities of surplus farm products in countries receiving US "aid" at prices higher than the world market. It is under 'economic aid' that the U.S. has sold tens of thousands of tons of inferior and even rotten surplus wheat and cotton to India, Japan and other countries.

This being the nature of U.S. 'aid,' it is only natural that recipient countries cannot benefit economically. In fact, those Asian countries that have received large amounts of U.S. 'aid' are not only far from being industrialised, but their national economies have been seriously damaged.

The Asian people have come to realise that for their national economies to develop independently, they must rely on their own efforts, instead of imperialist 'aid,' and develop international economic cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

#### **76 Observer's commentary in *People's Daily* on Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union, 10 June 1955 (Summary)**

The Chinese people wholeheartedly welcome the Indian Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union and the growth of friendly Soviet-Indian relations. . . .

The facts prove that friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and India is important for the defence of peace, irrespective of the different social systems in these two countries. . . .

Observer cited instances of economic and cultural co-operation between the Soviet Union and India along these lines in recent years, particularly the Soviet assistance to India in the building of a steel plant with a capacity of one million tons of steel annually. "This disinterested assistance. . . contrasted

sharply with the "aid" from Western countries, which was tied in with scheming for control of the under-developed countries."

At this time when Soviet-Indian friendship is daily growing Prime Minister Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union is a very significant event. It augurs well for the extension of existing friendly relations between the Soviet Union and India.

**77 Chou En-lai's speech on the Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy delivered at the second session of the First National People's Congress, 30 July 1955 (Extract)**

The Chinese people hope that the countries of Asia and the Pacific region, including the United States, will sign a pact of collective peace to replace the antagonistic military blocs now existing in this part of the world, so that the collective peace first advocated by the Indian Government may be realized.

**78 Chou En-lai's interview with Japanese press delegation, 17 August 1955 (Extract)**

In response to the proposal first put forward by Prime Minister Nehru of India for establishing collective peace and extending the area of peace, I said, as early as 1954, at the Geneva Conference, that the Government of the People's Republic of China considers that "the countries of Asia should consult among themselves with a view to seeking common measures to safeguard peace and security in Asia by means of respective mutual obligations." We have also declared that this proposal of ours does not exclude any countries outside Asia. Later, the five principles of peaceful co-existence initiated by China together with India and Burma and the Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation unanimously adopted by the Asian-African Conference further paved the way for establishing collective peace and extending the area of peace. Therefore, our proposal for the signing of a collective peace pact by the countries of Asia and the Pacific region, including the United States, was put forward on the basis of such developments of the situation.

This collective peace pact which we advocate is in complete conformity with the stipulations of the United Nations Charter.

Its purpose is not to create division and antagonism among the countries, but to make countries live together in peace and in friendly co-operation, so as to replace the antagonistic military blocs now existing in this area. We believe that the realistic nature of this proposal will become even more obvious with the development of the situation favourable to world peace.

**79 *People's Daily* commentary on India's fight for Goa,  
24 August 1955 (Extracts)**

The atrocities committed by the Portuguese Colonial authorities have aroused the indignation of the Indian people and just people in all countries. Goa is an integral part of India historically, geographically, ethnically, economically and culturally.

The Chinese people . . . . fully support the Indian's just demand.

The Indian people's fight to recover Goa is part of the struggle in defence of peace. In the past few years, Goa was being converted into a military base of the North Atlantic bloc in South Asia. This inevitably jeopardises the peace and security of India and the rest of Southeast Asia. . . . The reason Portugal has persisted in its savage and unreasonable action on the question of Goa is because it has the support of certain Western colonialist forces. . . . The Indian people's struggle to recover Goa is bound to result in victory.

**80 *Observer's* commentary in *People's Daily* on Dulles' Allegation that Goa and Macao are "Portuguese provinces",  
11 December 1955 (Extract)**

By his allegation that India's Goa and China's Macao are "Portuguese provinces," Dulles has clearly exposed himself as the repulsive colonialist he has always been. . . .

Dulles' statement at his December 6th press conference "have helped the Asian people see that in their struggle against colonialism the United States sides firmly with the colonialists and is their ringleader. . . .

"Contrary to Dulles argument, Soviet leaders' condemnation of colonialism is a powerful support for the Asian people's



struggle for peace and against colonialism. This support is obviously beneficial to the easing of the Asian situation.

“What Dulles fears most is precisely the far-reaching influence of the Soviet leaders’ visits to the countries of Asia. This influence is bound to help the consolidation of Asian peace and the Asian people’s struggle for independence and freedom, and deal a heavy blow to the aggressive schemes of the U.S. Dulles’ support for the Portuguese colonialists indeed shows the confusion and alarm of the U.S. in face of this prospect that is emerging in the Asian situation; it shows its frantic and futile attempt to exercise pressure on the Asian people so as to hold back this development in the situation.

**81 *People’s Daily* editorial welcomes Soviet-Indian joint statement of 13 December 1955, 16 December 1955 (Extract)**

This unswerving stand and the efforts for world peace of the Soviet and Indian leaders correctly reflect the sincere wishes of all people desiring peace. It will reinforce their determination and power to struggle for peace.

The leaders of the two countries devoted great attention to the pressing questions now outstanding in Asia and set forward clear positions for their settlement. . . .

The Chinese people completely endorse the ways to settle these questions as suggested by the Soviet Union and India. The clearly defined positions of the governments of the two countries towards these questions will undoubtedly benefit Asian peace. . . .

The further growth of economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and India, countries have different social systems, will set a good example for other states. Such economic co-operation contrasts sharply with what the western states call “aid”.

The tremendous significance of strengthening economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and India also rests in the fact that the establishment of economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit is bound to help to a very great extent India’s construction. A powerful India is an important factor in consolidating peace in Asia and the whole world.

**82 Chou En-lai's speech at a reception given by Indian Ambassador R.K. Nehru, 26 January 1956 (Extract)**

In the past year the Republic of India, as one of the world's big powers, has made important contributions to the peace of Asia and the world. The Asian-African Conference held as a result of the initiative of India and the other Colombo Powers, has greatly advanced the Asian and African people's common cause of opposing colonialism, safeguarding world peace and strengthening their mutual friendly cooperation. Prime Minister Nehru played an outstanding role in bringing about these positive achievements of the Asian-African Conference. In 1955, friendly visits were exchanged between Prime Minister Nehru and national leaders of the Soviet Union. This not only marks a new development in the friendship and cooperation between India and the Soviet Union, but also has its far-reaching international significance. The firm and clear-cut position of the Indian and Soviet leaders on the pressing issues in current international relations accurately reflects the common desires of all the peace-loving countries and peoples. This is warmly welcomed and supported by the Chinese Government and people.

Thanks to the close cooperation and unrelaxing efforts of the Soviet Union, India, China and other peace-loving countries in fighting for peace, many new changes in favour of peace has been brought about in the international situation in the past year.

The five principles of peaceful co-existence have been accepted by more and more countries of the world. Both our countries are carrying on the struggle for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and are benefiting constantly from mutual support and encouragement.

The Chinese Government and people deeply appreciate the righteous stand of the Indian Government and people in consistently supporting China's demand for the restoration of its legitimate position in the United Nations and to exercise its sovereign right over Taiwan and the other coastal islands. Similarly, the Chinese Government and people fully support India's legitimate demand to recover Goa, an inalienable part of India's territory. These demands of China and India are all just,

and just demands of millions of people are bound to come true. We are also grateful to the Indian Government for accepting the trust of the People's Republic of China and undertaking in extremely difficult conditions, the task of assisting in the return to China of the Chinese in the United States in accordance with the agreement of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks. India has also made important contribution in leading the International Commissions in Indo-China in controlling and supervising the implementation of the Geneva agreements. The close cooperation and mutual support between China and India is a very important force in consolidating peace in Asia and the world. We are ready to work for the further strengthening of this cooperation in the new year.

In the past year, there was also satisfactory development in the relations between our two countries. Our contact and cooperation in the economic and cultural fields and the fields of science and technology have become broader and closer.

### **83 *People's Daily* editorial on India's National Day Anniversary, 26 January 1956 (Extracts)**

The founding of the Republic of India was a vitally significant event in the modern development of Asia. For many centuries India was placed in the position of a colony. India's achievements of national sovereignty and independence showed that the Western states' colonialist system was doomed. It encouraged the oppressed peoples to extend their fight for national independence. A wide road to independent development now lies before the Indian people. In their efforts to build up an independent country they have already met with success and India has become an increasingly important factor in the efforts of the peoples for peace. . . .

The Government and people of India have greatly contributed to consolidating peace and easing international tension. India is playing an increasingly important role in the solution of international problems and the establishment of friendly relations among all countries. It has made an unforgettable contribution to the termination of the Korean War, the restoration of peace in Indo-China, the sponsoring and holding of the Asian-African Conference, the establishment in conjunction with China and

27 other Asian and African countries of the Bandung spirit and the strengthening of friendly co-operation among nations.

On the Taiwan question, India maintains a just position. It has declared that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory. The five principles of peaceful co-existence initiated by the Prime Ministers of India and China opened up the road for countries with different social systems to co-exist in peace. Their initiation contributed to the relaxation of international tension. They have now become the principles which all peace-loving countries are jointly observing. Their influence is extending daily.

The exchange of visits between the Prime Ministers of China and India not only enhanced the close friendship between the two peoples but greatly helped to consolidate peace in the Far East. The visits of the Soviet and Indian leaders to each other's countries further accelerated the cause of world peace and enlarged the peace area. The efforts of the Government and people of India for Asian and world peace have been widely acclaimed by the people of all lands. In recent years India's international prestige has grown rapidly. It has already become one of the great powers of the world. This is certainly not accidental.

The facts show that by devoting its efforts for world peace, developing trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and strengthening friendly cooperation among nations, India has derived great advantages for its economic construction. In particular, the strengthening of India's friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union, China and other peaceful countries has produced increasingly conspicuous effects on India's economic construction. There was a rapid growth in trade between India and China in 1955. The growth of trade between India and the Soviet Union has been even greater. The strengthening of such trade relations based on equality and mutual benefit is of great significance to India's successful operation of its construction plans.

A deep friendship has long existed between the Chinese and Indian peoples. Following different roads, our two great Asian countries have attained our people's common goal—national independence. The pride we share in common of having achieved national independence has deepened our mutual understanding

and added to our respect for each other. Our two peoples are now advancing hand in hand for the common cause of peace and national independence. May our friendship grow stronger day by day!

**84 Chou En-lai's Political Report at the second session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 30 January 1956 (Extracts)**

The surging national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Central and South America have shaken the hold of colonialism in these areas and vigorously blocked the implementation of the U.S. aggressive circles' policy there. In Southeast Asia, countries like India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan have freed themselves from colonial status and taken the path of independent development. These countries treasure the national independence they have achieved and are determined to safeguard their independence and sovereignty. They condemn antagonistic military blocs and oppose war threats. They firmly maintain a position of neutrality and demand peaceful co-existence among all countries. These countries, particularly India as a great world power, are playing an increasingly great positive role in the peaceful settlement of many major international questions. We have a deep respect for the stand taken by these countries; we have established friendly relations with them on the principles of peaceful co-existence, and are co-operating with them in many respects in the struggle for peace and international security.

**85 President Rajendra Prasad's address to the Indian Parliament, 15 February 1956 (Extracts)**

My Government regret that the progress achieved as a result of the efforts of last year to bring about negotiations and to resolve differences between the United States and China has not made much headway, and observe with concern that the alternative to a negotiated settlement is fraught with grave possibilities. My Government will continue to use their best endeavours to advance the cause of peaceful negotiations. . . .

In the Far East and Asia generally, the continued exclusion

of China from the United Nations and the trade and other embargos and discriminations imposed against her, make for instability and conflict. My Government will try their utmost, in common with like-minded governments both at the United Nations and outside, to help to remedy this situation which continues to be perhaps the gravest threat to world peace.

**86 Chou En-lai's address to the third session of the First National People's Congress, 28 June 1956 (Extract)**

The proposition of replacing antagonistic military blocs with a system of collective peace which does not exclude any country has increasingly assumed realistic significance. In actively advocating the five principles of peaceful co-existence and expanding the influence of the peace areas, India, as a great world power, is playing a particularly outstanding role. In his foreign policy statement in the Indian Lok Sabha on March 20, 1956 Prime Minister Nehru of India said:

"We hold, and with each new experience are further confirmed in our conviction, that in the adherence to and the practice of the five principles, now widely known as the Panch Shila, alone lies the promise of a new era of international peace and stability." This unimpeachable position has received the approval and support of all peace-loving countries and peoples, and at the same time cannot but influence certain countries which are members of military blocs headed by the United States.

**87 Letter from India's permanent representative Arthur S. Lall to the UN Secretary-General requesting inclusion of an item on representation of China in the UN on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, 10 November 1956**

China is a founder Member of the United Nations and also a permanent member of the Security Council. The representation of China in the United Nations derives its special importance not only from these facts but also from the size of her population, the richness of her resources and the vital contribution she must make to the solution of important issues before the United Nations.

For a considerable period the Government of the People's

Republic of China alone has exercised effective, continuous and uncontested authority over China. Furthermore, consistently with the meaning and intension of the Charter, the Central People's Government alone is able and willing to carry out the obligations of United Nations membership on behalf of the people of China as required by Articles 2 and 4 of the Charter. It is the declared policy of the Central People's Government of China to carry out the obligations of a Member State in terms of the Charter. At the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung from 18 April to 28 April 1955, the Chinese delegation headed by the Prime Minister of China was among the strongest supporters of the United Nations and of its Charter. The Central People's Government is recognized by some thirty nations, two of whom are permanent members of the Security Council. As the Central People's Government in terms of ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of the Charter is the only Government that can represent China in the United Nations, to deny her representation through her Government is not only contrary to the Charter and the practice of the United Nations in regard to member States, but is against the interests of the United Nations and the promotion of world peace and international co-operation.

The present assignment of the seat of China can in no sense be regarded as in accord with the requirements of the Charter and has seriously impeded the Organisation in the fulfilment of its tasks and in dealing constructively with the problems before it. The absence of the representatives of China in the United Nations has in effect denied to a great part of Asia and to nearly a fourth of the people of the world participation in the work both of the Assembly and the Security Council as well as the specialized agencies and other United Nations bodies. The consideration of Far Eastern questions, of world problems generally and notably disarmament, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and the economic development of under-developed countries cannot be effective without Chinese co-operation. The proper representation of the Government of China in the United Nations is essential if the United Nations is to apply itself realistically and adequately to the problems before it.

The procedure adopted during the past several years of placing a moratorium on the consideration of China's repre-

sensation in the United Nations has rendered impossible adequate discussion of this increasingly important matter. In view of the growing urgency of rectifying the existing position, and with due regard to the provisions of rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the Delegation of India considers it necessary to bring before the eleventh session of the General Assembly a separate item entitled "Representation of China in the United Nations".

**88 Chou En-lai's press conference in Calcutta, 9 December 1956  
(Extract)**

An Indian Correspondent representing in several American papers and the Indian daily *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, asked if the Chinese Premier included Kashmir when he said in Delhi that China would support India's struggle in defence of territorial integrity. The Premier expressed the hope that the Kashmir question would be settled amicably. He said, "India and Pakistan are sister countries. The peoples of these countries are of the same race. There can be no dispute between them which cannot be settled."

**89 Chou En-lai's press conference in Dacca, 29 December 1956  
(Extract)**

Chou En-lai said that what he meant by Chinese support to "India's struggle to defend its territorial integrity"—was simply the assurance on Chinese side that China "would respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty" of India as of any other country. And all this, Chou said, was included in the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

**90 Chou En-lai's report on visits to eleven countries in Asia and Europe given to the third session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 5 March 1957 (Extracts)**

We were in Delhi on three occasions. Each time we held talks and exchanged views extensively with Prime Minister Nehru on many questions of common interest to both countries and



we reached full agreement in our views on many questions. We are of the opinion that such friendly and cordial talks are highly beneficial. Naturally, China and India do not hold, nor can they hold identical views on all questions. But just as Prime Minister Nehru said during our visit to India, "When we disagree in some matters, it is a friendly disagreement and it does not affect our friendship and co-operation." These talks have indeed increased our mutual understanding. They will further help our two countries, each in its different position, to play their roles in the common cause of safeguarding world peace and promoting international co-operation. The long ties of friendly and co-operative relations between our two countries in this regard will definitely be further strengthened in the future. . . .

In the relations between the Asian countries at present, the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan has caused much uneasiness on the part of their neighbours. We have expressed our hope to the leaders of India and Pakistan that they should seek a solution to this question through peaceful negotiation. In our Joint Statement of February 5, 1957, Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon and myself similarly appealed to the two parties to make further efforts for a peaceful settlement of this question for the sake of their own interests as well as for the broader interests of the solidarity of the Asian and African countries. Here, we should like to express this hope once again. It is our view that the sister countries of India and Pakistan can reach a friendly settlement of this question themselves through peaceful negotiation. To have this question referred to the United Nations which, in the circumstances today, is under the control of the United States, can only give rise to the danger of foreign interference.

**91 Letter from India's permanent representative Arthur S. Lall to the UN Secretary-General proposing item on representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly  
13 September 1957 (Extract)**

In the absence of the Government of about a quarter of the world's population, the organs of the United Nations cannot successfully pursue their task of fulfilling the objectives of the

Charter. This is all the more so in view of the special Charter obligations of China as a permanent member of the Security Council. Furthermore, it can no longer be gainsaid or overlooked that the Central People's Government of China is the only Government which, on behalf of China, is able and willing to carry out the obligations of United Nations membership in accordance with the Charter. Even though that Government has so far been prevented from taking its rightful place in the United Nations its spokesmen have frequently upheld both the Organization and its Charter. For example, the Prime Minister of China was a strong supporter of the Organization at the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April 1955.

It behoves the United Nations to look at the question of the representation of China not only from the point of view of the legitimate rights of the Chinese people and their Government, but also from the point of view of the effectiveness of the Organization itself and the obligation which all Members have to strengthen the Organization and to assist in achieving its objectives and purposes. Having regard to these important considerations the virtual absence of China is a major handicap to the progress of the work of the Organization.

The absence of genuine Chinese representation deprives the United Nations of the presence of spokesmen of a very large number of people whose economic and social needs and possible contribution to the Organization in these fields should be taken into account, and of an important Government whose participation in the United Nations would contribute to the solution of all problems and particularly to those affecting directly the Far East and such matters as disarmament, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the economic betterment of under-developed countries. Furthermore, without effective Chinese representation there exists an imbalance which militates against full weight being given in the counsels of the United Nations to the voice of a great portion of Asia.

**92 Chou En-lai's report to the fifth session of the First National People's Congress, 7 February 1958 (Extracts)**

Our great neighbour India which is always concerned for world peace and international security has given active support to the

proposal of the Soviet Union for an East-West summit conference. In line with his basic idea of expanding the area of peace, Prime Minister Nehru has expressed himself against the setting-up of bases for guided missiles in Europe and Asia and for the establishment and expansion of an area free from weapons of mass destruction. These propositions are what the Chinese people have all long supported. . . .

Together with India and Burma, our country initiated the five principles of peaceful co-existence. And during the past half year, the tremendous development in the relations between our country and the nationalist countries of Asia and Africa has provided further living examples of the five principles in action.

**93 Foreword by Ting Hsi-lin, President of the Sino-Indian Friendship Association, to a book *A Short History of Sino-Indian Friendship* by Chin Keh-mu, June 1958 (Extracts)**

A frontier thousands of *li* long stretched between China and India, and their contacts date back thousands of years; yet not a single war has ever been waged between them. This miracle in international relations is due to high motives and admirable conduct.

Although during the last few centuries the imperialists put a temporary stop to the friendly contacts between China and India, the people of both countries retained the warmest feelings for each other. . . .

Today both China and India have shaken off the fetters of imperialism. Our traditional friendship, further strengthened on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, will surely endure for ever to make even greater contributions to the defence of world peace and the cause of human progress.

**94 Chinese note to India, 10 July 1958 (Extracts)**

Since the peaceful liberation of the Tibetan region of China, reactionaries who have fled from Tibet to the Kalimpong area have been carrying on subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region under the instigation and direction of the U.S. and the Chiang Kai-shek clique and in collusion with local reactionaries in Kalimpong. . . .

According to reliable material available to the Chinese Government the American-Chiang Kai-shek clique and local special agents and Tibetan reactionaries operating in Kalimpong have recently stepped up their conspiratorial and disruptive activities against the Tibet region of China. Using Kalimpong as a base they are actively inciting and organising a handful of reactionaries hidden in Tibet for an armed revolt there in order to attain the traitorous aim of separating the Tibet region from the People's Republic of China. . . .

In using the Indian territory adjacent to China to perpetrate disruptive activities against the People's Republic of China, the American and Chiang Kai-shek clique special agents have also the hideous object of damaging China-India friendship. In order to shatter the underhand schemes of United States imperialists, defend China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and safeguard China-India friendship, the Chinese Government hereby requests the Government of India to repress the subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region carried out in Kalimpong. . . .

**95 Letter from India's Permanent Representative Arthur S. Lall to the UN Secretary-General proposing an item on the representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly, 14 July 1958 (Extracts)**

Among the founder-Members of the United Nations is China, and because of its importance in matters relating to international peace and security China is also a permanent member of the Security Council. The representation of China in the United Nations derives its special significance not only from these facts but also from the size of her population, the richness of her resources and the vital contributions she must make to the solution of important issues before the Organization. It cannot be gainsaid that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is the only Government which exercises effective control over China. The stability of that Government is today undisputed, and it has diplomatic relations with twenty-seven Member States of the United Nations, including two of the permanent members of the Security Council, and has developed normal commercial relations with sixty-eight countries of the world. It has participated in several

international conferences, such as the Geneva Conference on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China and the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. Even though the Central People's Government has so far been prevented from taking its rightful place in the United Nations, its spokesmen have frequently upheld both the organization and its Charter. For example, the Prime Minister of China spoke strongly in support of the Organization at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung.

It is necessary to consider the question of the representation of China in the United Nations not only from the point of view of the legitimate rights of the Chinese people and their Government, but also from the point of view of the effectiveness of the Organization itself. There is today no doubt that only the People's Government of China is in a position to comply with those decisions or recommendations of the United Nations Organization which affect China specifically or which are addressed to all Member States. . . .

There is little doubt that an effective disarmament agreement which is one of the major and urgent objectives of the United Nations and of all peoples, cannot be reached without the participation of China. The artificial situation whereby one-fourth of the peoples of the world are denied representation in the United Nations cannot but diminish the effectiveness of the Organization.

#### **96 Indian note to China, 2 August 1958 (Extracts)**

The Government of India were . . . greatly surprised by the note which the Government of the People's Republic of China handed over to the Indian Charge d'Affaires at Peking on July 10. They regret to say that the statements contained in this note must have been based on a complete misunderstanding of facts. The Government of India have no evidence that the U.S. Government and the Kuomintang regime are using Kalimpong as a base for disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region. The Government of India will never permit any portion of its territory to be used as a base of activities against any foreign Government, not to speak of the friendly Government of the People's Republic of China. . . .

**97 Indian note to China, 8 August 1958 (Extracts)**

Both sides have claimed jurisdiction over Barahoti and both sides in the past have been sending officials to Barahoti. While the Government of India were and are of the view that during the pendency of the negotiations neither side should send civil officials to the area, they cannot agree to only one side sending their civil officials to Barahoti. In the present case, the Government of the People's Republic of China did not accept the proposal of the Government of India in this regard and actually sent their civil officials to the area on the 29th June. The Government of India, therefore, had no option but to instruct the Government of Uttar Pradesh to send their civil officials also to the area. . . .

The facts stated above furnish no support for the suggestion in the Chinese note [of 2 August 1958] that the Government of India are "attempting to change the existing situation of Wu-Je and to create a new dispute." The Government of India, therefore, emphatically repudiate the suggestion.

**98 Indian note to China, 21 August 1958**

The attention of the Government of India has been drawn to a map of China published on pages 20-21 of the "China Pictorial" magazine (No. 95—July 1958) in which the borders of China have been indicated by a thick brown line. Though this map is on a small scale, there are clear inaccuracies in it insofar as China's border with India is concerned. The border as depicted in the map includes as Chinese territory (i) four of the five Divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency; (ii) some areas in the north of the State of Uttar Pradesh; and (iii) large areas in eastern Ladakh which form part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It appears that the entire Tashigang area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in north-west Bhutan have also been included as Chinese territory.

2. In the past, similar inaccurate maps have been published in China. The matter was referred to His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai by His Excellency the Prime Minister of India when the latter visited China in October 1954. His Excellency Chou En-lai had at that time replied that current Chinese maps were

based on old maps and that the Government of the People's Republic of China had had no time to correct them. The Government of India recognised the force of this statement. Since, however, the present Government of the People's Republic of China has now been in office for so many years and new maps are being repeatedly printed and published in China, the Government of India would suggest that necessary corrections in the Chinese maps should not be delayed further. In this particular case, the map has been published in a magazine, which is printed in an official press and is distributed by an official agency.

3. The Government of India are, therefore, drawing the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China again to this matter. They trust that the necessary corrections will be made soon. The northern boundary of India is clearly shown in the Political Map of India—3rd edition, 1956 (scale—one inch to seventy miles), which is freely available on sale. The Government of India will be happy to supply a copy of this map to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

### **99 Indian note to China, 18 October 1958 (Extracts)**

The attention of the Government of India has recently been drawn to the fact that a motor road has been constructed by the Government of the People's Republic of China across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu and Kashmir State, which is part of India. This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as Yehcheng-Gartok road or Sinkiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September 1957. The road enters Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, runs north-west to Amtogar and striking the western bank of the Amtogar lake runs north-west through Yangpa, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar which are all in indisputable Indian territory. Near the Amtogar lake several branch tracks have also been made motorable.

2. The India-China boundary in the Ladakh sector as in others is traditionally well-known and follows well marked geographical features . . .

3. It is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese

Government should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India.

4. The Government of India would like to point out that Chinese personnel, including officials and workers engaged in constructing and maintaining the road, as well as Chinese travellers traversing this road have been contravening Article V of the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and India on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet concluded in 1954. According to this Article "for travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the Other Party" except as provided in the subsequent paragraphs of the Article relating to traders, pilgrims and muleteers. No applications for visas from Chinese personnel working on the road or from Chinese travellers traversing this road have ever been received by the Government of India.

5. As the Chinese Government are aware, the Government of India are anxious to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer. The Government of India would therefore be glad for an early reply from the Tibetan Government. . . .

#### **100 Chinese reply to Indian note of 21 August 1958, 3 November 1958 (Extracts)**

In the maps currently published in China, the boundary line between China and its neighbouring countries, including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published in China before the liberation. . . . The reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own. The Chinese Government notes with satisfaction that the Indian Government recognises the force of Premier Chou En-lai's statement on this matter.

The Chinese Government believes that with the elapse of time, and after consultations with the various neighbouring



countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided on in accordance with the results of the consultations and the survey.

### 101 Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 14 December 1958 (Extracts)

When the Sino-Indian Agreement in regard to the Tibet region of China was concluded, various outstanding problems, including some relating to our border trade, were considered. A number of mountain passes were mentioned which should be used for purposes of travel between the two countries. No border questions were raised at that time and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries. In fact we thought that the Sino-Indian Agreement, which was happily concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our two countries.

Somewhat later, my attention was drawn to some maps published in China. The maps I saw were not very accurate maps, but nevertheless the frontier as roughly drawn in these maps did not correspond with the actual frontier. In fact it ran right across the territory of India in several places. . . .

Subsequently, in October 1954 . . . I briefly mentioned to you that I had seen some maps recently published in China which gave a wrong borderline between the two countries. I presumed that this was by some error and told you at the time that so far as India was concerned we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument. You were good enough to reply to me that these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that you had had no time to revise them. In view of the many and heavy pre-occupations of your Government. I could understand that this revision had not taken place till then. I expressed the hope that the borderline would be corrected before long.

Towards the end of 1956 . . . In the course of these talks you referred to the Sino-Burmese border. . . . It was in this connection that you mentioned to me the Sino-Indian border, and more especially the so-called MacMahon Line. This MacMahon Line covered a part of the Sino-Burmese border and a

large part of the Chinese border with India. I remember your telling me that you did not approve of this border being called the MacMahon Line and I replied that I did not like that name either. But for facility of reference we referred to it as such.

You told me then that you had accepted this MacMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so.

Immediately after our talk, I had written a minute so that we might have a record of this talk for our personal and confidential use. I am giving below a quotation from this minute:

“Premier Chou referred to the MacMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by British Imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this MacMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so.”

I remember discussing this matter with you at some considerable length. You were good enough to make this point quite clear. I then mentioned that there were no disputes between us about our frontier, but there were certain very minor border problems which were pending settlement. We decided that these petty issues should be settled amicably by representatives of the two Governments meeting together on the basis of established practice and custom as well as watersheds. There was long delay in this meeting taking place, but ultimately a representative of the Chinese Government came to Delhi and

discussed one of these petty issues for some time. Unfortunately no settlement about this matter was arrived at then and it was decided to continue the talks later. . . .

A few months ago, our attention was drawn again to a map of China published in the magazine "China Pictorial," which indicated the border with India. This map was also not very clearly defined. But even the rough borderline appeared to us to be wrongly placed. . . .

The magazine containing this map was widely distributed and questions were asked in our Parliament about this. I gave answers to the effect that these maps were merely reproductions of old ones and did not represent the actual facts of the situation. . . .

I was puzzled by this reply [Chinese reply of 3 Nov. 1958] because I thought that there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. You will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People's Republic came into power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries. I am sure that you will appreciate our difficulties in this matter.

I am venturing to write to you on this subject as I feel that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries should be removed as soon as possible. I am anxious, as I am sure you are, that the firm basis of our friendship should not only be maintained but should be strengthened.

## **102 Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 14 December 1958, 23 January 1959 (Extracts)**

In your letter you have taken much space to discuss the question of Sino-Indian boundary and thus enabled us to understand better the Indian Government's stand on the question. I would also like now to set forth the views and stand of the Chinese Government.

First of all, I wish to point out that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been con-

cluded between the Chinese central government and the Indian Government. So far as the actual situation is concerned, there are certain differences between the two sides over the border question. In the past few years, questions as to which side certain areas on the Sino-Indian border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. The latest case concerns an area in the southern part of China's Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which has always been under Chinese jurisdiction. Petrol duties have continually been carried out in that area by the border guards of the Chinese Government. And the Sinkiang-Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs through that area. Yet recently the Indian Government claimed that that area was Indian territory. All this shows that border disputes do exist between China and India.

It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between the Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question. The Chinese Government has always held that the existence of the border question absolutely should not affect the development of Sino-Indian friendly relations. We believe that, following proper preparations, this question which has been carried over from the past can certainly be settled reasonably on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence through friendly talks. To this end, the Chinese Government has now proceeded to take certain steps in making preparations.

An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the question of the so-called MacMahon Line. . . . As you are aware, the "MacMahon Line" was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically, too, it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognized by the Chinese central government. Although related documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities of the Tibet Region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line. And I have also told you formally about their

dissatisfaction. On the other hand, one cannot, of course, fail to take cognizance of the great and encouraging changes: India and Burma, which are concerned in this line, have attained independence successively and become states friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the MacMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on more than one occasion. However, we believe that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the boundary line.

Precisely because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally delimited and some differences exist, it is unavoidable that there should be discrepancies between the boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the two sides. On the maps currently published in our country, the Chinese boundaries are drawn in the way consistently followed in Chinese maps for the part several decades, if not longer. We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient grounds. But it would be inappropriate for us to make changes without having made surveys and without having consulted the countries concerned. Furthermore, there would be difficulties in making such changes, because they would give rise to confusion among our people and bring censure on our government. As a matter of fact, our people have also expressed surprise at the way the Sino-Indian boundary, particularly its western section, is drawn on maps published in India. They have asked our government to take up this matter with the Indian Government. Yet we have not done so, but have explained to them the actual situation of the Sino-Indian boundary. With the settlement of the boundary question—which, as our government has repeatedly pointed out, requires surveys and mutual consultations—the problem of drawing the boundary on the maps will also be solved.

In recent years, there occurred between China and India some minor border incidents which are probably difficult to avoid pending the formal delimitation of the boundary. In order to avoid such incidents so far as possible before the

boundary is formally delimited, our government would like to propose to the Indian Government that, as a provisional measure, the two sides temporarily maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, each side keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them. For the differences between the two sides, naturally, a solution may be sought through consultations like those held on the Wu-Je (Hoti) question. As to the negotiations regarding Wu-Je, we also regret very much that no agreement has yet been reached, as we formerly thought a solution would not be difficult to achieve through negotiations and on-the-spot investigations. We still believe that this small question can be settled satisfactorily through the continued efforts of our two sides. The Chinese Government hopes that the above proposal about temporary maintenance of the present state of the boundary between the two sides will be approved of by the Indian Government.

I need not reiterate how highly the Chinese Government and people value Sino-Indian friendship. We will never allow any difference between our two countries to affect this friendship, and we believe that India shares the same views. I hope that the letter will help you get a better understanding of our government's stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question.

**103 Paper by Yi Li-yu, member of editorial board of *World Culture* (Shih Chieh Chih Shih) at a joint conference of the editorial boards of *International Affairs* (Moscow) and *World Culture*, January 1959 (Extracts)**

The joint statements made in the summer of 1954 by the Prime Ministers of People's China and India, and also by People's China and Burma opened up a new stage in the relations between China and the "nationalistic" states of Asia and Africa. These declarations not merely expressed the desire for friendly relations between China and these states, but also created a firm foundation for them. . . .

In order to consolidate friendly relations with her neighbours, China ardently supports the method of negotiations to resolve complex problems inherited from the distant past. Thus, as a result of cordial discussions between China and India in 1954, agreement was reached on trade and communications between

the Chinese territory, Tibet and India. This agreement erased the vestiges of British imperialist aggression against Chinese Tibet and consolidated relations between China and India on a new basis. . . .

The Five Principles play an unusually important part in ensuring the security of China and the peace-loving neutral countries, in consolidating and extending the peace zone in Asia and Africa, and in easing international tension. . . .

Direct contact and exchange of visits, particularly by government leaders, is one of the proven means of developing friendly co-operation and mutual understanding. China, therefore, makes great efforts in this direction.

#### **104 Proclamation of the Tibet Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army regarding the revolt in Tibet, 20 March 1959 (Extract)**

For a long time the Tibetan local government and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata have plotted a rebellion in collaboration with imperialists and reactionaries outside the country. For quite some time they gathered together rebellious bandits and connived at their ravages, their disruption of communication, their plundering of merchants and travellers, and crimes of rape, arson and murder in various parts of Tibet, which brought suffering to the people.

The Central People's Government, adopting an attitude of magnanimity, repeatedly ordered the Tibetan local government to punish the rebels severely and safeguard law and order. But the Tibetan local government only feigned compliance. It not only evaded responsibility for stamping out the rebellion, but connived at and supported it and thus encouraged the rebel bandits. By March 10 of this year, most of the kaloons and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata in Tibet even joined the rebels. They put the Dalai Lama under duress, tore up the 17-articles Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, openly betrayed the motherland and undermined unification of the country. They murdered in cold blood Kanchung Soanamchiatso, a Tibetan official of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, and wounded Sampo Tsewong-Rentzen, Deputy Commander of the Tibet

**Military Area Command.** In addition, on the night of March 19, they launched an all-out attack on the People's Liberation Army garrison in Lhasa. Their crimes could not be worse.

In order to protect the unification of the motherland and national unity and to relieve the people of the Tibet region from their suffering, our army has been ordered to take punitive action to put down the rebellion. We believe that all the people in Tibet, ecclesiastical and secular, will energetically help our troops put down the rebellion and not give shelter or supplies to the bandits, or provide them with information.

#### **105 Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 22 March 1959 (Extracts)**

4. On receipt of your letter [of 23 January 1959] I have again examined the basis of the determination of the frontier between India and the Tibet Region of China. It is true that this frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the sectors but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier, as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this, in most parts, it has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Governments of India and the Central Government of China. . . .

5. Thus, in these three different sectors covering much the larger part of our boundary with China, there is sufficient authority based on geography, tradition as well as treaties for the boundary as shown in our published maps. The remaining sector from the tri-junction of the Nepal, India and Tibet boundary upto Ladakh is also traditional and follows well-defined geographical features. Here, too, the boundary runs along well-defined watersheds between the river systems in the south and the west on the one hand and north and east on the other. This delineation is confirmed by old revenue records and maps and by the exercise of Indian administrative authority up to the boundary line for decades.

6. As regards Barahoti (which you call Wu-Je), I agree with you that its rightful ownership should be settled by negotiation. During the talks held last year, we provided extensive documentary proofs that this area has been under Indian jurisdic-



tion and lies well within our frontiers. An on-the-spot investigation could hardly throw any useful light until proofs to the contrary could be adduced. Nevertheless, we were agreeable to both sides agreeing not to send their civil and military officials to the area. Unfortunately, your delegation did not agree to our suggestion. I learn that a material change in the situation has since been effected by the despatch of Chinese civil and military detachments, equipped with arms, to camp in the area, after our own civil party had withdrawn at the beginning of last winter. If the reports that we have received about an armed Chinese party camping and erecting permanent structures in Hoti during winter are correct, it would seem that unilateral action, not in accordance with custom, was being taken in assertion of your claim to the disputed area.

7. I do hope that a study of the foregoing paragraphs will convince you that not only is the delineation of our frontier, as published in our maps, based on natural and geographical features but that it also coincides with tradition and over a large part is confirmed by international agreements. I need hardly add that independent India would be the last country to make any encroachments beyond its well-established frontiers. It was in the confidence that the general question of our common frontier was settled to the satisfaction of both sides that I declared publicly and in Parliament on several occasions that there is no room for doubt about our frontiers as shown in the published maps. We thought that our position was clearly understood and accepted by your Government. However, as unfortunately there is some difference of views between our two Governments in regard to the delineation of the frontier at some places, I agree that the position as it was before the recent disputes arose should be respected by both sides and that neither side should try to take unilateral action in exercise of what it conceives to be its right. Further, if any possession has been secured recently, the position should be rectified.

8. You will appreciate that the continuing publication of Chinese maps showing considerable parts of Indian and Bhutanese territory as if they were in China is not in accordance with long established usage as well as treaties, and is a matter of great concern to us. As I said in my previous letter, we greatly value our friendship with China. Our two countries evolved

the principles of *Panch Sheel* which has now found widespread acceptance among the other countries in the world. It would be most unfortunate if these frontier questions should now affect the friendly relations existing between our countries. I hope therefore that an early understanding in this matter will be reached.

**106 Order of the State Council of China proclaimed by  
Chou En-lai, 28 March 1959 (Extracts)**

Most of the *kaloons*\* of the Tibetan local government and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata colluded with imperialism, gathered together rebellious bandits, rebelled, wrought havoc among the people, held the Dalai Lama under duress, tore up the 17-article Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet and, on the night of March 19, directed the Tibetan local army and rebels in an all-out attack against the People's Liberation Army garrison in Lhasa. Such acts which betray the motherland and disrupt the unification of the country cannot be tolerated by the law.

To safeguard the unification of the country and national unity, in addition to enjoining the Tibet Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to put down the rebellion thoroughly, it has been decided that as from today the Tibetan local government is dissolved and its functions and powers will be exercised by the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. During the time when the Dalai Lama Dantzen-Jaltso, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, is held under duress, Panchen Erdeni Chuji-Geltseng, Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, shall act as Chairman . . .

The Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region will lead all the people of Tibet, ecclesiastical and secular, to unite as one and make common efforts to assist the People's Liberation Army in putting down the rebellion quickly, to strengthen the national defence, protect the interests of the

\*The local government of Tibet is called *Kasha* and its six members are called *Kaloons* in Tibetan.

people of all nationalities, maintain social order and strive for the building of a democratic and socialist, new Tibet.

**107 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on developments in Tibet, 30 March 1959 (Extract)**

Our attitude and the position of all previous Governments in India and elsewhere has historically been the recognition of some kind of suzerainty or sovereignty of China over Tibet, and Tibetan autonomy. The measure of the autonomy has varied depending upon the relative strength and weakness of China and Tibet, which have varied in the last hundreds of years. Every Government in China has claimed suzerainty there. Many Governments in Tibet have repudiated it. When the Prime Minister of the Chinese Government came here, two or three years ago, he discussed the situation in Tibet with me at his own instance. I did not raise it, so far as I remember. He told me then that Tibet had always been, according to him and according to the Chinese position, a part of the Chinese State, although Tibet was not China in the sense of being a province of China. Tibet was an autonomous region which had been a part of the Chinese State. They had always claimed it and had it. Those, as far as I remember, were the words of the Chinese Premier. He said they wanted to treat Tibet as an autonomous region and give it full autonomy. All I can say is that we had to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. But I was glad to hear Mr. Chou En-lai laying such stress on Tibetan autonomy. I said that if this was fully acted upon and was well known to Tibetans, possibly the difficulties would be much less, because, I remember, difficulties had already arisen three years ago.

For nearly three years, there has been what is called the Khampa revolt in China. The Khampa region, although it contains people of Tibetan origin, is not technically Tibet now. About fifty or sixty years ago, the Khampa region in Eastern Tibet was incorporated in China. It was never really adequately controlled or ruled by any authority, Tibetan or Chinese, because the Khampas are tough mountain people and do not like anybody ruling over them.

When the new Chinese Government came in, the Khampa region was in China proper. They started introducing their new

reforms or changes there. These brought them into trouble with the Khampas. The trouble, which started three years ago, spread to the south and south-east chiefly. It was a kind of guerilla activity which caused much trouble and damage to both the parties. When Premier Chou En-lai talked to me, this Khampa trouble had started. It was not the kind of trouble which is of great military importance to a Government, but it prevented things from settling down.

That has been continuing. Some convoy is attacked or taken away, or something like that has been happening. But what has happened in Lhasa does not follow from that; it is a completely new development.

### **108 Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet welcoming Panchen Erdeni, 14 April 1959 (Extract)**

The handful of Tibetan rebels who betrayed the motherland had attempted to split the motherland, but the result was the further consolidation of the unification of the motherland, the promotion of unity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities and the promotion of the rebirth of the people in Tibet.

. . . The Tibetan reactionary clique, in collusion with imperialism, had assembled rebellious bandits and launched military rebellion, completely violating the interests of the one million two hundred thousand people of Tibet and also the common interests of the people of all the various nationalities of the country. With the active assistance of the patriotic people of all sections, both ecclesiastic and temporal, the People's Liberation Army had in fact, already basically put down the rebellion . . . .

The overwhelming majority of the people of Tibet want to free themselves from the cruelty and darkness of serfdom . . . . Many just-minded patriotic members of the upper and middle strata in Tibet also stand for the step by step reform of the unreasonable social system. In the interests of national solidarity and taking the specific conditions in Tibet into consideration, the Central People's Government has been following a policy of slowing down the pace and patiently waiting as regards reform in Tibet. However, the obstinate reactionaries

in Tibet courting self-destruction, chose the path of betrayal of the people of Tibet and the motherland.

In so destroying themselves they have in fact created extremely favourable conditions for the democratisation in Tibet.

We believe that from now on, the people of Tibet will gradually free themselves from poverty and backwardness and advance to the bright road of prosperity and happiness . . . .

**109 Observer's commentary in *People's Daily* on Sino-Indian friendship, 15 April 1959 (Extracts)**

Much has been said in India recently which is extremely incompatible with Sino-Indian friendly relations . . . . Since Tibet is a part of China, the political system of Tibet is naturally the Chinese people's own affair. It cannot be considered appropriate for any outsider to advocate vociferously this or that on the issue any more than it is appropriate for any country to raise a hue and cry about the policy of the Indian Government in relation to one of India's states or one of India's national minorities . . . . Some Indian friends are particularly sensitive about the question of Kalimpong. This also cannot be considered realistic. It has long been an open secret that the Tibetan traitors use Kalimpong as their base, outside the country to collude with imperialist elements and engineer rebellious activities . . . . In his statement of April 2, Prime Minister Nehru while denying that Kalimpong was a commanding centre of the rebellion, declared that "I cannot guarantee any secret thing." It is true that the traitors' activities in Kalimpong are sometimes open and sometimes secret. Our Indian friends may not be aware of it. But this does not warrant the conclusion that we, too, are surely not aware of it. Our Indian friends must not trust them too much.

. . . . Contrary to the wishes of the imperialists, the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples will consolidate and grow further through all these tests.

**110 Dalai Lama's statement in Tezpur (India), 18 April 1959 (Extract)**

It has always been accepted that the Tibetan people are different from the Han people of China. There has always been a strong

desire for independence on the part of the Tibetan people. Throughout history this has been asserted on numerous occasions. Sometimes the Chinese Government has imposed their suzerainty on Tibet and at other times Tibet has functioned as an independent country. In any event, at all times, even when the suzerainty of China was imposed, Tibet remained autonomous in control of its internal affairs.

In 1951 under the pressure of the Chinese Government a 17-article agreement was made between China and Tibet. In that agreement the suzerainty of China was accepted as there was no alternative left to the Tibetans. But even in the agreement it was stated that Tibet would enjoy full autonomy. Though the control of external events were to be in the hands of the Chinese Government it was agreed that there would be no interference by the Chinese Government with Tibetan religion and customs and her internal administration. In fact after the occupation of Tibet by Chinese armies the Tibetan Government did not enjoy any measure of autonomy, even in internal matters and Chinese Government exercised full powers in Tibetan affairs.

In 1956 a preparatory committee was set up for Tibet with the Dalai Lama as the Chairman and the Panchen Lama as Vice-Chairman and General Chang Kuo-hua as their representative of the Chinese Government. In practice, even this body had little power and decision in all important matters were taken by the Chinese authorities. The Dalai Lama and his government tried their best to adhere to the 17-article agreement but interference of the Chinese authorities persisted. By the end of 1955 a struggle had started in Kham Province and this assumed serious proportions in 1956. In the consequential struggle, Chinese armed forces destroyed a large number of monasteries.

Many Lamas were killed and a large number of monks and officials were taken and employed on the construction of roads in China and interference in the exercise of religious freedom increased.

The relation of the Tibetans with China became openly strained from the early part of February 1959. The Dalai Lama had agreed a month in advance to attend a cultural show in the Chinese headquarters and the date was suddenly fixed for

the 10th of March. The people of Lhasa became apprehensive that some harm might be done to the Dalai Lama and as a result about 10,000 people gathered around the Dalai Lama's summer palace at Norbu Lingka and physically prevented the Dalai Lama from attending the function.

Thereafter the people themselves decided to raise a body-guard for the protection of the Dalai Lama. Large crowds of Tibetans went about the streets of Lhasa demonstrating against Chinese rule in Tibet. Two days later thousands of Tibetan women held demonstrations protesting against the Chinese authorities. In spite of this demonstration from the people the Dalai Lama and his government endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese and tried to carry out negotiations with the Chinese representatives as to how best to bring about peace in Tibet and assuage the people's anxiety.

While these negotiations were being carried out reinforcements arrived to strengthen the Chinese garrisons in Lhasa and Tibet. On the 17th of March, two or three mortar shells were fired in the direction of Norbu Lingka Palace. Fortunately the shells fell in a nearby pond.

After this, the advisers became alive to the danger to the person of the Dalai Lama and in those difficult circumstances it became imperative for the Dalai Lama, members of his family and his high officials to leave Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama would like to state categorically that he left Lhasa and Tibet and came to India of his own free will and not under duress.

### **111 Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Second National People's Congress, 18 April 1959 (Extracts)**

There are now some people abroad who are harping on their sympathy for the Tibetans. But they do not make clear which section of the Tibetans they sympathize with—the working people and progressives who demand and support reform and the middle-of-roaders who can be won over, amounting to over one million one hundred thousand people, or the handful of reactionaries. We hope that all well-intentioned friends—I refer to those who are willing to persist in practising the Five Princi-

ples of Peaceful Co-existence with our country and have pledged not to interfere in China's internal affairs—will in the first place note this clear distinction between the overwhelming majority and the small handful . . . .

After the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, and after the Dalai Lama was abducted to India by the rebels, Prime Minister Nehru of our great friendly neighbour India issued successive statements on non-interference in China's internal affairs and in favour of continued consolidation of friendly Sino-Indian relations. We welcome these statements. There is a friendship over two thousand year old between China and India, which are moreover the initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. There is no reason at all why either of our two countries should let our mutual friendship and the principles in foreign relations adhered to by our two countries jointly be shaken on account of a handful of Tibetan rebels. It is true that the defeat of the rebellion in Tibet, the Tibetan reactionaries and certain foreign reactionaries made use of certain areas on the Sino-Indian border to carry out activities designed to disrupt the unity of our country and undermine Sino-Indian friendship. The plans of those reactionaries however, have already fallen through. It is our hope that, with the suppression of the rebellion in Tibet and through the joint efforts of China and India, we will lay an even firmer foundation, and secure an even more flourishing development of friendly relations between our two great peace-loving Asian countries with their populations totalling more than one thousand million people. All the ill-intentioned provocations of those who are deliberately seeking to disrupt Sino-Indian friendship will be in vain.

**112 Speech on Tibet by Panchen Erdeni Chuji-Geltseng, Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of Tibet, at the First Session of the Second National People's Congress, 22 April 1959 (Extracts)**

This so-called statement of the Dalai Lama was imposed on him by foreigners . . . .

We know that this so-called "independence" for Tibet was first proposed by the British . . . .

Now some Indians are again talking about "independence"



for Tibet and saying that they “recognize Chinese suzerainty but do not permit China to interfere in Tibet’s internal affairs.” It may be asked, why is it that China cannot run Chinese affairs, while other people can? What difference is there between these utterances and those of the British in the past? I think there is none. These statements are approved only by the imperialists, colonialists and reactionaries, and not by the Indian and other peoples of the world, nor by all those people in India who stand for the five principles of peaceful co-existence, treasure Sino-Indian friendship and genuinely sympathize with the Tibetan people . . . .

It is utterly futile for the rebels under the direction of their foreign masters to usurp the name of the Dalai Lama in carrying out their activities to disrupt and split the motherland. The imperialists are doing their utmost to use this incident to undermine Sino-Indian relations. This is intolerable. It is worth noting that the reactionaries in India, treading the path of the British imperialists, have always harboured expansionist ambitions towards Tibet and have carried out various forms of sabotage which undoubtedly benefit the imperialists and are unfavourable to the friendship between China and India.

### 113 Article in *People’s Daily*, 25-26 April 1959 (Extracts)

The people in Tibet have long established close and fraternal relations with other nationalities in China, particularly with the Han nationality, and constitute one of the members of the great family of the motherland. For a long time Tibet has been an inalienable and component part of Chinese territory . . . .

If China’s sovereignty over Tibet, suffered injuries, it was entirely because of imperialist aggression. But in no way can this be offered as a reason for denying China’s sovereignty over Tibet . . . .

In March 1947, the Asian Conference was convened by Britain in New Delhi, India, to which Tibet was invited as a “country”. As part of the imperialist plot, the “snow mountains and lions” religious pennant of Tibetan Buddhism was displayed as the “national flag” of Tibet among the flags of Asian countries hung at the conference. More shameless was

that on a map of Asia displayed at the conference Tibet was drawn outside the boundaries of China, in an attempt to make the “independence” of Tibet an accomplished fact. The great indignation among the people all over China, and a serious protest made by the Chinese delegation, caused a correction to be undertaken.

While plotting for the “independence of Tibet”, the British imperialists never forgot to offer as a pretext the relations between China and India. The British imperialist J.B. Gould, representative of Britain in Tibet, openly declared that there should be a buffer state between two big powers, and that China should make Tibet a buffer state so as to avoid conflict between China and India. Actually, the talks about the so-called “buffer state” are sheer imperialist nonsense. The peoples of China and India have been co-existing in peace for many years, and they do not need any “buffer”. Suppose that a “buffer” were needed, why then should China’s territory be chosen, is it not obvious expansion and aggression? . . .

In January 1950, the United Press reported that the Tibetan authorities were going to dispatch “goodwill missions” to the United States, Britain, India, Nepal and Peking respectively, to declare Tibet’s “independence”. The U.S. and British imperialists tried thus to create a pretext for their open interference in China’s internal affairs so as to attain their aim of preventing the People’s Liberation Army from entering Tibet. . . .

The People’s Liberation Army gave a smashing blow to the Tibetan army, wiped out the main force of the Tibetan Army, over 5,000 men, and liberated Chamdo on October 19, 1950. This shattered the scheme of the British and U.S. imperialists and the handful of Tibetan reactionaries to prevent the entrance of the People’s Liberation Army into Tibet and the liberation of the Tibetan people. . . .

The imperialists and the Tibetan upper strata reactionary clique were not willing to see Tibet return to the big family of the motherland. They plotted all along to scrap the 17-Article Agreement and prepared for an armed rebellion.

**114 Statement made by Foreign Secretary of India to the Chinese Ambassador, 26 April 1959 (Extracts)**

On the 3rd April the Foreign Secretary informed His Excellency the Ambassador that the Dalai Lama with a small party had entered Indian territory on the 31st March. The Dalai Lama had earlier sent a message to the Government of India asking for political asylum in India. The Government of India had, in accordance with international usage, allowed the Dalai Lama and his party to cross into Indian territory and stay in India. . . .

The Government of India have now seen recent reports of speeches delivered in the current session of the National People's Congress in Peking. They have read these reports with regret as they contain unbecoming and unjustified attacks on the Government of India and their officials and certain allegations which are patently untrue. Thus, it is stated that the Dalai Lama continues to be under duress and that the statements made by him are imposed on him by foreigners. Reference has also been made to so-called "Indian reactionaries" who are supposed to be "working in the footsteps of the British imperialists and have been harbouring expansionist ambitions towards Tibet". The Government of India are distressed to see these reports and to notice that a furious and unworthy campaign has been started in the press and the radio in Peking, the effect of which can only be to do incalculable damage to the friendly relations between India and China. The Government of India would like to state categorically that the statements made by the Dalai Lama are entirely his own and no official of theirs was in any way responsible for them. The Dalai Lama was allowed to enter India at his own request; he is acting entirely on his own and is free to return to his country any time he wishes to do so. If the Chinese Government want to satisfy themselves on this point, they are welcome to send their Ambassador in India or any other emissary to meet the Dalai Lama and necessary facilities will be given to the emissary to discuss with him and ascertain his wishes. . . .

It is well-known that India has had long-standing religious and cultural contacts with the people of Tibet and the people of India are interested in developments there. India has had and

has no desire to interfere in internal happenings in Tibet. Because of old contacts, recent tragic events in Tibet have affected the people of India considerably, but it has been made clear by the Prime Minister that there is no question of any interference in the internal affairs of Tibet. As the Government of the People's Republic of China are no doubt aware, there is by law and Constitution complete freedom of expression of opinion in Parliament and the press and elsewhere in India. Opinions are often expressed in severe criticism of the Government of India's policies, as well as other opinions with which the Government are not in agreement.

The Prime Minister has declared in Parliament that the Dalai Lama will be accorded respectful treatment in India, but he is not expected to carry on any political activities from this country. The Government of India consider it most unfortunate that the fact of their having given asylum to the Dalai Lama, in exercise of their sovereignty and in accordance with well-known international usage, should have led responsible persons in China to make serious allegations which are unbecoming and entirely void of substance.

**15 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on the situation in Tibet, 27 April 1959 (Extracts)**

Our broad policy was governed by three factors: (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. That policy we shall continue to follow, because we think that a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future. It would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia, India and China, which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past, should develop feelings of hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy, but we hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the wider point of view of the peace of Asia and the world. The Five Principles have laid down, *inter alia*, mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of cold war used.

I have already made it clear previously that the charge that Kalimpong was a centre of the Tibetan rebellion, is wholly unjustified. The Khampa revolt started in an area of China proper adjoining Tibet, more than three years ago. Is Kalimpong supposed to be responsible for that? This revolt gradually spread and no doubt created a powerful impression on the minds of large numbers of Tibetans, who had kept away from the revolt. Fears and apprehensions about their future gripped their minds and the nationalist upsurge swayed their feelings. Their fears may have been unjustified, but surely they cannot be denied. Such feelings can only be dealt with adequately by gentler methods than warfare.

When Premier Chou En-lai came here two or three years ago, he was good enough to discuss Tibet with me at considerable length. We had a frank and full talk. He told me that while Tibet had long been a part of the Chinese State, they did not consider Tibet as a province of China. The people were different from the people of China proper, just as in other autonomous regions of Chinese State the people were different, even though they formed part of that State. Therefore, they considered Tibet an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy. He told me further that it was absurd for anyone to imagine that China was going to force Communism on Tibet. Communism could not be enforced in this way on a very backward country and they had no wish to do so even though they would like reforms to come in progressively. Even these reforms they proposed to postpone for a considerable time.

About that time, the Dalai Lama was also here and I had long talks with him then. I told him of Premier Chou En-lai's friendly approach and of his assurance that he would respect the autonomy of Tibet. I suggested to him that he should accept these assurances in good faith and co-operate in maintaining that autonomy and bringing about certain reforms in Tibet. The Dalai Lama agreed that his country, though according to him, advanced spiritually, was very backward socially and economically and reforms were needed.

It is not for us to say how far these friendly intentions and approaches materialised. The circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. On the one side, there was a dynamic, rapidly moving society; on the other, a static, unchanging society fearful of what

might be done to it in the name of reforms. The distance between the two was great and there appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile changes in some forms inevitably came to Tibet. Communications developed rapidly and the long isolation of Tibet was partly broken through. Though physical barriers were progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased. Apparently, the attempt to cross these mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed.

To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation. Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only upper class people but others also. No doubt, vested interests joined it and sought to profit by it. The attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans, is seldom helpful.

**116 Resolution of the Question of Tibet adopted at the First Session of the Second National People's Congress, 28 April 1959 (Extracts)**

The rebellion of the handful of Tibetan reactionaries and its suppression are wholly internal affairs of China which do not permit of any interference by foreigners. . . .

The People's Republic of China has consistently abided by the Five Principles, coexisting peacefully with its neighbours in the southwest, respecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity and not interfering in their internal affairs. The National People's Congress notes with regret that certain people in Indian political circles have recently made extremely unfriendly statements and committed extremely unfriendly acts which interfere in China's internal affairs. These statements and acts do not conform to the common interests of the peoples of the two countries, they only conform to the interests of their common enemy, the imperialists. Congress hopes that this abnormal situation will quickly disappear and that through the joint efforts of both sides, the great and long-standing friendly relations

between China and India will be further consolidated and developed.

**117 “The revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s philosophy,”  
commentary by the Editorial Department of *People’s Daily*,  
6 May 1959 (Extracts)**

The war of rebellion unleashed by the handful of traitors in Tibet has in the main been quelled. . . . Now Tibet faces a peaceful revolution, that is, the democratic reforms in Tibet. . . . This is a revolution—the continuation in Tibet of the great people’s revolution which swept the Chinese mainland around 1949. Because of obstruction by the former local government of Tibet, this revolution has all along been delayed in Tibet during the past eight years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. . . . The revolution in Tibet has been accelerated by this rebellion and with the democratization of Tibet the history of foreign intervention in Tibet will finally come to an end. This is absolutely necessary for the true consolidation of Sino-Indian friendship. . . . Mr. Nehru has on many occasions expressed his sympathy with the so-called “aspirations of the Tibetans for autonomy” and his opposition to what he called “armed intervention” by China. His statement of April 27 is somewhat more systematic. Nehru did not explain what kind of society in Tibet he referred to as a “static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform.” But this is precisely the starting point of the whole question. Our discussion must and can only begin here. . . . The Dalai Lama is by no means highly respected unconditionally by these people as Nehru says. The so-called “sympathizers” are only usurping the name of the Tibetan people, the name of Tibetan autonomy and the name of humanitarianism.

This counter-revolutionary “holy alliance” of the Metternich type has bound together the U.S. State Department, British colonialists, Syngman Rhee of south Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem of south Viet-nam, Chiang Kai-shek of China and India’s reactionary parties — the Praja Socialist Party and the Jan Sangh Party. . . .

Nehru has involuntarily been pushed by that alliance into an important role in their so-called sympathy-with-Tibet move-

ment. . . . We feel greatly distressed at being forced now to argue with Mr. Nehru in our comment. Mr. Nehru, the respected Prime Minister of our friendly neighbour, India, is one of the statesmen who enjoy prestige in the world. In particular, we cannot forget that he is a friend to China and an opponent to the imperialist policy of war and aggression. Furthermore, he has also made a number of enlightened statements on social progress. . . .

In his statement on April 27, 1959! Either he has completely cast away the views he once expressed, or else he really did not understand the scientific Marxist methods which he had thought he understood. . . . He tries to write off at one stroke the class analysis of Tibetan society as "wornout words, phrases and slogans". . . . Of course, we find it impossible to agree with this attempt of Nehru's. The class antagonism in Tibetan society is a living fact. . . . Reforms naturally call for action, and they should naturally be in the interests of the overwhelming majority who demand reforms and detrimental only to the tiny minority who stubbornly oppose reforms. . . . If the Khampas who account for about one-third of the rebels are subtracted, the Tibetans who took part in the rebellion were only a little over one per cent of the 1,200,000 population of Tibet. To think that the entire upper class in Tibet rebelled is not correct. . . .

In discussing Tibetan society, although Nehru does not oppose reforms and does not deny the past vested interests played in the rebellion, still on the whole he not only fails to touch on its extremely cruel system of exploitation, but virtually lumps together the vast majority of the exploited with the tiny minority of the exploiters. On this basis, he denies that a handful of upper-strata reactionaries are responsible for the rebellion in Tibet, describes the just action of the Chinese people in putting down the rebellion as a "tragedy" and expresses sympathy for the rebellion. Thus, he commits a most deplorable error. As friends of India and as the people whose affairs Nehru is discussing, we deem it necessary to point out this error. If one agrees with Nehru's logic, not only the revolution in Tibet, but the whole Chinese revolution would be impermissible. . . .

In Tibet, we displayed especially great patience in order to win the co-operation of Tibetan upper-strata elements. For



eight long years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet we maintained intact the former local government of Tibet, its complete system, its army and even its currency and persuaded the people of Tibet not to carry out for the time being the reforms they urgently demand. . . .

The communists have always dealt very carefully with the question of nationalities, and in particular have exerted the maximum efforts to win over the upper-strata elements in Tibet. . . .

In the relations between nationalities, the fundamental key-point is still the method of class analysis. Mr. Nehru hopes that we "will win them to friendly co-operation." No doubt this is a good idea, though it was meant by Mr. Nehru as an indirect charge that we have not done so and are not doing so. In point of fact, only the revolutionary proletariat can find a thorough and correct solution to historical national problems. . . . Messrs. Humanitarians of the world should know that the serfs in Tibet are also human beings. . . .

There is no ground to call the rebellion a national "revolution" and to describe the putting down of the rebellion as a national "tragedy." . . .

Obviously, there exist contradictions in Mr. Nehru's thinking. But we do not propose to discuss how these contradictions are to be resolved. On such matters, we could engage in a friendly debate, or we need not debate at all. Both our households have plenty to do. We are busy enough minding our own business, and why should either of us poke his nose into the other's business? . . . The point now is, that a group of Indians, unfortunately including Mr. Nehru, insist that we do things according to their opinions. We are very good friends and neighbours and can easily live in peace with each going his own way. If your way of doing things yields good results in India, it will not be too late for us to learn from you. Where, indeed, is the need for this urgency, not even scrupling to resort to certain acts of interference which impair friendship? . . .

Prime Minister Nehru denies that India has interfered in Tibet. He recalls the course of events before and after India's independence and partition to show that India has never had "political or ulterior ambitions" in Tibet. We acknowledge that Nehru's remarks conform with reality in the sense that the

Indian Government has no desire to annex Tibet or send its armed forces to intervene in Tibetan affairs. India has all along recognized Tibet as a part of China and that the Chinese Government enjoys sovereignty over Tibet. India concluded with China in April 1954 the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India based on the five principles, and later withdrew its troops from Tibet and handed over its post and telegraphic installations. The Chinese people view all this with satisfaction. However, interference by one country in the internal affairs of another may take diverse forms. To say that the Indian Government has not interfered in China's Tibet in any way in the past and at present is not convincing.

It may be recalled, as this newspaper reported, that the Indian Government intervened through diplomatic channels in October 1950 when the Chinese Government ordered its troops to enter Tibet.

It may not be pleasant to recall this episode. However, facts are facts. How can it be said that the Indian Government has never interfered in Tibet?

Unfortunately, such interference still continues in certain forms. Such interference is all the more regrettable since it has taken place after the Chinese and Indian Governments jointly declared that relations between their two countries should be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence . . . . It may be asked, to describe China's putting down a rebellion in its own territory as "armed intervention," as "oppressing and suppressing" their "autonomy," and to say that "the assurances given to India" have not been kept—how can it be said that all this is not interference? The Indian Government insists that the Dalai Lama is not held under duress by the rebels but is the head of the rebels . . . . The Indian Government has never pursued a clear-cut policy of non-interference . . . . After the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet and even before, certain political figures and papers in India launched a smear campaign against China of a scope reminiscent of the intervention of U.S. political and press circles in the execution of counter-revolutionary criminals in Cuba. We must ask, applying such political pressure to the internal affairs of a friendly country—can this be considered conformable to the five principles?

Prime Minister Nehru says that the Indian reaction on the question of Tibet is essentially not political but instinctive, largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons, also on a feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts with the Tibetan people. We understand that the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the people of China's Tibet . . . But how can feelings towards the people in Tibet be used by certain political figures as a pretext for impairing feelings towards the Chinese people and for interference in China's internal affairs? This kind of logic is fraught with obvious dangers, because if such logic can stand, then when Tibet has taken the road of democracy and socialism, the road of strength and prosperity, could not a "people's committee to support Assam" and a "committee for Uttar Pradesh affairs" be set up to interfere in the affairs of India's state of Assam or Uttar Pradesh under the pretext of ancient religious and cultural links? Could not the government of the Autonomous Region of Tibet or the Government of China as a whole declare deep sympathy with the people of Assam or Uttar Pradesh as a basic policy and in pursuance of such a policy find fault with this and that in the affairs of these states? . . .

Although the Indian Government has no desire to occupy Tibet or make Tibet formally independent, it really strives to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its own territory of Tibet. In this respect certain political figures in India have followed the tradition of the British Government of the past—they only recognize China's "suzerainty" over Tibet, like India's "suzerainty" over Bhutan and Sikkim. What they call "autonomy" for Tibet is different from national autonomy as laid down in clear terms in the Constitution of China, different from the national regional autonomy practised in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kwangsi and Ninghsia; rather it is a kind of semi-independent status. True, Tibet is not a province but an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China, with greater powers and functions than a province as laid down in the Constitution and by law; but it is definitely no protectorate—neither a Chinese protectorate, nor an Indian protectorate, nor a joint Chinese-Indian protectorate, nor a so-called buffer state between China and India. Any status of semi-independence for Tibet would be detrimental to the

Tibetan people, to the Chinese people, to the Indian people, to Sino-Indian friendship and to Asian peace . . . If establishment of such a buffer zone were pressed for, it would indeed create a truly deplorable conflict where none existed before.

Interference in China's internal affairs by certain political figures in India is not fortuitous. It bears the sign of the times. India is a country that has gained independence after shaking off the colonial rule of British imperialism. It desires to develop its national economy in a peaceful international environment and has profound contradictions with the imperialist and colonialist forces. This is one aspect of the picture. Another aspect is that the Indian big bourgeoisie maintains innumerable links with imperialism and is, to a certain extent dependent on foreign capital. Moreover, by its class nature, the big bourgeoisie has a certain urge for outward expansion. This is why, while it opposes the imperialist policy of intervention, it more or less reflects consciously or unconsciously, certain influences of imperialist policy of intervention. In international affairs, the Indian Government, headed by Prime Minister Nehru, has been reflecting generally the will of the Indian people and playing an important and praiseworthy role in opposing war and colonialism and safeguarding peace, in carrying out a foreign policy of friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and with other socialist countries, of not joining in the military blocs of United States imperialism. But for historical reasons India's big bourgeoisie has inherited and is attempting to maintain, certain legacies from the British colonialist rulers. Of course, the great Indian people are not in the least responsible for this dual character of the Indian bourgeoisie. . . We, as they do, hold that for the authorities of a country which gained independence not long ago and is now still subjected to threats from imperialist interventionists to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbour is a regrettable phenomenon in contemporary international politics . . .

It was only after a large volume of slanderous utterances had appeared in India that the Chinese people began to hit back . . . China's charge of Indian interference, as already stated, is well-founded. The suspicions voiced by Chinese public opinion about the authenticity of the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama are also based on facts. The numerous

loopholes and traces of forgery in that statement are still there objectively. . . .

When he Nehru accused the Central People's Government of China of violating the seventeen-article agreement and spoke about China's so-called "assurances" to India and so forth, we, after all, cannot say that his remarks showed regard for truth and propriety. . . .

Nehru is different from many persons who obviously bear ill-will towards China. He disagrees somewhat with us on the Tibet question. But in general he advocates Sino-Indian friendship. Of this we have no doubts whatsoever. We have made such a detailed reply to Prime Minister Nehru's reproaches (touching, of course, in not a few parts of the article also on those people who obviously bear us ill-will) precisely because we are fully confident that differences can be reduced and the argument can be settled. The argument may have been a bit sharp, because the vital interests of our motherland and the Tibetan people are involved. But we still hope that, in substance, our argument will benefit the mutual understanding between our two peoples and the friendship between our two peoples and two governments and that in the use of language friendship and propriety have not been overlooked. . . . Our basic interests are the same and our main enemy is also the same; we will certainly not forget our common interests and fall into the trap of our common enemy. Although it is regrettable for this argument to have taken place, we firmly believe that it will not result in feelings of hostility, nor will it shake the friendship between our two countries . . . We would like solemnly to assure all Indian patriots who are concerned for the security of India that democratic and prosperous Autonomous Region of Tibet as a member of the big family of the people of various nationalities of China is bound to be a factor for consolidating and strengthening friendship between China and India: It certainly will not be, nor can it possibly be, any sort of "menace" to the Republic of India. The peaceful, good-neighbour policy of socialist China is for ever unshakable and the friendship of the nearly 1,100 million people of our two countries is for ever unshakable, just as the Himalayas are unshakable.

**118 Statement made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary of India, 16 May 1959**

Since March 10, 1959 when the former Tibet Local Government and the Tibetan upper class reactionary clique unleashed armed rebellion, there have appeared deplorable abnormalities in the relations between China and India. This situation was caused by the Indian side, yet in his conversation on April 26, 1959 Mr. Dutt, Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, shifted responsibility onto the Chinese side. This is what the Chinese Government absolutely cannot accept.

The Tibet Region is an inalienable part of China's territory. The quelling of the rebellion in the Tibet Region by the Chinese Government and following that, the conducting by it of democratic reforms which the Tibetan people have longed for, are entirely China's internal affairs, in which no foreign country has any right to interfere under whatever pretext or in whatever form. In Tibet, just as in other national minority areas in China, regional national autonomy shall be implemented as stipulated in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. In this matter which is purely China's internal affairs, the Chinese Government has no obligation to give assurances to any foreign country, nor can it tolerate others under the pretext of a so-called different interpretation of autonomy, to obstruct the Chinese Government's exercise of its state sovereignty in the Tibet Region to make Tibet semi-independent or even to turn it into a sphere of influence of a foreign country or buffer zone.

The above-said is self-evident and undeniable. Nevertheless, there appeared in India, before and after the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, large quantities of words and deeds slandering China and interfering in China's internal affairs. Responsible persons of many Indian political parties, including the National Congress, and not a few Indian publications openly called Tibet a "country", slandered the Chinese Government's putting down the rebellion in Tibet as "practising banditry and imperialism", demanded that the Tibet question be submitted to the United Nations and even proposed the holding of a tripartite conference of India, China and Tibet to settle the Tibet question which can only be handled by the Chinese Government. Most

of the political parties in India went so far as to form organisations in support of the Tibetan rebels. Groups of ruffians were allowed to make provocations and disturbances in front of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General in India, and there even occurred the grave incident of insulting the head of state of China. These words and deeds were in the nature of serious interference in China's internal affairs and sabotage of Sino-Indian friendship, and this cannot be altered by recourse to any pretext, whether "freedom of speech" or any other "freedom", even less can the "feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts with the Tibetan people" be a pretext for these words and deeds. It is obvious that the Chinese people likewise have a "feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts" towards the Indian people, but China has never used this as a pretext to interfere in India's internal affairs, and will never do so.

The Indian Government has recognised the Tibet region as a part of China's territory and has repeatedly declared that it has no desire to interfere in China's internal affairs. This was worthy of welcome. Nevertheless, responsible members of the Indian Government, though they could not possibly be better acquainted with the situation in Tibet than the Chinese Government openly expressed doubts about documents published by China officially, refused to accept the Chinese Government's account of the facts, and asserted that the basis of the rebellion in Tibet "must have been a strong feeling of nationalism" and that the upper strata reactionaries in Tibet were not solely responsible for the rebellion. They even charged that "agreement between Tibet and China on the autonomous status of Tibet and the assurances given to India had not been kept" by the Chinese Government, and described the Chinese Government's putting down the rebellion in Tibet as "armed intervention" and as "oppressing and suppressing" the Tibetan people. The Indian Government announced that it had granted political asylum to the Dalai Lama in accordance with international practice and stated that the Dalai Lama was "not expected" to engage in any political activities in India. This would not have caused any dispute. But on April 18 and 22, two statements advocating "independence of Tibet" and directing wanton attacks on the Chinese

Government were issued respectively in Tezpur and Mussoorie in the name of the Dalai Lama. What was particularly surprising, the so-called "statement of the Dalai Lama" of April 18 was not only distributed by an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs but also carried on official bulletins of Indian Embassies abroad. Such a line of action on the part of the Indian Government could hardly be considered conformable to well-known international practice. The Indian Government insisted that the Dalai Lama was entirely responsible for the two traitorous statements issued in his name. In that case, did not the impressive welcome extended to the Dalai Lama by the Indian Government and the talks Prime Minister Nehru himself held with him mean giving a welcome to a Chinese rebel and holding a meeting with him? All these statements and actions of the Indian Government, no matter what the subjective intentions might be, undoubtedly played an objective role of encouraging the Tibetan rebels.

The facts themselves have completely overthrown the allegation that there is no Indian interference in China's internal affairs. The Chinese Government and people, having regard for the overall Sino Indian friendship, for quite a long time exercised utmost forbearance in the hope that the words and deeds occurring in India interfering in China's internal affairs and detrimental to Sino-Indian friendship would end. To the contrary, however, the words and deeds against China and interfering in China's internal affairs coming from the Indian side went from bad to worse and developed to an intolerable extent. Only then did the Chinese people give the reply that was due, in order to safeguard their state sovereignty and oppose outside interference, and also to uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and Sino-Indian friendship. The Chinese people's reply is in the nature of reasoning and is well grounded on fact. All those who have the opportunity of reading a full report of the opinions of the Chinese people will arrive at this conclusion. It is unjustifiable that the Indian Government should have tried in various ways to defend the words and deeds of the Indian side interfering in China's internal affairs and impairing Sino-Indian friendship, while making charges against the proper reply of the Chinese people.

The Dalai Lama was abducted to India by the Tibetan rebels.



A most strong proof of this is the three letters he wrote to General Tan Kuan-san, Acting Representative of the Central People's Government in Tibet, before he was abducted out of Lhasa. The so-called "statement of the Dalai Lama", which is full of loopholes, instead of being capable of making one believe that the Dalai Lama is now able to act on his own volition, precisely serves to show that he is still being surrounded and under control. The Chinese Government is greatly concerned about the situation of the Dalai Lama. It is, however, futile for the Chinese Government to send someone to see the Dalai Lama before he has freed himself from encirclement and control. It would be even more inappropriate for the Chinese Government to send someone to see the Dalai Lama, if, as alleged by the Indian Government, he was entirely responsible for the two statements betraying his motherland.

In its relations with India, China has consistently adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and worked for the development of friendly co-operation between the two countries. China has always held that every thing must be done to safeguard the friendly relations between the two great Asian countries, China and India, from being impaired. In spite of the fact that the Indian side brought about this unpleasant argument between the two countries, and the Indian Government has failed to give a satisfactory reply on the Bombay incident of insulting the head of State of China, the Chinese side is willing to stop its rebuff as soon as the Indian side stops its words and deeds against China and interfering in China's internal affairs. Prime Minister Nehru has now expressed the wish to end this argument and called on Indian newspapers to exercise restraint and wisdom, this is worthy of welcome. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that the dark clouds overcasting Sino-Indian relations for a time will speedily disperse and that, through the current trial, Sino-Indian friendship, which is of long standing and based on the Five Principles, will develop even better.

On the whole, India is a friend of China, this has been so in the past thousand and more years, and we believe will certainly continue to be so in one thousand, ten thousand years to come. The enemy of the Chinese people lies in the East—the U.S. imperialists have many military bases in Taiwan, in South Korea,

Japan and in the Philippines which are all directed against China. China's main attention and policy of struggle are directed to the east, to the west Pacific region, to the vicious and aggressive U.S. imperialism, and not to India or any other country in the southeast Asia and south Asia. Although the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan have joined the SEATO which is designed to oppose China, we have not treated those three countries as our principal enemy; our principal enemy is U.S. imperialism. India has not taken part in the Southeast Asia Treaty; it is not an opponent, but a friend to our country. China will not be so foolish as to antagonize the United States in the east and again to antagonize India in the West. The putting down of the rebellion and the carrying out of democratic reforms in Tibet will not in the least endanger India. You can wait and see. As the Chinese proverb goes "the strength of a horse is borne out by the distance travelled, and the heart of a person is seen with the lapse of time." You will ultimately see whether relations between the Tibet region of China and India are friendly or hostile by watching three, five, ten, twenty, a hundred . . . years. We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can we take friend for foe. This is our state policy. The quarrel between our two countries in the past few years, particularly in the last three months, is but an interlude in the course of thousands upon thousands of years of friendship between the two countries and does not warrant a big fuss on the part of the broad masses and the Government authorities of our countries. The principles, positions and distinctions between right and wrong as set forth in the foregoing paragraphs have to be set forth; otherwise the current difference between our countries cannot be resolved. But so far as the extent of the implication of those words is concerned, it is only temporary and local; that is to say, they refer only to a temporary difference between our two countries and concern solely the region of Tibet. Our Indian friends ! What is your mind? Will you be agreeing to our thinking regarding the view that China can only concentrate its main attention eastward of China, but not south-westward of China, nor is it necessary for it to do so. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the leader of our country, talked on many occasions with Mr. R.K. Nehru, former Indian Ambassador to China, who could well understand and appreciate it. We do not know whe-

ther the former Indian Ambassador conveyed this to the Indian authorities. Friends ! It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting point of our two sides. Will you please think it over ? Allow me to take this opportunity to extend my best regards to Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of India.

**119 Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 30 June 1959**

A number of statements, allegations and counter-allegations on Tibet have appeared in India during the last three months from various sources. Among these is a statement made by the Dalai Lama during a recent press conference at Mussoorie, in the course of which he sought to answer some of the criticisms made against him. The Government of India do not take responsibility for any of these various statements. So far as the Dalai Lama is concerned, the Prime Minister has made it clear on more than one occasion that, while the Government of India are glad to give asylum to the Dalai Lama and show him the respect due to his high position, they have no reason to believe that he will do anything which is contrary to international usage and embarrassing to the host country. The Government of India want to make it clear that they do not recognise any separate Government of Tibet and there is, therefore, no question of a Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India.

**120 Letter from Indian's Permanent Representative C.S. Jha to the UN Secretary-General proposing an item on the representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly, 13 July 1959 (Extract)**

It is necessary to consider the question of the representation of China in the United Nations not only from the point of view of the legitimate rights of the Chinese people and their Government, but also from the point of view of the effectiveness of the organization itself. There is no doubt that only the People's Government of China is in a position to comply with those decisions and recommendations of the United Nations which affect the Chinese specifically or which are addressed to all Member

States.

The Government of India have, therefore, for the last few years sought proper representation of China in the United Nations. If a country like China with a vast territory and population is not properly represented in the United Nations, the work and worth of this most important organisation is certain to be ineffective in many important fields where international co-operation and endeavour are vital. No major measures of peace and security can successfully be undertaken without proper consultation with and co-operation of China, and in the view of the Government of India all possible efforts must be made to secure the proper representation of China in the United Nations. It was because of the importance of China in the activities of the United Nations that she was made a permanent member of the Security Council and it is unfortunate from every point of view that the United Nations has not yet been able to have the benefit of her participation through her true representatives. The Government of India hopes that the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will remove this shortcoming and agree to China being properly represented in the United Nations by the representatives of the People's Government of China.

**121 Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 22 March 1959,  
8 September 1959 (Extracts)**

There is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Government on the Sino-Indian boundary question. . . .

The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history. In tackling this question, one cannot but, first of all, take into account the historical background of British aggression on China when India was under British rule. . . .

The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the Five Principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing *status quo* of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, even less by force. As to

some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning isolated places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquility of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries. This is exactly the basic idea expressed in my January 23, 1959 letter to you. The Chinese Government still considers this to be the way that should be followed by our two countries in settling the boundary question. Judging from Your Excellency's letter of March 22, 1959, it seems you are not completely against this principle. . . .

You also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim. Like the boundary between China and Bhutan, this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion. I would like, however, to take this opportunity to make clear once again that China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other and has always respected the proper relations between them and India. . . .

Regarding the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary, the Chinese Government absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon Line, but Chinese troops have never crossed that line. This is for the sake of maintaining amity along the border to facilitate negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, and in no way implies that the Chinese Government has recognised that line. In view of the fact that my former explanation of this point to Your Excellency is obviously misunderstood in Your Excellency's latest two letters to me, I have deemed it necessary once again to make the above explanation clearly.

Regarding the western section of the Sino-Indian boundary, China has strictly abided by the traditional customary line and, with regard to Indian troops' repeated intrusions into or occupation of Chinese territory, the Chinese Government, acting always in a friendly manner, has dealt with each case in a way befitting it. . . . the tense situation recently arising on the Sino-Indian border was all caused by trespassing and provocations by Indian troops, and that for this the Indian side should be held fully responsible. . . . The fact that India does not recognise the undelimited state of the Sino-Indian boundary and steps up bringing pressure to bear on China militarily, diplomatically and through public opinion cannot but make one suspect

that it is the attempt of India to impose upon China its one-sided claims on the boundary question.

### **122 Dalai Lama's appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 9 September 1959**

Kindly refer to the proceedings of the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held on Friday the 24th November 1950 at which it was resolved that the consideration of El Salvador's complaint against 'invasion of Tibet by foreign forces' should be adjourned in order to give the parties the opportunity to arrive at a peaceful settlement. It is with the deepest regret that I am informing you that the act of aggression has been substantially extended with the result that practically the whole of Tibet is under the occupation of the Chinese Forces. I and my Government have made several appeals for the peaceful and friendly settlement, but so far these appeals have been completely ignored. In these circumstances and in view of the inhuman treatment and crimes against humanity and religion to which the people of Tibet are being subjected, I solicit immediate intervention of the United Nations and consideration by the General Committee on its own initiative of the Tibetan issue which had been adjourned. In this connection I and my Government wish to emphasize that Tibet was a sovereign state at the time when her territorial integrity was violated by the Chinese armies in 1950. In support of this contention the Government of Tibet urge the following :

*First*, no power of authority was exercised by the Government of China in or over Tibet since the Declaration of Independence by the 13th Dalai Lama in 1912.

*Second*, the sovereign status of Tibet during the period finds conclusive evidence in the fact that the Government of Tibet concluded as many as five international agreements immediately before and during these years.

*Third*, the Government of Tibet take their stand on the Anglo-Tibet Convention of 1914 which recognized the sovereign status of Tibet and accorded the same position to the Tibetan plenipotentiary as was given to the representatives of Great Britain and China. It is true that this convention imposed certain restrictions on the external sovereignty of Tibet, but these did

not deprive her of her internal position. Moreover, these restrictions ceased to have any effect on the transfer of power in India.

*Fourth*, there is no valid and subsisting international agreement under which Tibet or any other power recognized Chinese suzerainty.

*Fifth*, the sovereign status of Tibet is equally evident from the fact that during the Second World War Tibet insisted on maintaining her neutrality and only allowed the transport of non-military goods from India to China through Tibet. This position was accepted by the Governments of Great Britain and China.

*Sixth*, the sovereign status has also been recognized by other powers. In 1948 when the Trade Delegation from the Government of Tibet visited India, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the passport issued by the Tibetan Government was accepted by the Governments of these countries. Your Excellency, I and my Government also solicit immediate intervention of the United Nations on humanitarian grounds. Since their violation of the territorial integrity of Tibet the Chinese forces have committed the following offences against the universally accepted laws of conduct.

*First*, they have dispossessed thousands of Tibetans of their properties and deprived them of every source of livelihood and thus driven them to death and desperation.

*Second*, men, women and children have been pressed into labour gangs and made to work on military constructions without payment or on nominal payment.

*Third*, they have adopted cruel and inhuman measures for the purpose of sterilizing men and women with a view to the total extermination of the Tibetan race.

*Fourth*, thousands of innocent people of Tibet have been brutally massacred.

*Fifth*, there have been many cases of murder of leading citizens of Tibet without any cause or justification.

*Sixth*, every attempt has been made to destroy our religion and culture. Thousands of monasteries have been razed to the ground and sacred images and articles of religion completely destroyed. Life and property are no longer safe and Lhasa, the capital of the State, is now a dead city. The sufferings which my people are undergoing are beyond description and it is im-

peratively necessary that this wanton and ruthless murder of my people should be immediately brought to an end. It is in these circumstances that I appeal to you and the United Nations in the confident hope that our appeal will receive the consideration it deserves.

**123 Chou En-lai's report on the Sino-Indian boundary question at the enlarged session of the NPC Standing Committee, 11 September 1959 (Extracts)**

The recent tension on the Sino-Indian boundary question, had been entirely and deliberately created by some Indians who, with ulterior motives, had made use of some boundary disputes to launch a new anti-Chinese campaign, make vicious attacks on China and slander China as having committed "aggression" against India. It was regrettable that the Indian Government, too, had made groundless charges against China and brought pressure to bear on her—military, diplomatic, and through public opinion—in an attempt to impose upon China its unilateral claims on the boundary question. For the sake of Sino-Indian friendship China had in the past few month's consistently exercised the greatest restraint and patience. This, however, had not met with the response it deserved from official Indian circles. Consequently, there was no alternative but to bring the Sino-Indian boundary question before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and make an open reply to the unfriendly attacks from Indian quarters. . . .

The Chinese Government had all along held that an overall settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step, taking into account the historical background and the present actual situation and in conformity with the five principles. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the *status quo* on the border which has existed for a long time, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, much less by force; as to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning individual places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquillity of the border areas and uphold the friendship between the two countries. . . .

The boundary line between the two countries, which is



about two thousand kilometres long, had never been formally delimited, nor had negotiations or survey ever been carried out for an overall settlement of the boundary question. Therefore there was no reason whatsoever to demand that the Chinese Government accept the Indian Government's unilateral claims concerning the Sino-Indian boundary. The so-called McMahon Line was a product of British imperialist aggression against Tibet. It had never been recognized by any Central Government of China and thus had absolutely no validity in law.

Even if the boundary between China and India were not delimited, China and India could still coexist quite well in peace, as long as both countries maintained the long existing *status quo* of the border. This was borne out by events in the past ten years. . . .

China and India are two big Asian countries with a total population of more than 1,000 million people and they have common interests and responsibilities in safeguarding world peace especially peace in Asia. Long and traditional friendly relations had always existed between the two countries which were the initiators of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The differences, even some disputes, between the two countries on the boundary question should be resolved through friendly negotiations for a just and reasonable settlement, and not by measures that might lead to clashes.

#### **124 Nehru's reply to the debate in Lok Sabha, 12 September 1959 (Extract)**

In Premier Chou En-lai's last letter, he says :

“In Your Excellency's letter, you also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim. Like the boundary between China and Bhutan, this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion.”

I beg to differ from Premier Chou En-lai. It does very much fall within the scope of our present or future discussion. If he thinks that he can deal with it as something apart from India, we are not agreeable to that. We have publicly, and rightly, undertaken certain responsibilities for the defence of Sikkim and Bhutan, if they are attacked. It is very necessary for us to

understand that if something happens on their borders, then it is the same thing as an interference with the border of India.

**125 Foreign Minister Chen Yi's speech at the NPC Standing Committee meeting, 13 September 1959 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government holds that, in addition to maintaining the long-existing *status quo* of the border between the two countries, in connection with some of the border disputes China and India could also reach provisional agreements concerning individual places through negotiations. It must be pointed out that this proposition of the Chinese Government is designed to facilitate an overall settlement of the boundary question in the future and to ensure the tranquillity of the border areas and uphold Sino-Indian friendship. . . .

We have always regarded India as a friendly country. Of course, even between friendly countries differences and disputes are not always avoidable. But, as we see it, the Sino-Indian disputes of the past six months are, from a long-range point of view, merely an episode in the course of the thousands of years of friendship between our two countries. But considering the issue by itself, the disputes involved are all matters of principle. They must be settled in a fair and reasonable way. Only this would be in the interests of the friendly coexistence of the two countries. We are convinced that as long as the two sides prize their friendship and adhere to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, all differences between China and India can be resolved through negotiations. In the *Rajya Sabha* on September 10, Prime Minister Nehru also said that he would always try to find a way for the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese Government welcomes this attitude of Prime Minister Nehru.

The contributions Prime Minister Nehru has made to peace in Asia and the world are acknowledged by all. At a press conference held on September 11, Prime Minister Nehru dealt with the question of Laos. He berated the Security Council's appointment of a commission on Laos as a measure completely bypassing the Geneva agreements. He said that it would be a dangerous thing to abolish the procedures laid down by the Geneva agreements. He stressed that any real success in the

solution of the Laotian question was likely to result only by agreement of the parties concerned. This attitude of Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian Government on the Laotian question deserves the warm support of the Chinese Government and all those who uphold the Geneva agreements and peace in Asia.

**126 Speech by Chu Teh, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee at the closing session of the NPC Standing Committee, 13 September 1959 (Extracts)**

The so-called MacMahon line is precisely a product of this British imperialist aggression against China's Tibet. . . . For the sake of upholding Sino-Indian friendship, Chinese troops and administrative personnel have never crossed this so-called MacMahon line, pending a settlement and delimitation of the boundary by the two governments. This goodwill and good intention of the Chinese Government, however, was not understood by the Indian Government. Just as all those present have said, the facts today are that it is Indian troops who have encroached on China, not Chinese troops encroaching on India, and that it is not China but certain persons in India who have violated the Five Principles and Sino-Indian friendship and created tension on the border. These facts are crystal clear; nobody can deny them.

China and India are two great powers. The friendship and unity between the peoples of the two countries are of great significance to the defence of peace in Asia and the world. That is why imperialism is always bent on undermining the friendship and unity between China and India. The anti-Chinese campaign whipped up in India today can only benefit imperialism; it will not benefit the Chinese and Indian peoples. We hope that Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian Government will hold in high esteem Sino-Indian friendship, immediately correct the extremely erroneous approach of exerting military and diplomatic pressure and the pressure of public opinion on China and immediately put a stop to all the anti-Chinese clamours aimed at disrupting Sino-Indian friendship and the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence. We believe that so long as we base ourselves on the Five Principles and carry out peaceful

negotiations, the boundary disputes between China and India can certainly be settled satisfactorily.

### **127 Resolution of the NPC Standing Committee on the Sino-Indian boundary question, 13 September 1959**

On September 13, 1959, the Eighth Session of the Standing Committee of the Second National People's Congress unanimously endorsed Premier Chou En-lai's report on the Sino-Indian boundary question and fully approved the stand, attitude and policy adopted by the government in dealing with the Sino-Indian boundary question.

The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the five principles, by means of friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way and step by step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing *status quo*, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, still less by force; as to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning individual places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquillity of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries. This stand and policy represent the strong will of the people throughout the country to defend the sacred territory of their motherland and their sincere desire to preserve Sino-Indian friendship.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress expresses regret at the recent series of intrusions by Indian troops into Chinese territory and the anti-Chinese campaign whipped up by some right-wing politicians in India and expresses the hope that the Indian side will swiftly withdraw from the places into which it has intruded, stop the anti-Chinese agitation and start friendly negotiations with China for a peaceful settlement of the boundary question.

The imperialist forces of the West and their agents in India are trying to take advantage of the Sino-Indian border incidents to disrupt the great friendship between China and India and change India's foreign policy of peace and 'neutrality. The Chinese people fervently hope that the Indian people will frus-

trate their vicious schemes, so that the common interests of the peoples of India, China and the other countries of Asia may be safeguarded.

China and India have friendly relations of long duration and are the initiators of the five principles of peaceful coexistence; they share common interests and responsibilities in safeguarding peace in the world, especially in Asia. We believe that through the friendly efforts of their governments and peoples, the two countries will certainly be able to attain a reasonable solution of their differences on the boundary question in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence and their desire for mutual friendship, thus defeating the schemes of their common enemies and consolidating their great friendship.

**128 Nehru's reply to Chou En-lai's letter of 8 September 1959,  
26 September 1959 (Extracts)**

I have received your letter of September 8, 1959. I must say that I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India. As you know, the boundary in the eastern sector is loosely referred to as the McMahon Line. I do not like this description, but for convenience I propose to refer to it as such. When I discussed this with you, I thought that we were confronted with the problem of reaching an agreement on where exactly the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the boundary lay. Even when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century. In your latest letter you have sought to make out a claim to large tracts of Indian territory and have even suggested that the independent Government of India are seeking to reap a benefit from the British aggression against China. Our Parliament and our people deeply resent this allegation. . . .

There is great resentment in India at the action of your troops in overpowering our outpost in Longju on our side of the McMahon Line, and although you have up till now not withdrawn your troops we have not sought to reoccupy the post.

You have referred to the maintenance of the long existing *status quo* on the border. The Government of India have always been in favour of it. It is the Chinese Government who have violated it repeatedly in recent years. I can refer, for example, to the construction of a 100-mile road across what has traditionally been Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area, the entry of Chinese survey parties in the Lohit Frontier Division in 1957, the establishment of a camp at Spanggur in 1959, the despatch of armed personnel to Bara Hoti in 1958 and stationing them there in winter against customary practice and last, but not least, the use of force in Longju.

It is true that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited along its entire length. Indeed the terrain of the Sino-Indian border in many places makes such physical demarcation on the ground impossible. But the entire length of the border has been either defined by treaty or recognised by custom or by both and until now the Chinese Government have not protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of India upto the customary border. You have yourself acknowledged the fact that no armed clash ever occurred along our border until the beginning of this year. All Chinese Governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that previous Chinese Governments were weak is no answer. Not even a protest was registered in accordance with established state practice in this regard, as was done in the case of Burma between 1906 and 1937. . . .

I am particularly surprised by your statement that "the so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China." . . .

It is wrong to say that the frontier east of Bhutan as shown on Chinese maps is the traditional frontier. On the contrary, it is the McMahon Line which correctly represents the customary boundary in this area. The water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries. . . .

It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are

the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations, and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government. The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector. As regards Sikkim, the Chinese Government recognised as far back as 1890 that the Government of India "has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State". This Convention of 1890 also defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet; and the boundary was later, in 1895, demarcated. There is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region.

You have stated that the Sino-Indian boundary is about 2,000 kilometres in length, is wholly undelimited, and that it is not Chinese maps but British and Indian maps that have been unilaterally altering the Sino-Indian boundary. In fact, the Sino-Indian boundary (apart from the boundary of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet) extends over 3,520 kilometres. It is wrong to say that this long boundary is wholly undelimited. The frontier east of Bhutan has been explicitly delineated on the 1914 treaty map. The frontier of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh has been clarified by implication by the mention of six passes in the 1954 Agreement. As for the charge that British and Indian maps have been unilaterally altering the boundary, the fact is that early British maps showed the boundary roughly where the British thought the water-parting was at the time. Later, as more topographical as well as local information about the water-parting was obtained, the boundary was shown with greater precision on the subsequent maps. . . .

It should be clear from what has been stated in previous paragraphs that it is the Chinese maps that have altered the boundary alignments through the years to include large areas of Indian territory in China. It should also be stated that Chinese maps published even after 1949 have not adhered to any definite frontier. Different maps show different alignments in the same sector. . . .

Reports have reached us that some Chinese officers in Tibet

have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and our North-East Frontier Agency. I do not know what authority they had to make these remarks but I would like to draw Your Excellency's attention to them as these remarks have naturally added to the tension on the frontier. . . .

I entirely disagree with your view that the tense situation that has arisen on the border has been caused by Indian trespassing and provocation. In fact, as the attached note will show, it is the Chinese who have trespassed into Indian territory across the traditional border at a number of places in recent years. . . .

I have stated before and wish to affirm once again that the Government of India attach great importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with China. They have hitherto sought to conduct their relations with China, as with other countries, in the spirit of Panch Sheel. This indeed had always been India's policy even before the five principles were enunciated. It is therefore all the more a matter of regret and surprise to us that China should now have put forth claims to large areas of Indian territory inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Indian nationals, which have been under the administrative jurisdiction of India for many years. No Government could possibly discuss the future of such large areas which are an integral part of their territory. We however recognise that the India-China frontier which extends over more than 3,500 kilometres has not been demarcated on the ground and disputes may therefore arise at some places along the traditional frontier as to whether these places lie on the Indian or the Tibetan side of this traditional frontier. We agree therefore that the border disputes which have already arisen should be amicably and peacefully settled. We also agree that until a settlement has been reached the *status quo* should be maintained. In the meantime both sides should respect the traditional frontier and neither party should seek to alter the *status quo* in any manner. Further, if any party has trespassed into the other's territory across the traditional frontier, it should immediately withdraw to its side of the frontier. So far as the Government of India are concerned, at no places at present have they any personnel, civil, police or military, on the Tibetan side of the traditional



frontier. There was only one outpost, that at Tamaden, established some months ago, which, subsequent enquiries showed, was somewhat north of the McMahon Line. In keeping with our earlier promise we have already withdrawn it to a point south of the Line. There can therefore be no question of withdrawing any Indian personnel at any other place. We would now request that in the same spirit your Government should withdraw their personnel from a number of posts which you have opened in recent months at Spanggur, Mandal and one or two other places in eastern Ladakh. Similarly, your forces should also withdraw from Longju which they forcibly occupied on the 26th August and which they still continue to occupy. No discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations immediately cease.

**129 Statement by Indian representative V. K. Krishna Menon  
in the UN General Assembly on the Question of Tibet,  
21 October 1959 (Extracts)**

While we did not support the inscription of this item, for reasons which I shall mention in a moment, we do not want in any way to put forward legalistic objections or seek to raise a procedural barrier.

Consideration of this problem must, first of all, have as its central theme the interests of the Tibetan people and of the Dalai Lama himself. So far as we are aware, there have been troubles in Tibet not only in the old days but in recent times also. This may well be part of the changes that are taking place in the world. But we should like to have these changes take place more peacefully with less cruelty, perhaps with less upset. Also, we do not subscribe to the view that these changes are merely the overthrow of certain feudal lords or otherwise. If these upsets have to come, they should come, so far as possible, with the least degree of violence. But, while we may wish that, we have no right to impose non-violence with violence. That is to say, we cannot argue non-interference by interfering. Therefore, all we can do is to express our point of view and, without violence to our foreign policy and without violence to our rela-

tions with other countries, unless there is justification for it, do what we can within our own capacities . . . .

More recently, there have been disturbances in Tibet, for instance, the revolt of the Khampas. They themselves are not in Tibet proper ; they are in the Chinese Province. They are Chinese themselves. However, the Tibetans joined them, and a very considerable revolt appears to have taken place.

As a result, the Dalai Lama himself and some 12,000 or 13,000 of his followers came over to India. I think it would be right for us in this connexion, when considering the concern that parties and countries and peoples have in regard to human rights and humanitarian affairs, to point out to the Assembly that, while we are not a Buddhist country, we alone of all countries in the world willingly undertook responsibilities in pursuit of human rights to give asylum to the Dalai Lama, as we had the right but not the obligation to do, and also to receive some 12,000 or 13,000 refugees . . . .

There are 12,000 refugees from Tibet who have crossed into India through the North Eastern Frontier Agency, which is Indian territory, and about 1,600 through Bhutan, through the Himalayan territory, and a few hundreds through Sikkim. These refugees are being cared for. But I should like to say in order to put the international position correctly, that we have disarmed these refugees on the border. And where there have been any instances of arms not being surrendered we have not allowed these refugees to come into our country. That is international law in regard to all political asylum, which we have carried out.

All this is done on the basis of broad policy. I would like to quote again the Prime Minister:

“Our broad policy was governed by three factors :

- (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India;
- (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China ;
- and
- (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet.

That policy we shall continue to follow, because we think that a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future.”

We stand by the Treaty of 1954. What is more, in regard to the 17-point agreement, to which reference has been made by many representatives in this Assembly, it is the view of the Government that that agreement still stands. It is quite true that some of its provisions have been broken, but that appears to be the case in many international treaties. If certain conditions are broken, we take whatever action is necessary, either party concerned, taking a different view. But the 17-point agreement as a whole stands, and we have not had any difference of opinion on this, so far . . . .

We have examined the draft resolution very carefully, so as my Government, and we therefore take the only position we can take, that, in the interests of reconciliation in the future and because it does not promote any constructive step at all, the draft resolution contained in document A/L. 264 cannot have our support. We do not see a basis for it in the sense that if it is a question of human rights we must deal with people here who have subscribed to the Declaration, because the Declaration definitely states that it is the States' Parties whom it binds. Therefore, I have to state that this draft resolution cannot have our support. We will therefore abstain on every paragraph of it and on the resolution as a whole.

Our abstention, however, will be in no sense—I repeat, in no sense—a lack of concern or a lack of feeling in regard to the Tibetan people or any reflection upon our relations with China. It merely arises from the posture and policy which I have placed before the Assembly.

This also does not mean that we are unconcerned when the issue of human rights is raised before us.

### **130 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Question of Tibet, 21 October 1959**

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms set out in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948,

Considering that the fundamental human rights and freedoms to which the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled include

the right to civil and religious liberty for all without distinction, Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage of the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed,

Gravely concerned at reports, including the official statements of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly denied them,

Deploring the effect of these events in increasing international tension and in embittering the relations between peoples at a time when earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations,

1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of Law ;

2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.

**131 Chinese Government statement on U N General Assembly  
Resolution on the Question of Tibet, 23 October 1959  
(Extracts)**

Recently, the 14th session of the United Nations General Assembly unlawfully discussed the so-called "Tibet question" and adopted a resolution slandering the People's Republic of China. This is another criminal act of the U. S. Government of pressganging the majority of the members of the United Nations to interfere crudely in China's internal affairs and deliberately increasing international tension, in disregard of the opposition of the Soviet Union and many other states as well as world just public opinion. At this, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the entire Chinese people are greatly indignant and express their strong protest.

Tibet is China's territory. The putting down of the rebellion of the reactionaries in Tibet and the introduction of democratic reform in the Tibet region are entirely China's internal affairs, in which neither the United States and other countries nor any

international organization have the right to meddle. The Charter of the United Nations explicitly provides that the United Nations shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Thus the discussion of the so-called "Tibet question" by the United Nations has been in complete violation of the United Nations Charter, and the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on the so-called "Tibet question" is illegal and null and void.

It is a great mockery to carry out this intervention in the name of respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people. . . . The fact that the United States coerced the United Nations into adopting the resolution on the so-called "Tibetan question" is an indisputable proof before the world that it is precisely the United States and nobody else that is bent on creating tension and trying to obstruct the easing of the international situation. . . .

Under the manipulation of the United States and its followers, the United Nations has now again served as a tool for interfering in China's internal affairs and creating international tension. This will only further lower the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of the Chinese people and the people of the world. At the same time, it should be pointed out in particular that Pakistan, Norway, Denmark, Sweden as well as Britain and the Netherlands—countries which have established diplomatic or partial diplomatic relations with China—have acted most unfriendly towards the People's Republic of China in voting for the inclusion of the so-called "Tibet question" in the agenda or the adoption of the resolution. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people cannot but express their deep regret at this.

The fact that the United States coerced the United Nations into adopting the illegal resolution on the so-called "Tibet question" is another proof that U. S. imperialism is the most vicious enemy of the Chinese people.

**132 Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 26 September 1959,  
7 November 1959 (Extracts)**

As the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, and it

is very long and very far, or comparatively far, from the political centres of the two countries, I am afraid that, if no fully appropriate solution is worked out by the two governments, border clashes which both sides do not want to see may again occur in the future. . . . I order to maintain effectively the *status quo* of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometers at once from the so-called McMahon line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order. This proposal is in effect an extension of the Indian Government's proposal contained in its note dated September 10 that neither side should send its armed personnel to Longju, to the entire border between China and India, and moreover a proposal to separate the troops of the two sides by as great a distance as 40 kilometers. If there is any need to increase this distance, the Chinese Government is also willing to give it consideration. In a word, both before and after the formal delimitation of the boundary between our two countries through negotiations, the Chinese Government is willing to do its utmost to create the most peaceful and most secure border zones between our two countries, so that our two countries will never again have apprehension or come to a clash on account of border issues. If this proposal of the Chinese Government is acceptable to the Indian Government, concrete measures for its implementation can be discussed and decided upon at once by the two Governments through diplomatic channels.

**133 Nehru's reply to Chou En-lai's letter of 7 November 1959,  
16 November 1959 (Extract)**

In your letter, you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the

lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes. Before I discuss this suggestion further, I should like to state categorically that the Government of India had not posted any army personnel anywhere at or near the international border. Our border check-posts were manned by civil constabulary, equipped with light arms. The main purpose of these check-posts was to deal with traders or others going along the recognised routes and to prevent any undesirable or unauthorised persons crossing the border. This itself indicates that these border check-posts were not intended for any aggressive purpose or for any armed conflict. It was only after the recent unfortunate incidents that we asked our Army to take over responsibility for the protection of our border.

A proper understanding of the facts in regard to the Sino-Indian boundary is essential to the consideration of any proposal that is made for the avoidance of border clashes. The facts are that on our North-East frontier, the entire territory up to the border (which is referred to as the McMahan Line) has been for long years part of India. Our civil administration has been functioning there, and there are important civil divisional headquarters not far from the border. At no point, except at Longju, are Chinese forces in occupation of any area south of the Indian border. The boundary in this area passes over a terrain, the height of which varies from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea-level. In this extremely difficult terrain, almost all our border check-posts are situated on high hill features. We do not know where the Chinese posts are, but I understand that at no point along the length of this sector are posts on the two sides situated within sight of each other. In view of the difficult mountainous terrain, even where the distance between two posts is short on the map or as the crow flies, the actual journey from one place to another might take several days.

8. In view of these facts, we think that there should not be the slightest risk of any border clash if each Government instructs its outposts not to send out patrols. It is only when armed patrols go out in these difficult mountainous areas that there is likelihood of clashes taking place. We have, in fact, instructed our border outposts not to send out any forward patrols for the present. It would be extremely difficult in

practice to establish a new line of outposts in the rear, whether they are to be ten or twenty kilometers from the international boundary. The risk of border clashes will be completely eliminated if our suggestion is accepted by your Government.

9. Longju stands on a different footing altogether. As we have repeatedly stated earlier, we disagree with your statement that it is on your side of the so-called McMahon Line. We have no doubt that it is on our side. But whether it is on your side or ours, the facts are that your armed forces attacked and ousted our personnel from Longju, inflicting casualties on them, and forcibly occupied our outpost. We cannot, therefore, agree to any arrangement, even as an interim measure, which would keep your forcible possession intact. The proper course, which we have already suggested to you, would be for you to withdraw from Longju. We on our part will not re-occupy it. This suggestion, if accepted, will immediately result in a lowering of tension.

10. At no point on this border or elsewhere, have we taken over any post from you. In your talk with our Ambassador, you have stated that Khinzemane is north of the international boundary. I do not agree with this statement. As we have informed your Government previously, Khinzemane lies clearly south of this boundary and within our territory. It has throughout been in our possession.

11. I presume that your suggestion for a zone of withdrawal is intended also to apply to the Sino-Indian border in the middle areas, that is, where it touches our States of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab. In these sectors also, there is no ambiguity about our border and at no point do the Chinese authorities occupy any area below the boundary. This would apply to the border of Sikkim also. If, therefore, we observe the precaution which I have mentioned above, all risk of border clashes will be eliminated in this sector of the frontier also.

12. I shall now deal with the international frontier in the Ladakh area of our State of Jammu and Kashmir. In my letter to you of September 26 and in our note of November 4, we have described in detail the international boundary in this sector, supported by factual data. Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise



based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.

13. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them. The nature of this possession has inevitably been different from that of an inhabited area. This area is uninhabited, mountainous territory of an altitude varying from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea-level, with the mountain peaks going up much higher. Because of this, and because we did not accept any kind of aggression across our frontier, we did not think it necessary to establish check-posts right on the international boundary. But, . . . we exercised jurisdiction over this area by sending regular patrols up to the international boundary. Certain police check-posts were established some distance from the boundary to control the trade routes, etc. Since this statement is controverted by you, it is obvious that there is complete disagreement between the two Governments even about the facts of possession. An agreement about the observance of the *status quo* would, therefore, be meaningless as the facts concerning the *status quo* are themselves disputed. As we are at present discussing a short term interim measure to avoid border clashes, it is essential that we do not get involved in interminable discussions on the *status quo* at this stage.

14. I suggest, therefore, that in the Ladakh area, both our Governments should agree on the following as an interim measure. The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware, are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the

two lines on the east and the west.

**134 Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha, 8 December 1959**  
(Extracts)

Apart from the obvious responsibilities of defending India and Indian territory, our responsibilities undoubtedly extend to the neighbouring countries, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal. We have to stand by them whatever the consequences. Each one of them stands on a separate footing, and let us not mix them up. Nepal, of course, is an independent country just as India is independent and whatever it chooses to do in the exercise of that independence, we cannot come in the way. But, If I mentioned Nepal on the last occasion, it was because over nine years ago, there was a clear understanding between the Governments on Nepal and India on this point. It was no military alliance. It was a clear understanding which has advantages for both. In order to remove any doubts from hon. Members minds, I shall read out the words of that understanding. This treaty between India and Nepal, a treaty of peace and friendship, was signed on July 31, 1950. I shall read the first two articles.

Article 1 states

That the two Governments agree to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

Article 2 states

That the two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations existing between the two Governments.

Now, apart from the treaty—but as an essential, operative part of that—there was an exchange of letters between the two Governments in identical language; as is the custom. In these letters there is this sentence:

Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two Governments shall consult with each other

and devise effective counter-measures. . . .

this understanding has nothing to do with any kind of unilateral action on our part. We cannot do it; we will not do it. It is for the Government of Nepal to decide but it is in mutual interest—as stated in these letters and the treaty—for us to associate, ourselves, first of all in knowledge as to what is happening and, secondly in the counter-measures that might have to be taken.

### **135 Chou En-lai's letter to Nehru, 17 December 1959**

**(Extract)**

The Chinese Government, in a conciliatory spirit and out of the desire to move toward the withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border, is prepared to agree first to reach a partial solution by applying the proposal you have made in your letter for the non-stationing of the armed forces of both sides at Longju to the other disputed places on the border as well. In the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel once occupied Longju and are now still in occupation of Khinzemane. In the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel are up to now in occupation of Shipki Pass, Parigas, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Laphal. Most of these places which definitely belong to China were occupied successively by armed Indian personnel after the signing of the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India in which China and India for the first time put forward the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence. Among them Puling-sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari area of the Tibet region of China as specified in Article II Section 2 of the 1954 Agreement. Now since the Indian Government holds a different opinion on the ownership of these places, the Chinese Government proposes that no armed personnel of either side be stationed at any of them.

Pending a further agreement between the two sides, the Chinese Government also welcomes the Indian Government's proposal for the frontier outposts of the two sides to stop send-

ing out patrols. The Chinese Government has, in fact, instructed the Chinese frontier guards to stop sending out patrols from all their outposts on the Sino-Indian border after the Kongka Pass incident. Now that the Indian side has also taken the same step, this is of course a happy progress in safeguarding the tranquillity of the border between the two countries. But the Chinese Government would like to ask for clarification on one point, that is: The proposal to stop patrolling should apply to the entire Sino-Indian border, and no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.

The Chinese Government is very much perplexed by the fact that Your Excellency put forward a separate proposal for the prevention of clashes in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh. The Chinese Government deems it necessary to point out the following: (1) There is no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case. The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector. Except for the Parigas area by the Shangatsangpu River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary. (2) This proposal of Your Excellency's represents a big step backward from the principle agreed upon earlier by the two countries of maintaining for the time being the state actually existing on the border. To demand a great change in this state as a pre-condition for the elimination of border clashes is not to diminish but to widen the dispute. (3) Your Excellency's proposal is unfair. Your Excellency proposes that in this sector Chinese personnel withdraw to the east of the boundary as shown on Indian maps and Indian personnel withdraw to the west of the boundary as shown on Chinese maps. This proposal may appear "equitable" to those who are ignorant about the truth. But even the most anti-Chinese part of the Indian press pointed out immediately that, under this proposal, India's "concession" would only be theoretical, because, to begin with, the area concerned does not belong to India and India has no personnel there to withdraw, while China would

have to withdraw from a territory of above 33,000 square kilometers, which has long belonged to it, its military personnel guarding the frontiers and its civil administrative personnel of the Hotien County, the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and of Rudok *Dzong* in the Ari area of the Tibet Autonomous Region respectively. (4) This area has long been under Chinese jurisdiction and is of great importance to China. Since the Ching Dynasty, this area has been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang and western Tibet. As far back as in the latter half of 1950, it was along the traditional route in this area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Ari area of Tibet from Sinkiang to guard the frontiers. In the nine years since then, they have been making regular and busy use of this route to bring supplies. On the basis of this route, the motor-road over 1,200 kilometers long from Yehcheng in southwestern Sinkiang to Gartok in southwestern Tibet was built by Chinese frontier guard units together with more than 3,000 civilian builders working under extremely difficult natural conditions from March 1956 to October 1957, cutting across high mountains, throwing bridges and building culverts. For up to 8 or 9 years since the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang and Tibet when units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army began to be stationed in and patrol this area till September 1958 when the intrusion of the area by armed Indian personnel occurred, so many activities were carried out by the Chinese side in this area under its jurisdiction, and yet the Indian side was utterly unaware of them. This is eloquent proof that this area has indeed always been under Chinese jurisdiction and not under Indian jurisdiction. Now the Indian Government asserts that this area has all along been under Indian jurisdiction. This is absolutely unconvincing.

If the Indian Government, after being acquainted with the above viewpoints of the Chinese Government, should still insist that its demand in regard to this area is proper, then the Chinese Government would like to know whether the Indian Government is prepared to apply the same principle equally to the eastern sector of the border, that is to say, to require both the Chinese and Indian sides to withdraw all their personnel from the area between the so-called McMahon line and the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary as shown on Chinese maps

(and on Indian maps too during a long period of time). The Chinese Government has not up to now made any demand in regard to the area south of the so-called McMahon line as a pre-condition or interim measure, and what I find difficult to understand is why the Indian Government should demand that the Chinese side withdraw one-sidedly from its western frontier area.

**136 President Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament,  
8 February 1960 (Extract)**

The incursions into parts of the territory of the Union of India, across our traditional and well understood borders, by elements of Chinese forces have, . . . deeply distressed our people and evoked legitimate and widespread resentment. They impose a great strain on our resources and our nation-building endeavours. We regret and deplore these developments on our border. They have resulted from the disregard by China of the application of the principles, which it had been mutually agreed to between us, should govern our relations. My Government have taken prompt and calculated measures, both defensive and diplomatic, to meet the threat to our sovereignty.

My Government particularly deplore the unilateral use of force by our neighbour on our common frontier, where no military units of the Union were functioning. This is a breach of faith; but we may not lose faith in the principles which we regard as basic in the relations between nations.

Members of Parliament, you have been kept informed by the release, from time to time, of the correspondence between my Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of China, of the respective positions of our two countries in this matter. My Government have made it clear, beyond doubt, that they seek a peaceful approach in the settlement of outstanding matters. They have also stated and reiterated, equally clearly, that they will not accept the course, or the results of unilateral action or decision, taken by China. My Government, therefore, pursues a policy, both of a peaceful approach, by negotiation under appropriate conditions, and of being determined and ready to defend our country.

This and the weight of world public opinion which is adverse

to her action should, we hope, persuade China sooner than later to come to agreement in regard to the common frontiers which for long have been well established by treaties, custom and usage. Thus, and thus alone, can friendly relations with our great neighbour which my Government and our people desire, become a reality and endure for our common good. The actions taken and the policy pursued by my Government, it may be hoped, will be adequate to convince China of both our policy and our determination.

**137 Foreword by Indian Minister G.B. Pant to Congress Party publication entitled *India-China Border Problem*, 4 March 1960 (Extract)**

The boundary between India and China along its entire length has been well known for centuries and is defined by treaty or international agreements or recognised by custom and tradition. It follows unchanging natural features and is in the main marked out by the Himalayas which are inseparably bound up with our frontiers as, since the dawn of our history, they are inter-woven with the fabric of Indian civilisation. The historic northern frontiers of India are so well established that there could be no doubt, except to a mind pre-possessed otherwise, as to where the customary boundary lay. No Chinese Government called it in question in the past. Even the present Chinese Government which came into power in 1949, did not dispute the location or the alignment of the boundary until recently when it encroached on Indian territory designedly, advancing step by step from equivocation to aggrandizement. Claims on vast areas of our territory have been made in utter disregard of well-established facts. The very acts of encroachment and aggression have been quoted as if they lent support to these claims and constituted their justification. It is a type of argument made familiar to history by those who have pursued the path of aggression.

The people and the Government of India have all along befriended China and endeavoured to strengthen the bonds of friendship with it in many ways. So, it is all the more disappointing that the sentiments of friendship should have been requited with an arrogant challenge to the territorial integrity of

India.

India is wedded to the policy of peace and good neighbourliness. But the aggressive attitude of the Chinese Government and its unwarranted claims have been taken by the Indian people for what they are—a challenge to the territorial integrity of the country. The Indian people and the Government are firm in their determination to defend the integrity of India with their united strength.

**138 *People's Daily* editorial on Khrushchov's visit to India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, 6 March 1960 (Extract)**

The foreign policy of peace of the socialist countries finds particularly clear expression in their economic and cultural relations with those countries which have won national independence. Comrade Khrushchov's visit to the four nations provides an example of true international co-operation. The economic and cultural agreements signed by the Soviet Union with India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan make it clear that the economic and cultural co-operation of the socialist countries with these nations is entirely motivated by the desire to help them develop their national economies and raise their people's living standards. This contrasts sharply with the "aid" from imperialism which is used as a smokescreen for aggression.

The Soviet Union is consistently helping those peoples who have overthrown colonialist rule so as to enable them to smash completely all the shackles which kept them in a subordinate status, to do away with their economic backwardness and achieved social progress and economic prosperity. It has rendered genuine assistance to these countries; the Indian Bhilai steel works with an annual capacity of one million tons, built with Soviet assistance, is an outstanding example of this. Now the Soviet Union has again offered India and Indonesia big loans for the development of their industries. All these facts will undoubtedly help more and more people in Southeast Asian countries to understand more clearly the policy of peace pursued by the socialist countries.



### 139 Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1959-60, March 1960 (Extracts)

During the year under review, our relations with China suffered a serious setback. It will be recalled that in the middle of March 1959 there was a sudden uprising in Lhasa leading to the outbreak of hostilities between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces and, as a consequence, the Dalai Lama, with a small entourage, left Lhasa on 17 March 1959. In view of the age-old cultural and religious relationship between Tibet and India, there was a spontaneous outburst of sympathy with the Tibetan people when the news of the disturbances was published in India. The Government of India made it clear that while they sympathised with the Tibetans in their aspirations for autonomy, they fully recognized the suzerainty of China and could not, in any way, intervene in the developments inside Tibet. When, however, the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, the Government of India, in exercise of their sovereign right, agreed to grant asylum to him and to afford to the Dalai Lama the courtesy which befitted his recognized spiritual position. But even while evincing natural concern at the developments in Tibet, the Government of India categorically repudiated the Chinese suggestion that Indian territory was used by the Tibetan rebels as the directing centre for the uprising against the Chinese or indeed for any purpose prejudicial to Chinese interests.

During the month following the Tibetan disturbances, it was noted with surprise and concern that normal facilities and courtesies expected in international relations and specifically embodied in the 1954 Agreement between India and China were being denied to the Indian representatives and Indian nationals in Tibet. Trade was adversely affected because of new currency regulations and restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on border type of trade. Chinese official propaganda challenged the *bona fides* of India's policies. The Government of India, in various notes, protested to the Chinese Government against their unfriendly attitude and against the manifold difficulties of her representatives and her nationals, but continued to affirm her faith in the importance of continuing friendly relations between the two countries.

In the wake of the Dalai Lama, nearly 14,000 Tibetan refugees entered into India through passes in NEFA, Bhutan, Sikkim and the U.P. . . .

The anxiety of the Indian people over the developments in Tibet had hardly abated when a number of incidents occurred, which clearly indicated that Chinese troops in considerable strength had spread themselves along the common border and at some points even intruded into Indian territory. In July, an Indian Police party, which was proceeding on a reconnaissance tour towards Khurnak, was taken into custody by Chinese troops in Indian territory to the Spanggur area, Ladakh. In August, a strong detachment of Chinese forces pushed back our defence pickets in Khinzemane area of the Kameng Frontier Division. At the end of August, a large Chinese detachment actually attacked and overwhelmed the Indian border post at Longju resulting in the death of 3 Indian personnel and the withdrawal of the picket further south. The Government of India strongly protested against these border violations. In Khinzemane, the Indian picket re-established itself on the McMahon Line, but in the case of Longju the Government of India asked, through normal diplomatic channel, for the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese detachment. . . .

Public indignation at the action of China was further intensified by the attack on an Indian Police rescue party in the Chang Chenmo Valley in Ladakh on 21 October 1959. Nine members of the Police party were killed and 10 unlawfully taken into custody by the Chinese troops at a point which is 40 miles within Indian territory. . . .

Early in the year, India had sent 4 students to China under the Students Exchange Scheme. China, however, sent only one student. Two official delegations, one for studying Chinese Minor Irrigation Projects, and one for studying Chinese Small-Scale Industries, visited China during the early part of 1959. China also sent a last-minute invitation to India to participate in her Decennial Celebrations on the Chinese National Day. This invitation was declined. In supersession of an earlier decision, however, China decided to participate in the World Agricultural Fair in New Delhi which is being organised by a non-official body called the Farmers Forum.

**140 Speech by Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, at the National People's Congress, 9 April 1960 (Extracts)**

The Tibetan nationality had entered a new stage of national development and prosperity and this showed how absurd were the reactionary clamours of the imperialists and foreign reactionaries about Tibet. . . .

The people in Tibet had obtained much successes in the vigorous democratic reform movement since June at last year. The vast number of serfs and slaves obtained complete emancipation and received land and other means of production. In the areas where the distribution of land had been completed, 2,100,000 ko of farmland had been distributed among the peasants and every peasant received an average of three and half ko.

The policy that each reaps what he sows, the policy of reduction of rent and interest and cancelling old debts had been carried out. The economic benefits to the working people were equivalent to more than 1,000 million catties of grain. The masses of peasants and herdsmen warmly praised the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung for making them masters of land.

**141 Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the second session of the Second National People's Congress, 10 April 1960 (Extract)**

We likewise place ardent hopes in friendly relations between China and India. We are happy to see that the Indian Government has agreed to the Chinese Government's proposal for a meeting between the Premiers of China and India. In a few days I will be setting out for a visit to our great neighbour, India. We sincerely hope that this visit and the meeting with Prime Minister Nehru will yield positive results. We deeply believe that the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India will shine forth brilliantly in the end.

### **142 Finance Minister Morarji Desai's discussions with Chou En-lai, April 1960 (Extract)**

When nobody supported China, India took your side and put up your case in the United Nations and forged friendship with you. You accepted the principles of Panchasheela. India accepted your sovereignty over Tibet, but you had accepted the condition that Tibet's autonomy would be respected and that you would not interfere with it. When that understanding was broken and China began to take possession of Tibet and kept its army there, and the Dalai Lama and his followers came to India to save themselves from the oppression of the Chinese army and India gave them refuge, you began to be inimical towards us. We had not raised any disputes about the boundaries before this and we had suggested that we should solve whatever differences there may be about the boundaries by mutual consultation.

### **143 Joint communique of the Prime Ministers of India and China, 25 April 1960**

At the invitation of the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Delhi on the 19th April to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which have arisen between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China. His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai was accompanied by His Excellency Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu, Vice Foreign Minister of China, and other officials of the Chinese Government. His Excellency the Premier and his party concluded their visit to India on the morning of the 26th April.

The two Prime Ministers had several long, frank, and friendly talks between themselves. Their Excellencies the Premier of the Chinese People's Republic and the Vice-Premier also had long talks with the President, the Vice President and several senior Ministers of the Government of India.

The two Prime Ministers explained fully their respective stands on the problems affecting the border areas. This led to a greater understanding of the views of the two Governments.

but the talks did not result in resolving the differences that had arisen. The two Prime Ministers were of opinion that further examination should take place by officials of the two sides of the factual material in the possession of both the Governments.

The two Prime Ministers, therefore, agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question, on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments. This report would list the points on which there was agreement and the points on which there were disagreements or which should be examined more fully and clarified. This report should prove helpful towards further consideration of these problems by the two Governments.

It was further agreed that the officials should meet from June to September, 1960, alternately in the capitals of the two countries. The first meeting should take place in Peking and the officials would report to the two Governments by the end of September, 1960. During the period of further examination of the factual material, every effort should be made by the parties to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas.

Advantage was taken of the meeting by the two Prime Ministers to discuss certain other important problems in world affairs. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the forthcoming conference in Paris of the Heads of Governments and expressed the hope that this conference would help in lessening international tensions, banning the production and use of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament.

**144 Chou En-lai's written statement at the press conference in New Delhi outlining Six Points of Proximity, 25 April 1960 (Extracts)**

There is no basic conflict of interests between our two countries. Our two countries have every reason to remain friendly to each other for thousands and tens of thousands of years to come. . . .

After seven days of talks, although, unlike what we expected, no agreement has been reached for the settlement of the boundary questions, the two sides have unanimously agreed that the officials of the two sides should meet and examine, check and

study the factual material relevant to the boundary question and submit report to the Governments of the two countries. Both sides have also agreed that while the officials of the two countries are holding meetings, all efforts should be made to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas. These agreements have been set forth in the Joint Communique of the two Prime Ministers. We hold that these agreements have a bearing on the maintenance of tranquillity on the border and on the continued search for avenues to a reasonable settlement of the boundary question.

Through a frank exchange of views between us two Prime Ministers, I have found that the two sides not only share the common desire to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, but that, on the boundary question, too, it is not impossible for the two sides to find common points or points of proximity, which in my view, can be broadly summarized into the following six points:

I. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.

II. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.

III. In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as water-sheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.

IV. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains.

V. Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual adjustments may be made.

VI. In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.

There is now still a certain distance between us and the Indian Government with regard to the above six points. How-

ever, I am of the opinion that as long as both sides continue consultations, it will not be difficult to narrow down and eliminate this distance. Once these common points are found, the two sides undoubtedly will have taken a big stride forward towards the reasonable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

The Chinese Government has consistently maintained that since the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, both the Chinese and Indian sides should seek a reasonable settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through peaceful and friendly consultations, taking into consideration the historical background and the present actualities, acting on the Five Principles jointly initiated by the two countries and adopting an attitude of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Pending this, both sides should maintain the present state of the boundary and not change it by unilateral action, let alone by force. Regarding some of the disputes, provisional agreements can be reached through negotiations. The Chinese Government holds that Sino-Indian friendship is of extremely great significance both to the 1,000 million people of the two countries and to Asian and world peace. This friendship should not be, nor can it be jeopardized because of the temporary lack of a settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

#### **145 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 26 April 1960 (Extracts)**

Our whole argument was based on the Chinese forces having come into our territory. Their [Chinese] argument was that they had always been there—not those particular forces, but the Chinese authorities either of Sinkiang in the north or of Tibet had been in constructive or actual possession of these areas for two hundred years. That was such a variance in the factual state that there was no meeting ground. We repeat, again after all these talks, that their forces came into this area within quite recent times, in the course of the last year and a half or so. That is our case, to which we hold. . . .

In the prolonged talks that took place, this basic disagreement about historical and actual facts came up again and again.

We are quite clear in our minds about our facts and we have stated them, and we are prepared to establish them with such material as we have. The Chinese position was basically different, historically, actually, practically.

Also, an attempt was made to equate the eastern sector with the western sector. That is, according to the Chinese, we had no right to be there in the eastern sector but we had advanced gradually, in the course of the last eight to ten years, to the present boundary line which we call the McMahon Line. They equated it to the western sector, although the conditions are quite different and the facts are quite different.

Thus the actual discussion came up against a rock of entirely different sets of data. If data differ, if inferences differ, arguments differ, if the basic facts are different, then there is no meeting ground at all.

Therefore, it was suggested, and ultimately agreed to, that these facts should be explored from the material available with us and with the Chinese Government. . . .

It is obvious that the officials who might do it have no authority or competence to deal with the political aspect of the problem in the sense of suggesting a solution or recommending anything. That is not their function. All they can do is to examine facts, and, as stated in the communique, to list, more or less, the facts that are agreed to, the facts on which there is a difference of opinion and those on which perhaps some further enquiry may be necessary. I do not imagine that this process will clarify the situation and make it easy of solution. But it might make some basic facts somewhat clearer. . . .

Their case is that from immemorial times, at any rate for hundreds of years, their border has been from the Karakoram range to the Kongka Pass. Unless you have maps, you will not be able to understand it. If you accept that border, a large area of Ladakh is cut off. They say that the northern part of this area pertained to Sinkiang, not to Tibet at all, and the lower part to Tibet. That is their case, broadly. They say that it is not the present Government but the previous Chinese Government that came there.



**146 *People's Daily* editorial commenting on Sino-Indian talks  
and Chou En-lai's six points, 27 April 1960 (Extracts)**

Of the six points, the first and the second are objective facts which nobody can deny. If the two sides recognize these facts and reach identical views, a favourable prerequisite will be provided for a reasonable solution of the boundary question. Points three and four are principles for the handling of the boundary question. Obviously they are completely reasonable and some of the geographical principles contained in them have also been repeatedly stressed by the Indian side on certain occasions. Therefore, there should not be difficulties, too, in reaching identical views on these principles. Points five and six relate to the necessary measures to be taken by the two sides pending a settlement of the boundary question. They are both reasonable and justifiable. In the past, the Indian side also maintained that individual adjustments may be made on the boundary and that patrolling along the eastern sector should be discontinued. This comes near to points five and six. . . .

Imperialism and the reactionary forces in India tried unscrupulously to exert pressure on the talks for China to make unilateral concessions. They even demanded that China give up its own territory as a pre-condition for negotiation. . . .

There is no conflict of fundamental interests whatsoever between us. Although the social systems and the paths of economic development of the two countries are different, it is necessary for us to learn from each other, encourage and cooperate with each other on many questions.

China and India are both peace-loving countries. The solidarity of the 1,000 million people of China and India, has been, still is and will remain a great force in defence of world peace. The common interest of the Chinese and Indian peoples requires us to make still greater contributions to the cause of world peace and progress in the years to come. The great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore once said in 1924 that the friendship and solidarity between China and India constituted the foundation-stone of a struggling Asia. Today we still cherish these words of Tagore. We are deeply convinced that the difference between China and India concerning the boundary question will eventually be solved reasonably and that, through

their joint efforts, the traditional and fraternal friendship between the 1,000 million people of China and India will eventually dispel all the dark clouds of evil and illumine the whole of Asia.

**147 Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha, 29 April 1960 (Extract)**

So far as the original Akasai Chin road was concerned, it was an old caravan route, hundreds and hundreds of years old. This has always been used as a caravan route by people going from Sinkiang to Tibet. This and the near-by route were used by the Chinese forces, probably in 1951 or may be 1952, that is to say, soon after the Chinese Government came to Tibet. It was not a road proper but they used it for taking materials, supplies, forces, etc. Three or four years later, probably in 1957 or 1958, they built some kind of a road there. In the last eighteen months (less, perhaps, according to our information and our belief) they occupied a number of other places in the Ladakh area, apart from the Akasai Chin area. And later, about the middle of last year, they built the other road in the area controlled by them. It was not obviously possible for us to stop the building of that road, because they controlled that area. Either we control it by pushing them out or we cannot prevent their building that road. That is the position.

**148 Nehru's statement in the UN General Assembly, 3 October 1960 (Extract)**

For a number of years India has brought this issue before the United Nations because we have felt that it was not only improper for this great and powerful country to remain unrespected but that this had an urgent bearing on all world problems, and especially those of disarmament.

We hold that all countries must be represented in the United Nations. We have welcomed during this session many new countries. It appears most extraordinary that any argument should be advanced to keep out China and to give the seat meant for China to those who certainly do not and cannot represent China.

It is well known that we in India have had and are having, a controversy with the Government of the People's Republic of

China about our frontiers. In spite of that controversy, we continue to feel that proper representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations is essential, and the longer we delay it the more harm we cause to the United Nations and to the consideration of the major problems we have before us. This is not a question of liking or disliking, but of doing the right and proper thing.

**149 Statement by Indian representative, V.K. Krishna Menon, in the UN General Assembly, 3 October 1960 (Extracts)**

What we are doing is to shut our eyes to reality. It does not respond to the call of either logic or reason or the requirements of prudence or of security.

We shall discuss here, I am afraid somewhat unrealistically, the problems of world peace and of disarmament. Here is a country with large legions of men in her armies and even larger legions in the reserves, with a vast potential power for the manufacture of weapons of destruction and the capacity to contribute either negatively or positively to the maintenance of peace or the reverse. Now, how is it possible to discuss any of these problems, with any view towards settling them, unless, of course, the whole of our disarmament discussion is either academic or not taking into account realities? How is it possible for us to make any assessment of the situation without taking into account a large country like this? It would mean that the arms that China possesses, the resources that she possesses, would be outside the agreement. It is almost like disarming all good citizens and all citizens outside the law having possession of fire-arms. . . .

We are told that because we had controversies and conflicts with China, in regard to our frontier, therefore we have abandoned the principles of our foreign policy, we have abandoned considerations that are applicable to our membership of the United Nations, and, what is more important, that we reversed the views which were applicable at a time when this was not the case.

It is quite true that China, in disregard of neighbourly considerations, in disregard of a very formal decency, has violated the frontiers of India. My country will take every step that is

required in order to resist such aggression and to guard the security of our land. We make no reservations on this. We have told the world that this is an act which is against the relations that exist between our two countries, against our desire for peaceful and friendly neighbourliness, and, what is more, it is against the interests of peace. But in a role of that kind, however painful it may be to us, however much it may be a violation of the principles of coexistence, it will not push us away from the fundamental things that govern us in regard to the United Nations.

**150 Report of the Indian officials on their statements and comments made during the meetings of the officials of the Governments of India and China on the boundary question, 12 December 1960 (released February 1961) (Extracts)**

The Indian side furnished a vast and varied amount of material and fully established that the long traditional boundary of over 2,400 miles shown on current Indian maps was clear and precise, conformed to unchanging natural features, had support in tradition and custom as well as in the exercise of administrative jurisdiction right upto it, had been recognised for centuries and had been confirmed in agreements. It, therefore, required no further delimitation. . . .

The material cited by the Chinese side was wholly inconclusive and the Chinese stand had no basis either in fact or in law or in logic. . . .

The Indian side were surprised at the reluctance of the Chinese side to discuss questions pertaining to the boundary of Kashmir State of India west of the Karakoram Pass and to the northern boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan on the ground that these boundaries did not fall within the scope of these discussions.

The Chinese refusal to discuss the segment of the boundary west of the Karakoram Pass was tantamount to questioning the legality of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India when in fact the accession had not only been recognised by other countries but even by the United Nations organisation. . . .

Traditional boundaries are delimited by a historical process

and that both Indian and Chinese evidence established beyond doubt that the true traditional boundary between the two countries is that shown by India. The Chinese side, by the logic of their own arguments, should recognise that traditional boundaries are valid and that the emphasis on formal delimitation is irrelevant and extraneous to the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Any kind of formal delimitation is optional and not essential in establishing the location and validity of traditional boundaries. If boundaries only become valid when they are formalized in a Boundary Agreement, it would amount to suggesting that there were no valid boundaries between China and Nepal or Burma prior to 1960, and that there are still no boundaries between China and Mongolia and, in the Sarikol sector, between China and the U.S.S.R.—indeed that there were no boundaries in the world before such formal agreements, which are a feature only of modern history.

The fact is that formal delimitation of the Sino-Indian boundary cannot resolve the issue because, unlike the northern boundaries of Nepal or Burma, the Indian and Chinese alignments are separated for long distances by large belts of territory—100 to 150 miles in depth. The crux of the Sino-Indian boundary question is not the nature of the boundary, because both sides contend that their alignment is, in fact, what for centuries has been accepted, but which of the two alignments is the true traditional boundary. During the last six months the two sides brought forward material which they considered to be in support of the stands of their respective Governments. The Indian case stood proven, as it conformed to the obvious principles of the formation of traditional boundaries, and was, therefore, naturally and irresistibly supported by unbroken historical evidence and administrative record. The Chinese case, on the other hand, was found to be inconsistent in logic, and documentary support for it was meagre and lacking in content. The result, as is plain from these Reports, was a telling contrast between the wealth of consistent and conclusive evidence produced by the Indian side, and the sketchy and contradictory material brought forward by the Chinese side. The positive Indian evidence as well as the analysis of the Chinese evidence establish indisputably that the true traditional boundary between India and China is that defined in the description provided by the Indian side at the commence-

ment of these discussions. The title of India is an ancient and immemorial one and no major dispute regarding it existed till just over twelve months ago. The majestic arc of the Kuen Lun and the Great Himalayan Ranges forms the most impressive natural boundary in the world, has been recognized in tradition and custom for centuries, has determined the limits of administration on both sides and has received confirmation, for different sectors at different times during the last 300 years, in valid international agreements. The facts, therefore, demand respect for this boundary defined by nature, confirmed by history and sanctified by the laws of nations.

**151 Report of the Chinese officials on their statements and comments made during the meetings of the officials of the Governments of China and India on the boundary question, 12 December 1960 (released February 1961) (Extract)**

The boundary line claimed by the Indian side, whether in the western, middle or eastern sectors, not only lacks basis in tradition and custom, but also lacks basis in administration and jurisdiction. This line was wilfully created by the British imperialists in the course of their invasion of and nibbling at China's Sinkiang and Tibet.

The examination, checking and study of a mass of evidence relevant to the Sino-Indian boundary by the officials of both sides over the past five months and more have further substantiated the basic facts regarding the boundary as repeatedly expounded by the Chinese Government. They are:

1. The entire Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and there does not exist between China and India any treaty or agreement delimiting their boundary.

2. The boundary line pointed out by the Chinese side correctly reflects the true traditional customary line of the Sino-Indian boundary. This traditional customary line was gradually formed and made clear through a long process of historical development according to the extent up to which each side has all along exercised administrative jurisdiction, and it was not mechanically defined or pre-determined by some geographical principle. A vast amount of factual material has incontestably proved that this boundary line pointed out by the Chinese side

has full basis in tradition and custom as well as conclusive basis in administrative jurisdiction. As for the alignment claimed by the Indian side, it does not at all represent any so-called traditional customary line; it has neither been confirmed by history nor sanctioned by any treaty or agreement, but is a line planned out by the British imperialists for the purpose of implementing its policy of aggression and expansion against China's Sinkiang and Tibet and which only appeared for the first time in 1954 on official Indian maps as its territorial claim.

3. There exists at present a line up to which each side exercises actual control which differs from the traditional customary line, this came about because India not only inherited the occupation by British imperialism of what originally was Chinese territory, but even in recent years further forcibly pushed its control into Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line. China, on the other hand, has never at any time or at any point crossed the traditional customary line and entered Indian territory. Chinese military and civil personnel even did not cross the so-called McMahan Line which China has never recognized.

### **152 Indian note to China, 30 December 1960 (Extract)**

Although Article 5 of the Treaty [Burmese-Chinese Boundary Treaty of 1 October 1960] does not specify the exact location of the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary, in the map attached to the Treaty the boundary is shown as ending at the Diphu L'ka Pass. The traditional boundary of India west of the Sino-Burmese boundary follows the watershed between D-chu in India and Lat-te in the Tibet region of China; and the tri-junction of India, Burma and China is five miles north of the Diphu L'ka Pass, and not at the Diphu L'ka Pass itself. The coordinates of the tri-junction are approximately longitude 97° 23' east and latitude 28° 13' north. The fact that the traditional boundary running along the Himalayan watershed passes through this point has in the past been accepted by the Governments of Burma and China and it has for many years been shown correctly on official maps published in India.

The Government of India recognise that the text of the Treaty has left the exact location of this point unspecified. The Government of India are however obliged to point out that the

extremity of the boundary between the two countries has been shown on the maps attached to the Treaty in an erroneous manner. As the location of the tri-junction at the Diphu L'ka Pass has an adverse implication on the territorial integrity of India, the Government of India wish to make clear to the Government of the People's Republic of China that they would be unable to recognise this map insofar as it prejudicially affects Indian territory.

**153 President Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament,  
14 February 1961 (Extract)**

The problems of aggression on and incursions into the sovereign territory of the Union have yet to be resolved, but my Government is well alert to them and to all their implications. Defensive arrangements, including the opening up of areas by better communications and development, receive their continuous and careful attention.

While China has withdrawn from the military post it had established at Longju and not attempted any further violations of Union territory, her intransigence continues. It is the constant endeavour of my Government to maintain our defensive strength in the face of this continuing hostility from across our frontier. My Government will, however, seek to adhere firmly to the principles which this Nation regard as basic in our relations with nations. They cannot accept the results of unilateral action or decisions taken by China.

This peaceful but firm policy and progressive preparedness for defence, has the support of our people and has also profoundly influenced world opinion. We firmly hold that the frontiers between India and China have been for long well established by treaties, custom and usage. In spite of present unwillingness, or even intransigence, my Government hope that, sooner rather than later, China will persuade herself to come to a satisfactory agreement with our country in regard to our common frontiers. Friendly relations with our great neighbour, which my Government have always sought to promote, can then become a reality which will endure and contribute to our common good and to stability in Asia and the world.



**154 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 15 February 1961 (Extracts)**

The Boundary Treaty was signed between Burma and China on October 1, 1960. In this treaty no definite co-ordinates of the tri-junction had been mentioned.

We were informed by the Prime Minister of Burma that the Chinese Government did not agree that the tri-junction lay near the Talu Pass, but reaffirmed that it should lie near the Diphu Pass. It appears that ultimately the representatives of the Burmese and Chinese Governments agreed not to describe the precise location of the tri-junction in the treaty and left the point vague. . . . The Burmese Government argued that because of the difference of views as regards the exact location of the tri-junction, the agreement which had been reached on all other points could not remain unsigned and the Burmese Government were obliged to accept the Chinese contention as far as the cartographic delineation was concerned. We appreciate that the exact location has not been specified, but this vague mention and the fact that the treaty maps showed the line as starting from the Diphu Pass, five miles south of the watershed, are likely to have prejudicial effect on 75 square miles of Indian territory. The Government of India, therefore, in Notes presented to the Chinese and the Burmese Governments at the end of December 1960, made clear once again the exact co-ordinates of the tri-junction, stating that the traditional boundary running along the Himalayan watershed passed through the point near the Talu Pass and not the Diphu pass which had been shown as the western extremity in the maps attached to the treaty. The Government of India could not recognize the erroneous depiction of the tri-junction since it has an adverse implication so far as the territorial integrity of India is concerned.

**155 Chinese reply to Indian note of 30 December 1960,  
21 February 1961 (Extracts)**

Diphu Pass is shown on the attached maps not as the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary. As the Indian Government is aware, no specific provision is made in the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty for the exact location of the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary. This is an appro-

priate way of handling the matter, having regard for the fact that the boundary between China and India has not yet been formally delimited and that there is a dispute between China and India on the boundary question. There is no basis whatsoever for the Indian Government to think that the delineation of any part of the Sino-Burmese boundary in the maps attached to the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty has an adverse implication on the territorial integrity of India.

The Indian Government states that the Sino-Indian boundary west of the Sino-Burmese boundary follows the "Himalaya watershed" between Di-chu and Lat-te and that the tri-junction of China, Burma and India is five miles north of the Diphu Pass. The Indian Government further asserts that this fact has in the past been accepted by the Chinese Government. These assertions are all inconsistent with the facts. The traditional customary Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan follows in the main the southern foot of the Himalayas and Chinese maps published throughout the years have all shown the location of this line. The unilateral claim about the boundary in this sector put forward by the Indian Government in its memorandum has never been accepted by the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government believes that. . . the entire boundary question between China and India can be settled and, along with it, the question of the tri-junction of China, India and Burma will be finally decided.

#### **156 Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1960-61, February 1961 (Extracts)**

Difficulties encountered by Indian representatives and traders in Tibet did not materially decrease and the provisions of the 1954 Agreement were not fully observed. Indian traders continued to suffer difficulties because of the lack of facilities to repatriate their legitimate profits after the Indian and Tibetan currency were declared as illegal tender. Instances of harassment of and discrimination against Indian nationals were also reported. In the early part of the year, the Kashmir Muslims residing in Lhasa and neighbouring regions were subjected to severe hardship and intimidation but it was gratifying to note that they were eventually permitted to return to India. . . .

During the year under report the Government of India were obliged to take action under the Foreigners Act against a number of Chinese Nationals who were indulging in anti-Indian activities on Indian soil.

**157 Statement by Government of Burma on India's objection regarding Sino-Burmese boundary treaty, March 1961**

(a) The Government of India have made a reservation with regard to the maps appended to the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. The reservation arises from the fact that the Government of India claim that the Sino-Burmese boundary and the Sino-Indian boundary meet at a point near the Talu Pass, while the Sino-Burmese boundary shown on the treaty maps does not terminate at this point.

(b) The position of the Government of the Union of Burma on this matter was fully set out in the Hon'ble Prime Minister's statement in Parliament on December 5, 1960, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“Concerning Articles V, VI and VII, there is a point on which an explanation is due to the House. It is in regard to the use of the expression ‘Western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary’ in Articles V and VII (1) (6) of the Treaty. It will be observed that in Articles VI and VII (2) (18) the expression used to describe the other end of the Sino-Burmese boundary is the ‘south-eastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary at the junction of the Nam La and the Lanchang (Mekong) Rivers’. Thus, the specific geographical location of the south-eastern extremity is given in the Treaty, whereas no such location is given for the western extremity. This omission was intentional, and the reason for it is the existence of the unfortunate boundary dispute between China and India. The western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary must naturally be the point where three international boundaries meet, these being the boundary between Burma and China, the boundary between Burma and India, and the boundary between China and India. Of these, the boundary between Burma and China is being settled by this Treaty and the boundary between Burma and India is already settled. What is still in dispute is the boundary between China and India. This is a dispute to be settled between China and India and it is my

fervent hope that it will be settled quickly and peacefully. But until these two Powers come to an agreement on their common boundary, the point where the Sino-Indian boundary meets the Burmese boundary must necessarily remain indeterminate. It is for this reason that the 'western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary, has not been given any specific geographical location in the Treaty. But while the location of the western extremity is left indeterminate in the Treaty, it is not possible to give it the same treatment in the map attached to the Treaty, since a line has to have a beginning and an end. In these circumstances, we have shown the Sino-Burmese Boundary on the map as running down to the Diphu Pass. If and when China and India settle their boundary question, it should happen that the agreed boundary between China and India meets the Burmese boundary not at the Diphu Pass but at some other point, not only would the specific geographical location of that point have to be entered in the Treaty, but the map would also naturally have to be altered.'

The Government, therefore, have nothing further to add to this matter.

**158 Message of Greetings from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Communist Party of India on the convocation of its 6th Congress, April 1961 (Extracts)**

Together with the great Indian People, the Communist Party of India is waging a stern battle to safeguard and consolidate India's national independence, develop its national economy which is an aid to consolidating independence and improving the people's livelihood and defend their democratic rights and vital interests.

The Communist Party and people of India have also made great efforts in opposing the policies of war and aggression of the imperialist bloc headed by U.S. imperialism, in safeguarding the peace of Asia and the world, in defending the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly initiated by China and India and in developing the traditional and great friendship between the peoples of China and India.

Historically, both the Chinese and Indian peoples have suffered long years of imperialist slavery and oppression; consequently the Communist Party and people of China regard every success in the struggle of the Communist Party and people of India as their own and rejoice in it with a special feeling of warmth. History will prove that in spite of the difference in social systems the friendship between the two great peoples of China and India can never be disrupted. . . .

We are convinced that, through this congress and through the strenuous and complicated struggles of your Party and people, you will assuredly overcome all difficulties in your path of progress and make new contributions and win new success in strengthening the unity of all democratic and progressive forces of India and promoting the cause of the Indian people in the defence of world peace, the safeguarding of national independence and for democracy and socialism.

**159 "India and foreign aid," article by Hsiao Leng in *Peking Review*, 10 November 1961 (Extracts)**

With the unfolding of the foreign exchange crisis, India has become increasingly dependent on foreign aid. During its First Five-Year Plan, foreign aid amounted to 1,880 million rupees, making up 9.6 per cent of the expenditure of the public owned sector which totalled 19,600 million rupees. During the Second Five-Year Plan, foreign aid rose to 10,900 million rupees, or 23.7 per cent of the expenditure of the public-owned sector, which totalled 46,000 million rupees. Besides, India is, in the main, also dependent on foreign loans or grants to finance its grain imports. The foreign aid India receives comes mainly from the United States. . . .

The influence of foreign aid is also expanding in India's privately owned industrial enterprises. . . .

In seeking foreign aid the Indian Government has pinned its hopes mainly on the West, the United States in particular. . . .

As the recipient of large amounts of U.S. aid in the last few years, India has become the biggest international market of the United States for the dumping of its surplus foodgrains and

the main object of its investments in Southeast Asia. . . .

With its Third Five-Year Plan beset with difficulties and its foreign exchange crisis deepening all the time, it seems, India is becoming more and more dependent on the West, and especially on the United States.

### **160 Chinese note to India, 3 December 1961**

The Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, which was signed on April 29, 1954, came into effect on June 3, the same year upon ratification by both Parties. According to the provisions of Article 6 of the Agreement, the Agreement shall remain in force for eight years, so it is due to expire and cease to be in force on June 3, 1962.

With a view to consolidating and developing the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India and promoting the economic and cultural interflow between the two countries, the Chinese Government proposes that the Chinese and Indian Governments hold negotiations so as to conclude, in accordance with the Five Principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, a new agreement on trade and intercourse, to replace the original Agreement. The Chinese Government is looking forward to the reply of the Indian Government to this proposal.

### **161 Indian reply to Chinese note of 3 December 1961, 15 December 1961 (Extract)**

As the Embassy of the People's Republic of China is aware, Government of India took the initiative to enter into negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China in 1954 with a view to reaching an agreement on the revised pattern of economic and cultural relations between India and Tibet so as to establish a climate of friendship and co-operation between India and China and to ensure and indeed to facilitate friendly and co-operative relations between India and China and to promote peace and rapid economic and cultural develop-

ment not only in the two countries but also in South East Asia. It was with this end in view that the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence were enunciated and set out in the preamble to the Agreement. It was hoped that these Five Principles would not only regulate for years to come the relations between India and China but that the agreement would pave the way for a wider acceptance of these principles in inter-state relations more particularly in Asia.

The Government of India, ever since the signing of the 1954 Agreement, consistently pursued a policy of creating a zone in Asia free from cold-war conflicts and expected that the Government of the People's Republic of China would also co-operate in this commendable objective.

Within a year or two of the signing of this Agreement, the Government of the People's Republic of China not only began to curtail progressively the economic and cultural facilities provided for Indian traders and Indian pilgrims under the Agreement, but, what is more reprehensible, started to encroach, at first insidiously and later on openly, on territories which had clearly been accepted as Indian, and by 1958, began to make open claims, followed up by aggressive military activity, on several thousand square miles of Indian territory. The position today is that the Government of the People's Republic of China have not only violated both in letter and spirit the Five Principles of co-existence set out in the preamble to the 1954 Agreement but have actually occupied by force over 12,000 square miles of Indian territory and continue to expand their illegal claims and pursue their aggressive military activities to forcibly occupy large areas of Indian territory.

The Government of India always desired friendly and co-operative relations with the Government of the People's Republic of China. It was to this end that they negotiated the 1954 Agreement even though this involved relinquishment of important rights and privileges in Tibet that the Government of India had inherited from the past. The Government of India willingly sacrificed these inherited rights and privileges with a view to laying a new and firm foundation of friendship and co-operation between India and China. The hopes and aspirations entertained by the Government of India while negotiating for and signing the 1954 Agreement have, however, been complete-

ly frustrated by the aggressive and expansionist policies followed by the Government of the People's Republic of China during the last few years.

The Government of India are still desirous of having friendly and co-operative relations with the Government of the People's Republic of China but they cannot see how, in the context of what has been stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, they can start negotiations for a new agreement in accordance with the Five Principles. The first essential for the starting of such negotiations is the reversal of the aggressive policies followed by the Government of the People's Republic of China during the last few years and the restoration of climate which assures the strict observance of the Five Principles both in letter and spirit.

### **162 Statement of the Chinese Government in support of India's recovery of Goa, 19 December 1961**

On December 18, 1961 the Indian Government announced the dispatch of its troops into Goa to terminate Portuguese colonial rule over Goa. Goa is an inalienable part of India's territory. To oppose colonialism and safeguard national independence and the unity of their country, the Indian people have for a long time been demanding the recovery of Goa and have waged an unremitting struggle for this purpose. The action of the Indian Government in recovering Goa reflects the just demand of the Indian people. The Chinese Government and people express their resolute support for it.

The colonial rule of the Portuguese colonialists over India's Goa has already lasted over 400 years. After India attained independence, the Indian Government has repeatedly proposed to settle the Goa question by peaceful means, but has each time met with the unreasonable refusal of the Portuguese authorities. Even now the Portuguese authorities are still attempting to use force to prevent the return of Goa to India. All this proves that imperialism and colonialism will never of their own accord abandon their colonial rule and interests. Only by waging resolute struggles can the people in various countries drive out imperialism and colonialism from their own soil and win genuine independence and freedom.



What calls for serious attention is that the imperialist powers headed by the United States of America openly oppose and unjustifiably censure the Indian people's just demand for recovering Goa and support continued Portuguese occupation of Goa. Apart from taking separate diplomatic moves, the imperialist powers have lined up to use the United Nations Security Council to pressurize India in a strenuous attempt to obstruct India's effort to recover Goa. This shows that at the present time, when the United Nations is controlled by the imperialist powers headed by the United States, it is sheer illusion to wish that the United Nations would make the old and new colonialists abandon their colonial rule in various parts of the world.

The Chinese people and Government have consistently given active support to the Asian, African and Latin American peoples in their just struggles to oppose imperialism and colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence and state sovereignty. Such struggles are not only an important factor in defence of world peace, they are also a very powerful support to the Chinese people who are resolutely opposing the occupation of China's territory Taiwan by U.S. imperialism.

### **163 Commentary by Hsiao Leng in *Peking Review* on election results in India, 23 March 1962 (Extracts)**

The Congress Party lost ground in both the Lok Sabha and the various state assemblies. This is because of the growing discontent of the people at large with the party that has held power since India's independence. . . .

In spite of temporary setbacks in some electorates there was a marked growth of the progressive force in India represented by the Communist Party of India. The results show that the Communist Party of India increased its votes and won more seats than in the second general elections in places like West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala where the peasant movement and mass struggle have made vigorous progress. . . .

The Communist Party of India, with 29 seats, retains its position as the second largest political party in the Lok Sabha . . .

The results of the third general elections in India have shown a very important trend in Indian politics. In places where the

prestige of the Congress Party is waning and the progressive forces are relatively weak, the feudal and comprador forces, taking advantage of popular discontent, are strengthening their position. They do this by fomenting language disputes and disputes between various communal organizations.

In the recent Lok Sabha elections, the Swatantra Party, founded less than three years ago and representing the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords become the third biggest party in the country, while the Jan Sangh, a Hindu communal group, which suffered heavy losses in the previous election increased the number of its seats three and a half times to become the fourth biggest party in the country . . . .

Another notable result of these latest general elections in India was that both the politicians who have been most energetic in stirring up anti-Chinese feeling in recent years and the Praja Socialist Party which made election capital of its anti-Chinese stand, have suffered heavy losses. In this campaign they were almost obliterated. . . .

U.S. imperialism has shown a keen interest in India's general elections. In recent years by dumping farm produce on the Indian market the United States has accumulated a huge amount of Indian currency amounting to more than 1,000 million rupees. With this money it is engaged in buying over the big bourgeoisie in India and is carrying on a variety of political activities.

**164 President Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament,  
18 April 1962 (Extract)**

India's uneasy relations with China remain unsolved. The Officials' Report, which was placed by my Government before Parliament in 1961, has not yet been published in China.

The Indo-Tibetan Agreement of 1954 is due to expire on June 2, 1962. The Government of the People's Republic of China have offered to negotiate a new Agreement to replace the 1954 Agreement. My Government responding by way of

reply, have asked for a reversal of the aggressive policies pursued by our neighbour and for the restoration of a climate of peace on the basis of strict observance of the Five Principles.

**165 Hsinhua commentary on the Report of the Chinese and Indian Officials on the Boundary Question, 28 April 1962 (Extracts)**

The report of the officials shows that there is serious divergence between the two sides in their comprehension of the facts concerning the boundary question. But the factual material provided and the comments made by the two sides objectively and indisputably testify that the position of the Chinese Government is correct, namely, the Sino-Indian boundary indeed has not been formally delimited and the Sino-Indian traditional customary line as pointed out by China is well-grounded, while the boundary line claimed by India has no treaty, historical or factual basis, and there is between it and the traditional customary line pointed out by China a difference of about 120,000 square kilometres. The Indian side can in no way negate these facts. The report further proves that the Chinese Government's advocacy of a settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through friendly negotiations and formal delimitation is logical; while the Indian Government's position of refusing to negotiate and insisting on China's acceptance of the alignment claimed by India is totally untenable.

Following is a brief account of the contents of this report.

*(1) The Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited; India's assertion that the alignment it claims has treaty basis runs counter to fact.*

The Chinese side pointed out that there has never been any boundary delimiting treaty or agreement, whether concerning the whole length or a section of the Sino-Indian boundary. Nor is there a single article in past treaties or agreements of other nature between the two countries which defines the concrete location of any section of the boundary between the two countries. Therefore, the whole length of the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited.

The Indian side, seeking legal basis for the alignment uni-

laterally claimed by it, arbitrarily asserted that the Sino-Indian boundary has been confirmed by a number of treaties and agreements and that further delimitation is not necessary. But none of the treaties and agreements cited by the Indian side can serve as a basis for the delimitation of the boundary. . . .

*(II) The Traditional Customary Line maintained by China is well-grounded while the alignment claimed by India is groundless.*

With the Sino-Indian boundary not formally delimited, there only exists between the two countries a traditional customary boundary which has been formed by the limits to which each side's jurisdiction has always extended. The examination and comparison of the evidence cited by the two sides have confirmed that the traditional customary boundary pointed out by China is well-grounded, while the alignment claimed by India is groundless. . . .

*(III) The Indian side's assertion that the Sino-Indian Boundary is pre-determined by watersheds is totally untenable.*

Being unable to produce convincing evidence, the Indian side stressed that the alignment claimed by it was pre-determined by geographical features, saying that it consistently follows the main watershed. This assertion is totally untenable. The Chinese side pointed out that the traditional customary boundary is mainly formed by the extent to which each side all along exercised its administrative jurisdiction, and is not pre-determined by geographical features. As a matter of fact, the alignment claimed by the Indian side does not wholly follow the main watershed. . . .

*(IV) Chinese maps always show the Traditional Customary Line, Indian maps are full of confusion and inconsistencies.*

The map evidence of the two countries forms a significant contrast. The traditional customary line maintained by China has always been reflected in Chinese maps. The large-scale authoritative official maps cited by the Chinese side, such as the Map of China (2,000,000:1) made by China's defence authorities in 1918 and the Map of China (1,000,000:1) compiled in 1943,

clearly show that the delineation of the boundary by China in those days was exactly the same as today. For decades, the delineation of the boundary in Chinese maps has been basically consistent with that shown in the above-mentioned maps. Though occasionally there have been some insignificant discrepancies, this is understandable before a formal delimitation of the boundary.

In contrast with the Chinese maps, the official Indian maps are full of confusion and inconsistencies. . . .

*(V) The Indian side attempts to deny the facts about British imperialist aggression against China.*

In order to defend the alignment unilaterally claimed by it, the Indian side spared no effort in whitewashing the aggressive activities then carried out by British imperialism against China's Tibet and Sinkiang with India as its base. . . .

*(VI) The Indian side distorts the facts, creates side-issues and broadens the controversy.*

In the face of the large amount of authoritative and powerful evidence and arguments put forward by the Chinese side, the Indian side could not find any untenable arguments to counter them, and so resorted to arbitrary argumentation, distortion and slander, or created side-issues to divert the issue. . . .

The Indian side went so far as to allege that the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaties, which were signed in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence and through friendly consultations, supported the Indian position with regard to the boundary. . . .

Furthermore, the Indian side repeatedly raised the question of the boundary between China and Bhutan, between China and Sikkim and between China's Sinkiang and the area under the jurisdiction of Pakistan west of the Karakoram pass, and asked to discuss them.

*(VII) China has always sought a peaceful settlement of the Boundary Question through negotiations; India adopts an attitude of imposing its will on others, thus making the Boundary Question more difficult and complicated.*

The work of the officials of the two sides once again confirmed the facts about the Sino-Indian boundary expounded all

along by the Chinese Government and testified to the reasonableness of the position consistently maintained by the Chinese Government for a settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese and the Indian sides should settle the boundary question by taking into account the historical background and the present actual situation, basing themselves on the five principles of peaceful co-existence, holding friendly consultations and taking an attitude of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Pending an over-all settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should maintain the *status quo* of the boundary, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, let alone by force. The Chinese side pointed out that it is futile for the Indian Government to disagree with the Chinese Government's proposition that negotiations should be conducted for an over-all settlement of the boundary between the two countries, and to insist on the Chinese Government's total acceptance and recognition of the entirely baseless alignment put forward by the Indian side. . . .

**166 Nehru's statement regarding China-Pakistan boundary negotiations, 7 May 1962 (Extracts)**

We have made it perfectly clear even in the past both to the Pakistan Government and the Chinese Government about those parts of the frontier now in possession of Pakistan that we would not recognise any agreements arrived at between them and Pakistan. I have stated the other day in the other house that a little more than a year and a half ago when I was in Pakistan I discussed this question or I raised this question with President Ayub Khan with his foreign Minister and others present in a friendly way, because China was encroaching upon us and part of that boundary was at present under occupation of Pakistan. I wanted to know exactly where the Chinese were on that part of the boundary, and if they had given any trouble to Pakistan, what steps Pakistan had taken to meet the situation. . . . any action which they [Pakistan Government] might take should be in line with the action we were taking in regard to this border, and should not conflict. Unfortunately for various reasons they have come to this Agreement with the Chinese, which is an interference on both sides with India's

legal rights in the matter.

**167 Indian note to Pakistan, 10 May 1962 (Extracts)**

According to a communique issued by the Government of Pakistan on 3 May 1962, the Governments of Pakistan and China have agreed to enter into negotiations to locate and align that portion of boundary between India and China west of the Karakoram Pass which is presently under Pakistan's unlawful occupation. . . .

The Government of Pakistan are obviously not entitled to negotiate with China or any other country about territory that is not their own. . . .

The Government of India will never agree to any arrangements, provisional or otherwise, between the Governments of China and Pakistan regarding territory which constitutes an inalienable part of the Indian Union.

The Government of India lodge an emphatic protest with the Government of Pakistan and warn them of the grave consequences of their action.

**168 Indian note to China, 10 May 1962 (Extract)**

According to a communique issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the 3rd May 1962, the Governments of China and Pakistan have entered into an agreement "to locate and align their common border".

As the Government of China are aware there is no common border between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. It is the India-China boundary which starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan at approximately long 74° 34' E and Lat. 37° 3' N and runs eastward upto the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, Burma and China.

There has never been any doubt that the sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir, including that part which is under Pakistan's unlawful occupation, vests solely in the Indian Union. The Government of India had so far believed that the Government of the People's Republic of China had accepted this basic position without any reservation. This was

confirmed by Premier Chou En-lai when he stated to the Indian Ambassador in Peking on March 16, 1956 "that the people of Kashmir had already expressed their will" on the issue of Kashmir's accession to India. The same impression was gained at the meeting between the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Chinese Prime Minister in July 1961. At that time it seemed that the Government of China still acknowledged the final accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union. The Government of India are, in view of this background, surprised that the Government of the People's Republic of China should have suddenly decided to enter into an international agreement to negotiate the boundary of that part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is under the unlawful occupation of Pakistan with the Government of Pakistan. This is a reversal of the attitude of the Government of the People's Republic of China in regard to India's sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir and is obviously a step in furtherance of the aggressive aims that China has been pursuing towards India in recent years.

In lodging an emphatic protest with the Government of the People's Republic of China for this interference with the sovereignty of India over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Government of India solemnly warns the Government of China that any change, provisional or otherwise, in the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir brought about by third parties which seeks to submit certain parts of Indian territory to foreign jurisdiction will not be binding on the Government of India and that the Government of India firmly repudiate any agreements provisional or otherwise regarding her own territories arrived at between third parties who have no legal or constitutional *locus standi* of any kind.

It is clear that the Government of China are in this matter acting in furtherance of their aggressive designs and are seeking to exploit the troubled situation in Kashmir and India's differences with Pakistan for their advantage. The Government of India will hold the Government of China responsible for the consequences of their action.



**169 Indian note to China, 14 May 1962 (Extract)**

The Prime Minister of India stated in Parliament on 2nd May 1962, "India does not want, and dislikes very much, a war with China. But that is not within India's control". The Government of India hope that the Government of China are earnest about maintaining peace. If so, the two Governments should take necessary steps to prevent armed clashes on the border, ease the tension now existing in the northern sector of Ladakh and lay a proper foundation for peaceful negotiations on the boundary question between the two Governments. In this connection, the Government of India would urge the Chinese Government to give serious consideration to the offer made in the Indian Prime Minister's letter dated 16th November 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai, which *inter alia* proposed as an interim measure that, in the Ladakh region, the Government of India should withdraw their personnel to the west of the line shown in the 1956 Chinese map and the Government of China should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary shown in Indian official maps. This will apply not only to armed but also to unarmed and administrative personnel which should be withdrawn and the entire area between the boundaries claimed by the two sides left unoccupied. The adoption of this suggestion will lead to the relaxation of tension in this border region and create the necessary atmosphere for settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary problem by negotiations and discussions. The Government of India are prepared, in the interest of a peaceful settlement, to permit, pending negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, the continued use of the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic. In renewing the Prime Minister of India's offer of 16th November 1959 and also providing for the continued use of the Aksai Chin road, pending negotiations and settlement, the Government of India are solely motivated by their earnest desire to settle the boundary question by peaceful methods. The Government of India hope that the Chinese Government will give serious consideration to this proposal and avoid threatening and aggressive postures which solve no problem but only create a climate of conflict.

**170 Chinese reply to Indian note of 10 May 1962,  
31 May 1962 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government categorically rejects the unjustifiable protest of the Indian Government and, from the Indian Government's completely unreasonable attitude of imposing its will on others, cannot but draw with regret the conclusion that the Indian Government is bent on making use of the Sino-Pakistan negotiations to whip up anti-Chinese sentiments and aggravate the tension between China and India.

2. The Indian note alleges that the Chinese Government accepted without reservation the position that Kashmir is under Indian sovereignty, that there is no common boundary between China and Pakistan, and that therefore China has no right to conduct boundary negotiations with Pakistan. This allegation is totally untenable. When did the Chinese Government accept without any reservation the position that Kashmir is under Indian sovereignty? The Indian Government could not cite any official Chinese document to prove this arbitrary contention but, basing itself solely on the guesswork and impression of Indian diplomatic officials who have been to China, insisted that Chinese Government authorities had made statements to that effect. This is not only a unilateral misrepresentation of the fact but a conclusion imposed on others, to which the Chinese Government categorically objects. There is a boundary of several hundred kilometers between China's Sinkiang and the areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan, and it has never been formally delimited and demarcated. . . .

3. The boundary negotiations between China and Pakistan do not at all involve the question of the ownership of Kashmir. The agreement between the Governments of China and Pakistan made it crystal clear that after the settlement of the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, the sovereign authorities concerned shall reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government on the question of the Kashmir boundary so as to conclude a formal boundary treaty to replace the provisional agreement to be signed after the Sino-Pakistan negotiations. The signing of such an agreement will only help maintain tranquillity on the existing boundary between China and Pakistan, and will in no way prejudice a peaceful settlement of the

**Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.** The Indian Government is wholly unjustified in objecting to boundary negotiations between China and Pakistan on the pretext of the Kashmir dispute.

4. With regard to the Kashmir dispute, it has been the consistent position of the Chinese Government to be impartial and to wish that India and Pakistan will reach a peaceful settlement. This has been and still is, the Chinese position. . . .

5. The Kashmir question is after all a dispute between two legal governments, those of India and Pakistan. . . . So far as China is concerned, nothing would be better than a peaceful settlement of this dispute by India and Pakistan through negotiation. However, more than ten years have passed and despite the best wishes and expectations all along cherished by China, this dispute between India and Pakistan remains unsettled. In these circumstances, anyone with common sense can understand that the Chinese Government cannot leave unsettled indefinitely its boundary of several hundred kilometres with the areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan merely because there is a dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. . . .

#### **171 Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1961-62, May 1962 (Extracts)**

During the year, relations with China, strained since 1959, tended to worsen. While Chinese propaganda still sought to convey the impression that the border problem with India was a 'family affair' to be settled by negotiations, China's military activity along the border was increased in disregard of solemn Chinese assurances. . . .

During the year, there was a further curtailment of the economic and cultural facilities provided to Indian traders and pilgrims in Tibet under the 1954 Agreement. Indian traders had to contend with restrictions on their movements, a termination of the traditional pattern of barter trade, ban on the export of conventional merchandise to India, and the denial of facilities for the repatriation of their assets and profits to India. At the same time the Chinese persisted in their policy of discouraging the payment of debts by Tibetans to Indian

traders. These restrictive trade and fiscal policies, together with the acts of discrimination against Indian traders, led to a serious fall in Indo-Tibetan trade, and caused a sharp decline in the customary number of Indian trading establishments in Yatung.

Indian Missions in Tibet, which had been guaranteed certain rights and immunities under the 1954 Agreement, fared on better. The numerous restrictions placed on them greatly reduced their sphere of activity. The Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Gartok were unable to start building of the Agency accommodation (mere mud-huts in Gartok) because of the dilatory and obstructive tactics of the Chinese authorities.

The Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 expires on 2 June 1962. Under Article VI of the Agreement a request had to be made by either party by 1 December 1961, for its renewal. Neither party made any such move by the due date; but on 3 December 1961 the Government of China offered to negotiate a new agreement. They sought in particular to separate the Sino-Indian border problem and the question of trade relations between India and Tibet. This was not acceptable to the Government of India. Replying to the Chinese offer, the Government of India asked for a reversal of the aggressive policies pursued by the Government of China during the last few years and the restoration of a climate of peace which would assure the strict observance of the Five Principles both in letter and spirit as essential pre-requisites to negotiations for a new agreement.

During the year, it was found that Chinese nationals resident in India served with notices to quit India for engaging in subversive activities against the State, were either defying these orders or seeking to defeat them. The Government of India had, therefore, to deport some of them. 12 have been deported out of a total Chinese population of over 12,000 in India.

During the year, the programme for the exchange of scholars between the two countries was discontinued at the instance of the Government of China.

**172 Chinese reply to Indian note of 14 May 1962, 2 June 1962  
(Extracts)**

Why should China need to ask India's permission for using its own road on its own territory? What an absurdity! As for the Indian Government's old proposal made in 1959, Premier Chou En-lai already pointed out in his letter to Prime Minister Nehru dated December 17, 1959 that it is unfair and that, though "equitable" it may appear, it in fact would require China to make a one-sided withdrawal. The Indian Government knows this only too well. Prime Minister Nehru said in Parliament on May 14, 1962 that this proposal "applies entirely to the Ladakh area (it should be read as 'the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary') and not the eastern area at all, because we are not going to withdraw in the east. In the Ladakh area, it meant a very small withdrawal for us—a few villages—and it meant a large withdrawal for them." That is to say, this "very fair" proposal bragged of by India means in essence that India wants to secure the Chinese side's withdrawal from large tracts of Chinese territory, measuring more than 33,000 square kilometres, which have always belonged to China in exchange for the Indian side's withdrawal from a few points, which always belong to China but have only recently been occupied by India, while the Indian side continues to occupy, exactly as before, Chinese territories in the eastern and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary. This is of course unacceptable to the Chinese Government, unacceptable now as before.

There is reason to believe that the Indian Government is not serious in making the above-mentioned proposal. If it truly wishes the Chinese Government to give earnest consideration to its proposal, it should be prepared to apply the principle embodied in the proposal equally to the eastern section of the border, that is to say, to require both the Chinese and Indian sides to withdraw all their personnel from the area between the so-called McMahon Line and the section of the Sino-Indian boundary as shown on Chinese maps. However, judging from Prime Minister Nehru's May 14 speech, in the Indian Parliament, the Indian Government has renewed this proposal on the pre-condition of not doing that. How can one assume that the Chinese Government would accept such unilaterally-imposed

submissive terms? Is China a defeated country?

**173 Chinese Foreign Ministry statement criticizing India's role in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 9 June 1962 (Extracts)**

On June 2, 1962 the representatives of India and Canada on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet Nam, disregarding the resolute opposition of the Polish representative, adopted a special report to the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, slandering the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as carrying out "aggression and subversion" against southern Viet Nam. According to provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements, decisions of the International Commission on questions concerning violation, or threats of violations of the agreements, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, must be unanimous. Nevertheless the Indian and Canadian representatives adopted the report by a majority vote. This is obviously illegal. . . .

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam issued a statement on June 4, 1962 sternly condemning this wrong action of the Indian and Canadian representatives, pointing out that their report is illegal and invalid and should be cancelled and asking the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to reject this report. The Chinese Government fully supports the correct position and just demand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. It hopes that the Indian and Canadian representatives on the International Commission in Viet Nam will not prove unworthy of the trust placed in them by the 1954 Geneva Conference, but will value their position, truly carry out their solemn duties, and contribute as they should to upholding the Geneva agreements.

**174 Indian reply to Chinese note of 31 May 1962, 30 June 1962 (Extracts)**

It has been argued by the Government of China that "they cannot indefinitely leave unsettled their boundary of several hundred kilometres with the areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan merely because there is a dispute between

India and Pakistan over Kashmir". To justify their untenable move, the Government of China have emphasised a particular necessity which in fact does not exist. There is no boundary dispute in this sector of the Sino-Indian boundary and no urgency for a fresh settlement over it. Even in 1847, the Government of China had informed the British Government that as the boundary in this sector was sufficiently and distinctly fixed there was no need for any additional measures for refixing it. The initiative in this matter was for political reasons taken by the Government of Pakistan who had committed aggression in Kashmir. Though the Chinese Government had not responded to this initiative earlier, it is clear that they decided to do so now for possible political advantage to be obtained by exploiting the Indo-Pakistan differences in this matter.

The position stated in the preceding paragraph is confirmed by the earlier Chinese attempts to exploit Indo-Pakistan differences. On 23rd May, 1959, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi had mentioned to the Indian Foreign Secretary that India could not afford to have "two fronts" against her. Now the Government of China have brought the "two fronts" together against India to further the territorial ambitions of Pakistan and China.

It is patent that the Government of China have now taken a new stand on the legal status of Kashmir. Hitherto, while not formally declaring their official stand on the status of Kashmir, they had, perhaps with mental reservations of their own, given the impression on a number of occasions that they had, by and large, accepted India's basic position in Kashmir. At other times, they had declared themselves against any third party interference in the situation created by Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir.

On March 16, 1956, Premier Chou En-lai told the Indian Ambassador in Peking that "the people of Kashmir have already expressed their will". Again on 16th July 1961, at the talks between Premier Chou En-lai and the Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Premier Chou En-lai stated that "Pakistan had formally proposed border talks" but emphasised that the Chinese Government "have not discussed with them anything so far". In the same discussions, Premier Chou En-lai went on to ask the Secretary-General, "Can you cite any

document to show that we have ever said that Kashmir is not a part of India?" Now this position has been reversed. The Chinese note under reply asks, "Can you cite any document to show that we have ever said that Kashmir is a part of India?". . . .

The entire evidence cited above supports the view that, until recently, the Chinese Government had declared themselves in favour of the question of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir being settled peacefully, and against any third party taking advantage of it. However, this stand of the Government of China has changed and a new situation now created by the Sino-Pakistan agreement to demarcate their non-existent common border. In departing from their earlier policy of non-interference in the Kashmir situation, the Government of China are giving legal and moral encouragement to an aggressor State and prejudicing the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan.

The Government of India, while rejecting the Government of China's note under reference, would again reiterate that any change, provisional or otherwise, in the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir brought about by third parties which seeks to submit certain parts of Indian territory to foreign jurisdiction will not be binding on the Government of India.

### **175 Indian note to China, 22 August 1962 (Extracts)**

There was no Chinese presence of any sort in the Aksai Chin and the Ladakh region of India till 1957. The Chinese entered the uninhabited areas of Aksai Chin and its neighbourhood clandestinely some time about 1957 and began to improve the Sinkiang-Tibet caravan route across Aksai Chin. Thereafter they started a series of aggressive moves into the Ladakh area of India, stationing garrisons of troops and indulging in aggressive forward patrolling which led to clashes between the Chinese forces and the Indian patrols in this area. This aggressive activity has been intensified since 1959. . . .

If the Government of China are genuinely desirous of resolving the differences between the two Governments on the boundary question by further discussions and negotiations, they must realise that these discussions cannot start unless the *status quo* of the boundary in this region which has been altered



by force since 1957 is restored and the current tensions are removed. There can be no pre-judging or acceptance of the Chinese claim before discussions start. . . .

An essential preliminary to the holding of further discussions on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides with a view to resolving differences between the two governments on the boundary question is a definition of measures that should be taken to restore the status quo of the boundary in this region which has been altered by force during the last five years and to remove the current tensions in this area so as to create the appropriate climate for purposeful discussions. The Government of India would be glad to receive a representative of the Government of China to discuss these essential preliminary measures.

**176 Chinese reply to Indian note of 22 August 1962,  
13 September 1962 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government has never said that discussions cannot start unless India accepts China's position on the boundary question. On the contrary, it has time and again stressed that "there need not and should not be any pre-conditions for such discussions." . . .

In China's opinion it is, after all, not good to maintain prolonged border tension between two big Asian countries, China and India. With a view to easing the border tension the Chinese Government once again proposes that the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres along the entire border. It believes that the implementation of this measure will not only immediately ease the border tension but also in a way stabilize the Sino-Indian boundary pending a peaceful settlement through negotiations.

The Chinese Government still considers that the Chinese and Indian Governments should quickly hold further discussions on the Sino-Indian boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two countries without setting any pre-conditions. . . .

**177 Nehru's broadcast to the nation on the Chinese aggression, 22 October 1962 (Extracts)**

I must speak to you about the grave situation that has arisen on our frontiers because of continuing and unabashed aggression by the Chinese forces. A situation has arisen which calls upon all of us to meet it effectively. We are men and women of peace in this country, conditioned to the ways of peace. We are unused to the necessities of war. Because of this, we endeavoured to follow a policy of peace even when aggression took place on our territory in Ladakh five years ago. We explored avenues for an honourable settlement by peaceful methods. That was our policy all over the world, and we tried to apply it even in our own country. We know the horrors of war in this age today, and we have done our utmost to prevent war from engulfing the world.

But all our efforts have been in vain in so far as our own frontier is concerned, where a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace or peaceful methods, has continuously threatened us and even carried these threats into action. The time has, therefore, come for us to realise fully this menace that threatens the freedom of our people and the independence of our country. . . .

There have been five years of continuous aggression on the Ladakh frontier. Our other frontier at NEFA remained largely free from this aggression. Just when we were discussing ways and means of reducing tension, and there was even some chance of the representatives of the two countries meeting to consider this matter, a new and fresh aggression took place on the NEFA border. This began on the 8th of September last. This was a curious way of lessening tension. It is typical of the way the Chinese Government have treated us.

**178 Statement of the Chinese Government putting forward three point proposal, 24 October 1962 (Extracts)**

In the past year and more, the Chinese Government has again and again asked India to stop changing the *status quo* of the boundary by force and return to the table of negotiations. In the last three months, the Chinese Government three times

proposed negotiating the Sino-Indian boundary question without any preconditions but all three times met with the refusal of the Indian Government. The Indian Government insisted that negotiations cannot start until China has withdrawn from vast tracts of China's own territory.

Especially shocking to China is the fact that the Indian Government, after rejecting China's peaceful proposal, on October 12 ordered the Indian forces to "free" Chinese frontiers of Chinese troops. Then, on October 20, Indian forces started a massive general offensive in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. In these serious circumstances, the Chinese frontier guards had no choice but to strike back in self-defence. . . .

Although the relations between China and India are presently very tense, there is no reason to abandon the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the spirit of the Bandung Conference. The Chinese Government holds that both the Chinese and Indian Governments should take to heart the fundamental interests of the 1,100 million people of China and India, the common interests of the people of the two countries in their struggle against imperialism and the interests of Asian peace and Asian-African solidarity, and try their best to seek a way to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.

In line with its consistent stand for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the Chinese Government now solemnly puts forward the following three proposals :

(1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultations between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e., the tradi-

tional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.

(3) The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

The Chinese Government appeals to the Indian Government for a positive response to the above three proposals. The Chinese Government appeals to the governments of Asian and African countries for an effort to bring about the materialization of these three proposals. The Chinese Government appeals to all the peace-loving countries and people to do their part in promoting Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and world peace.

### **179 Indian Government reaction to the three-point Chinese proposal of 24 October 1962, 24 October 1962**

The Government of India have seen Press Agency reports of the three-point statement issued by the People's Republic of China which the New China News Agency has put out this morning. There has been no official communication from the Chinese Government on this matter so far.

The Government of India have in previous notes and in statements made by the Prime Minister clearly indicated their attitude in this matter. Government of India's position is :

- (i) The Government of India wedded to peace and peaceful methods have always sought to resolve differences by talks and discussions in this case of border differences with the Government of China.
- (ii) On the 16th October, 1962, in a note sent to the

Government of China they proposed the restoration of the *status quo* of the boundary as it prevailed before the Chinese aggression in the eastern sector on 8th September, 1962, prior to talks and discussions for easing of tension and for creating the appropriate climate for purposeful talks and discussions to resolve the differences between the Governments of India and China on the boundary question.

- (iii) Since then, it is the Government of China which on the morning of the 20th October 1962, hurled its vast armies at various points on all sectors of the India-China boundary and enlarged the conflict. These Chinese forces have advanced in all sectors into Indian territory and are still advancing. India cannot and will not accept a position under which Chinese forces continue to commit aggression into Indian territory, occupy substantial Indian territories and use these as a bargaining counter to force a settlement on their terms.
- (iv) There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20 kilometres from what they call 'line of actual control'. What is this 'line of actual control'? Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of September. Advancing 40 or 60 kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw 20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which can fool nobody.
- (v) If the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let them go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 8th September, 1962. India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the *status quo* along the India-China boundary.
- (vi) India is always prepared to resolve differences by talks and discussions but only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect and not under threat of military might of any country however strong it may be.
- (vii) India would be prepared to welcome the Chinese Prime Minister or any suitable representative of the Chinese Government on a mutually agreed date if China is sincere in its professions of peaceful settlement and accepts the constructive proposal made in point (v) above which is fully consistent with dignity and self-respect both of India and China.

**180 Statement by Indian representative B.N. Chakravarti in the UN General Assembly, 26 October 1962**

We are meeting here today while a raw and naked war, premeditated and planned, is being committed by the People's Republic of China against my country which, as most of the representatives assembled here know, was one of the principal supports of the People's Republic of China on the question that is being discussed here today. Year after year, we initiated moves which were designed to give the People's Republic of China its representation in this Organization. For several years past, my Government has attempted to settle with the Chinese Government the question of the erroneous showing of our borders on Chinese maps. Throughout this period, this Chinese Government evaded the issue and talked of peaceful negotiations.

Over the last few years, the Chinese have forcibly occupied by unilateral action more than 12,000 square miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh region of India in the western section of the Indo-Chinese boundary. Despite this, we did not, because of our firm belief in settling differences by discussion, resort to any precipitate action and force a clash. We continued the exchange of notes and negotiations, and the matter was discussed by the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of China in 1960.

Pursuant to these discussions, a team of Indian officials held prolonged discussions with Chinese officials in Peking, in New Delhi and in Rangoon. As the documents began to be produced, it became crystal clear that the Government of China had hardly any evidence, traditional, historical or legal, to support its claim to more than 50,000 square miles of Indian territory. The Government of India, on the other hand, proved that their case was sound and supported by incontrovertible evidence.

Having failed to prove their claim and ignoring the evidence produced by us, the People's Government of China has now embarked on an all-out attack against my country, which has consistently sought to be a peaceful and friendly neighbour. The People's Republic of China has committed flagrant, massive and premeditated aggression on the eastern and western sectors of our territory, while glibly talking of peaceful negotia-

tions. The kinds of armaments and weapons, including tanks, used in these attacks on India indisputably are of an offensive character. They could not have been gathered and grouped together in such large quantities in a terrain which is thousands of feet above sea level without prior and deliberate planning over a long period.

My delegation has always supported the principle of universality in regard to the membership of this world Organization. We also think that the only effective way to check Chinese military adventurism is to make it accept its responsibilities as a member of the world Organization and thereby be subject to the views and disciplines of this august body.

### **181 Nehru's message to Heads of Governments on Chinese aggression, 27 October 1962 (Extracts)**

When the Chinese aggression first started in Ladakh five years ago, we showed patience and restraint. Even though 12,000 square miles of Indian territory was occupied by the Chinese forces, we did not force a crisis but continued to explore avenues of a peaceful and honourable settlement. . . . The Chinese forces suddenly, on the 8th September 1962, made a fresh incursion into our territory. They crossed the international boundary in the Eastern sector which they had respected for twelve years since they came into Tibet. Our frontier in that sector traditionally and by treaty is the high ridge of the Himalaya mountains which forms the watershed. . . .

Even the pre-meditated and massive attack on our Defence forces on the 20th October has been represented by China as an attack by Indian forces on China's border guards. That this assertion is completely false is clear from the weight and intensity of the Chinese attack which is not confined to the Eastern sector but includes other sectors of the India-China border. No self-respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to such aggression, whatever may be the consequences. Nor can India allow China's occupation of Indian territory to be used as a bargaining counter for dictating to India a settlement of the differences regarding the boundary on China's terms.

This is not a mere boundary dispute or a question of small

territorial frontier adjustments. Apart from the vast and fantastic claims that China has made. China had already occupied 12,000 square miles of Indian territory during the last five years. While notes were being exchanged for arranging talks and discussions to ease tensions and even dates and places were being suggested, further aggression by China started on 8th September and further areas of Indian territory were occupied in a new sector. The issue involved is not one of small territorial gains, one way or the other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries and whether the world will allow the principle of 'Might is Right' to prevail in international relations. Bearing this in mind, India will continue to resist aggression, both to preserve her honour and integrity and to prevent international standards from deteriorating into the jungle law of 'Might is Right'. When aggression is continuously taking place and vast Chinese armies are moving further into our territory, how can we discuss or talk about a peaceful settlement? The first essential is that the Chinese forces along the India-China border should go back at least to where they were prior to the 8th September, 1962. . . .

This crisis is not only of India but of the world and will have far-reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the peace of the world. We cannot submit to this law of the jungle which affects our integrity and the honour of our motherland.

In this hour of crisis, when we are engaged in resisting this aggression, we are confident that we shall have your sympathy and support as well as the sympathy and support of all countries, not only because of their friendly relations with us, but also because our struggle is in the interests of world peace and is directed to the elimination of deceit, dissimulation and force in international relations.

**182 More on Nehru's philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question,' Commentary by the Editorial  
Department of *People's Daily*, 27 October 1962 (Extracts)**

China has at no time occupied or intruded into any part of India; . . . China's frontier guards. . . never fired the first shot even when under their very eyes they saw their territory being



occupied by Indian troops. . . It is now more than three years since the ruling circles of India, headed by Nehru, started the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. . . .

The provoking of Sino-Indian border incidents by India's ruling circles headed by Nehru, leading to their large-scale armed invasion of China, just like their interference in China's Tibet, is no accident. Both are determined by the class nature of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India whose interests are closely connected with those of the imperialists. . . .

Readers are invited first to read the following passage written by Nehru in his book *The Discovery of India* in 1944. . . .

This enables one to understand two things clearly :

First, the goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history. The sphere of influence of this great empire would include a series of countries from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British empire.

Secondly, this ambitious Nehru believes that when the "regional grouping" with India as "the center of economic and political activity" is established, or, in other words, when the great empire conceived by Nehru comes into existence, "minority problems will disappear" in this region. According to Nehru, "the small national state is doomed", "it may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit", in a word, it can only be a vassal in Nehru's great empire.

These statements of Nehru were written 18 years ago. Nehru was dreaming of a great Indian empire long before India's proclamation of independence. This is a real "discovery" of the expansionism of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India!

These reactionary, expansionist ideas of the big bourgeoisie and big landlord of India form an important part of Nehru's philosophy. . . .

After India's proclamation of independence, the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru inherited and have tried their best to preserve the bequests of the British colonialist rulers; they have become increasingly brazen in carrying out their chauvinistic and expansionist policy. India is the only country in Asia that has a protectorate. The Indian ruling circles have

used every means to interfere in the internal and external affairs of countries around India, to control their economy and trade and demand their absolute obedience. . . .

Nehru has his ulterior motives for refusing to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question over a long period of time and continuously creating tension. To understand this, we must examine the class nature of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords, represented by Nehru, whose interests are closely connected with those of the imperialists; we must examine the needs of the Indian reactionary ruling circles, represented by Nehru, in domestic and international politics; and we must broadly examine the background, both inside India and in regard to its international relations. . . .

The Indian bourgeoisie has a blood relationship with the British bourgeoisie and the Indian landlord class. But for the sake of its own class interest, it participated in the Indian people's anti-British movement in varying degrees at different stages. However, as determined by its economic position, it had from the very beginning a strong tendency toward compromise in the anti-British movement. In the national independence struggle, the Indian bourgeoisie, on the one hand, carried on the non-cooperation movement against British colonial rule and, on the other hand, used the slogan of "non-violence" to paralyze the people's struggle and restrain their revolutionary movement.

In his "autobiography" Nehru himself shows this characteristic of the Indian bourgeoisie. He writes that the Indian national movement "has been not a change of the social order, but political independence. . . . it is absurd to say that the leaders betray the masses because they do not try to upset the land system or the capitalist system. They never claimed to do so". . . .

British colonialists reached a compromise with the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India and turned over their rule to the latter on conditions which basically preserved intact the economic interests of the British colonialists. Thus, the fruits gained by the Indian people in their anti-British struggle were seized by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India.

After India proclaimed independence, Nehru, who once represented to a certain degree the interests of the Indian nation-

nal bourgeoisie, gradually, as the class struggle developed at home and abroad, became a loyal representative of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India. . . . India did not gain economic independence after its proclamation of independence. Imperialism still retained its economic influence in India. . . . Although in the early days of independence, the Indian government nationalized a few enterprises run by British capital by paying large sums in compensation, the fundamental interests of imperialism in India were not touched. In recent years, foreign investments in India have increased rapidly. . . . From 1948 to 1959, British investments in India doubled but U.S. investments increased seven times.

The Nehru Government has established a number of state-run enterprises in India which are nothing but state-capitalist enterprises dominated by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords and actually dependent on foreign monopoly capital. Such enterprises serve the interests of both the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords and of foreign monopoly capital. They are in essence Indian bureaucrat monopoly capital. . . .

In the initial period of India's independence, the Nehru Government, in order to meet the needs of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords to concentrate power in their own hands, abolished the political privileges of some of the local feudal princes and the zamindari (tax-farming) privileges of some landlords, but the Indian feudal land system as a whole was preserved. . . . Since coming to power, Nehru has used violence to suppress the masses of the people and the progressive forces; he has become an old hand at opposing communism and the people. . . .

Nehru openly encouraged the reactionary forces in Kerala to use violence to overthrow the communist-led government of Kerala in July 1959. In view of the actual economic and political conditions in India, is not the building of a "socialist pattern of society" in India, as advertized by Nehru, an out-and-out hoax ?

With any country, a given foreign policy is necessarily the continuation of a given domestic policy. Like its domestic policy, the foreign policy of the Nehru Government reflects its reactionary class nature.

At one time some actions of the Nehru Government were helpful to world peace. It refused to join imperialist military

blocs, turned down the imperialists request to establish military bases in India and declared its adherence to the policy of "non-alignment." It stood for peaceful co-existence with socialist countries and joined with China in initiating the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The Nehru Government played a positive role in sponsoring the first Asian-African Conference. Even in that period, however, Nehru seldom voiced opposition to the major acts of aggression by imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, but constantly came out against the just struggles of the people of various countries, and against the socialist countries. On many important, key international questions, Nehru always stood on the side of imperialism, adopting towards imperialism mainly a policy of "criticizing in a small way and helping in a big way."

For instance, during the war of U.S. aggression in Korea, the Indian Government put forward a proposal in the United Nations in November, 1952, supporting the forcible retention of prisoners of war by the United States. In the counter-revolutionary event in Hungary in 1956, Nehru maliciously slandered the Soviet Union and attacked the Hungarian workers and peasants' revolutionary government. When the U.S. and British imperialists sent troops to the Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, Nehru openly spoke up for the U.S. and British aggressors, characterizing their act as "protecting their own interests." Nehru said that "he was sorry" about the death of Faisal, the common enemy of the Iraqi people. In 1958, in his article "The Basic Approach," Nehru vilified the Soviet Union for using "violence." He distorted the criticism of Yugoslav modern revisionism by the communists of various countries as "interference in the internal affairs of other countries" and described the execution of the traitor Nagy by the Hungarian people as "contributing to world tensions."

With the changes in India's domestic situation and in the international situation during the past few years, Nehru's foreign policy has leaned more markedly towards imperialism. . . .

U.S. imperialism now attaches greater importance to the part played by Nehru. . . .

An analysis of the figures of the "aid" granted to India by the United States and U.S.-controlled international financial organization in the past ten years and more shows that their

“aid” to India is a barometer of the foreign policy of the Nehru Government, and particularly its policy towards China. Statistics show that in the period from 1949 to the end of the first half of 1956, their “aid” to India amounted to 789.1 million U.S. dollars, averaging 105.2 million U.S. dollars a year. In the period from the second half of 1956 to the end of the first half of 1959, when the foreign policy of the Nehru Government gradually turned to the right, their “aid” to India was 1,936.7 million U.S. dollars, averaging 645.5 million a year. And in the period from the second half of 1959 to the end of July 1962, that is, after the Nehru Government had stirred up the anti-China campaign, their “aid” to India was 3,872.4 million U.S. dollars, an annual average of 1,290.8 million U.S. dollars.

It is precisely in these circumstances that over the past few years Nehru has practically thrown away the banner of opposition to imperialism and colonialism in international affairs, suited himself to the needs of U.S. imperialism, become a busy spokesman for U.S. imperialism, and even openly made Indian troops serve as an international policeman for U.S. imperialism in its suppression of national liberation movements.

Nehru neither supported nor sympathized with the great struggle of the Japanese people against the U.S.-Japan military alliance treaty in 1960, saying “It is not for me to discuss the issue.”

After U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba, Nehru said that “India could not judge, nor was she in a position to judge, the international conditions of Cuba—who was right and who was in the wrong.”

In March 1961, when Mali, the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, Indonesia, Morocco, Burma, Guinea and other Asian and African countries announced one after another the withdrawal of their troops from the Congo in protest against the use of the United Nations by imperialism for intervention in the Congo, the Nehru Government, on the contrary, agreed to send a contingent of three thousand Indian troops (afterwards increased to six thousand) as reinforcements for the “United Nations forces” in the Congo to suppress the national liberation struggle of the Congolese people and assist U.S. imperialism in its attempt to swallow up the Congo. The Nehru Government is in a way responsible for the fact that, after the murder of the

Congolese national hero Lumumba, his successor Gizenga was imprisoned.

In September 1961 at the conference of the heads of state of the non-aligned countries, Nehru, going contrary to the opinions of the heads of many countries, held that the question of opposing imperialism and colonialism should occupy "a secondary place," he disagreed with the adoption of "brave declarations" condemning imperialism and colonialism, and thus gave help in a big way to the Western countries, especially U.S. imperialism. . . .

The policy of "non-alignment" publicized by Nehru has obviously become more and more a mere facade behind which he is actually carrying out a policy of opposing the national revolutionary movements of various countries, opposing socialism, and serving imperialism.

It is at a time when their entire home and foreign policy has become increasingly reactionary that the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru have instigated the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, provoked China and finally launched large-scale armed attacks on China. . . .

In a word, in the effort to satisfy their own needs and the demands of U.S. imperialism, the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru have become pawns in the international anti-China campaign. This is the root cause and background of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. . . .

The national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, because of their contradictions with imperialism and the feudal forces, can take part in the revolutionary anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle during certain historical periods and to a certain extent and therefore play a progressive role in history. . . .

On the other hand, however, the bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, because of their class status, are inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism and are liable to waver in the revolution against them. One section, the big bourgeoisie, whose interests are closely connected with those of imperialism and domestic feudalism, are the reactionaries among the bourgeoisie. . . .

In relation to the nationalist countries, the basis of China's policy is this: firstly, the primary common task of China and

all nationalist countries is to oppose their common enemy, imperialism and colonialism, especially U.S. imperialism. They must support one another in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. China has consistently given active support to the struggles waged by the various nationalist states against imperialism and colonialism. Secondly, it is necessary and entirely possible to establish and develop, between China and these countries, relations of friendship and cooperation on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. It is necessary and fully possible to bring about a reasonable settlement of all outstanding disputes among them in accordance with the five principles and the Bandung spirit, through friendly consultations. . . .

Even in the period when Sino-Indian relations were good, the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru repeatedly interfered in our Tibet and harbored expansionist designs against it, thereby revealing their policy of reactionary nationalism. Then in 1959, when the rebellion of the reactionary clique of upper social strata of the Tibet region instigated by Nehru was defeated and Nehru's expansionist dream about Tibet was shattered, and when he took a more reactionary line in all his home and foreign policies, Nehru immediately turned against his friend, switching from professions of friendship for China to frantic hostility to China. . . .

What stand should the Marxist-Leninists take on this policy of reactionary nationalism followed by Nehru? . . . .

The Soviet Union's resolute counter-blow to the military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries not only defended the interests of the socialist state but also accorded with the interests of the Chinese people and of the revolutionary people of the world.

Sino-Indian relations today bear certain similarities to Sino-Soviet relations of more than 30 years ago. . . .

After the Nehru Government started the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, the Yugoslav modern revisionists, renegades to Marxism-Leninism and lackeys of the imperialists, in total disregard of the truth about the Sino-Indian boundary question, openly shielded and supported the outrageous anti-China policy of the Nehru Government. On the Sino-Indian boundary question, Tito and his ilk have always hurled shameless slanders

against China and have become an echo of the imperialists and the Indian reactionaries. Moreover, Tito said that the Soviet Union should play a "pacifying" role in relation to China on the Sino-Indian boundary question. Does the Tito clique think that when a socialist country is invaded by the bourgeois reactionaries of a foreign country, another socialist country should stand by the bourgeois reactionaries and play a "pacifying" role in relations to the invaded socialist country? By this fallacy the Tito clique has further exposed itself as a group of renegades betraying socialism, hating socialist China and sowing dissension among the socialist countries.

Marxism-Leninism always points to the fact that bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism are two different world outlooks which represent two different classes and are fundamentally antagonistic to each other. While supporting progressive bourgeois nationalism, communists must draw a clear-cut line between themselves and bourgeois nationalism and must combat reactionary bourgeois nationalism.

More than 30 years ago, when the Kuomintang reactionaries launched that anti-Soviet campaign, the Chinese communists were not caught in the toils of the reactionary nationalism of the big bourgeoisie. The Chinese communists and progressives strongly protested against the anti-Soviet crime of the Kuomintang Government. . . .

Even today we feel proud that under those adverse conditions the Chinese communists by their acts proved themselves genuinely loyal to the interests of the Chinese people and to the principle of proletarian internationalism.

Today, the communists and progressives of India are in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than thirty years ago. . . .

As a result of the Second General Elections (1957) there was an increase in strength of the left-wing forces and an Indian state went to the communists. Since then we have been experiencing a gradually increasing trend of the government towards the right. A considerable time before the appearance of the boundary problem Nehru called China undemocratic because China had solved its unemployment problem and made comparatively rapid progress. Later, warm praise of land reform in China by the Malaviya Commission sent by the government



naturally alarmed the domestic feudal elements. Finally when the industrial goods of China became a hindrance to the Indian industrialists in reaping high profits on the east and west markets, it was almost to be presumed that relations would be aggravated on any pretext. After that the boundary problem came along as a boon. It was not only that an opportunity was found to distort everything concerning China, but an easy path was opened for censuring the gradually increasing progressive movements in the country. Within a very short period the boundary problem was first turned into border penetration and afterwards border aggression. . . .

It is surprising that in India some self-styled Marxist-Leninists, such as S.A. Dange, trail closely behind Nehru and falsely accuse China of "encroachment" on Indian territory. . . .

We note with great concern that since the Nehru Government has ignored the sufferings of the Indian people and has aggravated the tension on the Sino-Indian border and extended the armed clashes, the Indian people will have to shoulder heavy military burdens in addition to the exorbitant taxes which are weighing down on them. . . .

The Chinese people have the greatest sympathy for the broad masses of India's working people who are facing such sufferings.

**183 Morarji Desai's views on Chinese invasion, October 1962**  
**(Extract)**

I had told Jawaharlalji at the time of the invasion in 1962: 'If the bases which China had created in Tibet, which were very few at that time, could be destroyed by bombing, we could easily expel China from our territory.' But Jawaharlalji felt that if we bombed those areas, China could as well bomb Calcutta and some cities of UP and Delhi. This would cause a lot of destruction and there was the danger of the people getting frightened and demoralised. He, therefore, did not agree with the suggestion.

### **184 Resolution of the Communist Party of India on Chinese aggression, 1 November 1962 (Extracts)**

The National Council of the Communist Party of India, meeting in New Delhi in the present grave period of national emergency, appeals to all sections of the Indian people to unite in defence of the motherland against Chinese aggression. The Communist Party joins hands with all our patriotic people who stand behind the Prime Minister's stirring appeal for national unity in defence of the country. . . .

In violation of the solemn undertakings given by the Chinese Government during the last three years not to cross the McMahon Line, Chinese armed forces in large numbers have openly crossed this international frontier and are today in many places inside Indian territory.

The Chinese forces have also simultaneously launched big offensives against our positions in Ladakh.

The claims which have again and again been put forward by the Chinese Government on the grounds that the McMahon Line is illegal because it was the result of an agreement made at a time when British imperialists ruled India, are completely untenable and on no account can such arguments justify their launching aggression on India. The crossing of this Line under any excuse or pretence whatsoever indisputably constitutes aggression and violation of our territory. . . .

Negotiations can take place obviously on the basis of the withdrawal of Chinese forces at least to the positions they held before the present aggressive actions began, that is, as the Government of India has suggested, to the positions held before September 8, 1962. . . .

By its wrong and mistaken attitude, the Chinese Government facilitated the strengthening of the Right-wing reactionary parties and groups in this country, strengthening of the opponents of non-alignment. The result of Chinese aggression has been to give a tremendous fillip precisely to these forces.

**185 Resolution adopted by Lok Sabha on the Chinese aggression,  
14 November 1962**

1. 'This House approves the Proclamation of Emergency issued by the President on 26 October 1962 under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution'.
2. 'This House notes with deep regret that, in spite of the uniform gestures of goodwill and friendship by India towards the People's Government of China on the basis of recognition of each other's independence, non-aggression and non-interference and peaceful co-existence, China has betrayed this goodwill and friendship and the principles of *panch sheel* which had been agreed to between the two countries and has committed aggression and initiated a massive invasion of India by her Armed Forces.

'This House places on record its high appreciation of the valiant struggle of men and officers of our Armed Forces while defending our frontiers and pays its respectful homage to the martyrs who have laid down their lives in defending the honour and integrity of our Motherland.

'This House also records its profound appreciation of the wonderful and spontaneous response of the people of India to the emergency and the crisis that has resulted from China's invasion of India. It notes with deep gratitude this mighty upsurge amongst all sections of our people for harnessing all our resources towards the organisation of an all out effort to meet this grave national emergency. The flame of liberty and sacrifice has been kindled anew and a fresh dedication has taken place to the cause of India's freedom and integrity.

'This House gratefully acknowledges the sympathy and the moral and material support received from a large number of friendly countries in this grim hour of our struggle against aggression and invasion.

'With hope and faith, this House affirms the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be.'

**186 Memorandum of the Government of India (attached to  
Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai) describing implications of  
three-point Chinese proposal, 14 November 1962**

The implications of the three-point proposal of the Chinese

Government presented on the 24th of October and further elaborated upon in Prime Minister Chou En-lai's letter, dated 4th November 1962, are given below :

### *Western Sector*

The line of actual control in November 1959 was no line but a series of positions of Chinese forces on Indian territory. These positions had been progressively established since 1957 by forcibly and unilaterally altering the traditional *status quo* of the boundary, even while the Government of China were assuring the Government of India that they had no territorial claims against India. In November 1959, Chinese posts in the Western sector were at Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka La and along the main Aksai Chin Road. Within three years, *i.e.*, by September 1962, the Chinese had constructed a large network of military roads and posts, beginning with posts opposite Daulat Beg Oldi in the north, along the Chip Chap river valley and across the Galwan river to the Pangong and Spanggur lake areas. At certain points the network of military posts was more than one hundred miles to the west of Chinese positions in 1959.

The Chinese three-point proposal, taken with its clarifications, is that, in the Western sector, both parties agree to respect the "line of actual control" between the two sides. In his clarificatory letter Premier Chou En-lai states that "the line of actual control" "is basically still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and the Indian sides in November 1959". The normal deduction would be that this line of control would, therefore, be a line connecting Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka La and proceeding northwards to join the main Aksai Chin Road. However, Premier Chou En-lai's letter states that "in the Western and Middle Sectors it (the line of actual control) coincides in the main with the traditional customary line". In short, while referring to the line of control as it existed in 1959, the Chinese actually project it to the line they claimed in the meeting between the officials of the two sides in 1960 and the line they physically hold now since their massive attack which commenced in this region on 20th October 1962. This line not only includes all the Chinese posts established in the three years since 1959, but also includes all the Indian posts

in the territory that existed till 20th October 1962, and extends even farther westwards, thus taking in an additional 5,000 to 6,000 square miles since their 7th November 1959 position.

According to the Chinese proposal, after this "line of actual control" is determined, India would have to further withdraw yet another 20 kilometres inside territory accepted by the Chinese as undoubtedly Indian, while the Chinese withdrawal of 20 kilometres would be only 20 kilometres inside Indian territory claimed by them leaving the Chinese forces well over a hundred kilometres deep into territory belonging to India. The total effect of this would be that the entire network of Chinese aggressive posts which existed on 20th October 1962, and some more would remain intact poised for a further attack, while all Indian defence posts in Indian territory claimed by China will be eliminated and even posts in territory accepted as Indian including such key posts as Daulat Beg Oldi, Chushul and Hanle would be dismantled and eliminated.

### *Middle Sector*

In the middle sector, the suggestion that the "line of actual control", whether on 7th November 1959 or now, coincides only "in the main" with the traditional and customary boundary is absolutely without foundation. The Chinese Government have never had any authority south of the main Himalayan watershed ridge, which is the traditional boundary in this sector. Some Tibetan officials along with some Chinese troops did intrude into Barahoti on various occasions since 1954; and, in 1958, the two Governments agreed to withdraw their armed personnel from the locality. But Indian civilian personnel have throughout been functioning in the area. A conference held in 1958 to discuss the question made clear that the Chinese Government had not even precise knowledge of the area they were claiming.

### *Eastern Sector*

In the Eastern sector the Chinese Government are willing to withdraw their troops to the north of the "line of actual control". This "line of actual control" has been clarified in Premier Chou En-lai's letter as coinciding "in the main" with the McMahon Line. The Chinese Government by this ambi-

guous statement indicate that there are portions of the "line of actual control" as envisaged by them which do not coincide with the McMahon Line. These divergencies have not, however, been revealed. The fact remains, however, that Chinese positions have always remained to the north of the highest Himalayan ridge in the Eastern sector of the India-China border and the alignment of the McMahon Line has never been questioned by China. The Chinese were nowhere in the vicinity of this watershed boundary either in November 1959 or later till 8th September 1962, when they started their aggression into Indian territory in this region.

Premier Chou En-lai has in his letter referred to the 1914 original map of the McMahon Line and the coordinates given in this map. The Agreement of 1914 only formalised what was the traditional and customary boundary in the area which lies along the highest Himalayan watershed ridges. The maps attached to the Agreement were of small scale of 1 inch to 8 miles. They were sketch maps and intended to be only illustrative. All that they made clear was that the boundary ran along the main watershed ridges of the area. The parallels and meridians were shown only approximately in accordance with the progress achieved at that time in the sphere of scientific surveys. This is a common cartographic feature and the Chinese Government have themselves recognised this in Article 48 of their 1960 Treaty with Burma. If the maps and the coordinates given therein were taken literally it is impossible to explain the discrepancy between the existing distances and those given in the map between various villages in the area. Also Migyitun according to the maps is at latitude  $28^{\circ} 38'$  north while its actual position as ascertained by the latest surveys is much further north. Tulung La has been shown on the 1914 maps at  $27^{\circ} 47'$  N while its position on the ground is further north of this point. Strict adherence to the co-ordinates shown on the McMahon Line maps would result in advancing the Indian boundary in both the areas of Migyitun and Tulung La further north thereby including both these places inside Indian territory. In the area east of Tsari Sarpa, strict adherence to the coordinates of Lola in the McMahon Line maps would result in advancing the boundary of India into this area by at least 7 miles to the north. This would mean including at

least 70 square miles of Tibetan territory within India. The Government of India recognising the principle underlying the McMahon Line agreement that the boundaries lie along the highest watershed ridges actually confined their jurisdiction to the area south of this boundary and did not try to take over Tibetan territory beyond the highest watershed ridge on the basis of the inaccurate coordinates given in the 1914 maps. This must be known to the Chinese authorities and yet they ignore this and seek to use the inaccurate coordinates given in the maps where they are favourable to their fanciful claims made to support their latest aggression. The Chinese authorities cannot have it both ways. They cannot accept the highest watershed as the boundary in parts of the Eastern sector where it suits them though this is not consistent with the co-ordinates given in the 1914 maps and quote the coordinates in these very maps in their favour in other parts of the sector to make demands for territorial concessions from India.

The Chinese proposal envisages a further withdrawal of 20 kilometres on either side of the McMahon Line as understood by them. This would leave Chinese forces in command of the passes leading into India while Indian forces would be 20 kilometres to the south leaving the entire Indian frontier defenceless and at the mercy of any fresh invasion. The present Chinese invasion, which commenced on 8th September 1962, was known because there was a defence post near the border. If there are no border posts at or near the passes, Chinese aggression could recur without India knowing about it for quite some time.

The objective of the Chinese three-point proposal is to secure for the Chinese side guaranteed occupation of the Indian areas in the Western and Central sectors which they claim while they retain their right to negotiate, and negotiations failing, to enforce, whatever territorial adjustments they want in the Eastern sector.

*Western Sector.*—India should not dispute on the ground, though it will be allowed to talk about its juridical claim, the Chinese occupation of 14,000 square miles of Indian territory including 2,000 square miles forcibly occupied since 20th October 1962. India has to agree not only to respect this so-called line of actual control but must also dismantle and withdraw its defences in the region a further 20 kilometres into

admittedly Indian territory involving withdrawal from points like Chushul, etc.

*Middle Sector.*—The Chinese claims must be fully satisfied so far as physical occupation is concerned.

*Eastern Sector.*—The principles of the highest watershed, which is the boundary and which had been respected till 8th September 1962, should be given up in favour of whatever interpretation the Government of China decide to put on the McMahon Line. There should be a further withdrawal of 20 kilometres. Thus, India must give up control of the passes in the highest watershed ridges in the areas, with no guarantee that the Chinese side will not cross the actual line of control whichever it may be.

In short, the Chinese three-point proposal, despite the manner in which it is put forth, is a demand for surrender on terms which have to be accepted while the Chinese forces in great strength are occupying large areas of Indian territory which they have acquired since their further aggression which commenced on 8th September 1962, and the massive attack which they started on 20th October 1962.

### **187 Chou En-lai's letter to Leaders of Asian and African countries, 15 November 1962 (Extracts)**

Issues between Asian and African countries. . . are not the same as issues between Asian-African countries and the imperialist powers ; we should be on guard lest we be taken in by the imperialist attempt to sow discord among us.

Inasmuch as the boundary questions are a legacy of history, neither New China nor the other newly independent countries concerned should shoulder the blame. Hence the Chinese Government holds that, in dealing with the boundary questions, both the historical background and the actual situation that has come into being must be taken into account, and that, instead of trying to impose its claims on the other party, each of the parties concerned should seek a settlement that is reasonable and fair to both parties through friendly consultation and in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the ten principles adopted at the Bandung Conference,



In this spirit China and Burma have settled in a friendly way their boundary question, which was in fact much more complicated than that between China and India. Similarly, a friendly settlement of the Sino-Nepalese boundary question was brought about not long ago. . . .

The Indian Government, inherited the British imperialists' covetous desires towards the Tibet region of China and persisted in regarding Tibet as India's sphere of influence, or sought at least to transform it into a buffer zone between China and India. For this reason, the Indian Government tried its best to obstruct the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1950. When these attempts proved of no avail, India pressed forward in an all-out advance on the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the border and completely occupied China's territory south of that illegal Line and north of the traditional customary line. In the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border, apart from long ago inheriting from British imperialism the encroachment on Sang and Tsungsha, India further encroached on Chuva, Chuje, Shipki pass, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha, and Laphthal after 1954. After 1954, India also encroached on Parigas in the western sector of the border. . . .

Having occupied 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the eastern sector and 2,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border, India now wants to occupy another 33,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the western sector. In other words, India views both the parts of Chinese territory it has occupied and the other parts of Chinese territory it has not yet occupied as belonging to India. This represents a demand which even the overbearing British imperialists dared not put to semi-colonial, old China. That a newly independent India should have made such a demand came as a complete shock to China. . . .

In the course of the talks [with Nehru in April 1960] I repeatedly explained that the boundary question should be settled peacefully on a fair and reasonable basis ; that if there could not be a settlement for the time being, the state of the boundary that had already emerged should be maintained ; and that the Armed Forces of the two sides should be disengaged in order to forestall clashes. At the conclusion of the talks, I summed up the . . . six points as points of common ground on

of close proximity emerging from the talks. . . .

The sincerity for conciliation demonstrated by the Chinese Government during the talks between the two Prime Ministers was taken by the Indian Government as an indication that China was weak and could be bullied, and China's unilateral halting of border patrols was taken as an opportunity to take advantage of. . . .

In the western sector of the border, beginning from 1961, and particularly from last April on, Indian troops made repeated inroads into Chinese territory, and set up additional military strongpoints. Prior to the recent general outbreak of clashes on the border, India had established a total of 43 strongpoints encroaching on Chinese territory in the western sector of the border. Some were set up only a few metres away from Chinese posts, others even behind Chinese posts, cutting off their access to the rear. . . .

From last June onwards, Indian troops crossed the illegal McMahon Line, intruded into the Che Dong area north of the Line, incessantly expanded their scope of occupation, and launched a series of armed attacks on Chinese frontier guards, inflicting forty-seven casualties on them. Thus, before the recent full-scale border conflict broke out, the Indian side had already created in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border a grave situation in which an explosion might be touched off at any moment. . . .

All relevant facts show that the current grave Sino-Indian border conflict was wholly engineered by the Indian Government, deliberately and over a long period of time. . . .

The essence of the first of China's three proposals [of 24 October 1962] is to restore the state of the Sino-Indian boundary in 1959, that is, before complications arose in the border situation over the past three years, and to have the Armed Forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from the 1959 line of actual control. The obligations of both sides under this proposal would be equal. . . .

The reason why China has reiterated and emphasised its proposal for a 20-kilometre withdrawal by the Armed Forces of each side from the line of actual control is that, through its bitter experiences of the past three years, the Chinese Government has become acutely, aware that it is very difficult to avoid

clashes in border areas under dispute if the Armed Forces of the two sides are not disengaged. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the line of actual control is not equivalent to the boundary between the two countries. Acknowledging and respecting the line of actual control would not prejudice each side's adherence to its claims on the boundary, but would create a favourable atmosphere for the reopening of peaceful negotiations to settle the boundary question. . . .

What is the implication of the Indian Government's proposed restoration of the state of the boundary as it prevailed before 8 September? In the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, it would mean that Indian troops again invade and occupy Chinese territory north of the illegal McMahon Line; in the western sector it would mean that they again invade and occupy the military strongpoints they set up on Chinese territory after 1959. And what kind of a state of affairs would this be? This would again be the state of affairs on 20 October when Indian troops, utilizing the advantageous military positions they had seized, launched large-scale armed attacks against Chinese frontier guards. It would be a state of affairs pregnant with so grave a danger as to make border clashes inevitable. It would not be fair, nor would it bring peace, to revert either to the state of the boundary as of 8 September, or to that of 20 October.

The fact that the Indian Government refuses to restore the state of the boundary of 7 November 1959 but wants to restore the state of the boundary of 8 September 1962 proves that since 1959 the Indian Government has seized by force large tracts of Chinese territory. What India proposes to restore is the situation that resulted from the Indian troops' crossing the line of actual control and encroaching on Chinese territory over the past three years; whereas the situation which China proposes to restore is one in which tranquillity was basically maintained along the Sino-Indian border three years ago. . . .

The Indian Government has stepped up its persecution of Chinese nationals in India, arbitrarily ordered the closure of branch offices of the Bank of China in India, crudely restricted the movement of staff members of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in India, and is even considering severing diplomatic relations with China. Casting off the cloak of 'non-alignment', the Indian Government has openly begged for military aid from

the United States of America and is receiving a continuous supply of US arms. Large numbers of Indian troops and huge quantities of US munitions are being rushed to the Sino-Indian border areas. Indian troops on both the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border have not ceased attacking the Chinese frontier guards. The Indian press has been trumpeting that India is about to launch a big counter-offensive. All this indicates that the threat of border conflicts on a bigger scale is growing perilously. . . .

The present unfortunate situation has been brought about solely by the Indian Government. The reasons for these actions of the Indian Government are to be found not so much in the boundary question *per se* as in its designs of utilising this situation to whip up an anti-China campaign by which it seeks internally to divert the attention and increase the burden of the people and suppress the progressive forces, and externally to obtain more US aid. . . .

Your Excellency may rest assured that. . . however complicated the situation may be now, the Chinese Government will never waver in its determination to seek a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. So long as there remains a ray of hope, it will continue to seek a way to conciliation, and take the initiative to create conditions favouring the cessation of border clashes. There is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and India, and it is utterly unthinkable to the Chinese Government that the present border clashes should develop into a full-scale war between the two countries. The border clashes must and will eventually be settled peacefully.

Ever since the Sino-Indian border issue arose, leaders of many Asian and African countries have exerted great efforts to promote its peaceful settlement. Almost unanimously they hold that the arch enemy of us Asian and African countries is imperialism and colonialism, that our countries all face urgent tasks of reconstruction to transform the backward state of our economy, and that China and India, the two big Asian countries, should settle their boundary question peacefully, restore Sino-Indian friendship, enhance Asian-African solidarity and together cope with the main enemy before us. They appeal to China and India to halt the armed border clashes and immediately enter into negotiations, and they oppose foreign

intervention. Both China and India are big Asian countries. It is only through direct negotiations between China and India that a mutually satisfactory settlement of the boundary question can be secured. The Chinese Government heartily welcomes and sincerely thanks the leaders of friendly Asian and African countries for their fair-minded endeavours to promote direct negotiations between China and India, without themselves getting involved in the dispute. I sincerely hope that Your Excellency will uphold justice and continue to exercise your distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question on a fair and reasonable basis.

**188 "Why the Nehru Government of India has to date refused to enter into peaceful negotiations," *Red Flag* editorial, 16 November 1962 (Extracts)**

In this article, we shall discuss only the so-called "defence measures" recently adopted by the Indian Government and its acquisition of military aid from the western imperialist countries. . . . India's monopoly capital, be it bureaucratic monopoly capital or private monopoly capital, is in urgent need of a war atmosphere in which to thrive and batten itself by "making blood-profits from the militarisation of our frontiers."

The recently formed "National Defence Council" which is headed by Nehru and includes the Tata family, the biggest private monopoly capitalist in India, is to assist the Indian Government in continuing to provoke armed clashes on the Sino-Indian border and in war mobilisation. In fact, it is also to assist the various financial monopoly groups in arrangements for war profits. . . .

Some Indian commentators had expressed some time ago their views on the Indian Government's attempt to solve its market problem by increasing its military expenditure. In their opinion, since increasing the national defence budget and establishing the military industry under normal circumstances would be opposed by the people, the Indian big bourgeoisie attempted to prolong, as long as possible, India's dispute with China on the boundary questions and various issues with other neighbouring countries. It even initiated the deceptive slogans of "The nation in danger" and the "Danger of foreign aggression"

in order to divert the people's attention and increase the military expenditure.

One can see clearly the anxiety of the Indian financial monopoly groups about their profits. Their desire to change the "direction of production" and expand armament production is one of the basic reasons why the Indian Government provokes conflicts on the Sino-Indian boundary question and refuses to hold negotiations. . . . The busy officials of the Indian Ministry of Defence production and the aggressive members of the "National Defence Council" including a few generals have, in the interest of munitions production and profits, long cast to the winds the fundamental interests of the Indian nation. While talking vociferously to the public about "Chinese aggression" and looking furious, they are in fact intoxicated with the prospects of "blood-profits." They know where their interests lie just as they know that the so-called 'Chinese aggression' is only a sheer invention. . . .

The Indian financial monopoly groups are seeking still bigger profits and wealth in the continuation and extension of certain military conflicts and the war atmosphere they have created. Since their greed for profits and wealth is insatiable, they will not lightly give up their interest in creating these military conflicts and war atmosphere. . . . After the proclamation of India's independence, the U.S. and British imperialists continued to retain tremendous economic influence in India controlling many key branches of the economy. In the last few years, U.S. investments in India have shown a steep increase, and the Indian ruling group has to rely more and more on the United States. In order to strength its economic and political control over India, the U.S. imperialists have made great efforts in supporting the anti-China policy of the Nehru government. In addition the so-called "Aid-Indian Club" organized by the United States is actively increasing military aid to the reactionary ruling group of India. . . .

In pursuance of the selfish ends of the few monopoly financial groups, the Indian ruling circles have already tied India to the U.S. war chariot. By buying arms and munitions, these monopoly financial groups are grabbing the wealth of the people and are making fantastic profits on arms deals.

The Indian ruling group is trying to avert economic crisis

and turn India into a great empire through the militarization of the national economy. But in reality, by pursuing such a road, it can only plunge the Indian national economy into an abyss of disasters and drive India further into the position of an appendage of imperialism. Its so-called "national defence" is in fact the dismantling of national defence before imperialism.

### **189 Chinese Government statement announcing taking of three measures by China, 21 November 1962 (Extracts)**

The Indian Government has so far rejected...three proposals and continued to expand the border conflict, thus daily aggravating the Sino-Indian border situation. In order to reverse this trend, the Chinese Government has decided to take initiative measures in order to promote the realization of these three proposals.

The Chinese Government hereby declares the following :

(1) Beginning from the day following that of the issuance of the present statement, *i.e.*, from 00:00 hours on November 22, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border.

(2) Beginning from December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.

In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting back in self-defence on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the line of actual control, that is, north of the illegal McMahon line, and to withdraw 20 kilometres farther back from that line.

In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control.

(3) In order to ensure the normal movement of the inhabitants in the Sino-Indian border area, forestall the activities of saboteurs and maintain order there, China will set up checkpoints at a number of places on its side of the line of actual control with a certain number of civil police assigned to each checkpoint. The Chinese Government will notify the Indian Government of

the location of these checkpoints through diplomatic channels.

These measures taken by the Chinese Government on its own initiative demonstrate its great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully. It should be pointed out, in particular, that, after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962. The Chinese Government hopes that, as a result of the abovementioned initiative measures taken by China, the Indian Government will take into consideration the desires of the Indian people and peoples of the world, make a new start and give a positive response. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to take corresponding measures, the Chinese and Indian Government can immediately appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the Sino-Indian border to discuss matters relating to the 20 kilometres withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to fix a demilitarized zone, the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel.

When the talks between the officials of the two parties have yielded results and the results have been put into effect, talks can be held by the Prime Ministers of the two countries for further seeking an amicable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for the talks.

The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will make a positive response. Even if the Indian Government fails to make such a response in good time, the Chinese Government will take the initiative to carry out the above-mentioned measures as scheduled.

However, the Chinese Government cannot but take into account the following possible eventualities: (1) that the Indian troops should continue their attack after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and when they are withdrawing; (2) that, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, *i.e.*, the illegal McMahon Line and/or refuse to with-



draw but remain on the line of actual control in the middle and western sectors; and (3) that, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should cross the line of actual control and recover their positions prior to September 8, that is to say, again cross the illegal McMahon line and reoccupy the Kechilang River area north of the line in the eastern sector, reoccupy Wuje in the Middle sector, and restore their 43 strongpoints for aggression in the Chip Chap River Valley, the Galwan River Valley, the Pangong Lake area, and the Demchok area or set up more strongpoints for aggression on Chinese territory in the western sector. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that, should the above eventualities occur, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.

**190 Chinese clarifications to Indian Foreign Secretary on the points in their statement of 21 November 1962, 26 November 1962 (Extract)**

Chinese frontier guards will withdraw along the entire Sino-Indian border to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed on November 7, 1959. . . .this applies, without exception, to the western as well as the eastern and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian border.

*Question:* It is stated in point 2 of the Chinese Government's Statement that Chinese troops will withdraw 20 kilometres north of the so-called McMahon Line. Where will that be? Will that be behind the positions of September 8, 1962, as suggested by the Indian Government?

*Answer:* It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that, after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962. In the eastern sector the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres north of the illegal McMahon Line, that is, they will withdraw not only from the Kechilang River and Che Dong area, but also from Le village, Migyitun and Tsayul. China will, of course, continue to exercise administrative jurisdiction in the above-mentioned areas.

**Question:** The Chinese Government's decision to cease fire and take these measures is China's unilateral action. Where, according to the interpretation of the Chinese side, should the Indian troops be in order not to go against the three measures and to evoke China's reaction?

**Answer:** It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that it is out of its great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully that the Chinese Government is taking these three measures on its own initiative. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will give a positive response and take corresponding measures. In other words, it hopes that the Indian armed forces will similarly withdraw 20 kilometres on its side from the line of the actual control along the entire Sino-Indian border. When this is done, the armed forces of the two sides will disengage on an equitable basis, tranquillity along the border will be effectively ensured and recurrence of border clashes will be prevented. It goes without saying that respect by both China and India of the line of actual control up to which each side exercised administrative jurisdiction on November 7, 1959 and an equitable withdrawal of their respective armed forces from this line will in no way prejudice each side's adherence to its claims with regard to the boundary. However, as pointed out in the Chinese Government's Statement, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence in case, after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and withdrawn, Indian troops should continue to attack the Chinese frontier guards, or again advance to the line of actual control, or refuse to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control, or again cross it.

**Question:** Will China's checkposts be set up only in the areas within 20 kilometres of what China considers to be the boundary, or in other areas as well? In the middle and western sectors China will probably set up checkposts within 20 kilometres on its side of the customary line, but in the eastern sector will it set up checkposts within 20 kilometres north of the McMahon Line or, for a period of time, south of the line too?

**Answer:** It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that China will set up checkposts at a number of places on its side of the entire line of actual control which existed on November 7, 1959. Therefore, the question of China

setting up checkpoints south of the line of actual control in the eastern sector does not arise at all. As for the concrete location of the line of actual control of November 7, 1959, reference is made to maps 3 and 5 attached to Premier Chou En-lai's letter of November 15, 1962 addressed to the leaders of Asian and African countries.

*Question:* The McMahon Line was mentioned in Premier Chou's letters of November 4. India has always held that this line should follow the highest ridge. The map of the McMahon Line is merely a sketch map. If, as China says, one should go by the co-ordinates on the map, 140 square miles of territory would be included into India, which territory, however, is now under the jurisdiction of Tibet. The Indian side hopes that China will clarify as to which delineation it supports.

*Answer:* The so called McMahon Line is illegal and the Chinese Government has never recognized it. The reason why the Chinese Government pointed out the coordinates of the western extremity of the so-called McMahon Line was to show that Indian troops had crossed this line and intruded into the Kechilang River area. The Indian Government asserts that the so-called McMahon Line should follow the highest ridge. But this is an entirely groundless assertion. The Chinese Government considers that at present both sides should first adopt measures to disengage their armed forces, with the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 as the basic line, and prevent the recurrence of clashes so as to create an atmosphere conducive to boundary negotiations. Both sides should defer the differences on the boundary question for settlement by future negotiations, and refrain from haggling over them now endlessly.

**191 Chinese clarification to Indian Deputy Secretary on the points in their statement of 21 November 1962, 26 November 1962 (Extract)**

Beginning from December 1, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959. This line of actual control is described in detail in the letter from Premier Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru dated November 4, and in the letter and attached maps

from Premier Chou En-lai to the leaders of Asian and African countries dated November 15; the *People's Daily* of November 8 can also serve as a reference.

*Question:* According to the Statement, the Chinese frontier guards, after withdrawing 20 kilometres from the line of actual control, will be far behind their positions prior to September 8. How would you define this? Because even according to the so-called line of actual control claimed by China, Chinese troops, after withdrawing 20 kilometres, would still have crossed the line of September 8 at certain places.

*Answer:* The Chinese frontier guards, after withdrawing 20 kilometres from the line of actual control, will be far behind their positions prior to September 8 (reference documents mentioned above) In the eastern sector, China will even have to withdraw its frontier guards in Tsayul and Le Village; in the western sector, many Chinese posts in the Chip Chap River Valley, the Galwan River Valley, the Kongka Pass, the Pangong lake and the Spanggur lake areas will be withdrawn.

*Question:* Please clarify point (2) of the "possible eventualities" in the Statement.

*Answer:* It means that should the Indian side, taking advantage of the withdrawal by the Chinese side, again advance to the line of actual control or remain on it, this cannot but be regarded as the Indian side deliberately maintaining border tension, preparing for new intrusion at any moment and provoking clashes. The Chinese side hopes that such a situation will not arise.

### **192 Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 1 December 1962**

In the letters that have been exchanged between us since the further aggression by your forces commenced on 8th September, 1962, the following principles, on the basis of which our differences can be resolved peacefully, have emerged:

- (i) We should create a proper atmosphere for peaceful settlement of our differences. (This has also been mentioned in your message of 28th November).
- (ii) We should settle our differences in a friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions. (This has also

been reiterated in your message of 28th November). If we fail, we can consider what other agreed peaceful method of settling our differences should be adopted (my letter of 27th October, 1962).

- (iii) There should be no attempt to force any unilateral demand on either side on account of the advances gained in the recent clashes. (Your letter of 4th November, 1962).
- (iv) The necessary preliminaries for talks and discussions suggested should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self respect of both sides. (Your message of 28th November).
- (v) The implementation of these proposed arrangements will not in any way prejudice either side's position in regard to the correct boundary alignment. (Your message of 4th November and your message of 28th November, 1962).

The withdrawal arrangements, however, that you propose, behind what you refer to as "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959", are inconsistent with the principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

In spite of the clarifications given, I cannot understand how "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" can be as delineated in your maps 3 and 5 which were sent as accompaniments to your letter of 15th November to Heads of States/Government of some Asian-African countries and to which reference was made in the clarifications given regarding "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959". I would in this connection refer you to the last but one paragraph of my letter of 14th November, 1962, which gives, what we regard, as the line of actual Chinese control as it existed on the ground on 7th November, 1959.

You have mentioned in your letter that this line cannot be defined or interpreted according to the free will of either side. This is exactly, however, what your Government have done in the clarification given to the Indian Government regarding "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959".

What you call "the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959" in the western sector was only a series of isolated military posts. You are aware that in November 1959 there were no Chinese posts of any kind either at Qiziljilga, Shinglung, Dehra,

Samzangling or any areas to the west of these locations nor did the Chinese have any posts to the south or west of Spanggur. Despite this, "the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959", as your Government now claim in Ladakh, is along the line of control established by your forces after the massive attacks mounted since 20th October, 1962. This is a definite attempt to retain under cover of preliminary ceasefire arrangements, physical possession over the area which China claims and to secure which the massive attack since 20th October, 1962, was mounted by your forces. This we cannot agree to. This also violates principles (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) mentioned . . . above, which you have been reiterating in all your communications.

The same remarks apply to "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" defined by your Government in the central and the eastern sectors. Barahoti, which your Government call Wuje, had never been under Chinese control. As a matter of fact, if you will refer to the past communications on this subject, you would find that there is an understanding that the administrative control of Barahoti will remain with the Indian side, only unarmed civil administrative personnel being in charge of the area. As regards the eastern sector, Longju was under Indian administrative control till August 1959 when Chinese forces attacked the Indian garrison there. Since then it has not been under the administrative control of either side. Again various communications exchanged between our two Governments would show clearly that Khinzemane and the Dhola region to the south of the Thagla ridge, which the Chinese clarification describe as the Kechilang river and Chedong area, have always been under Indian administrative control till Chinese forces started their further aggression on 8th September, 1962, in this region.

The three-point proposals of October 24, 1962 and the statement on cease-fire and withdrawals of 21st November, 1962, clearly aim at securing physical control of areas which were never under Chinese administrative control either on 7th November 1959 or at any time prior to 8th September, 1962. These proposals not only violate principles (iii) and (iv) mentioned . . . above, but are a definite attempt to prejudice India's position in maintaining its stand as regards the boundary.

You have mentioned in your message of 28th November that "the initiative measures which the Chinese Government have decided to take are not conditional on simultaneous corresponding measures to be taken by the Indian side". And yet, later on in your message you state "that withdrawal by China alone of its frontier guards beyond 20 kilometres on its side of the 1959 line of actual control cannot ensure the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, nor can it prevent the recurrence of border clashes. On the contrary, in case the Indian side should refuse to co-operate, even the cease-fire which has been effected is liable to be upset." These observations appear to be contradictory. In any case, if the Government of India are to take any attitude to the so-called unilateral measures of cease-fire and withdrawals announced by the Chinese Government, they must clearly know what the "line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" is, nor can that line be unilaterally determined by the Chinese Government either on the basis of their alleged claims or on the basis of the position reached as a result of their further aggression.

In the light of the above, I would once again commend for your acceptance the clear and straightforward proposal made by us, namely, at least the *status quo* prior to 8th September 1962, should be restored so that the necessary atmosphere for reverting to peaceful processes may be created. There is no danger of any clashes under this arrangement if both sides are genuinely sincere in their desire to revert to paths of peace. As you know, the earlier minor clashes occurred because your forces attacked the small Indian patrols of posts guarding against surreptitious aggressive intrusions in Indian territory which had been going on since 1957, and the major clashes started since 8th September, 1962, when your forces started an unprovoked wanton invasion of Indian territory.

Our Foreign Office has presented a written note to your Charge d'Affaires in Delhi on 30th November for further clarification of "the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959". I hope that the written memorandum presented by our Foreign Office and my present letter will result in positive clarifications on this rather confusing and complicated question of what you call "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959".

### 193 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 10 December 1962 (Extracts)

On 24 October, the Chinese made their three-point proposal which, if agreed to, would have given them the benefit of their recent invasion and placed them in an advantageous and dominating position for further aggression in the future. We could not possibly accept this and consequently we rejected it. . . .

Whatever the claims may be, this well-prepared invasion [October 1962] was at variance with the Chinese professions and can only be described as blatantly imperialist expansionism and aggression. In answer to this, we stated that we could not proceed with any talks with them until at least this latest aggression was vacated and the *status quo* prior to 8 September 1962 is restored both in NEFA and Ladakh. This was the least we could do, and that is the position we have consistently held during the last few months. . . .

Does the Indian Government agree or does it not agree that the officials of the two sides should meet and discuss matters relating to the withdrawal of Armed Forces of each party to form a de-militarised zone etc? It is obvious if the officials are to meet they must have clear and precise instructions as to the cease-fire and withdrawal arrangements which they are supposed to implement. Unless they receive these instructions, which must be the result of an agreement between the Governments of India and China, they will be unable to function. Therefore it has to be determined previously which line is to be implemented. Between the line of actual control immediately prior to 8 September 1962 and that on 7 November 1959 as defined by China, there is a great difference of about 2,500 sq miles of Indian territory which China occupied as a result of invasion and massive attacks during the last three months. The Chinese Government by defining this line in its own way wants to retain the advantages secured by the latest invasion. . . .

The Chinese threat against India is a long-term one and the last five years, and even more so the last three months, have brought out the basic expansionist and imperialist attitude of China. This is a continuing threat to the independence and territorial integrity of India. We cannot submit to this challenge and must face it with all the consequences that it may bring.



Hon. Members may have read the pleas which we have repeated several times in our communications to the Chinese Government or the Chinese Premier that we should explore avenues of peaceful approach; apart from meeting each other, explore other avenues of settling these questions peacefully. I am prepared when the time comes, provided there is approval of Parliament, even to refer the basic dispute of the claims on the frontier to an international body like the International Court of Justice at The Hague. I submit that there is no fairer and more reasonable approach than what I have indicated. But that also can only come when the aggression is vacated and the position as it was before 8 September is restored.

**194 Colombo Conference proposals of six Non-aligned Afro-Asian countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic) for the border settlement between India and China, 12 December 1962 (released on 19 January 1963)**

Proposals of the Conference of six non-aligned nations held at Colombo (10th to 12th December 1962).

1. The Conference considers that the existing *de facto* cease-fire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian Chinese conflict.

2. (a) With regard to the Western Sector, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21 and November 28, 1962.

(b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position.

(c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals will be demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.

3 With regard to the Eastern Sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both the Governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their

respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions.

4. With regard to the problems of the Middle Sector, the Conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force.

5. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the ceasefire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the ceasefire position.

6. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries.

**195 "Workers of all countries, unite to oppose our common enemy," *People's Daily* editorial, 15 December 1962  
(Extract)**

China's consistent and sincere efforts for the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question are universally acknowledged. But the strange thing is that some self styled Marxist-Leninists have cast Marxism-Leninism to the wind; they never bother to analyse from the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism the Nehru government's reactionary policy of provoking the Sino-Indian boundary conflict and stubbornly refusing reconciliation. These people shut their eyes to the fact that this policy arises out of the need of India's big bourgeoisie and big landlords to oppose the people and the progressive movement of that country; they also refuse to recognise that this policy both suits exactly the needs of imperialists, especially those of the U.S. imperialists, and has their support.

As a matter of fact, the Nehru government has in recent years repressed the people at home with increasing brutality and become more and more a protege of U.S. imperialism, acting as its accomplice on many important international questions, such as the Congo. The Nehru government's persistence in its anti-China stand is the very outcome of its domestic and foreign policies which have become more and more reactionary. Those who accuse China of having pushed the Nehru

government to the west are mistaking the very cause for the effect. Throughout the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, they have all along confused right with wrong, pretending to be "neutral", calling China, "brother" while actually regarding the Indian reactionary group as their kinsmen. Shouldn't these people do well to examine their own conscience and ask themselves what has become of their Marxism-Leninism and their proletarian internationalism?

### **196 Indian note to China, 31 December 1962**

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the communique issued by the Chinese and Pakistan Governments on 26th December on their agreement in principle on the alignment of the border between China (Sinkiang) and the territory of Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan.

2. In their note of 30th June 1962, the Government of India had drawn attention to the attempts of the Chinese Government to exploit, for its own ends, the differences on Kashmir between the Indian and Pakistan Governments. Despite the assertion by the Chinese Government that it does not wish to get involved in the dispute, the calculated release of this communique at a time when delegations from India and Pakistan were attempting to resolve their differences on Kashmir and related matters is clear evidence of China's desire to exploit Indo-Pakistan differences for its own selfish and expansionist designs.

3. The joint communique is a brazen attempt at legitimisation of the gains of aggression in the hope that the Chinese Government will thereby secure Pakistan support to Chinese aggression on India and the gains of this aggression.

4. The Government of India protest strongly against this aggressive and expansionist move by the Government of China. They repudiate firmly the validity of any agreement involving Indian territory between parties who have no legal or constitutional *locus standi* whatever in respect of this territory.

**197 Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 1 January 1963 (Extract)**

I requested you in my letter of 1st December 1962, for positive clarifications on what you call "the line of actual control as of 7th November 1959". The only clarification given is that this line is the one unilaterally determined by China regardless of the factual history of the past few years. The only new suggestion in your present letter is that "the Indian troops should stay in their present positions along the entire Sino-Indian border and that in the meantime officials of the two sides should meet immediately to discuss such matters as withdrawal arrangements for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, establishment of checkpoints and return of captured personnel." This new proposal is worse than your three-point proposal in as much as it seeks to exclude the Indian armed forces from the entire area of Indian territory subjected to this latest aggression since 8th September, 1962, that is, from Indian territory of over 20,000 square kilometres in the Eastern sector and over 6,000 square kilometres in the western sector. Surely the officials of the two sides can hardly discuss and reach agreements on such matters as withdrawal arrangements for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides if they have no clear direction from their Governments regarding the line with reference to which the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides is to be arranged. . . .

**198 Clarifications given by the representatives of the Colombo Powers to the Government of India, 13 January 1963**

Upon request from the Government of India, the following clarifications of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Colombo Conference proposals were given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana:

*Western Sector*

(i) The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo Conference will be 20 kilometres as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21st November and in Prime Minister Chou En-lai's letter of 28th November, 1962,

*i.e.*, from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China.

(ii) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to will be on and upto the line indicated in (i) above.

(iii) The demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo Conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

### *Eastern Sector*

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo Conference proposals, move right upto the south of the line of actual control, *i.e.* the McMahon Line, except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right upto the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo Conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China, according to the Colombo Conference proposals, are Chedong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments.

### *Middle Sector*

The Colombo Conference desired that the *status quo* in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*.

## **199 Chou En-lai's letter to Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon giving Chinese interpretation of the Colombo Conference proposals, 19 January 1963 (Extract)**

I have already explained comprehensively to Your Excellency the Chinese Government's attitude towards the Colombo Conference and its proposals. In view of Your Excellency's convic-

tion expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter of 14 January, I now state to you that the Chinese Government accepts in principle the proposals of the Colombo Conference as a preliminary basis for meetings of Chinese and Indian officials to discuss stabilization of the cease-fire and disengagement and to promote Sino-Indian boundary negotiations but that it maintains the following two points of interpretation of the proposals of the Colombo Conference:

(1) In the interest of stabilizing the cease-fire and disengaging the troops of the two sides, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres along the entire Sino-Indian border on China's own initiative in accordance with the plan announced in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21 November 1962, the stipulation in the proposals of the Conference regarding the Indian troops keeping their existing military position should be equally applicable to the entire Sino-Indian border, and not to the western sector alone. It is the understanding of the Chinese Government that in the eastern sector, India will continue to refrain from sending its troops to re-enter the areas south of the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959, vacated by the Chinese frontier guards, and will send there only civilian personnel carrying arms of self-defence, as India says it has done up till now.

(2) After their continued withdrawal all along the border to positions 20 kilometres from the line of actual control of 7 November 1959 in accordance with the statement of the Chinese Government, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions on 8 September 1962. Thus no Chinese frontier guards will be stationed in the Che Dong area and Longju in the eastern sector, Wu-je in the middle sector and the areas in the western sector where India once set up 43 strong-points. Since all these places are on the Chinese side of the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959, it is a matter of course for China to set up civilian check-posts there. However, with a view to responding to the peace call of the Colombo Conference and promoting direct negotiations between China and India, China is willing to move another step forward on the road of reconciliation by refraining from setting up civilian check-posts in those places, provided Indian troops or civilian personnel do not re-enter these places.

The above-mentioned two-point interpretation by the Chinese Government helps to carry through, in the proposals of the Colombo Conference, the principle of being equitable to China and India and the principle of equal application to all the sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary, and does not in the least prejudice the positions held by China and India as regards the final alignment of the boundary. The Indian Government may have its own interpretation of the proposals of the Colombo Conference. The Chinese Government hopes that the differences in interpretation by the Chinese and Indian sides will not prevent the speedy holding of talks between Chinese and Indian officials, but will be resolved in these talks.

**200 Vice-Premier Chen Yi's statement on Sino-Indian boundary question, 21 January 1963 (Extract)**

The Chinese Government welcomes and supports the efforts made by the six friendly Asian and African countries of the Colombo Conference to promote direct negotiations between China and India. The Chinese Government accepts in principle the proposals of the Colombo conference as a preliminary basis for talks between Chinese and Indian officials. As a matter of course, it maintains certain points of its own interpretation of the proposals, and the Indian Government may have its own interpretation too. But differences in this regard may well be resolved by the two sides through direct negotiations. . . .

The Chinese Government earnestly hopes that, with the promotion and assistance of friendly Asian and African countries, direct Sino-Indian negotiations will soon start.

**201 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha regarding Colombo Conference proposals, 23 January 1963 (Extracts)**

The Chinese should vacate the aggression they had indulged in after 7 September. There is no question, therefore, of our going behind or varying in the slightest the resolution passed by this House in November.

The merits of the dispute were not considered by the Colombo countries or any other. It was only to pave the way for discussion between the representatives of both the parties

and as I said, we can only discuss them if certain conditions were created and certain aggression committed by the Chinese was vacated.

Now, these proposals as explained and amplified by them in answer to our questions related to these three sectors: the western, middle and eastern sectors of our border. In regard to the eastern sector the position prior to 8 September was that the Chinese forces were to the north of the international boundary and the Indian forces were to the south of this boundary—that is, what is normally called the McMahon Line for facility. . . .

In fact, the Chinese Government has recognised this boundary of the high ridge in Burma. So, before 8 September no Chinese forces elements had come across that boundary there except—there is one exception in Longju, as the House well knows, Longju being a village just on the frontier. In regard to this position that was taken was that for the present nobody, neither party, should occupy it. The Chinese have forcibly occupied it previously and later it was suggested that neither party should occupy it. The Colombo Conference proposals, as clarified by the visiting delegations, confirm this position except as regards the Thagla ridge area, which the Chinese call Che Cong area, where we have a border post known as the Dhola post. The Colombo proposals and the clarifications refer to these areas as Thagla ridge and Longju as remaining areas arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China by direct discussion. That is to say, in regard to the eastern sector, the 8 September position was according to the Colombo Conference proposals entirely restored, except in regard to Thagla ridge area and the Dhola post. These are within three miles of the McMahon Line. About this the Colombo proposals stated that this matter may be left undecided. They left it to the parties to decide by direct discussion. That is the position, so far as the eastern sector is concerned.

With regard to the middle sector the Colombo Conference proposals required the *status quo* to be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*. This conforms to the Government of India's position that the *status quo* prior to 8 September 1962 should be restored as there has been no conflict in this area and the existing situation has not been dis -



turbed.

Coming to the western sector, *i.e.* Ladakh sector, the restoration of the *status quo* as it obtained prior to 8 September would result in re-establishment of all the Indian posts shown in blue in the maps circulated to Members. . . .

If we went back to the 8 September position in the western sector, this would have resulted in the re-establishment of all the Indian posts shown in blue in the maps circulated to Members. This will also mean that the Chinese will maintain the old Chinese posts at the locations shown in red in the same map. The Colombo Conference proposes that a 20-kilometre area will be cleared by the withdrawal of Chinese forces, and this area is to be administered by civilian posts of both sides, Indian and Chinese. The House will observe that this area which is to be administered by civilian posts on both sides covers the entire area in which Indian posts existed prior to 8 September except for two or three posts to the west of Sumdo. On the other hand the 20-kilometre withdrawal by the Chinese forces entails the Chinese forces going several kilometres beyond the international boundary in the region of Spanggur and further south. The Colombo Conference proposals and the clarifications thus satisfy the demand made for the restoration of the *status quo* prior to 8 September. The slight variation is about two or three Indian posts west of Sumdo. This is, however, compensated by Chinese withdrawals in the region of Spanggur and further south. Also, by the fact that many Chinese military posts have to be removed from the withdrawal areas. If Hon. Members consider this matter with the help of maps, they will observe that this position, as indicated by the Colombo Conference proposals, has certain advantages over the one which we had previously indicated, that is, the restoration of the 8 September position. In the 8 September position the Chinese were there in strength, in very large strength, in that area and we had also some posts. In that particular area it was obviously much to the advantage of the Chinese, because of their large strength etc. Now, if this Colombo Conference proposal is accepted in regard to the western sector, it removes the Chinese strength from that sector and makes that sector a demilitarised area, with our posts as well as Chinese posts by agreement being civilian posts, in equal number with equal number of

people and similarity of arms. It would be civil arms, police arms or small arms. This, I think, is definitely better than the restoration of Chinese posts in that area in a big way with large arms.

On full consideration of these matters as contained in the Colombo Conference resolutions and their clarifications we came to the conclusion that these proposals fulfilled the essence of the demand made for a restoration of the *status quo* prior to 8 September. I thereupon, sent a letter [13 January] to the Ceylon Prime Minister, stating that the Government of India accept in principle the Colombo Conference proposals in the light of the clarifications given and will take further action to place them before the Indian Parliament for consideration before the Government of India can finally accept them. . . .

It is obvious that the Chinese Government do not accept the Colombo Conference proposals as 'a definite basis providing conditions for the acceptance of both parties,' nor do they accept the Colombo proposals and the clarifications given by the three Colombo Conference delegations who visited Delhi. The Chinese Government maintain certain points of their own interpretation of the Colombo proposals. This obviously means that they have not accepted the Colombo proposals as a whole. We on our part are, however, clear that there can be no talks and discussions between officials as stated in the Colombo Conference proposals to settle the points left for decision by direct discussions between the Governments of India and China by the Colombo Conference unless the Government of China accept *in toto* the Colombo Conference proposals and their clarifications.

We were perfectly prepared to follow any peaceful method for the solution of this matter provided the conditions for such discussion arise and the basis for these talks is created.

We have always been willing and are willing to take to peaceful methods for the solution of any dispute provided the conditions for such talks are created. We had pointed out repeatedly that the conditions would we created by their vacating the new aggression that they had indulged in since 8 September. When we made that proposal first in October, the Chinese Government did not respond to it. Subsequently they added to their own proposal the fact of their unilateral withdrawal and a cease-fire.

Now the Colombo Conference powers have put forward their own proposals which essentially bring about the restoration of the *status quo* prior to 8 September. We communicated our acceptance in principle of these proposals and their clarifications to the Ceylon Prime Minister without any attempt to vary them. These proposals have either to be accepted as a whole or rejected. Any attempt to accept them in part will mean a rejection of them as a whole. We feel, therefore, that both the Governments concerned must express their willingness to accept these proposals and clarifications *in toto* before the next stage of settling the remaining issues left for decision by the two Governments can be taken up in direct talks and discussions.

To put it succinctly, the position before us is that, firstly we cannot have any kind of talks, even preliminary talks, unless we are satisfied that the conditions we had laid down about the 8 September 1962 position being restored, is met; secondly, even if it is met and even if talks take place, they have to be about various preliminary matters. Then they may lead to other matters. On no account, at the present moment or in these preliminary matters, do we consider the merits of the case. They are not changed.

When we asked for the restoration of the 8 September line, that had nothing to do with our accepting the line as a settlement; of course not.

## **202 Nehru's reply to the debate in Lok Sabha on Colombo Conference proposals, 25 January 1963 (Extracts)**

China as constituted today, is an aggressive expansionist country, possibly with vast designs for the future. It believes in the inevitability of major wars. Thus, essentially it does not believe in peaceful co-existence between countries and it does not believe in the five principles of *Panchsheel*, which China and India laid down some seven or eight years ago and which had been accepted by a large number of countries. . . .

A great nation pursuing such aggressive policies necessarily becomes a danger and a menace to the other countries and to the world. . . . I believe that even the Government of China has realised the danger of the course that it follows. Possibly also it has realised the wrong it has done to India and to itself by

following this course. I am not referring to moral rights and wrongs, but to the practical consequences of the action. It must be obvious to China that they cannot compel us by military or other forceful means to surrender to them in any important matter. . . .

These proposals, not only in substance but essentially, carry out the main object of the 8th September proposal which we had made. . . .

The 8th September line, if it is reproduced completely, would mean that all our posts and all the Chinese posts in that area would remain, because they were there before the 8th September; they are not new Chinese posts. Our posts had, of course, been liquidated meanwhile by this aggressive action. So that, it meant our going back to those posts and the Chinese keeping their posts, 40 posts or so, in that area, and keeping them in a very dominating position, disadvantageous to us. Now, compared to that, the proposals that have been made by the Colombo Powers are that all these strong posts of the Chinese, which counted very much against us, should be withdrawn—we are not there at the present moment—and that there should be some civil posts of the Chinese and some civil posts by us in that area but not together. There is no question of dual posts or dual partnership; they will be separate posts by agreement.

Chinese . . . objections to the Colombo proposals. One is that they do not want us in that Ladakh area, that corridor as it is called, to put up any kind of military or civil posts. That is an important matter. And China wants to put up her own posts there, civilian posts, not military posts. That is one important matter. . . .

We had 40, and they had 40 or 50, I do not exactly know. . . .

That is a major point of difference between China and the Colombo Powers, and certainly we cannot accept the Chinese approach to it.

There is another. I imagine that is in NEFA about what they call the Che Dong Ridge which we call the Thagla Ridge. These are two major matters.

**203 Nehru's letter to the Prime Minister of Ceylon,  
26 January 1963 (Extracts)**

I have now the honour to state that the Government of India accept *in toto* the proposals of the Colombo Conference as clarified and explained to us by you and your colleagues during our discussions on 12th and 13th. . . .

It is obvious . . . that the Chinese Government have not accepted the Colombo Conference proposals in regard to certain important matters. . . . The reservations of the Government of China on the scope of the Colombo Conference proposals and their interpretation are contrary to the proposals made by the Conference. We, on our part, have accepted these proposals *in toto* and made no attempt to vary them in any manner. Obviously, both the Government of India and China accept the Colombo Conference proposals and clarifications *in toto* before the next stage of settling the remaining issues left for decision by the two Governments can be taken up in direct talks and discussions. The question of giving effect to the Colombo Conference proposals as clarified will, therefore, arise only when the Government of China have accepted the proposals and the clarifications without any reservations on their scope or interpretation.

**204 "Welcome the efforts of the Colombo conference to  
promote direct negotiations between China and India,"  
*People's Daily* editorial, 28 January 1963 (Extracts)**

The proposals of the Colombo Conference reflect the desire of its participating countries to promote direct negotiations between China and India. These proposals are of a positive nature but also contain ambiguities and inconsistencies. . . .

The view that there is dispute only over the western sector is entirely groundless. Therefore, any arrangement for stabilizing the ceasefire and for disengagement must consistently follow the principle of being equitable to China and India and the principle of equal application to all the sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary.

The proposals of the Colombo Conference contain no appeal for the withdrawal of Indian troops. They only express the hope

that the Indian forces in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary will keep their existing military position. If this is so, they should at least also keep their existing military position in the middle and eastern sectors as well. The proposals of the conference only provide for disengagement in the western sector but fail to make similar stipulations for the eastern and middle sectors. Concerning disputed areas in ceasefire arrangements in the eastern sector, that is, the Che Dong area and Longju, the proposals stipulate that the question should be solved by the two sides through discussion. If this is so, at least the same principle should be applied to the disputed areas in the ceasefire arrangements in the western sector, that is, the areas where India set up 43 strong-points after crossing the line of actual control of 1959 through the use of armed force. It should not be stipulated that the areas vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal in the western sector should be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon. To allow India to set up civilian posts in this area is tantamount to recognizing as legitimate the Indian armed invasion of this area and its setting up of 43 strongpoints there between 1959 and 1962. . . .

The original intention of the Colombo Conference nations it to make their proposals serve as a bridge to facilitate direct talks between China and India, but the Indian Government has done everything it can to turn these proposals into obstacles to the holding of talks.

**205 *Peking Review* commentary on the visit of US-Commonwealth mission to India, 8 February 1963 (Extract)**

The visit of the joint military mission shows that the Nehru government, in order to step up its anti-China campaign, will further throw itself into the embrace of U.S. imperialism at the expense of India's sovereignty and national interests.

The so-called neutrality and non-alignment of the Nehru government has long been cast to the winds. Its present plan to provide U.S. imperialism with military bases for operations against China has further exposed its military alliance with the western imperialist bloc.

By following this line, the Indian Government will simply become a tool of the U.S. war plan of "using Asians to fight

Asians," and will itself gain nothing.

**206 Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's television interview to Karlsson, correspondent of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation, 17 February 1963 (Extracts)**

India already occupied, around 1950, more than 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, south of the illegal McMahon line. The occupied area was three times the size of Belgium. The Chinese Government did not accept this encroachment, but in order to seek a peaceful settlement of the question, it restrained its frontier guards from crossing the illegal McMahon Line.

Then in 1959, India laid claim groundlessly to over 30,000 more square kilometres of Chinese territory in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. Moreover, India provoked sanguinary conflicts on two occasions during that year, first in the eastern and then in the western sector of the boundary. As a result, tension rose daily along the border. . . .

The Chinese Government has acclaimed and supported the efforts of the Colombo conference to promote direct negotiations between China and India. The Chinese Government accepts the Colombo proposals in principle as a basis for meetings between Chinese and Indian officials. The Colombo proposals are ambiguous on some matters of detail, and the Chinese Government has its own interpretation, but it does not make acceptance of its own interpretation a precondition for starting the meetings between Chinese and Indian officials. Actually, the Indian Government has its own interpretations too. The Chinese Government hopes that the differences in interpretation will be resolved satisfactorily in the meetings between Chinese and Indian officials.

*Question 8:* The Indians claim that the clarifications of the Colombo proposals are an inseparable part of these proposals. How do you look at it ?

*Answer:* The Chinese Government cannot agree with this view. The six nations which took part in the Colombo conference merely adopted the Colombo proposals and never adopted what is called clarifications of these proposals. . . .

The Colombo proposals contained six points. The Chinese

Government has put forward its own interpretation only in connections with item C of the second point and with the third point. We consider all the other points acceptable. Hence, even as to form, it cannot be said that China's two points of interpretation mean a complete rejection of the Colombo proposals. . . .

*Question 10:* Why can't the Chinese Government accept the Colombo proposals without reservation ?

*Answer:* The Colombo proposals contain contradictions and fallacies in logic. Moreover, they are ambiguous on some matters of detail. Prime Minister Nehru took advantage of this to interpret the Colombo proposals as being favourable to India's position in that it met the so-called Indian demand to restore the status of the boundary as it existed prior to September 8, 1962. In these circumstances, it was all the more impossible for China not to maintain its own interpretation, or not to have some reservations.

The whole purpose of the Colombo conference was to promote direct negotiations between China and India. The Colombo conference proposals are merely for the consideration of China and India; they are neither a command, nor an arbitration decision. The Chinese Government is not obliged to accept them *in toto*. Nor do the nations which participated in the conference consider that China has to accept their proposals *in toto* before direct negotiations can begin between China and India.

### **207 Chinese note to India, 21 February 1963 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government has never involved itself in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, the Sino-Pakistan boundary negotiations and the related agreement have not at all touched on the question of the ownership of Kashmir, and have even less to do with the India-Pakistan talks on this question. . . .

After the defeat of its military adventure against China, India, encouraged by certain Western powers, has redoubled its efforts to entice Pakistan into a joint anti-China campaign. This is no secret at all, Pakistan has repeatedly exposed such an attempt by India. India has not only brushed aside the traditional Sino-Indian friendship of thousands of years standing, but is deliberately sowing discord and sabotaging the relations



between China and her other neighbours. There is no need to cite any more facts to show to what lengths the Indian Government has gone in its opposition and hostility to China. The Indian Government's attitude is indeed that of downright big nation chauvinism and expansionism.

**208 Article in *Kuangming Jihpao* analyzing the US aggressive dispositions in Southeast Asia, 21 February 1963 (Extract)**

It is commonly known that the U.S. is using Indian reactionaries to undermine the national democratic movement. . . . The United States uses Nehru, who dons a "non-aligned" garb, to advertise at conferences of non-aligned countries that colonialism is something of the past and that there is no need to oppose it. The United States is trying to obstruct the convening of a second Bandung Conference through India. All these efforts of U.S. imperialism, however, will be futile. The intrigues of Kennedy and his like to use Japanese and Indian reactionaries to hinder the national liberation movement will be swept aside by the surging movement.

**209 "Whence the difference?—a reply to Thorez and other comrades," *People's Daily* editorial, 27 February 1963 (Extracts)**

Thorez and other comrades allege that the differences were brought into the open with "the Chinese Communist Party's publication of the pamphlet *Long Live Leninism!* in all languages in the summer of 1960." But what are the actual facts?

The truth is that the internal difference among the fraternal Parties were first brought into the open, not in the summer of 1960, but on the eve of the Camp David talks in September 1959—on September 9, 1959, to be exact. On that day a socialist country, turning a deaf ear to China's repeated explanations of the true situation and to China's advice, hastily issued a statement on a Sino-Indian border incident through its official news agency. Making no distinction between right and wrong, the statement expressed "regret" over the border clash and in reality condemned China's correct stand. They even said that it was "tragic" and "deplorable." Here is the first instance in

history in which a socialist country, instead of condemning the armed provocations of the reactionaries of a capitalist country, condemned another fraternal socialist country when it was confronted with such armed provocation. The imperialists and reactionaries immediately sensed that there were differences among the socialist countries, and they made venomous use of this erroneous statement to sow dissension. The bourgeois propaganda machines at that time made a great deal of it, saying that the statement was like a "diplomatic rocket launched at China" and that "the language of the statement was to some extent like that of a stern father coldly rebuking a child and telling him to behave himself." . . .

On the Sino-Indian boundary question, Thorez and other comrades have accused China of lacking the "minimum of goodwill" for a settlement of the dispute. This charge is ludicrous.

We have already had occasion to deal at length with the Chinese Government's consistent stand for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue and with the efforts it has exerted in this connection over a number of years. At the moment, the situation on the border has begun to relax, as a result of the serious defeat which the Indian forces sustained in their massive attacks and of the ceasefire and withdrawal which the Chinese forces effected on China's initiative after having fought back successfully in self-defence. The three years and more of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute have furnished conclusive proof that the Chinese Government has been absolutely right in waging a necessary struggle against the reactionary policy of the Nehru Government of India.

The surprising thing is that when a fraternal socialist country was facing the Nehru government's provocations and attacks certain self-styled Marxist-Leninists should abandon the principles of proletarian internationalism and assume a "neutral" stand. In practice, they have not only been giving political support to the anti-China policy of the Nehru government, but have been supplying that government with war material. Instead of condemning these wrong actions, Thorez and other comrades have described them as a "sensible policy." What has happened to your Marxism-Leninism and your proletarian internationalism?

Time and again, Comrade Thorez had denounced China's policy towards India as benefiting imperialism. As early as 1960,

he said that the Chinese Communist Party “gives Eisenhower the opportunity to obtain a welcome in India which he would not have received in other circumstances.” To this day, some French comrades are repeating this charge.

To anybody with political judgment, it is hardly necessary to dwell on the fact that one of the objects of the Nehru government in stirring up conflict on the Sino-Indian border was to serve the needs of U.S. imperialism and secure more U.S. aid. . . .

If the Chinese Communist Party is to blame for the welcome Nehru gave to Eisenhower, who is to blame, we would like to ask Comrade Thorez, for his endeavours to get all the elected communist municipal and general councillors of the Paris region to attend the reception welcoming Eisenhower ? From the class viewpoint of Marxism, no one need be surprised at Nehru’s welcome to Eisenhower, but when a Communist Party leader shows such eagerness to welcome the chieftain of U.S. imperialism and uses such stern language in criticism of comrades for failing to attend the reception, one cannot help being amazed.

These two issues, the Caribbean crisis and the Sino-Indian border question, have once again thoroughly exposed the line and policy followed by those who claim to be “completely correct” and shown them to be contrary to Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement.

### **210 Nehru’s statement in Lok Sabha, 5 March 1963 (Extract)**

It has been stated in Karachi that the difference between the Chinese claim line and the Pakistan claim line was 3,400 square miles. In the final agreement, Pakistan claims to have received 1,350 square miles, including 700 square miles of area which was in China’s possession. The Chinese have been given 2,050 square miles under the agreement.

According to the survey of Pakistan maps, even those published in 1962, about 11,000 square miles of Sinkiang territory formed part of Kashmir. If one goes by these maps, Pakistan has obviously surrendered over 13,000 square miles of territory.

Although, according to the agreement, the parties have agreed to delimit the boundary on the basis of the traditional

customary boundary line, including natural features, the boundary, as agreed to, does not do so. The Pakistan line of actual control, according to the map, which the Government of Pakistan had supplied to our High Commission, lay across the Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab Passes; but, thereafter, the line left the watershed and followed neither the Aghil range, which is the traditional boundary, nor the Karakoram range along which the alignment claimed by the government of China lay.

In fact, the Pakistan line of actual control ran along no definite natural features, but cut across the tributaries of the Shaksgam river and sometimes lay half way up the slopes. It then reached the Karakoram Pass. Running south of the traditional alignment, the Pakistan line of actual control surrounded about 1,600 square miles to China. The difference between the Pakistan and Chinese alignments was about 2,100 square miles.

The agreement claims to be provisional, and yet so much haste has been shown in concluding it. It is significant that it is not subject to ratification. Thus the National Assembly, the Press and the public of Pakistan have not been given and will not be given any opportunity to examine the terms of this agreement.

I have already stated in this House, that we are, naturally anxious to have a settlement with Pakistan, but I cannot help feeling that the joint announcement on December 26, the Pakistan Government's announcement on February 22, to sign the border agreement in Peking, and finally the signing of this agreement have been timed to prejudice the outcome of the joint talks on Kashmir and other related matter.

### **211 Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, 5 March 1963 (Extract)**

You have, in your letter, referred to four areas where there is a dispute about cease-fire arrangements. There is no dispute, so far as the Government of India are concerned, with the Colombo Conference proposals in respect of these four areas. The dispute if any is the one raised by the Government of China with the Colombo Conference proposals. Once these reservations are dropped, the Governments of India and China can undertake direct talks and discussions to settle the cease-fire arrangements for the Thagla Ridge area and Longju in the Eastern sector, the

maintenance of the *status quo* in the Middle sector and the question of establishment of civilian posts of both sides in the demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres in the Western sector as required under the Colombo Conference proposals.

### **212 Chinese note to India, 14 March 1963 (Extracts)**

For more than three months now since the Indian Government threw large number of peaceable and law-abiding Chinese nationals into concentration camps in November 1962, several thousand Chinese nationals have been wilfully maltreated by the Indian Government and placed in the direct straits. The Chinese Government has repeatedly asked the Indian Government to release all the arrested Chinese nationals, supply their number and names and arrange visits by members of the Chinese Embassy.

While diplomatic relations are maintained between China and India, the Chinese Embassy's sending of persons to contact the victimized nationals and compile a list of Chinese nationals wishing to return to China is an indisputable power of the Embassy in carrying out its diplomatic function of affording protection to its nationals. Nobody has the right to obstruct the Embassy from exercising this power or fact in its stead. Moreover, being interned by the Indian Government, the Chinese nationals are in no position to express their wishes freely. Nevertheless, in order to save at the earliest possible date Chinese nationals who have suffered long in Indian concentration camps and prison, the Chinese Government agrees in principle first to ship back in different stages and by groups that number of victimized nationals as provided in the note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs dated March 7, and the first ship for bringing back the nationals will be sent to India within March. This represents yet another major effort by China for a settlement of the question of Chinese nationals. If the Indian Government has the sincerity, it should give due cooperation and facilities. It should :

- (1) Immediately provide a list of all the interned Chinese nationals and arrange for members of the Chinese Embassy to go to the concentration camps and prisons to

register those Chinese nationals who wish to return to China so as to arrange for their transportation home by stages and groups;

- (2) Immediately release all the victimized Chinese nationals arrested by the Indian Government, return to them their property, compensate for their losses, permit them to return to their original places of residence and make it convenient for them to sell their property and wind up their unfinished business;
- (3) Allow the victimized Chinese nationals to bring back to China all their property;
- (4) Simplify departure formalities, be responsible for transporting the returning victimized Chinese nationals to the port of embarkation, guarantee their safety while they are travelling in India and be responsible for their food and lodgings before they leave India;
- (5) Provide due facilities for the port entry and exit of ships sent by China for transporting victimized Chinese nationals and for other relevant affairs of the ships;
- (6) Give due protection and full cooperation to persons sent by the Chinese Embassy to the port for the purpose of assisting in the work of transporting back the Chinese nationals.

The Chinese Embassy asks the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to agree speedily to discuss the above-mentioned matters concretely with the Embassy.

**213 "Air Umbrella and Alliance" *Peking Review* commentary,  
15 March 1963 (Extracts)**

Nehru's cloak of "non-alignment" has worn threadbare. Western military supplies are streaming into India, and in an atmosphere of war hysteria, Right-wing Indian politicians and newspapers are calling for an open alliance with their U.S. and British "brothers."

A subject much talked about in the Indian press is the so-called air umbrella scheme. The proposal came to light with the recent visit of a U.S. British Commonwealth joint military mission. At New Delhi's invitation, it spent 24 days in India, inspecting air force installations and equipment and discussing Western air support with Indian officials. . . .

Nehru himself is still a bit shy of doffing his "non-align-

ment” mantle. He characterized reports of the use of foreign planes and the establishment of foreign bases in India as “exaggerated” but he said : “In the event of a sudden emergency arising, the Government will have to deal with it in the light of developments with support from friendly countries which may become suddenly necessary and available”.

Be that as it may, with U.S. support behind him, Nehru is going the whole hog in arms build-up and war preparations. The Lok Sabha has just been presented with a 1963-64 budget in which military expenditure is roughly double that of fiscal 62-63. The Indian army is being reorganized and expanded. In an interview with the U.S. *Saturday Evening Post*, Nehru declared : “I do not see any real compromise [with the Chinese] . . . . We should be prepared for four or five years of war.” In the Lok Sabha, he announced that in the eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian boundary the Indian Government was proceeding “step by step” to send troops to areas vacated by the Chinese. In the western sector Indian troops had already “moved up” in areas (east of the line of actual control) from which the Chinese had also withdrawn.

#### **214 Indian reply to Chinese note of 14 March 1963, 26 March 1963 (Extracts)**

In their notes dated 31st December 1962, 25th January 1963 and 7th March, 1963, the Government of India had conveyed their willingness to permit Chinese internees and their families, who desire to be repatriated to China, to leave the country.

The reasons for the detention of these internees are well known to the Chinese Embassy. They had been interned purely in the interest of national security following the massive Chinese invasion of India in October-November, 1962. It is particularly regrettable that the Chinese Embassy should ignore these patent facts and continue to make baseless allegations claiming that these internees are being used “as hostages to blackmail the Chinese Government”. On the contrary, it will be clear to everyone that if there is any question of anyone holding hostages, it is the Chinese Government who are still holding as hostages over 3,000 Indians who had been unscrupulously captured on Indian territory during the unwarranted massive attacks

by Chinese forces in October-November 1962.

In their latest note dated 7th March 1963, the Government of India had, after ascertaining the wishes of the internees of Chinese origin, made known the approximate number of internees and their dependants in respect of whom the Chinese side would have to make arrangements for repatriation. In the same note the Government of India had agreed to permit ships sent by the Chinese Government to dock at Madras Port. They also agreed to provide the repatriates with transportation to the port of embarkation as soon as the actual date when the Chinese Government would send ships would be known. The Indian note had requested for details in regard to the ships for onward transmission to the port authorities and had also called for information on the health formalities to be completed by the repatriates. The requisite information on these lines has only been supplied by the Chinese Embassy on March 26, 1963.

The Embassy . . . had unilaterally laid down six points for discussion. Some of the points so raised were completely irrelevant to the issue and had little to do with the concrete formalities involved in the repatriation of Chinese nationals. . . .

India convened a number of meetings with the Charge-d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy. . . to discuss finalisation of the departure procedure for those Chinese internees and their families who had expressed their desire to leave for China. At these meetings, the Chinese side had regrettably taken an obstructive attitude and kept insisting on raising matters quite outside the purview of the discussions. For example, the Chinese side meaninglessly demanded the name-list of all the Chinese internees including the name-list of internees who had clearly expressed their desire to remain in India. Despite the fact that such a request exceeded the terms of reference of the meeting and amounted to a gross interference in the internal sovereign jurisdiction of the Indian Government, the Chinese side kept on repeating its unreasonable demands and refused to discuss concrete details concerning repatriation facilities for internees and their families who had expressed their desire to leave for China. . . .

The Government of India reiterate that they will provide the Chinese side with lists of Chinese internees and their dependants in groups and batches as and when the numbers and their



date of embarkation are communicated by the Chinese Government. This is necessary to secure that each group includes all the dependants of the internees who are sailing in that group. . . .

The Government of India have already indicated to the Chinese side their willingness to extend various facilities for the repatriation of the Chinese internees and their dependants who have expressed a desire to leave for China. These are listed in the attached annexure.

#### *Enclosure*

1. Exit permits will be issued to all the Chinese internees as well as their dependants outside the internment camp to leave India in groups and batches in accordance with departure arrangements as finalised by the Chinese Embassy.

2. Arrangements will be made by the Government of India to transport the internees in the camp to the port of embarkation, namely Madras. In the case of dependants of internees, similar arrangements will be made by the local authorities.

3. Health formalities for the internees will be arranged in the internment camp.

4. Internees and dependants will be permitted to take with them all items of personal luggage in conformity with the rules as laid down by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.

5. Internees will be permitted foreign exchange facilities upto Rs. 650 per family for meeting their immediate needs.

6. All personal property left behind by the repatriated Chinese families may be handed over either to the Custodian appointed for the purpose by the Government of India or a power of attorney could be left behind by the families with a friend or a relative.

7. Necessary port facilities will be made available for the Chinese ships at Madras Port.

8. Facilities will be accorded for two or three Consular officials of the Chinese Embassy to be present at Madras Port at the time of embarkation of repatriates.

#### **215 Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the year 1962-63, March 1963 (Extracts)**

During the year China intensified her aggressive military acti-

vities all along the Indian border. Chinese forces crossed the frontier in the north-west corner of NEFA on 8 September 1962 and after a series of probing attacks mounted on 20 October 1962 a large-scale attack on Indian territory in both the Western and the Eastern Sectors.

Anti-Indian propoganda in the Chinese and Tibetan press reached its peak during the year. This was stepped up towards the last few months in support of the Chinese massive aggression.

Early in 1962 Chinese troops intensified their aggressive forward patrolling in the Western Sector of the India-China boundary. On 30 April 1962 the Government of China repeated their threat that they would order the extension of patrolling along the entire boundary. They also continued to set up a number of new aggressive military posts in the Ladakh region. To eliminate the possibility of military clashes the Government of India once again suggested on 14 May 1962 that, as an interim measure in the Ladakh region, Indian forces should withdraw west of the Chinese claim line as shown on Chinese maps and Chinese forces should withdraw east of the traditional international boundary. This would create the proper atmosphere for peaceful talks on the boundary question between the two Governments. India was further willing to permit the continued use of the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic. This proved India's earnest desire to settle the boundary question.

In their reply dated 2 June 1962, however, the Chinese Government brusquely rejected the offer. . . .

Since October 1962 the Indian Consulates-General in Lhasa and Shanghai had been subjected to a number of additional restrictions. Ever since 1959 the movements of Indian staff there had been restricted and they had been denied any contacts with the local population. They were also not permitted to move beyond the municipal limits of the city. The telegraphic contact with the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa was completely cut off between 9 and 25 October 1962. The telephonic communications of the Consulate-General were also interfered with during this period and outsiders were forbidden to enter the premises of the Consulate-General. Supplies of essential commodities such as milk, eggs and firewood were

stopped.

In view of the restrictions and curbs imposed by the Chinese Government it was finally decided by the Government of India to withdraw the Indian Consulates-General at Shanghai and Lhasa with effect from 15 December 1962 as these Consular Posts were no longer able to perform their normal duties. The Chinese Government were informed of this decision and requested to take similar action in respect of the Chinese Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta. Indian Consulates-General at Lhasa and Shanghai were closed on 15 December and Officers and staff members returned to India thereafter. The Chinese closed their Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta and their officers and staff members left for China.

**216 What kind of stuff is Nehru's much-advertised "Socialism?"**  
*Red Flag commentary, 1 April 1963 (Extracts)*

In 1958, Nehru wrote an article entitled "The Basic Approach for the National Congress Party's journal *Economic Review*. . . .

According to him, "socialism" is some form of "planning," through which to "reduce the many evils of capitalism" without affecting the capitalist relations of production. . . .

According to Marxism-Leninism, planned economy, in the true sense of the term, is possible only when the proletariat has seized power, put an end to the capitalist relations of production, and established the socialist system of public ownership. There can be no economic planning under a bourgeois dictatorship, on the basis of capitalist economy. This unshakable truth has been borne out by practice. . . .

While the "public-operated" sector is financed by the government, the privately-operated sector mainly consists of private enterprise investments controlled by India's big monopoly groups and foreign capital, with government financial assistance. In a country where the rein of power is held by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, such an "economic construction plan" can only be a plan designed to "coordinate" to a certain extent the growth of state monopoly capitalism and that of private monopoly capitalism. . . .

The so-called State-operated enterprises in India had existed in the era of the colonial government long before the declara-

tion of independence. . . .

India's "economic planning" not only benefits a handful of exploiters at the expense of the people, but profits foreign monopoly capital to the detriment of India's national independence.

The Nehru government depends mainly on imperialist "aid" to finance its "economic construction plan" and to develop state monopoly capitalism, in addition to relying on brutal exploitation of the people through internal taxation, the issuance of public bonds, commercial capital and usury. . . .

The proportion of foreign aid in the investments in the "public sector" in India's three "five-year plans" has been steadily increasing. According to the Indian bourgeois economist B.R. Shenoy, 54 percent of the total investment in India's third "five-year plan" will be from foreign aid. . . .

For U.S. aid, the Nehru government has resorted to every means ranging from the launching of a campaign against China and against communism to the provoking of armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border. . . .

Today India is one of the countries which have received the largest amount of U.S. aid. By the end of July 1962, the Nehru government had received over 6,500 million dollars in U.S. aid, more than half of which amount was obtained after it had become more antagonistic to China in 1959. . . .

To beg foreign aid, the Nehru government has been compelled to make one concession after another to foreign monopoly capital. After 1957, such concessions have been even more marked, owing to the drastic fall in foreign exchange reserve to the continuous expansion of fiscal expenditures, and to a period of stagnation in industrial and agricultural production. The policy of nationalization has in fact been abolished. . . .

What is especially worth noting is that the number of enterprises operated jointly by foreign capital and Indian capital (including state and private capital) has rapidly increased. Partnership is an important means by which foreign capital penetrates and controls Indian economy. . . .

Imperialism is after all imperialism. The plundering nature of imperialist capital will never be changed. Wherever its "aid" reaches there will in fact be no real economic sovereignty and independence there. Although, following its declaration of

independence, India has in form broken through the outer political shell of a colony, yet this has not changed its economic content. On the contrary, in keeping with the increase in imperialist "aid," particularly since 1957, India has in fact been further colonialized economically.

Facts have fully proved that the state monopoly capital of a comprador character, which the Nehru government has built up with foreign "aid," and by means of "planning," is not a socialist factor as is claimed by the modern revisionists. Nor is it capable of promoting independent economic development of the nation as is asserted by certain economists. . . .

The Nehru government represents through and through the interests of the reactionary bourgeoisie and big landlords in India and foreign monopoly capital, . . . As regards how the internal and external policies could be produced on such an economic foundation, it is naturally not difficult to reach a judgement. But we are not prepared to discuss this point here.

He [Nehru] slanderously said that communism worshipped violence and destroyed individual freedom. communism "only wants to carry out reform through violence, in fact, through sabotage and destruction. Fascism once had all these evil aspects of violence and large-scale slaughter." In saying this, Nehru obviously vainly attempts to destroy the prestige of the socialist countries. . . .

Nehru's "socialist pattern of society" is nothing but a capitalist society which, while "assimilating" the method of "planning," preserves the basic characteristics of capitalism.

However, the facts cited above clearly show that a capitalism which "assimilates" the method of planning is not socialism as is claimed by Nehru, nor can it pave the way for "peaceful transition" to socialism as is alleged by the modern revisionists.

### **217 Indian note to China, 3 April 1963 (Extract)**

Various constructive steps indicated by the Government of India . . . are reiterated for the consideration of the Government of China :

- (i) The Government of China should accept, without reservations, the Colombo proposals just as the Government of India have done.
- (ii) The acceptance by both sides of the Colombo proposals can be followed up by a meeting of the officials to arrive at settlement of various matters left by the Colombo Powers for direct agreement between the parties and to decide the details regarding implementation of the Colombo proposals on the ground.
- (iii) The officials of both sides concerned can then take action to implement these proposals on the ground so that agreed cease-fire arrangements are established on the ground.
- (iv) Thereafter, in the improved atmosphere, India and China can take up the question of their differences on the boundary question and try to reach a mutually acceptable settlement in one or more than one stage. If a settlement is reached, this can then be implemented in detail on the ground.
- (v) If a settlement is not reached in these direct talks and discussions between the two parties, both sides can consider adoption of further measures to settle the differences peacefully in accordance with international practices followed in such cases. Both India and China can agree to make a reference, on the differences regarding the boundary, to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and agree to abide by the Court's decision. If this method of peaceful settlement is, for any reason, not acceptable to the Government of China, both parties can agree to some sort of international arbitration by a person or a group of persons, nominated in the manner agreed to by both Governments, who can go into the question objectively and impartially and give their award, the award being binding on both Governments. . . .

**218 "Changing India", Article by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1963  
(Extracts)**

China is guilty of premeditated aggression. In 1954 India and China signed a general treaty on Tibet, in the preamble of which both parties pledged themselves to mutual nonaggression and respect for each other's territorial integrity. At that date, China knew precisely what the extent of India's territorial

jurisdiction was; India, on the other hand, was not only not aware of the Chinese claims (they were not disclosed until five years later), but she had no reason even to suspect that there was any major question about the frontier.

All the fighting that has taken place, and the forcible seizure of territory by China, has been to the south and west—that is, on the Indian side—of the frontier as implicitly accepted by China herself in 1954. At no point have Indian troops ever gone beyond that line. The charge of aggression against the People's Republic of China thus holds, regardless of the controversy about the correct delineation of the border. . .

India's northern frontiers are not the result of any British imperialistic expansion, achieved in violation of China's rights or interests, but have their sanction in the facts of geography and history, and the generally accepted principles of international law. . . .

The initiative lies always with the aggressor, and the Chinese have been exceptionally devious and deceptive in their methods. What has happened so far serves to define, more clearly than before, certain considerations which must continue to govern our attitude and policy on this question.

First, it would be wrong and inexpedient, and also repugnant to every sentiment of national honour and self-respect, to acquiesce in aggression, as plainly established as it is in this case. We must, therefore, insist that the aggression be undone to our satisfaction before normal relations can be restored. Whether a peaceful settlement can eventually be reached, therefore, depends largely on China.

Secondly, despite our friendliness, China's behaviour toward us has shown such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behaviour that it has shaken severely our confidence in her good faith. We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with profoundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions.

Thirdly, the Himalayan barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached, the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would lie exposed; and the threat to India would then, likewise, be a threat to the other countries of South and Southeast Asia. India's determination to resist aggression and retain her territorial integrity is, therefore, a vital factor in the

safeguarding of peace and stability throughout this whole area.

This is no doubt appreciated by all the friendly countries whom we have asked for military and other assistance in the present emergency ; and the prompt response that the request evoked, particularly from the United States and Great Britain, has been warmly acknowledged by the Government of India and the leaders of Indian opinion. . . .

The conflict provoked by Chinese aggression raises wider issues than the simple demarcation of a remote border. It is difficult to understand why China chose to conceal her territorial claims for many years, pleading subsequently that “the time was not ripe” for revising her maps ; or why she had to mount large-scale, concerted attacks from one end to the other of the two-thousand-mile-long frontier ; or why she rejects any approach to settlement other than through bilateral negotiations in the context of military force ; or why she has been conducting world-wide anti-Indian propaganda denouncing the whole range of India’s policies and depicting India as a tool of reactionaries and imperialists.

The fact appears to be that China’s anti-Indian policy flows from her general analysis of the international situation, and reflects the aims and assumptions underlying her foreign policy as a whole. This policy itself, while formally subscribing to such ideals as peace and coexistence—though in the special Chinese meaning of these terms—leaves no room for non-alignment. If the world is viewed as divided essentially between imperialists and Communists, between whom war not only is inevitable in the end, but between whom tension in some form must be kept alive and even intensified as opportunity occurs, then there is indeed no place in it for the non-aligned. The non-aligned nations must, in this context, seem to be occupying an unstable, anomalous position from which, if they could be dislodged, either by cajolery or coercion, the result would be to accentuate the polarization of world forces. It is logical to conclude that China’s multiple campaign against India is an exercise in *realpolitik* on these lines. India is such an outstanding member of the nonaligned community that her defection, whether voluntary or enforced, cannot fail to bring grave and far-reaching consequences in its train.



If this analysis is well-founded the challenge from China, as it has revealed itself, is not only to our foreign policy, but to our domestic policy as well. Both are rooted in our needs and interests, and spring from the same cultural outlook and the same scale of moral values. Tolerance friendliness, the protection of the rights and dignity of the individual, peaceful settlement of disputes, the persistent effort to reach agreement through compromise and persuasion—these are the values we have been trying to uphold, imperfectly no doubt, in the conduct of our internal affairs. They represent a way of life, if I may so put it, a way of life that is anathema to the ruling ideologists in Peking, with their faith in power and violence as the instruments of benevolent change. . . .

It is pertinent to note that the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Europe allied to it have not considered it necessary to change their friendly attitude toward India in spite of open Chinese hostility toward us. Indeed, they have continued their aid to India in various ways. This implies a recognition on their part that India and other nonaligned countries have a vital role in the existing balance of forces.

I have endeavored to give, above, some explanation of the basic policy which China appears to be following in regard to India. It may be that this policy is partly affected by the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China. This may have led China to demonstrate, by her attack on India, that non-alignment has no reality and that the Soviet policy toward the non-aligned countries is wrong ; the only right course is to work for a polarization of forces in the world. This might, according to Chinese thinking, justify their ideological differences with the Soviet Union.

Whatever temporary military success the Chinese may have gained by their aggression on India, I think it would be correct to say that they have failed thus far in their main endeavor. Not only have they converted a friendly country like India into one basically hostile to them and united and determined against them, but the policy of nonalignment has not broken down and stands confirmed. China has lost the goodwill of most of the nonaligned countries and even of many of her Communist allies. She stands isolated today.

Ever since the ceasefire and the Colombo proposals, the

immediate excitement of day-to-day fighting on the border has naturally toned down. But it is generally recognised that the menace from China is a continuing one, and we must therefore prepare to meet it, whatever developments might take place in the near future.

**219 Chou En-lai's reply to Nehru's letter of 5 March 1963,  
20 April 1963 (Extracts)**

In your letter, you said that Sino-Indian talks can start only after the Chinese Government has, like the Indian Government, accepted *in toto* the Colombo proposals and the clarifications made by the Ceylonese Prime Minister in New Delhi. I cannot see why you have taken such an attitude which leaves no room for consultation.

Like me, you are aware that the main aim of the Colombo Conference was to promote direct negotiations between China and India for a peaceful settlement of the boundary question; that the task of the conference was to mediate, not arbitrate; and that the conference proposals are merely a recommendation for the consideration of China and India, not a verdict or adjudication which China and India have to accept *in toto*. The Indian Government is, of course, free to accept the Colombo proposals, in part or *in toto*. But I cannot understand why talks cannot start until the Chinese Government, like the Indian Government, has accepted *in toto* the Colombo proposals.

The Colombo Conference did not adopt any document other than the six-point proposals. The clarifications made by the Ceylonese Prime Minister and her colleagues in Peking and New Delhi do not constitute an official document of the Colombo Conference. Therefore, the question of accepting these clarifications as a component of the Colombo proposals does not arise. As it has now been established that the clarifications produced in New Delhi are not even a document prepared by participating nations of the Colombo Conference, it is, all the more, out of the question that they must be accepted. . . .

The Chinese Government is of the opinion that complicated questions involving sovereignty, such as the Sino-Indian boundary question, can be settled only through direct negotia-

tions between the two parties concerned, and absolutely not through any form of arbitration. The Chinese Government has never agreed to refer the Sino-Indian boundary dispute to international arbitration, nor will it ever do so.

**220 Nehru's reply to Chou En-lai's letter of 20 April 1963,  
1 May 1963 (Extracts)**

The Colombo proposals only deal with the question of consolidation of the cease-fire arrangements and not with the merits of the border differences. There can, therefore, be no question of arbitration or adjudication. Paragraph 5 of the Colombo proposals defines their scope and purpose in clear terms :

“The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the cease-fire, *once implemented*, should pave the way for discussion between representatives of both parties”.

The Colombo Conference countries have also categorically stated in para 6 of the proposals that acceptance of the proposals in response to their appeal “will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries”.

The aim, purpose and the scope of the proposals have been stated in a clear straightforward manner by the members of the Conference and do not call for any arguments or polemics.

I regret, Mr. Prime Minister that, on this, as on other matters, the issues are being deliberately confused to find some justification for Chinese intransigence with regard to the Colombo proposals. . . .

You state . . . that “it has now been established that the clarifications produced in New Delhi are not even a document prepared by participating nations of the Colombo Conference”. Having failed to substantiate the baseless allegation that different clarifications were given at Peking and Delhi by the Prime Minister of Ceylon and her colleagues, you are now making yet another unwarranted and baseless statement intended to confuse the main issue that the Government of China has not accepted the Colombo proposals. That your allegation is baseless is clear from the fact that in the Joint Communiqué

issued on the termination of the visit of the Prime Minister of Ceylon and her colleagues His Excellency Mr. Aly Sabri of the U.A.R. and His Excellency Mr. Kofi Asante Ofori-Atta of Ghana, it was clearly stated that “upon the request of the Government of India, *the leaders of the three visiting delegations gave detailed clarifications of the Colombo Conference proposals*”. And again from the fact that the document in which the clarifications were given in detail begins: “Upon request of the Government of India, the following clarifications of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Colombo Conference proposals were *given by the delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana*”.

No amount of casuistry, Mr. Prime Minister, can conceal the fact that the Government of China, while claiming to accept the proposals in principle, has been consistently opposing these proposals by maintaining its so-called reservations. If your concern for a peaceful settlement of the border dispute and for the preservation of Afro-Asian solidarity is genuine, one cannot understand your refusal to accept the proposals made unanimously and in all sincerity by six non-aligned friendly Afro-Asian countries. . . .

I agree that arbitration on the question of sovereignty is a concept that is unacceptable to my Government. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute, however, involves differences on interpretation of treaties, agreements, maps and the factual data relating to exercise of administration in the boundary areas under dispute. These differences are matters which are justiciable and capable of judicial interpretation either by the International Court of Justice at the Hague or by an arbitrator or arbitrators agreed to between our two governments. It is true that on August 7, 1961, I did not consider that arbitration on the Sino-Indian dispute was called for because we were hoping to resolve our differences by talks and discussions and evaluation of the material advanced in support of their claims by both sides. Since then, however, the Government of China has attempted to settle this dispute by force. In this context of force having been actually used, reversion to peaceful procedures requires that we must also agree, in case our differences cannot be settled by direct discussions, to some other peaceful method of resolving these differences so that neither India nor China need resort to force in future for settling this dispute. . . .

At no time have Indian forces violated Chinese frontiers nor have any undue restrictions been placed on the activities of the Chinese Embassy in India. Even on the question of repatriation of Chinese detenués, the Government of India has wholeheartedly co-operated in facilitating the repatriation of those who wanted to go to China. The only point on which the Government of India could not co-operate with the Chinese Government was in respect of the Chinese demand that even those Chinese detenués who wanted to stay in India should be compulsorily repatriated to China.

**221 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 7 May 1963 (Extract)**

Mr. Ali Sabry, President of the Executive Council of the UAR gave us, during his visit, his assessment of Chinese thinking based on his discussions with the Chinese leaders in Peking. We understood from our talks with Mr. Ali Sabry that while the Government of China were not prepared to drop their reservations on the Colombo proposals, and therefore not willing to implement the Colombo proposals, they were prepared to enter into discussions on the major issue of the difference regarding the boundary on the basis of their acceptance of the Colombo proposals in principle. In effect, this means that the Government of China are determined to maintain the unilateral situation on the border that they had created by their aggression and massive attacks and subsequent cease-fire and partial withdrawals from Indian territory and are not prepared to agree to the restoration of the presence of both sides in the demilitarised zone in the western sector as recommended by the Colombo proposals. All that the Government of China seem to be interested in is a negotiated settlement on our border differences on the basis of the altered situation on the border created by them as a result of their aggression.

It is obvious that we cannot enter into any talks and discussions with the Government of China on the major issue of our differences regarding the border till they accept the Colombo proposals without reservations and the recommendations made in the proposals are implemented on the ground. . . .

**222 "Satrap of imperialism," *Peking Review* commentary,  
17 May 1963 (Extracts)**

While publicly insisting on China's acceptance of the Colombo proposals "*in toto*" as their precondition for negotiations, the rulers of New Delhi are conditioning India to serve as a satrap for U.S. imperialism's anti-communist anti-China scheme in Southeast Asia. . . .

The United States and India . . . were working to build the "free world's" first substantial Southeast Asian "wall" against China. . . . The big Indian monopolist G.D. Birla, currently in the United States, . . . publicly called for more U.S. military and economic aid "with full understanding that India is the great citadel against communism in Asia. . ." New Delhi is only using the boundary issue as a fig-leaf to cover up its expansionist ambition . . . To get their dollars from Washington, the self-styled Indian neutralists are willing to act as the U.S. cat's-paw to fight the peoples of Southeast Asia.

**223 *Peking Review* commentary on India, 24 May 1963 (Extract)**

There can be no doubt that both London and Washington are scheming to use India as a pawn against China and the Southeast Asian countries. But in furnishing military aid to New Delhi, both have their own special axes to grind. Washington is as eager to oust traditional British influence as London is determined to retain it. Hence the clash of Anglo-American imperialist interests. *Link*, a weekly Indian journal, shed light on this when it wrote: "The U.K. is said to feel that if U.S. aircraft are supplied to India, it would lose the traditional market. Similarly, Britain would like India to continue use of the weapons now being used which are manufactured in Britain. If new types are introduced, British trade would suffer. But the U.S. would not like to advance credit to India to buy aircraft and weapons of a traditional type from the U.K."

While they mouth niceties about friendship for India, the merchants of death are once more openly tussling for their bloodstained profits.

**224 “A perspective into the ‘Non-Alignment Policy’ Nehru advertised,” article by Lih Tung in *World Culture*, 25 May 1963 (Extracts)**

This political deal between India and the United States finds its most outstanding expression in questions concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Congo. . . .

In March 1961, when many African countries, protesting against U.S. imperialism using the United Nations to interfere in the Congo, announced one after another withdrawal of their troops from the Congo, India nevertheless despatched a force comprising 3,000 men (later increased to 6,000) to the Congo to join the U.S. controlled “UN Forces.” . . .

People need only recall the history of the past few years to discover more and more facts showing how India has colluded with and served U.S. imperialism in the political field.

In December 1959, Nehru extended a warm welcome to Eisenhower on his visit to India, praising him as “holding high the banner of world peace.” . . .

On October 8, 1960, when Nehru visited the United States, he was quoted by the *New York Times* as saying, ‘the political stage of empire is gone.’ On September 2, 1961, at a conference of non-aligned nations, he further said, “the era of traditional colonialism is dead and gone.” He believed that the questions of opposing imperialism and colonialism should be “relegated to the secondary position.” He was not in favour of adopting any “tough declaration” to condemn imperialism and colonialism. In December last year, the Indian Information Service, confusing black with white, said: “In talking about imperialism, if there is today any country which is imperialistic, that country is China.” . . .

Not only has India despatched its troops to the Congo to be the gendarme for the United States, but Nehru himself personally praised Kennedy for “carrying out a new policy,” and described this policy as a “very promising policy.”

In April 1961, when U.S. mercenary troops invaded Cuba, Nehru said: “India cannot judge and is not qualified to judge the international condition of Cuba—as to who is right and who is wrong.” He wanted people to “believe” Kennedy’s verbal “assurances,” and not to “worry about” the “U.S. naval

activities.

In December 1960, when a news correspondent asked Nehru whether the stationing in Laos of a U.S. military delegation constituted a military interference in Laos, he hastily replied : "No, no. Certain things are allowed under the pact." In May 1962, when the United States stepped up its armed interference in Vietnam and sent troops into Thailand, India not only remained silent, but together with Canada, another member on the Vietnam International Control Commission, submitted a report slandering the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for carrying out "subversion and aggression" in South Vietnam, so as to cover up the U.S. activities.

In May 1960, after a U.S. spy plane which invaded the Soviet air space was shot down, the former Minister of Defence Menon said that this incident was given "too much attention." He said : "Such flights are not new, and have been carried out for a very long time."

In August 1961, Nehru arbitrarily said that the "tense situation of Berlin is due to the Soviet announcement that it will conclude with East Germany a peace treaty." In a special statement he emphasized that the "right" of the West to have access to Berlin should not be altered.

In November 1961, Nehru accused the Soviet Union of "adopting a brutal form of action in Hungary." . . .

In 1962, Indian at the Asian Sports Meeting collaborated with the United States in creating the plot of "two Chinas" to destroy Afro-Asian solidarity.

Military collusion with the United States is an important mark of India's open abandonment of "non-alignment" and surrender to U.S. imperialism. Since India launched a large-scale armed attack against China last year, the Indian-U.S. military collusion has been intensified step by step, with U.S. military forces entering India on a full scale. . . .

Driven by the nature of the reactionary class, Nehru himself has sometimes exposed the true face of the policy of "non-alignment." . . .

The reason why the Indian ruling class still wears the cloak of "non-alignment" is that it wants to render still better service to U.S. imperialism, practice deceptions, and create disturbances in Afro-Asian countries in order to subvert Afro-Asian unity



and the anti-imperialist struggle of the people in Africa and Asia.

**225 *People's Daily* editorial, 27 May 1963 (Extract)**

Ignoring the repeated efforts of the Chinese Government, the aspirations of the mass of the Indian people and the mediation of Afro-Asian countries, the Indian Government has adamantly refused direct negotiations. It has increased its military collaboration with the United States and openly offered to serve U.S. global strategy in Southeast Asia, so as to obtain U.S. military aid for a large-scale increase in armaments and war preparation. On the other hand, it has unreasonably demanded complete acceptance by the Chinese Government of the Colombo proposals and the so-called New Delhi "clarifications," invented by the Indian Government as preconditions for direct negotiations, in an attempt to compel the Chinese Government to agree to the unreasonable Indian demand for restoration of the so-called September 8 positions on the border. Recent repeated intrusions by Indian troops along the Sino-Indian border show that the Indian side, ignoring the repeated warnings of the Chinese Government and the appeal of the Colombo Conference, is using every means to create new tension. This cannot but arouse grave concern among all peace-loving countries and peoples.

**226 "Can rumour-mongering save Nehru," Article by Chung Ho-min in *Peking Review*, 14 June 1963 (Extracts)**

Nehru's reactionary policies at home and abroad are getting him nowhere. His policy of piling up armaments for war against China at the expense of the Indian people has met with growing opposition. His stubborn refusal to sit down for talks with China on the border issue has increasingly isolated India among the Asian and African countries.

Now, Nehru pins all his hopes on getting more and more aid from U.S. imperialism. And he has gingered up his anti-China campaign for this purpose. Recently, many high-ranking Indian officials went to Washington to beg for more dollars and military equipment. After two days' talks in Washington,

Indian President Radhakrishnan and U.S. President Kennedy issued a joint communique on June 4, declaring that the two countries "share a mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against the sub-continent." . . .

To convince Washington that the Nehru government is a faithful henchman of U.S. imperialism in its aggressive policy in Southeast Asia, the recent conference of the heads of Indian diplomatic missions in Southeast Asia in which Nehru himself participated, discussed the subject of increased co-operation with U.S. imperialism in pursuing their anti-China policy. AP reported that the conference signified India's "new determination to combat China's influence in Southeast Asia "

Relying more and more on aid from the United States and other imperialist powers, the Nehru government is naturally hostile to the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity for struggle against imperialism. . . .

**227 *People's Daily* commentary on India's attitude on the International Commission in Laos, 16 June 1963 (Extracts)**

In the face of the present serious Laotian situation, one cannot but express indignation at the actions of the Indian and Canadian representatives on the International Commission in Laos. Instead of exposing the illegal activities of US imperialism and its lackeys in Laos, they have, disregarding the opposition of the Polish representative and in the name of the International Commission, repeatedly submitted reports to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, which are deliberate distortions of the present situation in Laos and they have even groundlessly slandered and vilified the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the People's Republic of China. Behind the back of the Polish representative, they one-sidedly sent out a permanent group to the Plain of Jars to aid and abet the US plot of using the International Commission to expand its intervention and aggression in Laos. By serving thus as cat's-paw, the Indian and Canadian representatives have exposed themselves as willing tools of US imperialism in its aggression and intervention in Laos.

US government officials and propaganda agencies have recently time and again praised the Indian representative on the International Commission in Laos, thereby bringing fully to

light their secret collaboration. . . .

The flagrantly partial and irresponsible attitude of the Indian and Canadian representatives on the International Commission in Laos ought to be corrected.

**228 *Peking Review* commentary on use of "Mainland China" by Indian Government, 28 June 1963 (Extract)**

The appearance of the term "mainland China" in a recent Indian diplomatic note to the Chinese Government was no accident. The use of this U.S. imperialist expression designed to provide a cover for Washington's scheme to create "two Chinas" follows from New Delhi's subservience to the Kennedy Administration. This goes hand in hand with the Nehru government's policy of increased collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek gang in Taiwan.

**229 "Indian reactionaries in the anti-China chorus," *Observer's* commentary in *People's Daily*, 16 July 1963 (Extracts)**

Like the imperialists and the Tito group, Nehru's tactics in making use of the Sino-Soviet differences and poisoning Sino-Soviet relations are to laud the Soviet Union and vilify China; to woo the Soviet Union and attack China.

The Indian reactionaries headed by Nehru use the most venomous language in their unending slanders against China and attacks on her, alleging that the Chinese "are a military-minded nation" and are "aggressive in nature" and accusing China of being guilty of "expansionism" and "big-nation chauvinism". They even declared that the United States, the Soviet Union and all other countries in the world cherish peace and China alone is warlike. . . .

The Nehru government thinks that with the support of the Soviet Union, India will be able to continue donning the cloak of "non-alignment", to bluff and play tricks on the international arena, to gain advantage from both sides, to ask for money from both the United States and the Soviet Union and to use Soviet aid to cover up the fact that India is a protege of the United States. Nehru is posing the question everywhere: If India, as alleged, has abandoned its policy of "non-alignment", why

is the Soviet Union helping India ?

The Nehru government thinks that with Soviet support, it will be possible to disrupt the friendly relations between China and the nationalist countries, make wanton, slanderous attacks on China as being everywhere engaged in "communist subversive activities," and being "the most dangerous enemy of Asia," thus to damage the revolutionary image of China in the eyes of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and curtail and weaken the revolutionary influence of China. . . .

There is no reason for thinking that aid rendered by a socialist country to India will change its political orientation. In the case of a joint stock company, for example, he who makes the biggest investment always has the last word. Can the investment of one dollar outweigh that of ten dollars ?

However much the Indian reactionaries slander China as aggressive, warlike, expansionist and having used force of arms to settle the boundary question, they cannot answer this question of the Asian people and the people the world over: If China really is what India alleges, why did the Chinese frontier guards withdraw from the large tracts of territory south of the so-called MacMahon Line ?

The Indian reactionaries think that they can besmirch China by flaunting a "non-aligned" signboard. Facts prove quite the contrary. Through the Sino-Indian conflict the awakened Asian and African peoples have realized still more clearly that there are two kinds of nationalism: one progressive and the other reactionary. Reactionary nationalism is detestable. The Indian reactionaries precisely belong to this category. . . .

**230 "A grave step taken by the Indian Government to menace the peace of Asia," *People's Daily* editorial, 28 July 1963 (Extracts)**

On July 22 India and the United States simultaneously made official announcements that the Indian Government had concluded an "air defence agreement" with the United States. Under the pretext of opposing Chinese air raids, the agreement provides that the U.S. and British air forces will join with the Indian air force in periodic "joint exercises" in India. The United States will provide India with "a set of radar installa-

tions and connected communications equipment which would cover almost the entire northern border of India," and the United States may use these military installations at any time. . . .

The Indian Government's collaboration with the United States is directed not only against China but also against India's other neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto pointed out recently that a heavily armed India would always be a threat, not only to Pakistan but to the whole continent. . . .

One cannot help pointing out that the Indian Government's agreement to hold "joint exercises" in India with the U.S. air force is a new concrete step by U.S. imperialism to get India gradually into its "global strategic system" and to turn that country into a major U.S. aggressive military stronghold. . . . The Indian Government has for a long time not only given active service to U. S. imperialism in its aggressions against Laos and South Viet Nam but has also recently adopted a series of measures to meet the needs of U. S. imperialism. It has built naval and air force bases on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and is preparing to open these bases and the Bay of Bengal to the U. S. navy and air force. The Indian Government has agreed to the establishment by the Voice of America of a powerful relay station in India for Southeast Asia. Now, under the U. S.-India "air defence agreement," the U. S. air force may use Indian air space to spy on China's southwest border areas and threaten the security of China. The U.S. air force may also use its bases in India to step up its aggressive moves in South and Southeast Asia. Obviously this series of actions of the Indian Government in the service of the U. S. policy of aggression has seriously threatened the security of the Southeast Asian countries and the peace of Asia. . . .

The fact is that India has actually formed a political and military alliance with the United States. . . .

To cover up its sordid alliance with U. S. imperialism, the Indian Government has also used its receipt of aid from the Soviet Union as a last resort to retrieve the bankruptcy of its "non-alignment" fraud. . . .

**231 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 16 August 1963  
(Extracts)**

The Chinese, in total disregard of the Colombo proposals, proceeded to implement their so-called declaration of unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal and set up 26 civilian posts in the demilitarized zone in the three sectors, ostensibly "for normal movement of border inhabitants, prevention of the activities of saboteurs and maintenance of public order along the border". Seven of these so-called civilian posts were set up unilaterally in the demilitarised zone in the Western Sector in violation of the Colombo Proposals which laid down that there should be civil posts of both sides in this demilitarised zone. In the demilitarised zone in the Eastern Sector, in which there were to be 16 civilian posts according to the Chinese unilateral declaration, there are today as many as 52 combined military and civil posts and even the pretence of the posts being civilian in character has been given up. There is, a part from these posts, considerable patrolling and probing activity along the borders, particularly in the Eastern Sector. . . .

The Chinese have acted, not only in violation of the Colombo Proposals, but in violation even of their unilateral declaration by establishing a large number of military posts in the demilitarized zone and resorted to offensive patrolling and probing in the border areas.

**232 Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 August 1963 (Extract)**

The Indian Government has become more and more subservient to imperialism and gone a step further in tearing away its garb of "non-alignment," thus incurring ever stronger condemnation by the Indian people and peoples of Asia and Africa. On July 9, India signed an agreement with the United States allowing the latter to use the relay station to be set up in Calcutta for relaying the notorious "Voice of America." On July 22, India announced an "Air Defence Agreement" with the United States and Britain, under which U.S. and British fighters will be accepted for joint exercises with Indian aircraft in India. The so-called Indian "non-alignment" has increasingly become

a laughing-stock.

The Indian reactionaries take the conclusion of the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union and the opposition to it by China and other countries, as a golden opportunity for vilifying China. They think that, by merely concocting a story of Chinese troop concentration along the border and wantonly abusing China, they will be able to divert the attention of the people, ease the domestic crises, mend their cloak of "non-alignment," pass themselves off as peace-lovers and gain fame and wealth from both sides, begging for aims from the Soviet leaders with their left hand and from the U. S. imperialists with their right hand.

**233 "No one can save the Indian reactionaries from their political bankruptcy," *People's Daily* editorial, 22 August 1963 (Extracts)**

The Soviet paper, *Pravda*, has come out into the open in defence of the Indian reactionaries. In two articles published on August 13 and 16, this paper, completely disregarding the facts, attacked the Chinese Government's position on the border conflict with India as one of "maintaining tension in that region and rejecting a speedy settlement of territorial disputes by means of negotiation." It seems that following the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty among the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R., the Soviet leaders are seeking to utilize the lies put out by the Indian rumour mill as the latest evidence that China is bellicose and the "most dangerous of the war forces". . . .

It is reported that the Soviet Government has agreed to increase its military aid to the Indian reactionaries, to ship more weapons of still newer types to the anti-communist and anti-popular Nehru government which has become an advance detachment of U.S. imperialism in its campaign against China. . . .

In September 1959, the Soviet leaders, hoping to please U.S. imperialism and to show the flexibility of their own "destalinization" diplomacy, stepped forward and, as Western circles put it, fired a diplomatic "rocket" at China, at a time when a capi-

talist country was engaging in provocations against a socialist country. That was the Tass News Agency statement, applauded and welcomed by the West. In that statement, the Soviet Government, making no distinction at all between right and wrong, expressed its "regret" over the Sino-Indian border conflict. This Soviet government act which is a betrayal of proletarian internationalism amounted to tipping off the enemy that the socialist camp was not a monolithic whole, and that there were great possibilities for deals between the U. S. imperialist government and the Soviet Government headed by Khrushchov. This betrayal by the Soviet leaders greatly encouraged the insolence of the Indian reactionaries in their campaign against China and supported the stubborn, uncompromising stand which Nehru has always maintained on the Sino-Indian boundary question. . . .

The Soviet leaders not only encourage and support the Indian reactionaries politically. They also speed assistance to them economically and even militarily. . . .

From 1955 to April 1963, the Soviet Government agreed to give Indian 5,000 million rupees in aid, two-thirds of it after India provoked the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959.

During India's massive attack on China in October 1962, the Indian Government used equipment supplied by the Soviet Union. . . .

N.S. Khrushchov, in his report to the December 12, 1962, session of the Supreme Soviet, . . . claimed that the Soviet side "did not think that India wanted to start a war with China".

Even the peaceful measures adopted by the Chinese side on its initiative to cease-fire and withdraw its frontier guards were used in a negative manner by the Soviet leaders to back up the charge that China opposed a settlement of the boundary question through negotiations. . . .

The Soviet leaders present one bouquet after another to the Indian reactionaries. They describe them as "progressive Indian forces", and "a major sector of the peace zone". . . .

The Soviet Union is having a "real competition" with the Western imperialists in providing economic and military aid to India. . . .

What is even more preposterous is that the Soviet leaders have gone so far as to say that China is responsible for the



Indian reactionaries anti-communist, anti-popular policy. . . .

**234 "Behind Nehru's anti-China policy," article by  
Hsu Ching-lin in *Red Flag*, September 1963 (Extracts)**

The slackening at one time and tightening at other time of the shouting about "China's threat" and "Chinese invasion" by Nehru is dependent on the need of his reactionary internal and external policies, and serves as a means to arrive at certain reactionary objectives.

To use this to cover up the policy of selling out the country . . . diverting the attention of the people in the country, easing the strife within ruling circles and internal crisis, and begging for more foreign aid.

Because of Nehru Government's deliberate anti-China policy, inventing the danger of "Chinese invasion", and recklessly engaging in arms expansion and war preparations and raising military budget, India's financial crisis has reached an even more irrecoverable state. . . .

Harassed alternatively by unempolymnt; starvation and heavy taxation, the urban proletariat is virtually leading in inhuman life. . . . What a most miserable picture of the hell on earth ! . . .

This Dange under the signboard of the Communist Party even wanted to oppose and not permit strike of workers in struggle for the right of existence. . . . Despite the suppression by the Nehru government or sabotaging by the revisionist renegades, the worker's struggle for living cannot be checked. . . .

Deep dissatisfaction among India's intelligentsia is also rising. . . .

On account of the squeezing out by domestic monopoly capital and the threat of U.S. capital, coupled with high taxation and high price, India's national bourgeoisie are also showing increasing dissatisfaction. . . .

This Nehru who threw himself into the embrace of U.S. imperialism and served as U.S. aggressive tool in Asia had calculated that by starting a new anti-China wave he could not only divert the people's attention and ease the internal crisis but also could receive more foreign aid with his anti-China

campaign which falls in line with U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism. . . .

Under the anti-China smoke screen, and representing the interest of the big bourgeoisie, big landowners, big compradors and big bureaucrats, the heightened suppression, plunder and oppression of the people and further leaning towards U.S. imperialism by Nehru Government can only further aggravate its economic crisis and political crisis. Though he may pull along for a time, ultimately he cannot escape the final stage of thorough bankruptcy.

### **235 Chinese reply to Indian notes of 3 April 1963 and 6 September 1963, 9 October 1963 (Extract)**

The five steps proposed by the Indian Government consist of no more than the following three points: (1) The Chinese Government must "accept, without reservations, the Colombo proposals" before a meeting of officials can be held to discuss and implement the details of the proposals; (2) only when "these proposals" have been "implemented on the ground" and "in the improved atmosphere" so judged by the Indian Government can the two sides "take up the question of their differences on the boundary question"; and (3) If no agreement is reached between the two sides on the so-called boundary differences, a reference shall be made regarding the boundary differences to international arbitration of one kind or another. Comment on these three points follows. . . .

(1) ...The task of the Colombo Conference was to mediate and not to arbitrate. Its proposals are only a recommendation for the consideration of China and India and not a verdict or arbitral award which China or India must accept *in toto*. Although the Colombo Conference nations expressed the hope that the Colombo proposals would be accepted by both sides, they have never said that direct negotiations can start only when the Colombo proposals have been accepted *in toto*. On the contrary, more than one of them have expressed the view that even if the proposals were only partially accepted it would yet mark a step forward towards bridging the differences between China and India, and that there is no need for China and India to agree to all the Colombo proposals before going to

the Conference table. The Indian Government's insistence that China must accept the Colombo proposals without reservations is in fact an attempt to turn the Colombo proposals into an arbitral award. This attitude of imposing one's will upon others is diametrically against the purpose and objective of the Colombo Conference. . . .

India's so-called acceptance of the Colombo proposals without reservations actually means accepting the Colombo proposals *plus* the clarifications produced in New Delhi, which are in fact the Indian Government's interpretation of the Colombo proposals. There is authoritative proof that the so-called New Delhi clarifications were drafted by the Indian Government and written in its own language as a summary of the discussions in New Delhi, and that the key part of these clarifications, which holds that administration of the demilitarized zone in the western sector by civilian posts of both sides forms "a substantive part of the Colombo Conference proposals" is no comment by the Ceylonese Prime Minister or her colleagues but the Indian Government's own assertion. The Indian Government has done so in order to tamper with the Colombo proposals and make them conform to India's unreasonable demand for the restoration of its fruits of aggression prior to September 8, 1962. . . .

China has put forward its own interpretation, but has not made it a pre-condition to negotiations. China's attitude is reasonable and open and above board. By contrast, India has insisted on disguising its own interpretation as clarifications of the Colombo proposals, and attempted to force it on China under the pretext of acceptance of the Colombo proposals without reservations. This is not only utterly unreasonable, but also quite dishonest.

(2) . . . It cannot escape notice that the Indian Government draws a sharp distinction between negotiations on the boundary question itself and those on the ceasefire arrangements . . . . It holds in effect that Indian-occupied Chinese territory is not negotiable, that the question of Indian-craved Chinese territory is not negotiable either, and that negotiations, if any, must be confined to China's withdrawal or India's entrance. Up to now, one can see no change in this attitude of the Indian Government. In these circumstances, it can be

foreseen that no results will be obtained even though boundary negotiations are held. No wonder the Indian Government is already planning to substitute international arbitration for direct negotiations before there is any sign of boundary negotiations.

(3) . . . .The Sino-Indian boundary dispute is an important issue involving the sovereignty of both countries, and the territory involved totals more than a hundred thousand square kilometres. It goes without saying that this issue can be settled only through direct negotiations between the two parties and absolutely not through any form of international arbitration.

**236 Indian reply to Chinese note of 9 October 1963,  
16 October 1963 (Extracts)**

The Colombo proposals laid down not only that the proposals should be accepted but also laid down that they should be *implemented* before discussions between representatives of India and China *on the main question* of India-China differences can start.

(iii) When the Prime Minister of Ceylon went to Peking to explain the proposals she handed over to the Chinese authorities during the discussions a document entitled "The Principles underlying the proposals of the Six" giving the rationale of the proposals. The Chinese reservations communicated to the Ceylon Prime Minister towards the end of the Peking meeting contravene not only the Colombo proposals as formulated but also the principles underlying the proposals of the Six given in writing by the Ceylon Prime Minister to the Chinese authorities at Peking as can be seen from the following quotation from "The Principles underlying the Proposals of the Six:

"6 (a) On the Eastern Sector, it seems to be clear that, whether the McMahon Line is considered to be an illegal imposition or not, it has in fact become a line of actual control, with the Chinese Government exercising exclusive administrative control to the north of it, and the Indian Government exercising exclusive administrative control to the south of it, except in Che Dong and Longju which are disputed.

(b) for purposes of a cease-fire, the Six considered that this line of actual control would be the most appropriate."

The Chinese reservation that Indian forces should not re-enter areas in the Eastern sector from which the Chinese forces have withdrawn in accordance with their unilateral declaration of ceasefire and withdrawal, is in direct contradiction of the above principles underlying the proposals of the Six given by the Ceylon Prime Minister to the authorities in Peking during her visit.

Again, as regards the Western sector, after stating the facts in para 8, para 9 of the Principles states :

- “9. Bearing these considerations in mind, the six propose as a basis for a ceasefire—
- (a) that Chinese forces should carry out the withdrawal proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai on November 21, 1962 on the Western sector ;
  - (b) that Indian forces should remain where they are *i.e.* on the traditional customary line as claimed by China ;
  - (c) that the area in-between should be demilitarised pending a final settlement of the border dispute ;
  - (d) that the demilitarised zone should be so administered as not to exclude the presence of either India or China as hitherto, pending a final settlement of the border dispute;
  - (e) that pending a final settlement of the border dispute this zone should be so administered as to exclude the presence of military forces of both sides. It is therefore proposed that this zone should be administered by civilian posts to be agreed upon by both sides.”

The Chinese reservation that there should be no Indian civilian posts in the demilitarised zone in the Western sector is directly contrary to the principles stated above in the proposals of the Six.

The Chinese stand on the Colombo proposals and the principles underlying them was taken and the Chinese reservations stated above were made before the Prime Minister of Ceylon and her colleagues came to Delhi. The subsequent visit to Delhi and the clarifications given in Delhi against which China has been fulminating had no connection whatever with the position adopted by China as stated above. The opening sentence of the clarifications given by the representatives of the Colombo powers to the Government of India on 13th January 1963, reads : “Upon request from the Government of India the follow-

ing clarifications of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Colombo Conference Proposals were given by the delegations of Ceylon, the U.A.R. and Ghana.” This was on 13th January 1963. But the Chinese reservations were made in a memorandum dated 6th January and letter dated 8th January given to Mrs. Bandaranaike. It will be seen from this that the clarifications given in Delhi which are quite consistent with the principles underlying the proposals of the Six quoted above have, in any case, no relation to the reservations made by China so many days before the clarifications were even thought of.

If the Chinese reservations on the Colombo proposals are maintained, the resulting position would conform in great degree to just the position that China has tried to force on the Government of India under the Chinese declaration of the so-called unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal dated 21st November 1962. This is obviously what China wants to achieve. Its acceptance of the Colombo Proposals “in principle” is merely a cunning device to distort these proposals to suit its own position. Otherwise there can be no ground for denouncing the proposals as illogical, inequitable, ambiguous, etc., while maintaining the facade of acceptance “in principle”.

The above account makes it clear that it is China and not India who is unreasonable and dishonest and that it is China who is trying to impose its own interpretation of the Colombo proposals on the Colombo countries and on India.

## II

Taking up the question of differences on the boundary question, the Chinese note of 9th October makes a grievance of the fact that the Indian Government draws a distinction between negotiations on the boundary question itself and those on the cease-fire arrangements. This distinction has been made not only by India but by the Colombo Conference countries themselves in formulating the Colombo proposals. The following quotation from the principles underlying the proposals of the Six refers to this point :

“1. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute must be settled by peaceful negotiations between China and India. The

- object of the Six is to create an atmosphere which would enable China and India to enter upon negotiations with dignity and self-respect.
2. The proposals of the Six are intended to create such an atmosphere.
  3. In considering the proposals made by them, the Six welcomed the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal made by China on November 21, 1962.
  4. In the formulation of these proposals, the Six paid particular attention to the following principles :—
    - (a) neither side should be in a position to derive benefit from military operations ;
    - (b) a stable cease-fire *must precede* any attempt at negotiations between China and India ;
    - (c) any cease-fire arrangements must be without prejudice to the boundary claims of either party.’’

Also, the Colombo proposals themselves contain the following :

“The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the ceasefire, *once implemented, should pave the way for discussions* between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the cease-fire position.”

The Chinese note of 9th October questions the Indian Government's statement that there must be an appropriate atmosphere before boundary negotiations can start and goes on to say that there is a shroud of mystery over what is meant by appropriate atmosphere. The Chinese Government should know the above views of the Colombo Conference countries which were communicated to it. It should also know that the crisis of confidence created by its massive attack on India in which 3,942 persons were taken prisoner, 2,300 were killed, 770 are still missing and which has enabled China to continue to be in a forcible occupation of 15,000 square miles of Indian territory, cannot be wished away by mere words. This crisis has to be resolved as recommended by the Colombo Conference countries by bilateral ceasefire arrangement arrived at on the basis of these proposals, before the substantive question of India-China differences regarding the border can be discussed.

The Colombo proposals and the principles underlying the proposals of the Six handed over to Chinese authorities at

Peking by the Ceylon Prime Minister refer to the need for a proper atmosphere. This is no invention of India. . . . The rejection by China in advance and in absolute terms of the internationally accepted practice of settling by arbitration differences between nations which cannot be resolved bilaterally, leaves only one of the two alternatives; acceptance of Chinese dictates backed by military force, or continuance of the conflict. No independent country can, consistently with its honour and dignity, accept dictates backed by military force. China has tried to impose its will on the Colombo Conference countries by refusing to accept the Colombo proposals and the principles underlying the recommendations of the Six. It is at the same time attempting to force India to accept a settlement on Chinese terms, equivocation, duplicity and military forces being used by turns to get its own way. These attempts are bound to fail.

**237 Chinese protest against an Indian M P.'s visit to Taiwan,  
31 October 1963 (Extracts)**

The notorious Indian reactionary politician M.R. Masani, General Secretary of the Swatantra Party of India . . . is a member of the Indian Lok Sabha, his trip to Taiwan and all his scheming activities there were carried out with the connivance of the Indian Government. The Indian Government cannot shirk its responsibility for all this. This is another proof of the Indian Government serving the United States in the latter's plot to create 'two Chinas.' The Chinese Government hereby lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government in this connection and asks it to make an unequivocal reply with regard to Masani's political activities in Taiwan against the People's Republic of China.

**238 "The truth about how the leaders of the C.P.S.U. have allied themselves with India against China," article by the Editorial Department of *People's Daily*, 8 November 1963 (Extracts)**

One of the important differences of principle between the Soviet leaders and ourselves turns on the Sino-Indian boundary question. We would have preferred to be reticent about the origin



and development of the difference between China and the Soviet Union on this question. But the Soviet leaders have now brought it into the open...It has, therefore, become necessary to show how our difference with the Soviet leaders on this question has developed over the last few years so as to distinguish between truth and falsehood.

1. The Indian reactionaries provoked the first armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border on August 25, 1959, after their failure in the armed rebellion of the reactionary clique of the Tibetan upper strata, which they instigated and abetted. On September 6, 1959, a Chinese leader told the Soviet Charge d'Affaires the facts about the conflict and the Chinese policy of striving to avoid hostilities. He also pointed out that the Indian Government's purpose in provoking the border conflict was to oppose communism and China; that, as was to be logically expected, the Indian bourgeoisie had become increasingly reactionary with the sharpening of the internal class struggle; and that it was necessary not to be taken in by Nehru who was striving to put pressure on China by utilizing the Soviet Union.

2. On the morning of September 9, 1959, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires notified the Chinese Government that the Soviet Government would issue a TASS statement concerning the Sino-Indian boundary question on September 10 and delivered a copy of this statement. The Chinese Government immediately intimated in principle that it would be better for the Soviet Government to refrain from making a public statement on this question.

3. Ignoring China's advice, the Soviet Government issued the TASS statement ahead of time on the night of September 9, 1959, thus revealing the differences between China and the Soviet Union. In that statement, without distinguishing between right and wrong, the Soviet Government expressed general "regret" over the Sino-Indian border conflict and although assuming a facade of neutrality, actually favoured India and condemned China.

4. On September 30, 1959, Comrade Khrushchov publicly blamed China for wanting to "test by force the stability of the capitalist system." The whole world recognized this as an insinuation that China was being "bellicose" regarding Taiwan and the Sino-Indian boundary.

5. On October 2, 1959, the Chinese leaders personally gave Comrade Khrushchov explanation of the true situation and background concerning the Sino-Indian border hostilities, pointing out that it was India that had provoked conflict across the border and that it would not do to yield to the Indian reactionaries all the time. But Khrushchov did not wish to know the true situation and the identity of the party committing the provocation, but insisted that anyway it was wrong to shoot people dead.

6. The Indian reactionaries provoked the second armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border on October 21, 1959, on October 26, the Chinese Government informed the Soviet Charged' Affaires of the facts of the incident.

7. At a session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on October 31, 1959, Khrushchov again expressed "regret" and "distress" over the Sino-Indian border conflict and brushed aside India's responsibility for the provocation.

8. Receiving a correspondent of the Indian weekly, *New Age* on November 7, 1959, Khrushchov said that the Sino-Indian border incident was "sad" and "stupid." He cited the case of the settlement of the Soviet-Iranian boundary question and said, "What are a few kilometres for a country like the Soviet Union?" insinuating that China should cede her own territory to satisfy India's claims.

9. Between December 10, 1959, and January 30, 1960, the Chinese leaders had six talks with the Soviet Ambassador. They pointed out that the Soviet leaders were wrong to "maintain strict neutrality" on the Sino-Indian boundary question and that, far from being neutral, their statements actually censured China and were in favour of India.

10. In a verbal notification to the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on February 6, 1960, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. stated that "one cannot possibly seriously think that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it," that China's handling of the question was "an expression of a narrow nationalist attitude" and that "when shooting was heard on the Sino-Indian border on the eve of N.S. Khrushchov's trip to the United States, the whole world considered this to be an event

that could hamper the peace-loving activity of the Soviet Union.”

11. On June 22, 1960, Khrushchov said to the head of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party during the Bucharest meeting. “I know what war is. Since Indians were killed, this meant that China attacked India.” He also said, “We are Communists, for us it is not important where the frontier line runs.”

12. On October 8, 1962, a Chinese leader told the Soviet Ambassador that China had information that India was about to launch a massive attack along the Sino-Indian border and that should India attack we would resolutely defend ourselves. He also pointed out that the fact that Soviet-made helicopters and transport planes were being used by Indian for airdropping and transporting military supplies in the Sino-Indian border areas was making a bad impression on our frontier guards and that we deemed it our internationalist duty to inform the Soviet side of the situation.

13. On October 13 and 14, 1962, Khrushchov told the Chinese Ambassador the following: Their information on Indian preparations to attack China was similar to China’s. If they were in China’s position, they would have taken the same measures. A neutral attitude on the Sino-Indian boundary question was impossible. If anyone attacked China and they said they were neutral, it would be an act of betrayal.

14. On October 20, 1962, the Indian reactionaries launched a massive attack on China. On October 25, *Pravda* carried an editorial pointing out that the notorious McMahon Line was imposed on the Chinese and Indian peoples and had never been recognized by China. It said that the three proposals put forward by the Chinese Government in its statement of October 24 were constructive and constituted an acceptable basis for opening negotiations and settling the dispute between China and India peacefully.

15. On December 12, 1962, forgetting everything he had said less than two months earlier, Khrushchov reverted to his original tune and made the following insinuations at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.: The areas disputed by China and India were sparsely populated and of little value to human life. The Soviet Union could not possibly entertain the

thought that India wanted to start a war with China. . . .

16. By publishing the article of the *Pravda* Editorial Board on September 19, 1963, the Soviet leaders discarded all camouflage and openly sided with the U.S. imperialists in supporting the Indian reactionaries against socialist China. . . .

The leaders of the C.P.S U. have persisted in their attitude of great-power chauvinism, acted arrogantly and turned a deaf ear to China's opinions. They brought the Sino-Soviet differences into the open in order to create the so-called Camp David spirit and make a ceremonial gift to the U.S. imperialists. During the Caribbean crisis, they spoke a few seemingly fair words out of considerations of expediency. But when the crisis was over, they went back on their words. They have sided with the Indian reactionaries against China all the time. As facts show, the stand taken by the leaders of the C.P.S.U. on the Sino-Indian boundary question is a complete betrayal of proletarian internationalism. . . .

From 1955 to April 1963, the Soviet Government gave or promised economic aid to India totalling 5,000 million rupees, the larger part being offered since the Indian reactionaries began their campaign against China.

It was in 1960, that is, after the Indian reactionaries had started their armed provocations against China, that the Soviet leaders began to supply India with military aid.

After the Indian reactionaries unleashed a large-scale assault on China in October 1962, the Soviet leaders stepped up their aid to India. On December 19 of the last year, C. Subramaniam, Indian Minister of Steel and Heavy Industries, told correspondents that, after India's proclamation of "emergency," the Soviet Union accelerated the construction work on projects she was helping India on.

Following the talks between the Chinese and Soviet Parties in July of this year, the Soviet leaders promised to increase their military aid to the Indian reactionaries. . . .

Let us look at the events of the past year. The Indian Government has concluded agreements for military aid and "air defence" with US imperialism, both of which are in the nature of military treaties. Large number's of U.S. military personnel and large quantities of U.S. weapons and military equipment have poured into India. The Indian Government has undertaken

to provide the United States with more military intelligence and has agreed to the holding of air exercises by the U.S. and British imperialists in India. Radhakrishnan, the President of India, issued a joint communique with U.S. President Kennedy on June 4, 1963, openly declaring that the United States and India agreed that "their two countries share a mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against the sub-continent." Thus, it is clear to any unbiased person that the Nehru Government has virtually formed a military alliance with the United States, that India's "non-alignment" policy has very little practical significance left and that India has long ceased to be one of the countries "taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming, together with the socialist countries, a broad peace zone," as described by the 1957 Moscow Declaration. It is only because of the Soviet leaders' support and assistance that the Nehru Government can still make demagogic use of its tattered flag of "non-alignment" before the world. Such support and assistance make it possible for the Nehru government brazenly to become a retainer of U.S. imperialism in disregard of the Indian people's opposition. . . .

With the increase in Soviet aid, the Indian reactionaries have become more and more frantic in their exploitation and suppression of the Indian people. . . . The Nehru government has completely discarded its counterfeit democratic and progressive signboards. It is pursuing an out-and-out anti-communist and anti-popular policy. . . .

The 1960 Moscow Statement says that the national bourgeoisie in the newly independent countries has a dual character and that, as social contradictions grow, it inclines more and more to compromise with domestic reaction and imperialism. Communists in newly independent countries should expose the attempts of the reactionary section of the bourgeoisie to represent its selfish, narrow class interests as those of the entire nation. But so far from exposing the Nehru government's reactionary policy, the renegade Dange clique of the Indian Communist Party has completely betrayed the proletariat and the people of India and has degenerated into a shameful tool of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords. Instead of exposing the Dange clique of renegades, the Soviet leaders encourage them to help the Indian reactionaries persecute the true Communists and

progressives in an attempt to strangle the revolutionary movement of the Indian people. . . .

In international mass organisations, the Soviet leaders forbid activities against imperialism while instigating activities against China, and try to break up the anti-imperialist united front by exploiting the Sino-Indian boundary question. . . .

**239 "Soviet shot in the arm," *Peking Review* commentary,  
8 November 1963 (Extract)**

New Delhi's current military build-up has its backers in Moscow as well as in Washington. Side by the side with the U.S.-U.K.-India "Joint air exercise" this week, work is in full swing on the Soviet-designed MiG plants at Korapur and Nasik so that they can be in production by 1965. Indian pilots to man these locally made supersonic MiG-21s are being trained with Soviet help.

Moscow is now quietly furnishing New Delhi with such military hardware as tanks, artillery, helicopters, air transports, radar installations, ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles as well as the MIGs. After the recent return of an official Indian mission from Moscow, the New Delhi papers proclaimed their satisfaction at the favourable terms on which these weapons were being supplied. Payment is to be made in rupees. And the Nehru government, they reported, was given "a free hand" to use such equipment as it pleases.

The increased flow of Soviet arms to India is closely linked with the latter's anti-China campaign.

**240 Observer's commentary in *People's Daily* denouncing US-  
Indian collusion against China, 11 November 1963 (Extracts)**

The U.S.-U.K.-India joint air exercises which began on Saturday near the Sino-Indian border region "is a serious step taken by India in collaboration with the United States to threaten China with force." . . .

"The joint air exercises mark a new stage in the U.S.-Indian collusion against China, and also in the development of the Indian Government's treacherous line of selling itself out to U.S. imperialism. Through the joint exercises, the Indian

Government has actually proclaimed from the house-tops its military alliance with U.S. imperialism casting aside all pretences of 'non-alignment'." . . .

"While the Indian Government intends to realize its big-nation chauvinist, expansionist designs against China and the Southeast Asian nations depending upon U.S. military force, U.S. imperialism seeks to tighten its grip over India and turn it into an instrument of aggression in its scheme of 'global strategy'." . . .

**241 *Peking Review* commentary on US-Indian joint air exercise, 15 November 1963 (Extract)**

The joint air exercise is clearly directed against China. This neither New Delhi nor Washington bothers to hide. But it is also a fact that the harnessing of India to the American war chariot and the joining of Indian big-nation expansionist ambitions to U.S. imperialist designs pose a threat to South and Southeast Asia. The sharp reaction of the press in Pakistan, Burma and other countries in this region shows that the people there are aware of this.

**242 *Peking Review* commentary on India's increasing military cooperation with the United States, 27 December 1963 (Extracts)**

Despite all they did to prepare the way for sending the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean, the Pentagon brasshats must now realize that they underestimated the opposition that the news would arouse. If they have achieved anything at all, they have further exposed U.S. designs in Asia and exploded the myth of Nehru's non-alignment policy. India's collaboration with the U.S. Government has roused a hornets' nest because this expansionist move goes against the interests of all the peoples in Asia.

Pakistan, India's neighbour which has good reason to feel concerned about New Delhi's increasing military co-operation with Washington in Asia, is particularly alarmed by the part India is playing in this latest manoeuvre of U.S. imperialism. . . .

Burma, India's neighbour to the east, adds its voice of con-

demnation. . . .

There have been similar reactions from other neighbours. Nepal to the north and Ceylon to the south have both criticized India for ganging up with the United States against the interests of the Asian peoples.

### **243 Indian note to China, 13 January 1964 (Extract)**

Indian traders had been engaged in trade with Tibet for the last several decades and most of the transactions had been on a credit or barter basis. However, since 1959, the Chinese Government's attitude towards Indo-Tibetan trade had hardened to such an extent that, despite the continuing validity of the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Indian and the Tibet Region of China, it became virtually impossible for Indian traders to carry on their customary trade. Many of the former Tibetan associates of Indian traders were also put under arrest and their properties confiscated by the Chinese authorities on various pretexts and several others moved from western Tibet to Shigatse and Lhasa, and these towns declared as "out of bounds" for Indian traders. This was obviously done with the deliberate intention of denying to Indian traders their normal commercial contacts, as well as to place obstructions in the way of their recovering their dues from the Tibetan traders concerned. The local Chinese authorities even went to the extent of encouraging Tibetan traders not to repay their debts to the Indian traders. To harass the Indian traders further, the Chinese Government put a stop to the barter trade and introduced so-called "currency reforms", to hasten an end to the traditional pattern of trade between India and Tibet. The above unscrupulous and arbitrary measures of the Chinese Government, which have been detailed in the Indian Government's notes dated the 17th May 1960, 16th November 1961 and 17th July 1962, inevitably resulted in Indian traders leaving behind large assets in Tibet.

In the face of the above facts it is absurd for the Chinese Government to still assert as they have done in their note under reference [23 November 1963] that they have always actively striven to promote trade between Tibet and India and that they have faithfully abided by the 1954 Sino-Indian



Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India. The Chinese note has also had the temerity to describe the Government of India's reasonable request that equitable compensation should be paid to the Indian traders in respect of all property, moveable and immoveable, left behind by them in Tibet due to causes beyond their control, as "a completely unwarranted demand". Such a stand is completely contradictory to all canons of international law and Conventions accepted by civilised Governments.

**244 Statement by Indian representative M.C. Chagla in the UN Security Council, 5 February 1964 (Extract)**

India today is perhaps the only country which can stand up to Chinese expansion and aggression. If India failed, there would be nothing to control the Chinese forward policy. It is therefore not only in the interest of India itself, but also in the interest of peace, that India should be strong. We are very grateful for the aid that we have received from friendly countries.

**245 "Struggle of the CPSU for the solidarity of the World Communist movement," speech by M.A. Suslov at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, 14 February 1964 (Extract)**

It is a fact that when the Caribbean crisis was at its height the PRC Government extended the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian frontier. No matter how the Chinese leaders try belatedly to justify their behaviour at that moment they cannot escape the responsibility of the fact that by their actions they essentially helped the extreme reactionary circles of imperialism, thereby aggravating an already complicated and dangerous situation in the world.

The Sino-Indian conflict arose over the possession of frontier territories in the Himalayas which had not been disputed either by China or India in the course of many centuries. However, inasmuch as this problem arose, everything should have been done to settle it peacefully, by negotiation. The Government of the USSR has repeatedly advocated such a settlement of this frontier dispute. Hostilities broke out in the

region of the Himalayas. The pernicious consequences of this conflict have now manifested themselves fully. It has rendered a great service to imperialism and inflicted grave harm to the national liberation movement, the progressive forces of India and the entire front of the anti-imperialist struggle. Utilising the Sino-Indian conflict for their own purposes, the imperialists and their supporters are seeking to undermine the trust of the peoples of the young national states in the socialist countries, draw India into military blocs and strengthen the positions of extreme reaction in that country.

While allowing relations with India, which as everybody knows is not a member of military blocs, to deteriorate sharply, the Chinese leadership at the same time actually leagued together with Pakistan, a member of SEATO and CENTO, which are threatening the peace and security of the Asian peoples. It is a fact that having discarded their "revolutionary phrase-mongering", the Chinese leaders have in reality adopted a line that can hardly be dovetailed with the principled position of the countries of the socialist commonwealth with regard to imperialist blocs.

**246 Statement by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister without Portfolio, in the debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, 19 February 1964 (Extract)**

India will always like to avoid any kind of conflagration, any kind of step which would lead to a major conflict. Therefore, I say that the door for discussion and negotiations should never be closed. But no one in this country, and especially those in power, can conceive of any kind of negotiations or discussions which will not be in consonance with the dignity and honour of our country.

**247 Lal Bahadur Shastri's statement in the debate in Rajya Sabha on Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1964 (Extract)**

There is a stalemate there at present . . . the Colombo Proposals are still hanging in the balance, and nothing has happened so far. . . .

China has negated the proposals in action. We still feel

that if the Colombo Proposals are accepted, India would be willing to take further steps in the terms of her discussion with the Colombo powers who had come here.

**248 Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 29 February 1964 (Extract)**

When the Indian reactionaries attack socialist China, should proletarian internationalism be observed and the Indian reactionaries' provocations be denounced, or should they be helped with arms to fight the brothers of the Soviet people ?

**249 Opening speech by Swaran Singh, Indian Minister for Food and Agriculture, at the Preparatory Meeting of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, 10 April 1964 (Extract)**

We would like to welcome as a full participant among us at the main conference the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a great part of which country lies in the continent of Asia. Soviet Union is already a member of various Afro-Asian organisations at the peoples level, such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation, the Afro-Asian Films Festival, the Afro-Asian Workers' Conference, the Afro-Asian Games and so on. We are confident that the Soviet Union will make a worthy contribution to all that we are striving for. The proposed expansion of our membership would make the second Afro-Asian conference the largest and the most unique regional gathering in history.

**250 Statement by Vice-Premier Chen Yi at the Preparatory Meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference held in Jakarta, 10-15 April 1964 (Summary)**

The Indian delegation at the meeting proposed to invite the Soviet Union to the Second Asian-African Conference. This proposal was improper because the Soviet Union was not an Asian or African country. Acting in the spirit of seeking common ground and leaving aside differences and on the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation, the meeting turned down this proposal. In pursuance of the same

spirit and principle the meeting also correctly handled the question, also raised by the Indian delegation, of inviting "Malaysia" to participate in the Second Asian-African Conference. "All this demonstrates the irresistible, common will of the Asian and African peoples to unite against imperialism, to seek common ground and leave aside their differences and their earnest hope to make the Second Asian-African Conference a success."

**251 Nehru's press conference in New Delhi, 22 May 1964**  
(Extract)

*Question:* In regard to China, you recently stated that if there are no posts in the demilitarized zone, you are prepared to have talks with them. In what way does it differ from the previous stand that unless China accepts the Colombo proposals in full, India will not enter into negotiations?

*The Prime Minister:* The point is one of interpretation of the Colombo proposal. There could be an agreement on there being no posts on either side.

**252 "India aids U.S. 'two China's' plot," *Peking Review***  
commentary, 3 July 1964 (Extracts)

The Indian Government had deliberately taken a step to worsen Sino-Indian relations by acting as a tool in the U.S. imperialists' "two Chinas" plot.

A ten-member delegation of Indian M.P.'s, including a member of the Indian National Congress, the ruling party, went on a week's visit to China's province of Taiwan between June 18 and 24. It met Chiang Kai-shek and political, economic and military members of his gang. D.V. Patel, head of the delegation, openly called the gang's hide-out "free China" and asserted that "the Republic of China" and India share the same aim. . . .

This is not the first time that the Indian Government, in an attempt to push ahead its anti-China policy, has actively served the U.S. imperialists' "two Chinas" scheme.

**253 "Non-alignment today," article by Deputy Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh in *Indian and Foreign Review*, 1 September 1964 (Extract)**

China today accepts neither non-alignment nor peaceful co-existence. Her aggression on India is an obvious example of her desire to discredit non-alignment and to force the countries of Asia to come to terms with her. It is, however, heartening to note that despite her associations China has not been able to drag USSR on her side in this dispute. Both USA and USSR are aware of the risks China is taking to assert her supremacy in the world. The Chinese gamble can be disastrous. At a time when the major power blocs have begun to appreciate the role of non-alignment in lessening world tension and in finding a way towards the establishment of peace, China has chosen to destroy non-alignment.

When the 55 or so countries meet at Cairo later in the year, the problems they will have to study will include not only those created by the former power blocs, which are now showing signs of rapprochement, but also the problems that are being created by their, disintegration and above all the new threat that is being posed by China.

**254 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Lok Sabha, 25 September 1964 (Extracts)**

There has been no abatement of China's negative and intransigent attitude towards the Colombo proposals and her hostility and propaganda against us. . . .

The House is aware that there has been some correspondence between the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and India on the question of withdrawal of Chinese posts in the demilitarised area in Ladakh. Our stand on this question is clear and unambiguous. We have said that we are willing to regard the vacation of the seven Chinese posts in this area, should China undertake it, to be substantial compliance with the conditions set forth in the Colombo proposals. If China agrees to this we are willing to enter into negotiations with China in the manner envisaged in the Colombo proposals. We have thus gone to the farthest limit possible within the ambit of the Colombo

proposals in order to enable negotiations to take place between the two countries.

The ball is now in China's court. China has to make up her mind and say whether she is agreeable to removing her posts in the demilitarised area in Ladakh. . . .

The officially-controlled press in China has taken the stand that it is China's internal affairs to set up civilian posts, and that no one can ask China to withdraw the posts from what they call China's own territory. The House is, of course, aware that what China calls its own territory is the 20 km. demilitarised area, which was seized by China during its massive military operations in the autumn of 1962. It is part of the 14,500 sq. miles of Indian territory illegally occupied by China. It was from this very same 20 km. belt that the Colombo Conference had asked China to withdraw its troops. . . .

In consonance with our policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, we are in favour of settling all differences by peaceful negotiations. It is for this reason that we accepted the Colombo proposals though they were not entirely to our liking, and we further accepted its slight modification which was suggested in Mrs. Bandaranaike's letter, namely that instead of an equal number of Indian and Chinese posts in the demilitarised area, the Chinese should remove their seven posts. But we shall not go to the conference table on Chinese terms and we shall never give up our rights in territory which was illegally and by force occupied by China. It is for China to give evidence of her sincerity to seek a settlement which she has singularly failed to do so far.

### **255 Statement by Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri at the Conference of Non-aligned Nations, Cairo, 7 October 1964 (Extracts)**

Many of those assembled here might recall how strongly the first Non-Aligned Nations' Conference at Belgrade felt on the subject of nuclear tests and how separate missions were sent to the USA and to the USSR to persuade them to desist from further tests. With this background in mind this conference should consider the recent disturbing indications which suggest that China is about to explode a nuclear device. I would

propose that we might consider sending a special mission to persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons. I say this not because India and China have their differences today. These differences must sooner or later be resolved. But the threat to humanity from one more country having nuclear weapons at its disposal is a far more serious matter. We in India stand committed to the use of nuclear power only for peaceful purposes and, even though in purely technical and scientific sense, we have capability of developing nuclear weapons, our scientists and technicians are under firm orders not to make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for peaceful uses of atomic energy. Despite all our differences, may I venture to take this opportunity of appealing through this conference to China to accept a similar discipline. . . .

On our own northern borders, despite our acceptance of the proposals made by the Non-Aligned Powers assembled at Colombo, we have been unable to get friendly response from China. But we must continue to strive for peace, to resolve all differences through peaceful methods by conciliation as distinct from confrontation, and by trust instead of suspicion. . . .

While we have been moving steadily in the direction of the universality of membership—a major exception is China, which is still not a member. Although we have our differences with China, we have always supported and still support her admission to the United Nations.

### **256 Statement of the Chinese Government on the Sino-Indian border question, 9 October 1964 (Extracts)**

As for India's demand for China's withdrawal from the seven civilian posts as a precondition for negotiations, it is utterly unreasonable. The land on which these civilian posts are situated has always been Chinese territory under effective jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, and no Indian troops have ever been there. What right has India to ask China to withdraw? China will not withdraw from any of the seven civilian posts. On the contrary, China has every right to ask India to withdraw from the more than 90,000 square kilometres of China's territory south of the illegal McMahon Line. How-

ever, in order to seek a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations, China has up to now not raised such a demand as a precondition for negotiations.

The Chinese Government always welcomes the efforts at impartial mediation on the part of the Colombo Conference nations in promoting direct negotiations between China and India without involving themselves in the dispute. And the Chinese Government has no objection to any new consultations by the Colombo Conference nations to this end. But as is well-known the consent of both interested parties must be obtained before there can be effective mediation. And any proposal put forward by the mediators can only be a recommendation for the consideration of both sides and must in no case be an arbitral award to be imposed on either side. At present, exploiting the opportunity of his participation in the Conference of non-aligned countries in Cairo, the Indian Prime Minister is making distortions and slanders about China over the Sino-Indian boundary question, and is doing his utmost to make use of the Colombo Conference nations to bring pressure to bear upon China. Moreover, the Indian Prime Minister is in Cairo while the Chinese Premier is not. The Chinese Government holds that in these circumstances to motivate consultations among the Colombo Conference nations behind China's back is unfair and therefore the Chinese Government cannot agree. Such consultations not only cannot be of any help to the promotion of direct Sino-Indian negotiations, but will place more obstacles in their way, making it more difficult for the six Colombo Conference nations to conduct mediation in future. Any substantive discussion about the Sino-Indian boundary question must be held with China present. Any mediation or any proposal made without the agreement and not in the presence of China will be unacceptable to the Chinese Government. . . .

China will never submit to any international pressure. In continuously calling for the acceptance of the Colombo proposals *in toto*, China's withdrawal from the seven civilian posts, etc., the Indian Government aims solely at opposing China, so as to divert the attention of the people at home, seek US and Soviet military aid, and pursue its policy of double alignment under the cover of non-alignment. This practice of the Indian leaders is



being seen by more and more countries. The Sino-Indian border situation has on the whole eased. China does not feel threatened by India which has gained large quantities of foreign aid, it is the other neighbours of India that are really being threatened. The Chinese Government hereby declares once again that if the Indian Government really wishes to hold negotiations, the Chinese Government is ready to start them with the Indian Government at any time and at any place with the Colombo proposals as a basis. Otherwise, mere talk about reconciliation will be of no avail.

**257 "Sheep's head and dog's meat," *Peking Review*  
commentary on India's policy of "double alignment,"  
16 October 1964 (Extracts)**

Fighting Washington's battle in the Cairo University auditorium, the Indian Prime Minister, instead of saying something about opposing imperialism, the common enemy of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which was the dominant theme at the conference, tried to turn the discussion in another direction. He advocated a brand of "peaceful coexistence" which would in effect vitiate the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. He brought out the shop-worn proposals for "nuclear disarmament" and "settlement of border disputes with no recourse to force" which are actually the wares imperialism and revisionism have been peddling and which, in effect are directed against China. He urged other countries "to support the United Nations in action" which could only mean to turn these countries into instruments of imperialism in its armed suppression of the national liberation movements.

In fact Shastri's speech on October 7 made no mention at all of fighting imperialism. Taking his cue from Washington, he obsequiously suggested that a special mission be sent to "persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons." This met with universal opposition from the participating countries so that the Foreign Ministers' session did not even discuss the proposal. . . .

In the last few years India has become increasingly committed to U.S. imperialism. Since the large-scale attacks it mounted on the border with China in 1962, it has asked for and received

from the U.S. Government vast amounts of military "aid." . . .

Thus India has to act as apologist for, and often as collaborator with U.S. imperialism. Take India's infamous conduct during the recent U.S. sabre-rattling in Southeast Asia. It openly spoke in defence of the Johnson Administration's aggression and intervention in Indo-China. After the U.S. provoked "Bac Bo incident," Indian Prime Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh declared that the Indian Government would refrain from "sitting in judgement." Or take India's approval of the dispatch of the U.S. 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean. Or its sympathy and support for the British-created neo-colonialist "Malaysia" which has U.S. backing. These recent events are enough to show that the Delhi government has sold out to the United States.

To refurbish its non-aligned image, the Indian Government has collaborated with the revisionist Khrushchov clique, which gloats over and joins in the U.S.-supported Indian anti-China campaign. First Nehru and now Shastri have made great play with the military "aid" lavishly furnished by Khrushchov to cover up their threadbare non-alignment policy. The Shastri administration has moreover obtained from Moscow a "no restrictions" agreement to use the Soviet aircraft, tanks and other weapons against China. Thus in receiving military aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union, from the supply of weapons to the training of combat personnel, India has carried out a policy of double alignment. It is a dangerous development menacing other Asian countries, as public opinion in neighbouring Pakistan has been quick to point out.

**258 Prime Minister Shastri's letter to Chou En-lai commenting on nuclear explosion by China and the Chinese proposal of a summit conference, 27 November 1964 (Extracts)**

Whatever the political or military considerations, the nuclear explosion conducted at Lop Nor on the 16th of October in total defiance of the opinion of the nations of the world and in complete disregard of the health of its innocent inhabitants is a development that people all over the world must regard as retrograde and deplorable. . . .

The radioactive fall-out from the Chinese explosion has tra-

versed the atmosphere of the globe, spreading its unhealthy debris over the peoples of the world. It has also given a setback to the efforts being made by the international community to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and bring the world nearer to its goal of general and complete disarmament.

In your letter, last year,<sup>1</sup> Your Excellency had ignored conventional disarmament. This particular aspect of the matter cannot be absent in any proposal from the People's Republic of China which has the largest army in the world, not including millions of armed men in the Chinese militia. In your last letter, Your Excellency had also proposed a Summit Conference, which was to consider the question of prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons and of taking certain measures as initial steps. These initial steps included establishment of nuclear-free zones, including one which would cover China, refraining from export or import of nuclear weapons and technical data for their manufacture and cessation of all nuclear tests. This time,<sup>2</sup> Your Excellency has omitted these suggestions, as the People's Republic of China, in complete disregard of its own proposals, has now established China as a nuclear weapons zone, rather than a non-nuclear zone, and conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion. Now Your Excellency only suggests that steps to be taken should be that nuclear powers should not use nuclear weapons. There is no reference to non-manufacture of weapons, non-possession of weapons or non-testing of weapons. . . .

What is needed is not declarations or exhortations, but concrete and specific steps, like cessation of tests, prohibition of the use of fissile material for purposes of weapons, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, reduction of large and intimidating armies etc. In this context, I trust Your Excellency's Government will take early steps to subscribe to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and stop the production of these weapons of mass destruction.

<sup>1</sup> For Chou En-lai's letter to Nehru and other Heads of Government dated 2 August 1963 and Nehru's reply to that letter, see *White Paper X*, 115-20.

<sup>2</sup> See Chou En-lai's letter to Prime Minister of India and other Heads of Government dated 17 October 1964 and Chinese Government statement of 16 October 1964. *White Paper XI*, 81-4.

**259 Premier Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Third National People's Congress, 21-22 December 1964 (Extract)**

In 1959, the Dalai clique launched a traitorous counter-revolutionary armed rebellion in collusion with imperialism and the Indian reactionaries. It was promptly stamped out by our heroic People's Liberation Army and the broad masses of the Tibetan people. After his flight to India, the Dalai set up a bogus government in exile, promulgated a bogus constitution, supported the Indian reactionaries in their aggression against our country and actively organized and trained the remnant bandits who had escaped abroad to harass our frontier. All this proves that he has betrayed the motherland and the people. In compliance with the demand of the Tibetan people, the State Council has decided to remove him from the posts of Chairman and member of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. . . .

In the past five years China has settled boundary problems with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc. This is an outstanding achievement in our foreign relations. As for the Sino-Indian border issue, we have also made efforts for a peaceful settlement with India through negotiations. However, owing to the requirements of its domestic and foreign policies, the Indian Government is utterly devoid of any sincere desire to settle this issue. It has not only occupied 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory south of the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, it also wants to occupy over 30,000 square kilometres more of Chinese territory in the western sector. Moreover, it has demanded the withdrawal of seven civilian posts on Chinese territory in the western sector as a precondition for negotiations. This attitude of the Indian Government's is extremely unreasonable. We will not withdraw a single one of these seven civilian posts, and at the same time the Indian Government has to be reminded that the 90,000 square kilometres of territory south of the so-called McMahon Line are Chinese territory over which China has never relinquished its sovereignty. We are for peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue through negotiations, but if India is determined not to have negotiations—no matter, we

can wait.

**260 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's statement in Lok Sabha, 24 December 1964 (Extract)**

Some time after the Chinese had committed an aggression on our borders, the Colombo proposals were formulated by certain friendly countries. The Government of India accepted these proposals, but the Chinese Government did not do so. Later the Ceylonese Prime Minister consulted us on the question of civilian check posts in the demilitarised zone of Ladakh. In reply, the Government of India, indicated their willingness to agree to there being no posts of either side in the said demilitarised zone. Since then, there have been no further developments. In this context, the question of any negotiations does not arise at present.

The Government of India believe in the pursuit of peace and in settlement by mutual discussions provided always that such discussions can be held consistently with the honour and dignity of the country.

**261 Statement by the Spokesman of India's Ministry of External Affairs on Chou En-lai's speech at the National People's Congress, 31 December 1964 (Extracts)**

The Government of India have seen reports of Mr. Chou En-lai's speech at the National People's Congress at Peking. The tone and content of the Chinese Prime Minister's references to India is a demonstration of China's aggressiveness and arrogance. . . .

The Chinese Premier has asserted that the suggestion to hold talks between the two countries on the basis of no posts of either side in the demilitarized zone in Ladakh is an 'unreasonable Indian precondition' and that China would never withdraw its posts from this area. This is to put facts upside down and reflects an attitude of total intransigence and determination to hold on to the fruits of aggression. It is well-known that the suggestion about the withdrawal of posts was not made by India but by an impartial third party. India reacted to it positively

because of her desire to enter into negotiations with China. Mr. Chou En-lai has now finally killed this constructive suggestion and turned his back upon the Colombo Proposals. His speech seems to be Peking's *coup de grace* to the Colombo Proposals formulated by the six Non-aligned nations.

It should be clear to the whole world that what stands in the way of talks on the border problem are not Indian preconditions, so called, but China's truculence and arrogance. The Chinese Prime Minister has gone further and once again raised the spectre of China's fantastic claim to 90,000 sq. kilometres of Indian territory in the Eastern Sector, over and above the 14,500 sq. miles of territory in Ladakh illegally occupied by China.

**262 "New Delhi reaction strips off mask," article by *People's Daily* commentator, 17 January 1965 (Extracts)**

On December 30, 1964, the Indian Government suddenly started mass arrests all over the country of Indian Communists who adhere to Marxism Leninism. Some 800 Communists were reported to have been put into prison, including P. Sundarayya, General Secretary, H.S. Surjeet, M. Basavapunniah, A.K. Gopalan, and P. Ramamurti, Political Bureau Members, and other leaders of the Communist Party of India

With deep indignation, the Chinese people sternly condemn this fascist outrage of the Indian Government and extend their high regards and heartfelt sympathy to the comrades of the Communist Party of India now under arrest. The mass arrest of Indian Communists is another counter-revolutionary action taken by the Indian Government to suppress the national-democratic movement of the broad sections of the Indian people. It has further exposed the reactionary features of the Indian Government. . . .

Since his assumption of power, Shastri has followed Nehru's long-discredited reactionary home and foreign policies, thereby precipitating an ever more acute state of crisis in India's domestic and foreign affairs.

Under its anti-China signboard, the Indian Government has intensified its exploitation of the people to expand armament and prepare for war. This has increasingly aggravated India's

economic situation. Throughout India today food shortage is most serious, prices are soaring and the people are destitute. . . .

In foreign affairs, as the Indian Government is becoming more and more a protege of U.S. imperialism, begging for its "aid" and working for its "global strategy," India's cloak of "non-alignment" has become more tattered than ever and its anti-China schemes have all fallen through. India's utter isolation at the Second Conference of non-Aligned Countries is the best proof of this.

The Indian Government is now trying to save its tottering rule by suppressing the Communist Party of India and the revolutionary people. . . . It hopes to prop up the renegade Dange group which has been spurned by the proletariat and the broad masses of the people of India and to continue using this renegade group as a tool for sabotaging and disintegrating the revolutionary struggle of the Indian people. It hopes to stir up another anti-China campaign to divert the attention of the people and please U.S. imperialism in order to obtain more alms from it. . . .

Now by stripping off its own mask of "democracy" and "socialism," the Indian Government can only make the Indian people join in the struggle against the dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords and more resolutely, thus stimulating the national-democratic revolutionary movement in India.

### **263 Indian note to China, 12 February 1965 (Extracts)**

The Chinese note has taken objection to a statement in the Indian note of October 7, 1964, that India could not enter into "any international, scientific and cultural exchange" with China, as long as China remains in illegal possession of Indian territory and advocates the use of nuclear science for war-like purposes. The Chinese note, deviating from the scurrilous into the perversely romantic, has alleged that the Government of India "is in passionate embrace with the U.S. nuclear war-lord". In its note of December 28, 1964, further slanderous expression like "subservience to U.S. imperialism" and "begging for foreign aid" have been used about India. . . when more than 100 nations of the world have signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as a practical step towards total and complete disarmament, China

has not only refused to sign the Treaty, but opposed it vehemently and has conducted a nuclear explosion of its own. China stands condemned for its Lop Nor explosion because this nuclear test was conducted in defiance of powerful opinion expressed by the 47 non-aligned nations who had just then debated this question and called upon "all States to accede to the Moscow Treaty partially banning the nuclear tests and to abide by its provisions in the interests of peace and welfare of mankind". To argue that China's nuclear policy, today, is a "just stand", it may be pointed out, is a surprising reversal of what the Chinese Government had stood for in the Bandung declaration of 1955 which had appealed to all powers to reach an agreement to suspend nuclear experiments. The Lop Nor explosion thus stands condemned even in terms of China's own solemn commitment in 1955 which China apparently wants her friends to forget.

**264 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1964-65, March 1965 (Extract)**

China continued to occupy 14,500 square miles of Indian territory which she had seized by her earlier encroachment and the massive invasion across the Indian borders in October-November 1962. Having thus occupied strategic territory in Ladakh, China turned its back upon negotiations and rejected the Indian as well as third-party proposals calculated to bring the two countries to a negotiating table. The Colombo Proposals put forward by the Conference of six Non-Aligned countries were fully accepted by the Government of India, while the Chinese Government, under the cover of acceptance 'in principle', rejected the very basis as also the concrete provisions of these proposals.

One of the important reservations to the Colombo Proposals made by China was that in the demilitarized zone in the Western Sector there should be no Indian posts, although the Chinese posts remained in position. In order to break the deadlock arising out of China's non-acceptance of the Colombo Proposals, a suggestion was advanced by two emissaries of Earl Russell, in the summer of 1963, that the demilitarized zone in Ladakh should be kept vacant of posts of either side as a basis



for negotiations between the Governments of India and China. Early in the year under review, the same idea was pursued in an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister of Ceylon and the Prime Minister of India. Referring to this in Parliament, the late Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on April 13, 1964 that if both parties, by agreement, decided to have no posts at all in this demilitarized zone of 20 kilometres in Ladakh, it would be possible to consider that this satisfied the Colombo Proposals. In other words, if China agreed to treat the demilitarized area as "no-man's land" and removed its six "civil posts", India would consider it as a fulfilment of an important provision in the Colombo Proposals in regard to which the Chinese had earlier made reservations. Thereafter negotiations could take place between the two countries on the basis of and in accordance with the Colombo Proposals. This conciliatory gesture on the part of India was restated by the late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, on May 17, at a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay. The suggestion was reiterated by the present Prime Minister in Parliament on June 1, 1964. India thus went to the farthest limit possible, within the ambit of the Colombo Proposals, to break the deadlock and to make it possible for negotiations to take place between India and China.

Peking's response to this conciliatory gesture was negative and uncompromising. The official news agency of China characterized this gesture and concession on the part of India as "another precondition" to talks and said "it is China's internal affairs to set up civilian posts and there is no reason for asking China to withdraw in its own territory". On October 9, at the time of the Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations at Cairo, the Chinese Government issued an official statement in which, for the first time, it officially rejected the suggestion made by Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, and welcomed by India, that negotiations should be held between the two countries on the basis of there being no posts of either side in the 20 kilometre demilitarized zone in Ladakh. The statement further asserted "Chinese sovereignty" over the whole of 14,500 sq. miles of Indian territory illegally occupied in Ladakh, including the 20 kilometre demilitarized zone. The Chinese statement said: "China will not withdraw from any of the seven civilian posts

(in Ladakh). On the contrary, China has every right to ask India to withdraw from the more than 90,000 square kilometres of China's territory south of the illegal McMahon Line". It was a categorical rejection of the suggestion made by the Ceylon Prime Minister, and it obviously meant that China intended holding on to the territories that it had seized by military action in Ladakh and, in addition, wanted to revive its vast and fantastic claims against Indian territory elsewhere, south of the McMahon Line, in the Eastern sector. The Chinese statement ruled out third party mediation, by peremptorily asking the Colombo Powers not to consult amongst themselves on the Sino-Indian border question unless China was also present at these consultations, and by asserting that China would never agree to international pressure. The October 9 statement of the Chinese Government showed that China is interested neither in the Colombo Proposals nor in negotiations with India on an honourable basis.

While thus doing everything to obstruct the possibilities of a peaceful settlement on the border problem, China continued to build up its military strength in Tibet and concentrate more and more troops on the Indian border, where the build-up is heavier by the end of 1964 than in the autumn of 1962. The Chinese have also constructed a net-work of roads and barracks and several airfields on the Tibetan side, thereby very substantially enlarging the logistic and quartering facilities for their troops. There have been also a number of cases of aerial and land intrusions into Indian and Sikkimese territory by Chinese aircraft and armed personnel.

The Chinese aggression against India, it is now obvious, was motivated as much by ideological considerations as by expansionist motives. In the Chinese ideological spectrum, India is the key to the vast "intermediate zone" of Asia, Africa and Latin America, China would like to see India reduced to the status of a secondary power in Asia and to destroy the policy of non-alignment which has earned for India so much respect and prestige in the Asian-African world. In collusion with Pakistan, China has been conducting a virulent propaganda campaign denigrating Indian leadership and India's foreign and domestic policies. Resentful of the effective role played by India in the Non-Aligned Conference at Cairo, the Chinese

press and radio, echoing Pakistan propoganda, said that India was now “doubly aligned”, to the USA as well as to the USSR, and that instead of opposing imperialism India had “tried to turn the discussion at the Conference in another direction”. The Prime Minister’s suggestion at Cairo that the Conference might send a mission to Peking, to dissuade China from exploding a nuclear device, was attacked with particular vehemence in the Chinese press. A new trend in Chinese propoganda was to characterize India’s defensive efforts as a threat, not so much to China as to the geographically smaller countries of Asia. In this also Peking was echoing a theme of typical Pakistani propoganda.

**265 “Expose the essence of India’s new proposal on Vietnam”,  
Observer’s commentary in *People’s Daily*, 9 May 1965  
(Extracts)**

The Indian President’s “new proposal” taking the “cessation of hostilities in both parts of Viet Nam” as its starting point, is preposterous in the extreme. India does not dare say a single word about U.S. efforts to step up its war of aggression in South Viet Nam and extend the war in Viet Nam. It simply trails behind Johnson and shouts about Vietnamese people committing aggression against Vietnamese people. In the words of Indian Prime Minister Shastri on April 25, this means “to stop hostilities and trade raids from north Viet Nam.” . . .

The “new proposal” of the Indian Government is clearly a new plot to use the Asian and African countries to serve U.S. aggression against Viet Nam. . . .

India’s “new proposal” turns a blind eye to the Johnson Administration’s obstruction of the reunification of Viet Nam and its aggression in Viet Nam; instead, the Indian Government is obsessively interested in introducing foreign troops into Viet Nam to “police” and “maintain” the so-called “boundaries” between the two parts of Viet Nam. Isn’t this, in essence, helping the U.S. aggressors to occupy south Viet Nam and perpetuate the division of Viet Nam? . . .

The United States has more than once used the troops of other countries to suppress the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples, and India has been one of its

accomplices in this respect. India has left an ignominious record in the Congo (Leopoldville); several thousand Indian troops, flaunting the colours of the "United Nations force," helped the United States to seize that country and suppress the revolutionary struggle of its people. Now that the U.N. flag has become too notorious, the Indian President and his collaborators vainly hope to recruit troops from certain Asian-African countries under the name of an "Afro-Asian force" to "police" and "maintain" the "boundaries" of Viet Nam and thereby suppress the revolutionary struggle of the south Vietnamese people.

The Indian President has gone so far as to describe the temporary demarcation line on the 17th Parallel in Viet Nam as a "boundary." . . .

After Johnson's peace fraud had been exposed, the New Delhi authorities worked hand in glove with the Tito clique of Yugoslavia and engaged in flurry of activities, trying to sell Johnson's rubbish "unconditional discussions" in the name of "non-alignment" and "neutrality."

The root cause of this state of affairs is that the Indian representative, the Chairman of the International Commission, has never done anything to check U.S. crimes violating and sabotaging the Geneva agreements and extending the war in Viet Nam; instead it has shielded and connived at these U.S. crimes in every possible way. Such being the case, what right has India got to flaunt its views on the Viet Nam question?

This so-called "new proposal" of the Indian Government to restore peace and stability once again reveals its betrayal of the stand of the Asian and African countries in opposing imperialism and colonialism and supporting the national-liberation movement. We are convinced that the Asian and African countries will see through this Indian scheme and will not fall into its trap.

**266 "What Shastri's Soviet trip reveals," Observer's  
commentary in *People's Daily*, 27 May 1965 (Extracts)**

Shastri's trip was not in vain. He got money. The Soviet leaders acted handsomely. It was reported that they had promised him 900 million U.S. dollars in economic aid. . . .

As everybody knows, the Indian Government has received a large amount of U.S. military "aid" for arms expansion and war preparations, and India has been put under the U.S. "air umbrella" and has supplied the United States with naval and air force bases. In the Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, the Dominican Republic and on the "Malaysia" question, the Indian Government has acted as a U.S. accomplice by donning different masks. In fact, militarily and politically, India long ago entered into alliance with the United States. . . .

As Chairman of the International Commission in Viet Nam, the Indian Government, instead of fulfilling its duties by condemning and checking U.S. aggression, has strained every nerve to be of service U.S. imperialist aggression against Viet Nam. . . .

It is not at all surprising that U.S. imperialism should so highly appreciate Shastri's role in the Viet Nam question. But on what grounds, people have the right to ask, did the Soviet leaders allege that this favourite of Washington's "restrains the forces of war and strengthens the forces of peace?" . . .

The reason why the Soviet leaders set much such store by Shastri and praise him to the skies is that he is a rare anti-China caviliar as well as Washington's pet. The record of this Prime Minister of India is striking witness to the fact that Shastri loyally continues Nehru's anti-China policy. . . .

The joint Soviet-Indian communique specially emphasized the need for "the adoption of effective measures against any proliferation of nuclear weapons" and the impermissibility of the "use of force" to solve "border and territorial disputes." Thus it is clear that the Soviet leaders and the Indian reactionaries are bed fellows in opposing socialist China. . . .

Khrushchov's successors are pursuing the Khrushchov line to form an anti-China alliance with Nehru's successors. From the moment the new Soviet leaders came to power, they vowed to the Indian reactionaries that Soviet policy towards India would remain unchanged. Now they have made a high capital investment in Shastri. This demonstrates their determination to unite with India in opposition to China.

**267 “Non-aligned India’s double alignment,” article by Shih Yen in *Peking Review*, 13 August 1965 (Extracts)**

New Delhi and Washington military collaboration began early in 1951 when an “aid” agreement not unlike a military treaty was concluded in the form of an exchange of notes. This was renewed in 1958, restating some provisions of the old agreement . . . The amount of American military “aid” that has already been doled out to “non-aligned” India since October 1962 runs up to a total of 230 million dollars.

In the face of armed provocations by Indian reaction against China, the Khrushchov revisionist group began providing India with military “aid” in 1960. After October 1962, the amount soared greatly. . . . Since October 1962, estimated Soviet military “aid” to India—both delivered or promised—totalled 130 million dollars. A recent estimate of Soviet military “aid” is about 100 million dollars more. . . .

Both American and Soviet “aid” serve India’s purpose of opposing China and foreign expansion and of arms expansion and war preparations, all of which endanger the security of India’s neighbours and peace. Whether from the United States or from the Soviet Union, New Delhi is free to use the arms against its neighbours. . . .

In recent years the ruling group in India, working hand in glove with the modern revisionists, has been doing yeoman service for U.S. imperialism, speaking and acting for Washington on major international issues. New Delhi is opposed to, and undermines, the struggles against imperialism and colonialism and the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, trying to break up Asia-African unity. The cases in point are too numerous to be cited in full. . . . India tried to help the Soviet Union, which is neither an Asian nor an African country, worm its way into the conference [Second African Asian Conference]. New Delhi stood for participation by America’s Seoul and Saigon puppets in the conference, while avowing that “Malaysia”—a product of neo-colonialism—was an “independent country”. Where “non-aligned” India stands is clear as day: this and its many other disruptive activities were condemned by Afro-Asian public opinion.

**268 "India's food crisis and U.S. food aid," article by Chih Yi in *Peking Review*, 20 August 1965 (Extracts)**

Food shortage is the chronic ailment of India which is today ruled by the big bourgeoisie and landlords. The dumping of American "surplus" farm products has further damaged the country's food production.

Last year, India had its worst food crisis since its proclamation of independence in 1947. Twelve states were very seriously affected. Hoarding and racketeering were as rampant as starvation was widespread. . . .

The more India relies on importing American food grains, the more stagnant will its agricultural production become and the more serious will its food crisis be. India's present food problem is the logical conclusion of its subservience to U.S. monopoly capital.

**269 Vice Premier Cher Yi's press conference in Karachi, 4 September 1965 (Extract)\***

China completely sympathizes with and supports the Kashmir people's just struggle to resist India's tyrannical rule. China resolutely condemns India for its provocative acts of violating the ceasefire line and kindling and aggravating the conflict. China firmly supports Pakistan's just action in hitting back at India's armed provocations. China firmly holds that the Kashmir question should be settled according to the pledges made by India and Pakistan to the Kashmir people and in accordance with the aspirations of the Kashmir people.

**270 Indian schemes to sabotage Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism fail," *Peking Review* commentary, 5 November 1965 (Extracts)**

At the Algiers meeting the Indian authorities were thoroughly exposed as plotters opposed to the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism.

\*For various documents on Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, see volume II, pages 69-98.

For a long time, the Indian Government had tried by every conceivable means to obstruct the holding of the Second African-Asian Conference. . . .

However, with the appearance of some complicated factors in Africa and Asia un-favourable to the holding of the African-Asian conference and some divergences among the African-Asian countries which could not be settled for the time being, the Indian Government suddenly changed its attitude and pressed for the convening of the conference as scheduled. The Indian authorities became particularly active after some countries, including China, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Guinea and the Congo (B), which resolutely uphold solidarity against imperialism, had stood for the postponement of the Second African-Asian Conference.

The Indian press disclosed that the Indian authorities had intended to make use of the conference to render a big service to US imperialism and modern revisionism and conduct anti-China agitations. . . .

### **271 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Parliament, 10 November 1965 (Extracts)**

The Foreign Ministers of the Second Afro-Asian Conference met in Algiers on October 30, with forty-five countries participating out of the sixty-one to whom invitations had been sent. Neither China nor Pakistan attended. The Conference adjourned on November 2, having decided to postpone the Summit meeting indefinitely. . . .

During October, China made a proposal in the Standing Committee of fifteen nations seeking the postponement of the scheduled meeting. This came soon after China's apparent failure to establish a dominating position among Afro-Asian States and also after it became known that an overwhelming majority now supported Soviet participation. . . .

The postponement of the Conference has been a setback to the concept of Afro-Asian solidarity. The deliberate refusal of the People's Republic of China to participate in the Conference without any convincing reasons is no doubt partly responsible for the failure of the Conference to meet. The facts, however, are that the Conference met formally in spite of Chinese oppo-



sition and boycott, remained in session for several days, was participated in by forty-five delegations, and discussed the question of participation of the USSR, Malaysia and Singapore on whose right to participate a consensus was reached. These are positive achievements to the credit of the Conference. At the same time the abrupt postponement of the Conference makes it improbable that there will be another Conference in the near future.

**272 “Refutation of the new leaders of the C.P.S.U. on ‘United Action’,” article by the Editorial Departments of *People’s Daily* and *Red Flag*, 11 November 1965 (Extract)**

The new leaders of the C.P.S.U. have taken over and expanded the enterprises of the firm of Kennedy, Nehru and Khrushchov which Khrushchov worked hard to establish. They have carried further their alliance against China with the Indian reactionaries who are controlled by the U.S. imperialists. During Shastri’s visit to the Soviet Union, they granted India aid to the tune of U.S. \$900 million in one go, which is more than all the loans Khrushchov extended to India in nine years. They have speeded up their plans for military aid to India and are working hand in glove with the United States to help India’s arms expansion, so that the Indian reactionaries are able to use Soviet-made weapons against China and other neighbouring countries.

Recently, during India’s armed aggression against Pakistan and also in connection with the Sino-Indian boundary question, the new leaders of the C.P.S.U. revealed in all its ugliness their support of the aggressor and their alliance with the United States and India against China. The Soviet Union and the United States joined in an anti-China chorus both inside and outside the United Nations. In September 1965, in statements on the armed conflict between India and Pakistan, TASS attacked China by insinuation, and *Pravda* even openly sided with India against China on the Sino-Indian boundary question. People will recall that it was precisely with a TASS statement on the Sino-Indian boundary question that Khrushchov started his public attacks on China in September 1959. But his attacks pale into insignificance in comparison with those of the present leaders of the C.P.S.U. They have discarded even the small

fig-leaf Khrushchov used in order to feign neutrality. Small wonder that the U.S. imperialists are greedfully hailing a "new era" in U.S.-Soviet co-operation.

**273 *People's Daily* commentator on the Indian-Canadian report on Laos, 12 December 1965 (Extracts)**

The Indian Canadian members of the International Commission have all along misrepresented the true situation in Laos and glossed over Washington's aggressive actions in that country. For more than three years; the U.S. imperialists have committed endless aggression and intervention in Laos in violation of the Geneva agreements. Yet the Indian and Canadian members have consistently turned down the repeated requests of the Neo Lao Haksat for investigation. They turned deaf and dumb and would not condemn Washington for such an obvious violation as direct US air force participation in the Laotian war—a fact which Washington itself admitted. They even refused to question US pilots captured in the Laotian liberated areas. On the other hand, a mere nod from US imperialism is enough to send them scurrying on its errands, conjuring up all sorts of "evidence" to vilify the Laotian patriotic forces and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. This so-called report once again brings home the fact that the International Commission in Laos, under the sway of its Indian and Canadian members, has become a pliant tool of US imperialist aggression and intervention in Laos.

The "report" submitted by the Indian and Canadian members in the name of the International Commission and published by the British Government is completely illegal and therefore null and void. The "investigation" mentioned in the "report" was conducted at the unilateral request of the Laotian Rightists and in the absence of the Polish member of the commission. It directly violates Laotian sovereignty and contravenes both the letter and spirit of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos. . . .

The false conclusion drawn by the British Government on the basis of the report of the Indian and Canadian members that "north Vietnamese troops are operating in Laos" is specifically designed to provide a pretext for Washington to carry out its sinister scheme.

**274 Statement by the Indian representative Zakaria in the  
UN General Assembly on the question of Tibet,  
14 December 1965 (Extracts)**

For the past fifteen years the question of Tibet has been, from time to time, under the consideration of the United Nations. It was first raised here in 1950. . . but it could not be placed on the agenda. In fact, my country opposed its inclusion at that time because we were assured by China that it was anxious to settle the problem by peaceful means. However, instead of improving, the situation in Tibet began to worsen, and since then the question has come up several times before the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our delegation participated in the discussion at the fourteenth session, in 1959, and although we abstained from voting we made it clear that, because of our close historical, cultural and religious ties with the Tibetans, we could not but be deeply moved and affected by what was happening in that region. We hoped against hope that wiser counsel would prevail among the Chinese and that there would be an end to the sufferings of the people of Tibet.

However, the passage of time has completely belied our hopes. As the days pass, the situation becomes worse and cries out for the attention of all mankind. As we know, ever since Tibet came under the strangle-hold of China, the Tibetans have been subjected to a continuous and increasing ruthlessness which has few parallels in the annals of the world. In the name of introducing "democratic reforms" and of fighting a "counter-revolution", the Chinese have indulged in the worst kind of genocide and the suppression of a minority race. . . .

The Chinese never believed in living up to their assurances. They promised autonomy to Tibet and the safeguarding of its cultural and religious heritage and traditions but, as the International Commission of Jurists in its June 1959 report on Tibet has emphasized, they attempted, on the contrary, "to destroy the national, ethnical, racial and religious group of Tibetans as such by killing members of the group and by causing serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group." . . .

The Chinese have transformed Tibet into a vast military camp, where the indigenous Tibetans are made to live like

hewers of wood and drawers of water.

Although the relationship between Tibet and India is centuries old and has flourished all through the ages in all its manifestations, whether religious, cultural or economic, we have always taken care not to make that relationship a political problem. In recent years, despite the fact that the Dalai Lama and thousands of his Tibetan followers have come to our land, despite the fact that China has turned Tibet itself into a base for aggression against our northern borders, we have not exploited the situation. Undoubtedly, our national sentiments are now and again aroused as a result of the atrocities and cruelties committed by the Chinese against Tibetans, but we have exercised the greatest caution, for we believe that what should concern all of us is the much larger human problem, namely, the plight of these good and innocent people who are being victimized merely because they are different, ethnically and culturally, from the Chinese.

Here I feel that it would not be out of place to put before this Assembly the following facts which stand out stubbornly and irrefutably in connexion with Chinese policy in Tibet.

(1) The autonomy guaranteed in the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 has from the beginning remained a dead letter;

(2) Through increasing application of military force, the Chinese have in fact obliterated the autonomous character of Tibet;

(3) There has been arbitrary confiscation of properties belonging to monasteries and individuals and Tibetan Government institutions;

(4) Freedom of religion is denied to the Tibetans, and Buddhism is being suppressed, together with the system of priests, monasteries, shrines and monuments;

(5) The Tibetans are allowed no freedom of information or expression;

(6) There has also been carried out a systematic policy of killing, imprisonment and deportation of those Tibetans who have been active in their opposition to Chinese rule;

(7) The Chinese have forcibly transferred large numbers of Tibetan children to China in order to denationalize them, to indoctrinate them in Chinese ideology and to make them forget their own Tibetan religion, culture and way of life; and

(8) There has also been a large-scale attempt to bring Han Chinese into Tibet, and thereby make Tibet Chinese and overwhelm the indigenous people with a more numerous Chinese population.

These atrocities, carried out ruthlessly, with utter disregard for Tibetan sentiments and aspirations, and in complete violation of universally recognized human rights, add up to a frightful programme of the suppression of a whole people. It surpasses anything that colonialists have done in the past to the peoples whom they ruled and enslaved. . . .

My delegation naturally feels concerned about the terrible deterioration in the situation in Tibet. On 17 December 1964, for instance, the Dalai Lama was formally deprived of his position as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet and denounced as "an incorrigible running dog of imperialism and foreign reactionaries"; this was immediately followed by the deposition on 30 December 1964 of the Panchen Lama, whom the Chinese tried assiduously to take under their wing, and by his condemnation as a leader of the "clique of reactionary serf owners". . . . Thus the Chinese have severed the remaining political links between Tibet and its two politico-religious structures, and have given a final blow to what they fondly used to call, in the past, the special status of Tibet".

Moreover, the campaign to dispossess Tibetan peasants of their land and to distribute their properties is also being accelerated with the definition of what precisely constitutes feudal elements being expanded, from time to time, to cover a wider and wider range of peasants. In fact, these so-called land reforms are being used by the Chinese Government to advance its own political purpose and to turn the Tibetan peasants into slaves of its system. The naked truth—which all of us must face—is that the Chinese Government is determined to obliterate the Tibetan people; but surely no people can remain for long suppressed. I have faith in the world community. I believe it will be able to help restore to the Tibetans all the freedoms which we have enshrined, with such dedication, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

**275 Chinese protest note to India, 2 January 1966 (Extract)**

Recently the Indian Government and U.S. imperialism working hand in glove, utilized the U.S.-controlled United Nations to discuss the so-called "question of Tibet" and adopt a resolution vilifying the Chinese people and interfering in China's internal affairs. In his speech the Indian delegate heaped malicious abuse upon China, slandering her as "ruthlessly" carrying out "atrocities" in Tibet which "surpass anything the colonialists have done in the past", and so on and so forth. A little earlier, the Indian Government had again made use of the Chinese traitor Dalai to conduct a whole series of anti-Chinese activities in India. The President and Prime Minister of India and other high-ranking officials of the Indian Government blatantly received this Chinese traitor and held so-called talks with him. The leaders of the Indian Government also took the opportunity to vilify China. Indian Minister of Education M. C. Chagla went to the length of saying that the time had come for the Indian Government to consider whether to recognize China's "suzerainty"—which should be read as sovereignty—over Tibet. Led by the Indian Information Service, the Indian official propaganda organ, the Indian press spread numerous lies and slanders about China over the question of Tibet. All this constitutes an open provocation against the Chinese people a gross violation of the principles guiding international relations and a grave interference in China's internal affairs. The Chinese Government hereby lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government against this.

**276 "Confessions concerning the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration pursued by the new leaders of the C.P.S.U.," article by *Red Flag* Commentator, 11 February 1966 (Extracts)**

The tripartite Soviet-U. S.-Indian meeting in New Delhi in January 1966 openly strengthened the united front against China. U.S. Vice-President Humphrey made no secret of his satisfaction after his long talk with Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. In a television interview Humphrey said that the talk was "frank and candid," and that he had explained the U. S. Government's positions and "had a

response from Mr. Kosygin." He said that "the Soviet is attempting to build a containment wall, so to speak, around communist China" and that "the Government of the Soviet Union is much more concerned today about its relationships throughout the entire world vis-a-vis communist China than it is over anything that the United States may be doing in any part of the world." Humphrey held that "looking ahead for the next few years . . . the contacts between ourselves. . . and the Soviet Union will expand, that the relationships can and should improve."

Humphrey's comments show how chummy the Soviet Union and the United States have become in their collaboration. It is because they have confided to each other what they have in mind that Humphrey is so very sure of the policy of the new leaders of the C.P.S.U. and has dared to make these comments publicly. The policy of the new leaders of the C.P.S.U. is to unite with U. S. imperialism and the reactionaries of various countries in forming a counter-revolutionary ring of encirclement against China. . . .

The new leaders of the C.P.S.U. are taking united action with the U.S. imperialists, the Japanese reactionaries, the Indian reactionaries, and all the lackeys of U. S. imperialism.

**277 "The face of an accomplice," *People's Daily* commentary,  
15 February 1966 (Extract)**

The Soviet leaders and the Soviet press energetically advocate application of the so-called "Tashkent spirit" to the Vietnam question. This is merely an attempt to substitute the "Tashkent line" for the Vietnamese people's revolutionary line of resisting U.S. aggression and saving the country, thereby putting the Vietnam question into the orbit of U.S.-Soviet co-operation for world domination.

**278 Ting chuan's commentary on Indian food crisis in  
*Peking Review*, 11 March 1966 (Extract)**

The food shortage in India today has reached a critical stage. In a land of 480 million people, 300 million do not have enough to eat. In the worst-hit areas, grass roots, jute leaves and bark from trees are the only alternative to death by starvation for great numbers of people. Despair and panic run through town

and countryside. Popular protests and demonstrations are spreading. . . .

The massive imports of U.S. food grains have started a vicious circle. Unable to compete with U.S. dumping, many Indian growers of food have had to shift to other crops. Thus the area planted to food grains has decreased ; and more U.S. food has to be imported to make up for the increasing deficits.

**279 *Peking Review* news report on Indo-Japanese consultations, 11 March 1966**

In New Delhi, India and Japan have wound up the first official talks under their recent agreement for periodic consultations. The main subject was increased concerted anti-China activity in support of Washington's plan to "contain" China. During the talks, American Ambassador to Japan Reischauer rushed to New Delhi ; UPI said this was "evidence of U.S. interest in greater Indo-Japanese co-operation." The Tokyo newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* was more outspoken when it reported that Japan and India formed the "core" of an anti-China alliance in Asia which the U.S. is trying to put together. . . .

**280 *Peking Review* report on the Mizo revolt, 18 March 1966  
(Extract)**

The strikes and anti-hunger demonstrations in New Delhi, West Bengal and elsewhere, had hardly subsided before the first gunshots cracked in the air in the mountainous Mizo region which lies at the Southernmost tip of the Assam State bordering on Burma and East Pakistan.

At midnight on February 28, about 10,000 members of the Mizo National Liberation Front attacked Aijal, the capital, Lungleh, the second largest town, and the local arsenal. Communication lines were cut and the insurgents in three days established control over virtually the whole region except Aijal. Large numbers of Indian troops were flown in by helicopters because of the difficult terrain. The armed suppression by the government troops, however, met with strong resistance. When the armed Mizo tribesmen captured



Lungleh on March 5, they forced part of the Indian garrison to surrender.

The Mizo or Lushai region, so named because it is inhabited by 266,000 Mizo and Lushai tribesmen, became part of India after it was ceded to the British East India Company by Burma in 1826. The Mizos who fought alien and colonial rule in the past, have waged prolonged struggles against the Congress government which adopts a policy of discrimination against these minorities. Government posts were attacked by the Mizo tribesmen two years ago. According to AFP, G.G. Swell, a Mizo member of the Indian Parliament, ascribed the present armed uprising to neglect of the region and the imposition of the Assam language on the Mizo people by the Government.

**281 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1965-66, March 1966 (Extract)**

Throughout the year under review the Chinese Government maintained, in an intensified form, its hostility towards India. Developments during the year revealed, even more clearly than before, that the India-China border question was not merely a territorial issue but an instrument forged by China to bring about a political confrontation between the two countries and to apply protracted military pressure on India. It was clear that conflict with India was an integral part of China's foreign policy and its revolutionary objectives in Asia and Africa. While keeping the border question pending and tension on the frontier alive and often dangerously active, the Chinese Government and its organs of propaganda hurled threats and abuses at India and subjected India's domestic and foreign policies to intemperate criticism and outright condemnation.

In this domestic field China's opposition was directed to India's experiment in the development of its economy through peaceful democratic methods. The Chinese press and radio tried to present a lurid picture of conditions in India describing the Indian economy as a semi-colonial economy dependent on foreign aid and the Indian experiment in economic development a failure and "a negative example for the advancing people in Asia, Africa and Latin America". This brought to the surface some of the ideological bitterness and sense of

rivalry the Chinese Government has been harbouring towards India. The Chinese aim was to hold up to Asia and Africa the Chinese example as the only model worthy of imitation, ignoring the fact that what the Afro-Asian countries want is not to copy the example of 'the big brother' but to develop their economies and political systems in the light of their own particular conditions, set of values and national requirements.

India's foreign policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence was another major target of Chinese criticism and condemnation. Even though it was only India which was criticised, it was clear that the Chinese were attacking the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence in general. For them this policy stood in the way of their war-like theory of uninterrupted struggle and confrontation with "the imperialists" and "the revisionists". The fact that India's foreign policy played some part in bringing about relaxation in the cold war and in the *detente* between the two power-blocs was particularly disliked by China. During the year under review the Chinese tried hard to link India with the United States and Soviet Union imagining that there was some kind of collusion between these three powers against China. The Chinese incessantly talked of "the U.S. imperialists", "the Russian revisionists" and "the Indian reactionaries" fitting the three countries into a preconceived and maliciously neat ideological pattern framed up in Peking. Reviewing the situation in India in 1965 the *New China News Agency* said that "during the outgoing year, the Indian reactionaries, while serving American imperialists and modern revisionists in international affairs, tried to undermine the Afro-Asian solidarity in the struggle against imperialism, worked in the vanguard of their anti-China policy and committed aggression against their neighbour—Pakistan."

In the Asian-African world, and especially in connection with the Algiers Conference the Chinese attempted to damage the image of India and to isolate her.

### **282 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's speech at a reception in New York, 1 April 1966 (Extract)**

A question that may be asked is, if China threatened India'

then what is India doing to combat Peking's designs in South-East Asia? China is taking great care to avoid direct military involvement in Vietnam. But China's shadow does fall across South-East Asia. The real threat from China, however, is less military than political and economic. The Chinese influence will be diminished if its neighbours in Asia and the nations of the developing world can build up popular and forward-looking nationalist Governments dedicated to fulfilling the aspirations of their people. They would also be greatly strengthened in this purpose, were they to see a strong and viable alternative model. It is precisely by a successful effort to develop democracy, that India can answer the Chinese challenge.

India is part of that rural countryside that the Chinese leaders would win and use in their revolutionary approach on the advanced industrialized cities of the west. It is in this large and populous rural countryside that the Chinese influence can and must be stemmed. India is fighting this battle through its devotion to the democratic ideals, through perseverance in planned development and its struggle against poverty. India is militarily holding a two thousand miles long Himalayan frontier against China. India is also fighting this battle in the crucial forum of Afro-Asia which China has sought to use as a political launching pad and as a revolutionary substitute for the United Nations. India's contribution in this regard has earned little notice or thanks. But, I venture to suggest that this is a contribution of high significance, since it has the unique distinction of meeting China's challenge on the ground and plane of Peking's own choosing.

**283 *Peking Review* commentary on alleged provocation by India in creating "two Chinas", 8 April 1966 (Extracts)**

The Indian Government recently has become quite unscrupulous in following Washington's policy of hostility to China and its plot to create "two Chinas". It has gone so far as to wink at and support the Chiang Kai-shek elements' anti-Chinese activities in India.

On March 18, a so-called delegation of the Chiang Kai-shek clique arrived in New Delhi from Taipei. They came to

attend the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East Conference, which the Soviet Union, "Malaysia," the south Vietnamese and South Korean puppet cliques, the United States and Britain also attended. . . .

The Chinese Foreign Ministry in a note to the Indian Embassy in China on April 2, strongly protested the Indian Government's latest provocation against the Chinese people. The note described it as another grave step taken by the Indian Government in violating the principles guiding international relations, crudely interfering in China's internal affairs and undermining relations between the two countries.

The note pointed out that the Indian Government was persisting in its complicity with the Chiang Kai-shek clique while well aware that the latter was a political corpse. Obviously the object was to further demonstrate to U.S. imperialism that India meant to cling to its position of hostility to China so as to get more handouts from the United States. The Indian Government was warned that its collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in carrying out activities against the People's Republic of China would only worsen the already deteriorated relations between China and India and that it must bear full responsibility for this.

#### **284 *Peking Review* commentary on Mrs. Gandhi's visits to USA and USSR, 15 April 1966**

The Indian Prime Minister's recent visit to Washington and her subsequent Moscow mission early this month reflect the foreign policy needs of the three governments. They took place when the Johnson Administration was working feverishly for an anti-Communist, anti-China alliance in Asia while widening its war of aggression in Vietnam; when the Soviet revisionist leadership was organizing another anti-China campaign; and when Mrs. Gandhi's own India was in trouble—its massive economic problems being further aggravated by the acute food shortage.

Following her father's foreign policy, Mrs. Gandhi toed the U.S. line, allied India with the Soviet Union and opposed China. But she has outdone herself and thrown off the threadbare garment of "non-alignment" altogether. Volunteering to become a stormtrooper to serve the U.S. anti-China policy,

she made herself a sari-clad Amazon by announcing that her country "is fighting the battle against Chinese communism." Then, as imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, she talked like Johnson saying: "The threat of communist Chinese expansion must be contained by political and economic means as well as militarily."

Pleased with her performance, Johnson, besides handing out a \$300 million endowment for an "Indo-US Foundation," promised an additional shipment of 3.5 million tons of food. These, plus the 6.5 million tons of farm produce in an earlier offer, amount to \$1,000 million in value. As the American weekly *New Republic* observed, India is now "a great anti-Communist counterweight to red China" and this kind of Indian counterweight needs to be backed with big money.

Mrs. Gandhi's anti-China act was applauded by the Soviet leaders with equal enthusiasm. The Soviet Union is itself straitened for money and food and made no specific offer of food during Mrs. Gandhi's two-day stay, but Moscow still promised to "look at the question [of aid] in the context" of India's Fourth Five-Year Plan. During her tour, the Indian Prime Minister attacked Pakistan for having "violated" the Tashkent Declaration which is product of the U.S.-Soviet conspiracy, and tried to poison the friendly relations between China and Pakistan. This she did not only to meet the needs of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in their joint efforts to isolate China but also to suit India's own expansionist drive.

Scurrying from Washington to Moscow, the Indian Prime Minister also served as a go-between for the American and Soviet leaders in their plot for a new Munich over the Vietnam question. Both Johnson and Kosygin, she told the Indian parliament, "appreciated" India's stand on Vietnam.

### 285 Chinese note to India, 4 May 1966 (Extracts)

. . . the Indian side repeatedly asserted that China had sent her troops into the 20-kilometre zone on her side of the line of actual control along the Sino-Indian border and into the Longju, Che Dong and other areas. . . . The said 20-kilometre zone and Longju, Che Dong and other areas are all Chinese territory. It was to seek relaxation of the border situation that, after repuls-

ing the armed Indian attack in the winter of 1962, China took the initiative to withdraw her frontier guards 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control between the Chinese and Indian sides and decided not to establish even civilian checkposts in Longju, Che Dong, Wuje and the areas in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, where there was a dispute about the cease-fire arrangement. . . . China's above action in no way meant relinquishment of sovereignty over her territory or of the right to take precautionary and self-defence measures against Indian intrusions and provocations. . . .

As for the charge that India had violated the Colombo proposals, it is even more absurd. In the first place, since the Colombo proposals are mere proposals, the question of violation or non-violation simply does not arise. . . . India is using the Colombo proposals merely as a tool to compel China to make unilateral concessions, hoping that China will tolerate India's renewed and unbridled intrusions and provocations. It is a great irony for India to continue to harp on the Colombo proposals. In these circumstances. . . . India's purpose, both in conducting border intrusions and in making slanderous counter-charges against China, is to meet the needs of its domestic and foreign policies. . . .

In order to ask for food and money from the U.S. imperialists and the modern revisionists to solve the grave famine and economic difficulties at home, the Indian Prime Minister has recently, not hesitated to repeatedly slander China as a 'threat,' cry that 'China must be contained' and even boast about India's 'contribution' along the Sino-Indian border, in the hope of receiving more 'notice' and 'thanks'.

**286 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha on Chinese thermonuclear explosion, 10 May 1966 (Extracts)**

This third nuclear test by China is in arrogant defiance of the clearly and passionately expressed desire of people all over the world to discontinue nuclear tests and to arrest the process of nuclear proliferation . . . .

Government cannot too strongly condemn and deplore the action taken by the Chinese Government, in persisting with

these tests which constitute a threat to world peace, a grave hazard to the health and safety of people living in areas of the world likely to be affected by the radioactive fall-out resulting from this explosion, and generally contrary to the interests of Humanity at large.

**287 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's press conference in New Delhi, 19 May 1966 (Extract)**

*Question:* Will you attempt to hold talks with China directly or through some one as in the case of Pakistan ?

*Prime Minister:* At the previous Press conference I made myself very clear that we are prepared to talk with anybody but you have to find some sort of basis on which you feel the talks will lead to something. We are not the ones who want to shut the door.

**288 Indian reply to Chinese note of 2 January 1966, 30 May 1966 (Extracts)**

The resolution on the conditions in Tibet, which was discussed by the United Nations General Assembly and passed on December 10, 1965, by a vote of 41 against 26 regarding the "continued violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet", and which the Indian delegation supported, is in complete conformity with the United Nations Charter to which India has subscribed. The Government of China should know that one of the many purposes of the United Nations Charter is the preservation of the dignity of the individual and the protection of human rights. The United Nations resolution specifically deplored "the continued violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet", and reaffirmed "that respect for the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the evolution of peaceful world order based on the rule of law".

This U.N. resolution, to which the Government of China have taken objection, is the inevitable result of their own policy. Instead of taking conciliatory measures towards the people of Tibet, the Chinese Government have gradually and systematically destroyed Tibetan autonomy. Publicly calling for the

“self-determination” of the people of Kashmir . . . is gross interference in India’s internal affairs since Jammu & Kashmir is an inseparable and integral part of India. Similarly, the Chinese Government’s massive anti-Indian propaganda and their attempt to capitalize on India’s temporary economic difficulties are yet another example of unwarranted interference in the affairs of a neighbouring state.

The Government of India, therefore, reject categorically the allegation that by supporting this U.N. resolution they have interfered in China’s internal affairs.

**289 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet arms aid to India,  
3 June 1966 (Extracts)**

After claiming it was unable to give Vietnam direct assistance because of the lack of a common frontier, the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union has in fact transported large quantities of military supplies to the Indian reactionaries over sea routes.

Five Soviet ships loaded with arms and ammunition, including heavy tanks, MiG-21 fighters, military trucks, machine-guns and missiles, arrived in Calcutta, India, in the middle of May.

When the news reached the Pakistan public, the reaction was both immediate and strong. It was pointed out that this military assistance would make the Indian reactionaries more aggressive towards India’s neighbours, China and Pakistan, was “tantamount to stroking the fires of war” and would “embolden India to blackmail and browbeat its smaller neighbours.” It may be recalled that as late as May 26, Indian troops fired at peaceful Pakistan farmers at Gobindapur in Sylhet, East Pakistan, as they were ploughing their own land. . . .

This latest move of the Soviet revisionist group has shown many Pakistan people how much the so-called Tashkent spirit is worth.



**290 Vice-Premier Chen Yi's speech on the occasion of Sino-Korean Friendship Treaty anniversary condemning US-Soviet-Indian "plot" to "force peace talks through bombing," 12 July 1966 (Extracts)**

The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong by U.S. imperialism shows that the Johnson Administration has gone down a blind alley in its war of aggression in Vietnam. . . . The Indian Government hastily brought forth the so-called seven-point proposal for realizing 'peace' in Vietnam. The 'united action' taken by U.S. imperialism, Soviet modern revisionism and the Indian reactionaries to push the big conspiracy of 'forcing peace talks through bombing' has finally been exposed to broad daylight.

What kind of stuff is the Indian Government's proposal made of after all? It is a carbon-copy of the proposal for so-called unconditional negotiations repeatedly put forward by the United States. It is a proposal which appears to uphold the banner of the Geneva agreements but which utterly violates the Geneva agreements. Completely ignoring the explicit provisions of the Geneva agreements, it makes no demand whatever that the United States immediately stop its aggression against Vietnam as a whole and withdraw all of its aggressor troops from south Vietnam without delay. By giving the same status to both aggressors and victims of aggression, it demands that the Vietnamese people hold talks with the U.S. gangsters at a time when the U.S. aggressor troops still remain on the soil of Vietnam. It is in every sense a proposal that serves to ensure the continued occupation of south Vietnam by the United States and the permanent partition of Vietnam.

**291 Press statement issued on behalf of the Bhutan Government by its Trade Adviser in Calcutta, 3 October 1966**

The Government of Bhutan have, for some time, been concerned with reports received from its patrols of a number of intrusions by Tibetan graziers and Chinese troops in the Doklam pastures which are adjacent to the southern part of the Chumbi Valley. This area is traditionally part of Bhutan and no assertion has been made by the Government of the People's Republic of

China disputing the traditional frontier which runs along recognizable natural features. In the area of the intrusion, the boundary runs along the water-parting along Batang La to Sinchel La. Local attempts were made to inform the graziers and the Chinese troops that they had strayed into Bhutanese territory but these have not been heeded.

In view of the succession of violations of the frontier, Bhutan Government urged the Government of India to represent to the Chinese Government so that Chinese nationals and troops refrained from entry into Bhutan in future.

### **292 Hsinhua statement on Bhutan, 27 October 1966 (Extracts)**

1. The Indian Government's hue and cry about Chinese "intrusions" into Bhutanese territory is an out and out lie, a slander with ulterior motives.

2. The Dongnan grassland (referred to as "Doklam pasture" by the Indian side) where the Indian Government alleged that Chinese "intrusions" had taken place is located in the vicinity of the tri-junction of the boundaries of China, Bhutan and Sikkim and has always been under Chinese jurisdiction and Chinese herdsmen have grazed there for generations. . . .

3 China has consistently respected Bhutan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. China and Bhutan have all along been on friendly terms with each other without either side committing aggression against the other, and the border between the two countries has always been tranquil. The Bhutanese Government itself has refuted on many occasions the lies concocted by the Indian side about Chinese "threats" to and "intrusions" into Bhutan. It is true that the China-Bhutan boundary has never been formally delimited and if the Bhutanese sides understanding is not quite the same as that of the Chinese side as regards the alignment of the boundary between the two countries at certain specific points, a fair and reasonable solution can very well be found through consultations on an equal footing between the two sides on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. China has successfully settled boundary questions left over by history with such neighbouring countries as Burma, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan through friendly consultations. Nevertheless it must be explicitly pointed

out that the boundary question between China and Bhutan is a matter that concern China and Bhutan alone and has nothing to do with the Indian Government which has no right whatsoever to intervene in it.

4. The King of Bhutan has long since solemnly declared that "Bhutan is an independent sovereign state and has the right to conduct her own foreign affairs". However bluntly claiming to be acting on Bhutan's behalf, the Indian Government lodged a so-called protest with China. This is a manifestation of downright big nation chauvinism. Inheriting the mantle of British imperialism the Indian Government has all along been pursuing an expansionist policy and bullying its neighbouring countries. It treats Sikkim as its "protectorate", encroaching upon Sikkim's independence and sovereignty. It tries hard to tighten its control over Bhutan and makes every effort to prevent the latter from attaining its due international status and even intends to send troops directly into Bhutanese territory and station them there. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi openly asserted at the Press Conference on October 7 that India was committed to protect Bhutan. It is thus quite clear that in slanderously charging China with "intrusions" into Bhutan, the Indian Government not only wants to create a new pretext for opposing China and sow discord between China and Bhutan but also is vainly attempting to realize its sinister design of tightening its control over Bhutan under the guise of "protection".

**293 *Peking Review* commentary on New Delhi summit conference of India, Yugoslavia, and UAR, 4 November 1966 (Extracts)**

The 4-day summit conference . . . is a component part of U.S.-Soviet schemes for large-scale global collaboration. . . . The statements made by Indira Gandhi and Tito at the conference showed them up still more clearly as "peace talks" brokers for the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and as anti-China preachers.

**294 *Peking Review* report of famine in India, 9 December 1966 (Extracts)**

More than 100 million people are facing starvation in India. Of

the country's 16 states, 13 are calamity stricken. Such is the extent of the current Indian famine which is the worst in several decades. . . .

U.S. imperialism is taking advantage of the famine to further step up its economic infiltration and political control. The Indian Government has imported large quantities of U.S. grain to hold down prices. . . .

The famine has sharpened class contradictions in India and added fuel to the people's struggle against the Congress government. In many states, peasants are not only demonstrating but are seizing grain, forcibly harvesting the landlord's crops, and fighting police persecution. And this struggle of the hungry masses is merging with the students' movement and the national minorities' struggle for self-determination.

### **295 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet loan to India, 16 December 1966 (Extracts)**

During the Soviet-Indian talks in New Delhi on November 30, it was announced that the Soviet Union would provide India with a loan of 970 million rubles (about 8,300 million rupees) during the latter's 4th five-year plan (1966-70).

This loan more than doubles the total sum of Soviet "economic assistance" to India during its 3rd five-year plan and exceeds by far Soviet "economic assistance" granted during the 10 years of Khrushchov's rule. . . .

On November 21, Indian Defence Minister Singh confirmed that the Soviet Union had supplied three TU-124s to the Indian air force. One of the three plants built in India with Soviet help for the production of MiG-21 supersonic fighters began operation in mid-October. Soviet-made guided missiles, submarines, warships and tanks have continued to pour into India while Soviet specialists help train Indian military personnel.

The pace of Soviet "aid" to India has been accelerated as the Indian reactionaries have stepped up their expansionist activities and anti-China campaign. This serves world-wide U.S.-Soviet collusion and is part of the counter-revolutionary "Holy Alliance" of all reactionaries which is against China, the peoples and Communism. However, with the Congress government on the verge of political and economic bankruptcy and

becoming more and more shaky, how much good all this "aid" will do the Indian reactionaries is highly doubtful.

**296 Address by President S. Radhakrishnan to the Indian Parliament, 18 March 1967 (Extract)**

With China too we would like to live in peace. But the aggressive acts and postures of the People's Republic of China coupled with their rejection of the concept of peaceful co-existence, continue to be the major obstacles to an improvement of our relations with China.

**297 "Indian reactionaries ugly anti-China force," article by *People's Daily* commentator, 24 March 1967 (Extract)**

Use of the Tibetan bandit traitors by the Indian Government to oppose China is part of the anti-China campaign engineered by U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist leading clique. It is common knowledge that the Indian reactionaries live on the charity handed them by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionist leading clique. Currying favour with U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist leading clique, the Indian Government has been carrying out frantic anti-China activities. It carries out continuous intrusions into China's territory and air space and repeated border provocations, creating as it does tension on the Sino-Indian border. It is responsible for the arrests of large numbers of innocent Chinese residing in India and keeping them in concentration camps and jails in a number of places. It connives with and gives support to Chiang Kai-shek elements conducting anti-China activities in India and hatches a "two-Chinas" plot. And it is trying to slap together a Southeast Asia anti-China alliance. It is clear that by putting on this disgraceful anti-China performance in New Delhi the Indian Government intends to beg alms once more from U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist leading clique.

**298 *Peking Review* commentary on 1967 General Elections in India, 24 March 1967 (Extracts)**

The Congress Party, back to power with a small majority, has

formed a government which is more reactionary than ever and still more subservient to U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. . . .

Inaugurated on March 13, the new central government was knocked together with some difficulty by the Congress Party which suffered its worst reverses ever in the elections. Congress Party leaders, after days of hectic political haggling, finally decided that Indira Gandhi, who has been working hand in glove with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, should continue as prime minister. Morarji Desai, the notorious pro-U.S. politician, was named to fill the new position of deputy prime minister and was concurrently appointed Minister of Finance. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence remained unchanged. Indira Gandhi however brought two feudal aristocrats into her government.

The day following the inauguration Washington announced a loan equivalent to \$40 million to the new government. Soviet revisionism, which was one step ahead, had, on the eve of the elections and in disregard of its own food difficulties, made the Indian Government a sudden present of 200,000 tonnes of wheat. It was a move designed to canvass votes for those politicians who favour the Soviet revisionists. And TASS, the Soviet mouthpiece, on March 12 advertised Indira Gandhi's empty talk about the "road of non-alignment and construction of democratic socialism." . . .

The Congress Party lost control in eight of the 16 states, and thus the one-party monopoly of local political power in India came to an end. These results show that the Congress Party, the handy tool of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie for 20 years, has now become ineffective in face of the people's resistance.

### **299 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's reply to Lok Sabha debate on President's Address, 5 April 1967 (Extract)**

With regard to China also, our policy is well known, and here again, we have no quarrel with the Chinese people, and we would certainly like not to have a rigid attitude in this, but we feel that some indication should come or some situation created in which we can get out of our present rut. This has been complete-

ly lacking, but we do not believe that we should close the door for that matter.

**300 "U.S.-Soviet pawn against China," *Peking Review*  
commentary on the new Indian government, 28 April 1967  
(Extracts)**

In the six weeks since it came into office, the new Indian Government has had a record of eagerly selling out India's national interests, tailing ever more faithfully behind U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and serving as a pawn in their joint conspiracy against China.

Politically, the new government, in a vain attempt to interfere in China's internal affairs, has let loose a spate of anti-China rantings and talked about "recovery of lost territory" and helping the Tibetan slave-owners to regain their lost power. It is also working hand in glove with U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to hatch new schemes to perpetrate the "peace talks" swindle on the Vietnam question and camouflage its U.S. master's escalation of the criminal war of aggression against Vietnam.

Economically, the new government has opened the door wide for U.S. capital to come in and dominate the production of chemical fertilizers which has proved to be a most profitable business, and U.S. monopoly capital is penetrating into India on a large scale.

Militarily, the reactionary government is feverishly expanding its armed forces and preparing for war at the expense of the Indian people. . . .

India's key position in the strategy of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists against China prompts them to spend freely and make all efforts to try and control India and enslave its people. To encircle China, U.S. imperialism has made large-scale military dispositions and built many military bases in Japan proper, Okinawa, Taiwan, south Vietnam, and Thailand which form a crescent east and south of China. Soviet revisionism, on its part, has formed another crescent west and north of China. Now they are working to make the vast territory of India their military base to link up the crescents and turn them into an anti-China ring. . . .

**301 “Dange’s plot to sabotage Indian people’s revolution will surely fail,” commentary in *Peking Review*, 9 June 1967 (Extracts)**

With the steady development of the Indian people’s struggle against their reactionary government—a lackey of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism—the renegade Dange, running dog of the Soviet revisionists, once again springs forth to spread the absurdity of “peaceful transition” in a vain attempt to paralyse the Indian people’s revolutionary will and to deceive them into giving up the revolutionary struggle. . . .

As a result of this election, an extremely pro-U.S. traitorous central government was formed with Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai heading it. This Congress government is still a reactionary regime of the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie of India. It is strengthening its tools of dictatorship, the armed forces and police, to suppress the Indian people. Under the present extremely difficult economic conditions, the Indian Government is engaged in feverish armament expansion, allotting almost one-third of its total expenditure for its huge military budget. It has sent a large number of reinforcements to the eastern frontier region to flagrantly suppress the Naga people and the Mizo tribesmen who have put up armed resistance. Recently, there have been a succession of bloody incidents of brutal suppression of workers and peasants by the police in many parts of India.

**302 Chinese Foreign Ministry note to Indian *charge d’affaires ad interim* in China, 12 June 1967 (Extract)**

The facts have shown that K. Raghunath is an out-and-out spy under the cloak of a diplomat and has committed grave crimes against the Chinese people.

The Chinese Government is most indignant at such barefaced espionage activities by members of the Indian Embassy in China and lodges the strongest protest with the Indian Government. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hereby solemnly notifies the Indian Embassy in China: The Chinese Government shall henceforth cease to recognize the diplomatic status of K. Raghunath, and K. Raghunath shall not be allowed to leave



China before the Chinese judicial organs take sanctions against his crimes according to law.

### **303 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1966-67, June 1967 (Extracts)**

Developments in 1966 confirmed, if confirmation were needed, not only the Chinese Government's intense and all-round hostility against India but also their persistence, undeterred by Tashkent Declaration, in playing Pakistan against India and keeping the two countries of the subcontinent in a state of conflict. That China had extended material assistance besides verbal sympathy to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 was confirmed when Chinese military equipment including tanks and aircraft were displayed on Pakistan's National Day on 23 March 1966. The Chinese leaders strained every nerve to destroy the Tashkent spirit during the visit of President Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Pakistan in March-April 1966 by repeating the theme of Indian "aggression". The Chinese utilised every opportunity to register their special interest in Kashmir, projecting the image of Kashmir as an independent entity separate from Pakistan as well as from India. Chinese campaign to woo Pakistan was intensified after the exit of Foreign Minister Bhutto. Premier Chou En lai visited Western Pakistan in June on return from Rumania. Pakistan's Commerce Minister Mr. Ghulam Faruque and the new Foreign Minister of Pakistan Pirzada went to China in July and October respectively. During the latter's visit Marshal Chen Yi made a significant admission that Chinese friendship for Pakistan stemmed from the elementary principle that one should be friendly with the enemies of one's enemies.

Throughout the year the Chinese Government kept up its military, economic and political pressure on the border. The territorial claims in the western and eastern sector were repeated and dark hints that "accounts will be settled" were given. The Chinese troops also indulged in a series of intrusions along the entire length of the border and across the "line of actual control" in Ladakh. While no major armed clashes took place on the border, it was clear from the pattern of intrusions that this continuous aggressive activity was designed to keep tension

simmering on the border. . . .

The Chinese Government did not refrain from seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of India by exploiting the economic problems of the country and lending encouragement to fissiparous tendencies. While the Chinese Government saw signs of "a revolutionary situation" in India in the students' strikes and mass demonstrations which are normal features in a democratic country, the Chinese news agency described the Mizos and the Nagas as fighting against India's neo-colonialism and for self-determination. . . .

The completion of the general elections and the peaceful formation of new Governments both in the Centre and the States seem to have infuriated the Chinese who launched a virulent propaganda offensive alleging that the new Government both in its policies and personnel was more reactionary than the previous one. Recalling in ominous tones the Telengana episode, the Chinese propaganda media called for the early and successful conclusion of the mythical revolutionary armed struggle by the people against the Government, in the existence of which, by constant repetition, they have themselves begun to believe.

Intemperate criticism and denunciation of India's foreign policy have also become a regular feature of Chinese propaganda. The Prime Minister's visit to the United States in March was described as following "the Nehru line of fraternising with the United States, allying with the Soviet Union and abusing China". The 7-point proposal on Vietnam put forward by the Prime Minister of India on the eve of her departure for the UAR, Yugoslavia and the USSR was condemned as serving the continued US occupation of South Vietnam and the lasting partition of Vietnam. The Chinese also frowned upon the developing good relations between India and Japan and criticised the consultative meetings of officials of India and Japan as "anti-Chinese". Though the official policy of the Government of India on the recognition of the People's Republic is well-known, the Chinese Government thought it fit to lodge protest against visits of non-official Indians to Formosa and to accuse India of following the so-called policy of "two Chinas".

**304 Statement by Foreign Minister M.C. Chagla in Lok Sabha,  
14 June 1967 (Extracts)**

China did not accept the Colombo proposals . . . and since then, China has continuously followed an anti Indian policy. In 1965, it colluded with Pakistan. When the Tashkent agreement was signed China was the only country that denounced it, and after 1965, it has gone on supplying arms to Pakistan and . . . it has been trying to use subversive methods among the Nagas and the Mizos against our country; and the whole country has condemned it. . . .

I think it is a national shame and humiliation that 14,500 square miles of our country, of our sacred land, should be with China. What do we do about it? . . . how should we get it back? When we are strong economically and militarily. . .

Basically there has been no difference as far as our Chinese policy is concerned . . . Regarding the question of admission of China to UN, we have consistently taken the view that China is a fact of life and that recognition of China for the purpose of UN does not mean that we accept the policy of China or we treat China as a friendly country. Even in the USA and European countries, opinion is veering round that it was a mistake not to have admitted China into the UN. If China had been in the Comity of nations, perhaps its policy would have been different. Then, how are we going to have disarmament unless China is a party to any agreement? How can you call it United Nations, representing the nations of the world, when a nation of 650 million people, however, wicked its policy might be, is not a member of that organisation? That is the reason for our policy . . .

When we admitted the sovereignty of China over Tibet . . . we made it clear to China that China would respect the autonomy of Tibet, which China has not done in that sense China has violated the agreement. When we did not interfere in the affairs of Tibet we have to remember what repercussions it would have had on our own internal domestic policies. We have always taken the attitude that countries outside have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. If Tibet rightly was under China, if China had sovereignty over Tibet. . . If India had accepted that position it had been accepted before,

then logically we could only support the Tibetans on the question of human rights.

### **305 Chagla's statement in Lok Sabha regarding treatment of Indian diplomats by China, 15 June 1967 (Extracts)**

The whole world has been shocked by the news which have come from Peking about the humiliating treatment accorded to our diplomats by the Red Guards in Peking. At the airport Shri Raghunath was physically attacked and slapped. His glasses were broken and his face was stated to be bleeding. Shri Vijay who had only been declared *persona non grata* and who according to international law was entitled to all privileges of a diplomat until he left the territory of China was paraded round the airport for one hour and humiliated by a howling mob of Red Guards. Our First Secretary, Shri C.V. Ranganathan against whom no charges had been made was forced to bow his head by the Red Guards. That all this was done in no moment of frenzy but was the result of cold, calculated and deliberate policy was shown by the fact that after this scene was enacted, the Red Guards marched away in disciplined battle formation. . . .

Apart from subjecting him to verbal insults Raghunath was subjected to the characteristic form of punishment inflicted on victims in the cultural revolution, viz. hurling of shoes, spitting at victims and beating with sticks small enough not to bruise or lacerate. . . . We received information about three hours ago that both Shri Raghunath and Shri Vijay have arrived in Hong Kong. . . .

The Chinese government not only violated ordinary rules of diplomatic usage but also broke several promises made to our Charge d'Affaires. He had been assured that Raghunath would be allowed to be accompanied by an Indian officer. The accompanying officer Shri M.S. Rao, First Secretary, was never allowed to communicate with Raghunath during the journey. He has also assured that Shri Raghunath and Shri Vijay would be taken across to the border yesterday evening. The over-night stay in Canton was deliberately planned to subject our officers to humiliation. Thus the Chinese Government have proved themselves not merely indifferent to all civilized norms but have

shown themselves either unwilling or incapable of honouring their own pledged words.

**306 Statement by Swaran Singh, India's Minister of Defence, in Parliament on Chinese explosion of hydrogen bomb, 21 June 1967 (Extract)**

This repeated violation by China of the collective will of the international community has naturally evoked strong criticism, and great concern especially among China's neighbours. The latest explosion of the Hydrogen Bomb is further evidence of China's callous indifference to the opinion of the rest of world. The Government of India view this development with grave concern.

The nuclear policy of China and its impact on our security has been under study by our concerned authorities from time to time and it will continue to engage our most careful attention. I would like to assure the House that all practicable ways and means of ensuring our security are constantly under examination.

**307 Peking Review commentary on essence of Soviet aid to India, 30 June 1967 (Extracts)**

The Soviet Government has promised to give the Indian regime 200 up-to-date SV-7 fighter bombers, according to a recent report of the Press Trust of India quoting the *New York Times*.

In backing up the Indian reactionaries politically, economically and militarily together with U.S. imperialism, the Soviet revisionists aim to turn India into an anti-China advanced guard and joint Soviet-U.S. military base against China. . . .

The Soviet revisionists' efforts to strengthen the Indian reactionaries' military potential are also aimed at supporting American imperialism's schemes for aggression in Asia and menacing India's neighbours. After the recent U.S. announcement of suspension of military "aid" for India and Pakistan, the Soviet revisionists promptly took over the job of supplying military hardware to the Indian reactionaries. This is clearly designed to exert pressure on Pakistan and try and draw the latter into the U.S.-Soviet anti-China alliance. . . .

Judging from their "aid" given to India by the Soviet revisionists, it is clear that Soviet "aid" is no different from U.S. "aid." Following the example of U.S. imperialism, the Soviet revisionist clique uses its "aid" to foreign countries as a means of pushing ahead with its neo-colonialist policy. By means of its "aid," it penetrates into the recipient countries economically and militarily, controls and manipulates their ruling cliques and plunders and enslaves their people.

**308 "Spring thunder over India," *People's Daily* editorial,  
5 July 1967 (Extracts)**

A peal of thunder has crashed over the land of India. Revolutionary peasants in the Darjeeling area have risen in rebellion. Under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party, a red area of rural revolutionary, armed struggle has been established in India. This is a development of tremendous significance for the Indian people's revolutionary struggle. . . . The Chinese people enthusiastically applaud this revolutionary storm of the Indian peasants in the Darjeeling area as do all Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people of the whole world.

The Indian peasants' rebellion and the Indian people's revolution are inevitable; reactionary Congress rule has left them no alternative. India under Congress rule, though nominally independent, in fact is still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. The Congress government represents the interests of the Indian feudal princes, big landlords and bureaucrat-comprador capitalists. Internally, it mercilessly oppresses and ruthlessly exploits the Indian people. Internationally, while continuing to be dependent on its old suzerain, British imperialism, it throws itself into the lap of its new boss, U.S. imperialism, and the latter's number one accomplice, the Soviet revisionist clique, thus selling out the national interests of India on a big scale. Thus imperialism, Soviet revisionism, feudalism and bureaucrat-comprador capitalism weigh like big mountains on the backs of the Indian people, especially on the toiling masses of workers and peasants. The Congress government has intensified its suppression and exploitation of the Indian people and its pursuit of the policy of national betrayal in the last few years. . . .

The Indian revolution must take the road of relying on the peasants, establishing base areas in the countryside, persisting in protracted armed struggle and using the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities. This is Mao Tse-tung's road, the road that has led the Chinese revolution to victory, and the only road to victory for the revolution of all oppressed nations and people.

**309 Foreign Minister Chagla's statement in Lok Sabha,  
14 July 1967 (Extracts)**

I have had the privilege of knowing Dalai Lama for a long time and I have heard from his own lips the agony of his people, the tyranny, the oppression, the cruelty with which an ancient culture is being sought to be wiped out. But, with all the sympathy that I have, and I share it with practically everybody in this House, we must not forget to be realistic. And I would appeal to the House to bear in mind the important distinction between the political status of Tibet and the people of Tibet. . . .

China is indulging in religious genocide. I will go further. China is indulging in cultural genocide. . . . As far as the people of Tibet are concerned, we have done everything, through the United Nations, to raise our voice of protest against what is happening there. The resolution with regard to human rights, to which the people of Tibet are entitled, as any other people in the world, has been passed, supported by this country. . . .

The world body has condemned China for a very serious offence, namely, that she has trampled upon the human rights, the inalienable rights of the people of Tibet. Whatever more can be done can only be done through the United Nations. . . .

There are occasions when one must use cold logic and not sentiments. Are we in a position today to mount an invasion on Tibet? . . . . The only result of such a course might be a flare-up on our border or more oppression. . . . It might result in more oppression, more cruelty against the Tibetans. The Chinese can be a very vindictive people and they are. I do not believe in making empty gestures—it is no use—unless I have the power and strength to implement any decision that I take. If

we could do it today, well, it would be a different thing. But if we are not in a position to do anything, just to pass a resolution which might have serious repercussions, which cannot help Dalai Lama. . . .

However much we might regret, we have admitted a certain political status of Tibet. We have accepted, admitted and recognised the fact that China has sovereignty over Tibet. . . .

**310 "Historical lessons of Telengana uprising," article by  
*People's Daily* commentator, 3 August 1967 (Extract)**

The torch of armed revolution once lit by the peasants of Telengana and later quenched by the revisionists in the Indian Communist Party has been rekindled today by the peasants of Naxalbari in Darjeeling under the leadership of the revolutionaries in the Indian C. P. That red torch lights the road to victory for the Indian revolution; it points the way the Indian revolution has to take. . . .

**311 "Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari fly still higher," article by  
*People's Daily* commentator, 7 August 1967 (Extracts)**

The revolutionary peasant forces in Naxalbari and elsewhere in the Darjeeling District have won their first round victory in the struggle against the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns launched by the reactionary Indian troops and police. The Indian reactionaries' initial repressive actions have failed. . . .

Bravely and skilfully, the peasant armed forces led by revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party have launched guerrilla activities in this area.

**312 Statement by Indian Ambassador to France C. S. Jha at  
the International Diplomatic Seminar, Klesheim, Salzburg,  
August 1967 (Extracts)**

There have been various kinds of pressures which have put the fabric of nonalignment to severe tests. Such pressures could be identified as being of military, political and economic nature. It is a fact of history that for a variety of reasons and motivations on the part of others, nonaligned countries have



been subjected to open or insidious attempts to undermine their sovereignty and territorial integrity and political and economic independence.

Perhaps the worst example was the Chinese aggression against India in 1962. Chinese motivations are as inscrutable as the face of the Sphinx. Nevertheless, it may be said that whatever might appear to be the superficial reasons for such attack, it was principally aimed against the policy of nonalignment which had helped India attain stability, economic progress and influence among other nations. China wished to demonstrate the faiblesse of nonalignment. This China did in spite of its subscription to 'Panchsheel' in the Treaty of 1954 between India and China in regard to trade with Tibet. The Chinese aggression shattered India's sense of security, built up by a steadfast pursuit of nonalignment, and led to a questioning for the first time by some within the country itself of the efficacy and validity of the policy of nonalignment. It also compelled India to take measures for safeguarding its security, which meant diversion of part of her scarce resources from economic development to increased defence expenditure and which, in turn, meant another blow to the foundations of nonalignment. . . .

Another criticism levelled at the policy of nonalignment is that it has not saved nonaligned countries from becoming victims of aggression. For example, India and UAR, which are among the principal adherents to the policy of nonalignment, have both been victims of external attacks. Speaking of India, such a criticism is frequently voiced by our own people. In my opinion, however, the Chinese aggression against India was not due to the failure of the policy of nonalignment but to the expansionist and chauvinistic behaviour pattern of the People's Republic of China. It does not affect the values embodied in the policy of nonalignment, . . . It also means that China has disowned the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Panchsheel, to which it had itself subscribed, and which were the setting for our policy of nonalignment. Nonalignment is a two-way traffic and, therefore, so far as China is concerned, India cannot be a nonaligned country. Nevertheless it must be conceded that the experiences of India and UAR have cast some doubts in the minds of some about the adequacy

acy of the policy of non-alignment in so far as the security of a nonaligned country is concerned. . . .

Another factor affecting nonalignment is the curious triangular situation in the world—the confrontation between the People’s Republic of China and the two classic Power Blocs on the one hand, and China and nonaligned countries in Asia on the other. Among the latter are principally India, Burma and other non-aligned countries on the periphery of China. This is a new situation which was not envisaged in the earlier years of the policy of nonalignment. In such a complicated situation nonaligned countries, particularly those not directly affected, have found it difficult to steer a meaningful course and have to equate nonalignment with neutrality. They have played for safety, and it will be correct to say that in recent years for many nonaligned countries the distinction between nonalignment and passive neutrality has tended in practice to disappear.

A striking example of the confusion in which nonaligned countries were thrown, was provided during the Chinese attack on India in 1962. Many non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa on that occasion mistakenly abstained from what they described as “taking sides”, even though they were quite clear as to the merits of the case, namely, that India had been subjected to a deep and massive invasion by the Chinese armed forces. Likewise, during the recent West Asian conflict, several nonaligned countries have thought fit to remain neutral and not “take sides”, by refusing to pronounce on the merits of the case, despite their convictions.

This tendency to adopt a passive and neutral attitude in the face of glaring injustice and violations of the Charter of the United Nations, has been among the principal factors tending to besmirch and shake the foundations of nonalignment and to weaken that policy in playing the role of an effective force for peace.

### **313 *Peking Review* commentary on the Naga and Mizo rebellion movement, 1 September 1967 (Extracts)**

The Naga and Mizo tribesmen have made important headway in their armed struggle for national liberation. Active in Assam state, Nagaland and Manipur, all in northeast India,

they have united with the armed forces of other tribes to carry out still more extensive guerrilla actions. With increased fighting power, they have dealt heavier blows at the Indian reactionaries who are ruthlessly oppressing them. . . . These struggles have dealt a severe blow to the Congress Party's reactionary rule and exposed the nonsense of the Indian revisionists that "conditions aren't ripe for armed struggle in India."

**314 "The Indian food crisis and armed revolution," article by  
*People's Daily* commentator, 5 September 1967 (Extracts)**

The food shortage in India, unchecked for years, has ballooned into staggering proportions recently. India is a big country with a large population and rich resources but starvation is spreading across the land. Why has the food shortage become so serious that millions have died and are dying of hunger? What is the way out for hungry India? . . . .

The fact is India's serious food shortage is entirely due to the reactionary dark rule of the Congress government. At home, this government preserves intact the feudal system and boosts bureaucrat-capitalism, mercilessly exploiting and oppressing the Indian people. In foreign affairs, it hires itself out to and throws in its lot with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, following a policy of "letting the wolf into the sheepfold," selling out the national interests and bringing untold misery to the Indian people.

The teeming millions of India's toiling masses refuse to accept starvation as their fate. They have now risen to give battle, as witness the spring thunder from Naxalbari where the peasants have started armed struggle. . . . The only way out for the hungry, suffering Indian people is to cast off by revolutionary means imperialism, Soviet revisionism, feudalism and bureaucrat-comprador capitalism, the mountains weighing down on their backs, and fight for a new India where the people are their own masters. . . . The road of victory charted by Chairman Mao for the Chinese people is also the road to victory for the Indian people,

**315 “Indian reactionaries have miscalculated again,” article by *People’s Daily* commentator on border incident, 14 September 1967 (Extracts)**

Indian aggressor troops openly crossed the China-Sikkim border at Nathu La on September 11 and launched a fierce attack on the Chinese frontier guards. These aggressor troops continued to pour heavy artillery fire on Chinese territory up till the 13th. This is a grave armed provocation against China and a long premeditated act of military adventurism by the Indian reactionaries. . . .

The provocations and aggression by the Indian reactionaries are instigated by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. It is common knowledge that they provided the arms and equipment for the Indian aggressor troops. Of late, they have been urging their lackeys to carry out frantic anti-China activities. The Indian reactionaries are one group of their anti-China hatchetment. . . .

Indian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister M. Desai is now in the United States. Indian Defence Minister Swaran Singh will be going to Moscow to beg for aid. The large-scale military provocations launched by the reactionary Indian Government at this juncture are for the purpose of getting more dollars and rubles from its masters.

In creating this armed provocation on the China-Sikkim border, the Indian reactionaries evidently have another ulterior motive. They want to use it to spread rumours about China being a “threat” to Sikkim, undermine the friendly relations between the peoples of two countries, strengthen Indian control over Sikkim and keep it permanently as an Indian protectorate.

**316 “Soviet revisionism is one of the biggest foreign exploiters in India,” commentary in *Peking Review*, 29 September 1967 (Extracts)**

In plundering India via the medium of “aid,” the Soviet revisionists first of all seek to dominate the vital sectors of the Indian economy. . . . Acting in the same way as the imperialists, the Soviet revisionists use “aid” to promote the export of their commodities. . . . The Soviet revisionists have, through

a barter arrangement, made India's foreign trade heavily dependent on the Soviet market. . . . Besides, in return for their "aid," the Soviet revisionists have demanded special privileges which infringe on India's national interests.

What is noteworthy is that, in recent years, the Soviet revisionists have attempted to enter into partnership with private Indian monopoly capital to making use of India as a base for economic penetration in Asia and Africa. Acting like the imperialists, Soviet revisionism has jumped in to exploit India's cheap labour, technique and raw materials by investing and opening factories in India to produce goods for export to some Afro-Asian countries.

**317 Statement by Minister of Defence Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 14 November 1967**

The Chinese troops which had started a process of minor intrusions on to the Sikkim side of the Tibet-Sikkim border from about the middle of August, and which had been dealt with firmly by Indian troops guarding the Sikkim border, on 11th September after an altercation with our troops who were strengthening a barbed wire fence to curb the Chinese intrusions, suddenly and without provocation, opened up small arms fire on our troops at Nathu La. This was followed by artillery fire. Indian troops returned the Chinese fire. The firing continued from 11th to 14th September at Nathu La.

At Cho La where the Chinese had been improving and strengthening their defences for some time, on 1st October questioned our occupation of a position which had always been in our control. A scuffle took place in which a Chinese soldier bayoneted an Indian soldier. In retaliation the Indian sentry bayoneted two Chinese soldiers. Subsequently, the Chinese opened fire with MMGs, RCL guns and 60 mm and 82 mm mortars. The fire was returned by our troops. Mortar fire stopped at about 1515 hours and all firing ceased at 1615 hours.

Our losses in the incidents of firing at Nathu La and Cho La were 88 killed and 163 wounded. Besides, some damage was caused to our defensive positions and equipment. Though the exact casualties are not known, it is estimated that the Chinese suffered about 300 killed and wounded in the Nathu La

firing and 40 in Cho La. The damage caused to their defensive position was also more considerable.

Our troops have dealt with the Chinese provocations in a calm and cool manner but when unprovoked firing was resorted to by the Chinese, they gave effective replies. At no time did the Indian troops lose control of any military post to the Chinese and but for the fact that they were treacherously attacked on both occasions, our casualties would not have been as many as have actually taken place.

(c) Government keep a close watch on developments across our borders having a bearing on our security, and these are taken note of in our defence plans.

**318 "India 'non-Congress Governments' on the rocks,"  
commentary by Observer in *People's Daily*,  
5 December 1967 (Extracts)**

In India's sharpening class struggle, the so-called "non-Congress Governments" which have been loudly puffed up and paraded by the revisionists in the Indian Communist Party are bankrupt politically—and have been for quite some time. Recently, the reactionary ruling clique, seeing that the one in West Bengal had outlived its usefulness, curtly ordered its dissolution and sent large numbers of troops to Calcutta to put down the people's resistance struggle in that state still more directly and ruthlessly. And so the bubble surrounding the "non-Congress" governments" has been burst.

What goes by the name of "non-Congress government" is merely a device of India's big landlord class and big bourgeoisie for collecting together revisionists in the Indian Communist Party, the Dange renegade clique and reactionary politicians of all descriptions to hoodwink the people. Congress rule, which represents the interests of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie, has been going through a deepening crisis. The storm of the people's struggle against hunger and tyranny is sweeping one place after another. The whole of India has been gripped with panic. In these circumstances, the ruling clique used the "4th general elections" last February to put up the signboards of "non-Congress governments" in Kerala, West Bengal and several other states in order to maintain its reactionary rule. . . .

Whether in Kerala or in West Bengal, the “non-Congress governments” most ruthlessly suppressed the people’s revolutionary struggle. . . . Whether in Kerala or in West Bengal the “non-Congress governments” zealously protected the interests of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie; they did not dare touch the feudal landlords and bureaucrat-comprador capitalists in any way. . . . Both these “non-Congress governments” followed a treacherous policy of fraternizing and currying favour with U.S. imperialism. . . .

Despite their efforts to disguise themselves as opponents of the Dange renegade clique, the revisionists in the Indian Communist Party of whom Namboodiripad is a representative are nothing but the twin brothers of the Dange renegades.

Today, the peasants’ armed revolution and the struggle to seize land with Naxalbari as the banner are breaking out in many parts of India. The armed struggles of the Nagas and the Mizos persist and are growing stronger. The revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party and the broad masses of the revolutionary people in the country, having repudiated the Dange renegade clique, are now waging a sharp and irreconcilable struggle against the counter-revolutionary revisionist line pursued by Namboodiripad and his kind. In their tortuous struggle, they are in the course of discovering the correct road which will lead their revolution to victory. This is the road charted by Chairman Mao, i.e., under the leadership of the political party of the proletariat, to arouse the peasant masses in the countryside to wage guerrilla war, unfold an agrarian revolution, build rural base areas, use the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture the cities.

**319 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s statement in Lok Sabha debate on foreign affairs, 22 December 1967 (Extract)**

China continues to maintain an attitude of hostility towards us and. . . spares no opportunity to malign us and to carry on anti-Indian propaganda not only against the Indian Government but the whole way of our democratic functioning and even our national integrity.

But I would like to say that we do not harbour any evil intentions towards the Chinese people and we do hope that a

day will come when they will also realise that [it is to the interest of all the countries of South-East Asia that we should be friends and that each country should be able to devote its strength to solving the very major problems of combating poverty, backwardness and all their attending evils.

Many a time something seems to be in our interest today but it is not necessarily in our interest in the long term. That is why both with regard to Pakistan and China, although the Government of India must be fully prepared and be fully on guard against any threat, in spite of that we do not have a closed mind. We do want to have friendship, we do want to open up any kind of avenue which can lead to better understanding or which can lead to a solution of problems.

### **320 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 23 December 1967 (Extracts)**

Our treaty with China and Tibet is quite clear: we have accepted certain Chinese positions in relation to Tibet. . . .

We had taken a certain attitude with regard to Tibet after taking into consideration everything—historical background, documents, etc., and even the McMahon line on the eastern side of our border; there were talks with Tibetans. . . .

If there has been a conflict later on, to get away from that treaty is a suggestion which is most fantastic. Even if any particular clause of that treaty has not been actually adopted by any country, whether that entitles us to smash that treaty, to obliterate it. . . .

I want to make it clear that notwithstanding all these pressures that are mounted from time to time our policy on Tibet continues to be what it was. We cannot recognise Dalai Lama as the head of an emigre government, because there is no such government. This matter has been clarified more than once. . . .

We have our differences with China. China is in illegal occupation of our territory. They are mounting pressures on us in a variety of ways. Collusion between China and Pakistan is there. All these factors are known to us and to the country. But let our judgement, let our attitude not be clouded on issues about which there is no scope for confusion. . . .

Our position with regard to Formosa and our position on



Tibet remains the same, because raising these issues does not help us. In fact, it embarrasses us in the international community.

**321 “ ‘Public sector’ of Indian economy is scourge of the people,” commentary in *Peking Review*, 25 December 1967 (Extracts)**

In the name of developing the “public sector” of the economy and building a “socialist pattern of society,” the reactionary Congress Government has greatly expanded India’s state monopoly capitalism, or bureaucrat capitalism, with the help of state power, during the last ten years or more. The present paid-up capital of enterprises in the “public sector” accounts for nearly a half of the total paid-up capital of all Indian firms. The “public sector” has already become a big mountain lying like a dead weight on the Indian people. . . .

Most of the Indian “public sector” enterprises were started and expanded with the assistance of imperialism and the Soviet revisionist group. The machinery and equipment came from the imperialist and revisionist countries and design and technology are controlled by the imperialists and revisionists. Some are even run jointly with foreign monopoly capital. . . .

With the expansion of the “public sector,” the Indian Government leans increasingly heavily on imperialism and revisionism, primarily on U.S. imperialism. . . . The Indian people have to pay dearly for the development of bureaucratic and comprador capital and, at the same time, suffer from the ruthless exploitation by U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist group. . . . There is ample proof that the bureaucrat-capital fostered by Nehru and his successors primarily serves the interests of private monopoly capital and the top crust of officialdom. . . .

Indian bureaucrat-capital and private monopoly capital are so closely interlinked that some monopoly capitalists have become responsible figures of the “public sector” enterprises and some government ministers are agents of the monopoly capitalists.

In India, the state and private monopoly capital is also closely linked with feudal rajas and landlords.

As in China before its liberation, comprador, feudal, state

monopoly capitalism has become the economic foundation for the reactionary regime of the Indian Congress Party.

**322 “Historic turning point in the Indian revolution,” article in *Peking Review*, 12 January 1968 (Extracts)**

Nineteen sixty-seven marks a turning point in the history of the Indian revolution. Under the guidance of the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, the Indian people have finally embarked on the only correct road for the Indian revolution—the victorious road along which Chairman Mao led the Chinese people to seize political power by armed force. . . . Now, the revolutionary people of India led by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party are determined to take the road of the Chinese revolution, to oppose armed counter-revolution with armed revolution. This is not only a great turning point in the history of the Indian revolution, but is also of immense significance for the development of the world proletarian revolution.

The struggle between the two lines and the two roads which existed in the Indian Communist Party for a long time has intensified in the past few years. The revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung’s thought, have firmly opposed the parliamentary road of “peaceful transition” pursued by the usurpers of the Party’s leadership, the renegade Dange clique and the handful of revisionist chieftains whose representatives are Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu. . . .

And so at the beginning of 1967, a spring thunder-storm burst over India. In Naxalbari and other places of Darjeeling District, revolutionary peasants rallied by the revolutionaries in the Indian C.P., lit the flames of armed struggle. . . . The armed struggle waged by the Naxalbari peasants greatly inspired the revolutionaries in the Indian C.P. and the revolutionary people in all India.

**323 “What Kosygin was up to in India,” article by *People’s Daily* commentator, 5 February 1968 (Extracts)**

Kosygin’s activities in India and the Soviet-Indian joint communique show that his visit represents a new step by the

Soviet revisionist renegade clique to step up the aid it gives to India against China, and, acting in co-ordination with U.S. imperialism, to expand the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and actively peddle the "peace talks" fraud. . . .

The peasant revolutionary armed struggle in Naxalbari in particular has dealt a powerful blow at the reactionary rule of the Congress government. . . . Kosygin personally went to India to boost the morale of the reactionary Congress government in the hope of keeping this tossing ship afloat in the raging revolutionary torrent so that the Indian reactionaries can continue to serve as a tool in the joint U.S.-Soviet opposition to China.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin renegade clique has completely taken over Khrushchov's policy of supporting India and opposing China, and has gone even farther. Within the few years since it came into power, it has granted India loans twice as big as before and has supplied the country with a large quantity of modern weapons in order to strengthen the military forces of the Indian reactionaries for aggression against China. Now, the Soviet revisionist clique has become the biggest supplier of military "aid" to India. The Soviet Union has become the second biggest creditor of the nation and ranks third among countries trading with India. In collusion with U.S. imperialism, the Soviet revisionist clique is intensifying step by step its neocolonialist enslavement and control over India. . . .

On the very day of Kosygin's arrival in India, an Indian paper disclosed that the Soviet revisionist authorities had recently delivered 100 Soviet SU-7 supersonic fighter-bombers for use against China. In addition, the Soviet authorities will supply India with more military "aid" to meet the so-called "additional military requirements" of the Indian Government. Meanwhile, the Western press also disclosed that the United States had "proposed" to the Soviet revisionist clique that the two countries should jointly provide for India's "nuclear protection." Obviously Kosygin was directing his spearhead at China in his Indian tour. . . .

Kosygin. . . is obviously attempting to put up once again the signboard of the Soviet Union and Britain as the "co-chairman of the Geneva conference" and of India as "Chairman of the International Control Commission" in Indo-China, so as to serve U.S. imperialism by helping it avert its defeat in Vietnam.

Kosygin's dirty activities in New Delhi have once again exposed the Soviet revisionist clique's renegade features of sham support for and real betrayal of the Vietnamese people.

**324 Address by President of India to the joint session of both Houses of Indian Parliament, 12 February 1968 (Extract)**

We have always wished the Chinese people well. We naturally expect China to respect our right to pursue our own domestic and foreign policies. The principles of mutual respect, non-aggression and non-interference alone provide a durable basis for international relations. On our part, we seek restoration of our relations with China on these principles.

**325 "Let the peasants' revolutionary storm in India strike harder," article by *People's Daily* commentator, 26 February 1968 (Extract)**

The flames of revolutionary armed struggle of the Indian peasants have been rapidly spreading ever since the peasants of Naxalbari launched their revolutionary armed struggle. Recently, the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, guided by the great thought of Mao Tse-tung, have been leading the peasants in the northern part of Bihar State in a courageous struggle to seize land by force of arms. By now the Naxalbari-type of peasant movement has engulfed 50 areas in 8 of the 16 Indian states and regions under direct central control. Growing in scale, the peasants' struggle to seize land by force has assumed such proportions that, like thunderclaps and flashes of lightning breaking the dead silence of the overcast skies over India, it is shaking the reactionary rule of the Congress government. An excellent situation, never seen before, has opened up in the Indian revolution. We warmly acclaim and cheer this revolutionary storm let loose by the Indian peasants'. . . .

**326 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1967-68, March 1968 (Extracts)**

Our bilateral relations with our immediate neighbours, barring

Pakistan and China, have been characterised by trust and co-operation. Even with Pakistan, in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration, we have been able to achieve some small measure of progress towards normalisation of our relations. We shall persevere in these efforts despite a somewhat discouraging response from Pakistan. With China, our relations have shown no signs of improvement. The persisting hostility of the Government of the People's Republic of China towards the Government and the people of India is unwarranted and cannot but be regretted and deplored. Notwithstanding our desire for friendship, the Government of India remain vigilant against threats to our security, territorial integrity and the principles and the institutions which the people of India cherish. At the same time, the Government of India will not give up hope that China and Pakistan will also realise that, on the principle of peaceful co-existence, there is need and advantage in improving relations with India for their own benefit and that of stability in Asia.

**327 Statement by Minister B. R. Bhagat in Lok Sabha,  
4 April 1968 (Extract)**

With China, unfortunately, all our efforts to localise problems and not to allow them to worsen our relations have not borne fruit. Hon. Members have tried to say that we should develop more relations. The hon. Member, Shri Sondhi, said that we must try to have a new look on our policy with China. We agree. But the situation is such that it is China which has to change its policies. They have to change their posture of hostility. An internal upheaval has been going on in China for the last few years. So far as it is internal, it is not our concern but in so far as it has an effect on China's external relations, we cannot but be concerned with it because it affects us as well as some other peace-loving neighbours of China. Unfortunately, the result of this internal upheaval in China has been a stiffening in their external policy which does not show any possibility or probability of improving our relations with them in the near future. However, we have adopted a policy of reciprocity and firmness without giving any provocation towards China. We have made it clear that we shall not

tolerate any breaches of our territorial integrity or sovereignty and that we are determined to safeguard our national interest. If and when China changes her policy towards us, we shall not be found wanting in making a proper response to it

**328 Statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Lok Sabha, 5 April 1968 (Extracts)**

Some members accused us of not playing an effective role in developing regional security arrangement for the defence of South and South-East Asian countries from Chinese expansionism. . . .

The security of South and South-East Asia will not be made more secure by alliances or treaties. We believe that security will grow out of mutual cooperation and the growth of identity of interests, and on our part, we have been doing everything possible to explore all avenues of such mutual cooperation in economic and other fields. . . .

Some hon. Members have spoken of cutting off relations with China altogether; on the other hand some have talked of raising them to Ambassadorial level. We have diplomatic relations with a large number of countries. In fashioning these relations, we do not look into the political and social composition of the Governments concerned. We believe that that is the responsibility of the people of the country concerned. . . .

Our differences with China arose mainly from the fact that China is not prepared to accept this elementary code of international conduct. The day they accept it, we would have gone a long way towards normalising our relations. I have no doubt that through a process of trial and error, the Chinese Government will one day realise that the world is much too complex to be reduced to some uniform pattern however shining and bright that pattern might appear in the eyes of the hot gospellers of our present-day world.

**329 Indian note to China, 19 April 1968 (Extract)**

By entering into a so-called agreement [21 October 1967] on a land route between Gilgit Agency and Baltistan in Kashmir and Sinkiang on the Chinese side, the Chinese Government

have gone a step further in interfering in India's internal affairs. It is noteworthy that no details have yet been published of this dubious deal. The Press statements released in Pakistan and China have sought to give the impression that the so-called agreement has only a commercial context. However, against the known background of China's design to promote instability amongst her neighbours and her unabashed efforts to aggravate Indo-Pakistan relations, it is quite obvious that the so-called agreement is not quite as innocent as merely "to facilitate overland trade." No matter what pretence or purpose the so-called agreement may be for, the Government of India reiterate that they shall take no cognizance of it and that it will have no legal or constitutional validity whatsoever.

The Government of India hereby lodge an emphatic protest against the Chinese Government's illegal interference with regard to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir which is an inalienable part of India.

### **330 Statement by Minister B.R. Bhagat in Rajya Sabha, 13 May 1968 (Extracts)**

The House is aware that China and Pakistan have been building roads to link up Pakistan occupied Kashmir with China. The link is through the 15,000 ft. Mintaka Pass on the Sinkiang-Kashmir border. The Chinese have now completed their portion of the road north of the pass and trucks can use it during the summer months. On the Kashmir side, a fair weather jeepable road exists between Gilgit and Pasu, a distance of about 70 miles. The Pakistanis are improving this road as well as building a new jeepable road from Pasu onwards to the Mintaka Pass, a distance of another 70 miles.

On October 21, 1967, China and Pakistan signed an agreement on the opening of the Sinkiang-Gilgit link. The text of the agreement has not been published. The official Press releases issued by the two Governments announcing the agreement stated that the road provides for the reopening of the ancient overland route and would facilitate trade in the border areas as well as between China and Pakistan. According to Press reports in the Pakistan Press, the road was due to be opened this month.

There are two aspects of this agreement. . . First, it seeks to interfere with Indian sovereignty in Kashmir. Pakistan and China have no common border, the two countries being separated by the portion of Jammu and Kashmir which is in Pakistan's illegal occupation. Thus, agreements signed by Pakistan with China concerning Pakistan-occupied Kashmir are illegal, invalid and totally unacceptable to us. . . .

The second aspect of this agreement. . . is that an agreement which purports to relate to flow of commerce should be kept secret. Obviously the purpose is not as innocent as it is made out to be.

The Agreement is in the line with the collusive Sino-Pak postures directed against India. I need hardly add that Government are fully aware of the threat to our security posed by this road and everything possible has been done to safeguard our defence and security.

### **331 Commentary in *Peking Review* on the Nagas and Mizos rebellion in India, 28 June 1968 (Extracts)**

Operating in northeast India, the armed forces of the Naga, Mizo and other peoples have launched many effective attacks against Indian troops this year. . . .

The Nagas, Mizos and Kukis have recently made combined raids on the reactionary troops. . . .

Alarmed by their increased cooperation and activities, the Indian Government has tried to put down these armed forces by resorting to counter-revolutionary dual tactics. While inducing some Naga leaders to agree to "peaceful negotiations," it has simultaneously stepped up its collusion with the reactionary Burmese Government to set up "security corridors" in the Indian-Burmese border region and send out joint patrols against these peoples. . . .

And sure enough, the Indian Government mobilized large forces and launched a brutal suppression campaign against the Nagas and Mizos. Indian bourgeois papers disclosed that the Nagas fought fiercely against the reactionary troops near Kohima, capital of Nagaland, for several days on June 7, 8 and 10. . . .

The stand of the Indian revisionists on the Nagas and Mizos



is worth noting. Instead of supporting their armed struggle, they preach Indira Gandhi's willingness to "meet the demands" of these peoples and claim that she has given her blessing to a scheme to set up an "autonomous hills unit" in Asam State. By spreading such propaganda these revisionists try in vain to help the Indian Government benumb the militant spirit of these armed forces and inveigle them to lay down their arms.

However, neither armed suppression nor political deception can curb the development of the armed struggle of the Nagas, Mizos, Kukis and other peoples. Fighting for a just cause, they will surely win final victory.

**332 "Jackdaw in peacock feathers," *People's Daily* commentary, 10 August 1968**

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi spoke in extravagant terms in parliament the other day about India's so-called aid and loans to Southeast Asian countries and areas. One can have nothing but contempt for such tall talk.

Is this for showing off? India is far from being in a position to do so. It is well known that the Indian reactionaries who have not hesitated to barter away the nation's interests for hand-outs from the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists eke out an existence entirely by begging and borrowing. Up to their necks in debt, they have constantly to contract more debts in order to pay off outstanding ones. Annual interest on foreign debts alone runs from 4,000 million to 5,000 million rupees. They are clearly parasites who cannot survive for a single day without hand-outs from U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, and yet they make much of the miserable begged for and borrowed coppers jingling in their pockets. They are absolutely ridiculous.

Or is this benevolence? More than anything, this is hoax, pure and simple. As the representative of the interests of the country's big landlord and capitalist classes, India's ruling clique, drunk with expansionist ambitions, has long pursued an expansionist policy. From the favours received from its masters, it has doled out some small change as "aid" and loans to Southeast Asian countries and areas. Flaunting about in order to hide its come-down in the world, it actually hopes to carry

out economic infiltration by these nefarious measures to reap some profit. Some benevolence.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out that, in economically backward and semi-colonial countries, "the landlord class and the comprador class are wholly appendages of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon imperialism for their survival and growth." This is exactly what the big landlord and capitalist classes in India are. In the past, they wholly depended upon British imperialism. After India's proclamation of independence, they steadily went over to U.S. imperialism, becoming an appendage of imperialism headed by the United States. So-called "Indian aid" is nothing but an offshoot of "U.S. aid," with Indian ruling circles playing the role of a kind of sub-creditor to meet the needs of U.S. imperialism.

The so-called "Indian aid" advertised by Indira Gandhi can neither elevate the so-called "big power" status of the reactionary Indian ruling circles, nor solve the serious political crisis facing them. A jackdaw in peacock feathers—these antics of the Indian reactionaries are vulgar and revolting.

### **333 "U.S.-India collusion: plotting anti-China alliance,"**

*Peking Review* commentary, 16 August 1968 (Extracts)

From July 23 to 28, U.S. Under-Secretary of State Katzenbach was in New Delhi for closed-door talks with the reactionary Indian Government. This was in accordance with an agreement between the U.S. and Indian Governments to hold regular bilateral talks to step up their collaboration and hatch new schemes against China.

In the talks, Katzenbach again made much play with the U.S. imperialists' long-standing aggressive designs for Asia, namely, to use the reactionaries of various countries to rig up with U.S. support a counter-revolutionary encirclement of China. He reassured the Indian reactionaries that "the Johnson Administration is not easing or altering its policy toward communist China" while they brayed that they regarded "communist China as a continuing threat." Besides reiterating Indira Gandhi's anti-China proposals, they put forward a scheme for an anti-China alliance under the pretext of "strengthening economic links" among nations bordering on

China. Western newspapers disclosed that this won the "warm" support of U.S. imperialism.

The aim of U.S. imperialism is to knock together an anti-China alliance with Japan and India as its mainstays. The reactionary Indian Government for its part dreams of playing, with the support of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, a leading role in this alliance and thus facilitate its own expansionist policy in Asia. It is therefore doing its utmost to further the U.S. imperialist scheme to rig up this anti-China alliance.

Before and after Katzenbach's visit, the reactionary Indian Government has continued to step up its provocative activities along the China-Sikkim border and to create tension. . . .

Just like throwing eggs against rocks, the stepping-up by U.S. imperialism and the Indian reactionaries of their collusion and anti-China activities will only bring about their own doom.

**334 "Soviet revisionism carries out social-imperialism economic exploitation in India," commentary in *Peking Review*, 8 November 1968 (Extracts)**

Under the pretext of giving "economic assistance," the Soviet revisionist renegade clique is cruelly exploiting the Indian people and plundering India's rich resources. Its behaviour in India is practically the same as that of U.S. imperialism, thereby fully exposing its real social-imperialist nature.

U.S. imperialism has been supplying India with so-called surplus food grains, and as a result has gained control of the country's economic lifeline. . . . As to the Soviet-"aid" industrial enterprises, the Soviet revisionists maintain exclusive command over them, from the planning stage to the installation of equipment and the supply of raw materials. They have even stuck their noses into the management of these enterprises, and actually control some. . . .

The beneficiaries of either U.S. "aid" or Soviet "aid" are none other than the handful of big blood-suckers—the bureaucrat-comprador capitalists and the big landlords who trample on the people. . . .

Built with Soviet revisionist "aid", the Bhilai Steel Plant is one of the four government-run steel plants in the hands of the Indian bureaucrat-capitalist class. The Soviet revisionists sold

very bad quality refractory materials to this plant. . . .

Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism are now ganging up more closely to energetically expand their respective spheres of influence in India. They are speeding up their plunder and division of India between themselves. U.S. imperialism specializes in dumping grain and other agricultural products on India, in controlling India's communications, transport and electric power departments, and investing in privately-run fertilizer and chemical industries. Soviet revisionism controls the iron and steel, machine-building, power and other heavy industries of the Indian bureaucrat-capitalists. The U.S. imperialists had agreed to build a government-run big steel plant in Bokaro, but since the United States and India failed to reach agreement on the conditions, the project was taken over by the Soviet revisionists.

### **335 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's replies to questions at a press conference, 1 January 1969 (Extracts)**

*Question:* You have already dealt with American and other countries. What is your view of the Sino-Indian problem? Do you think that the dispute is limited merely to the border question, or the confrontation is much more basic—political and economic? In this context, is a dialogue possible?

*The Prime Minister:* I will start with the last part. I think that however difficult the situation may seem, it is always possible in the world to find a way out. The confrontation is not easy of definition because of the changing world situation and it is bound to be affected by what happens in the rest of the world. As you know, there is the anti-Indian propaganda campaign. I do not know whether I should use the word 'confrontation'. But certainly our attitude towards the world and our own development is entirely different. But, as I said, even though it may seem impossible at the moment, I think, all things are possible if one tries hard enough. A solution can only be found keeping the national interest and national honour in mind. . . .

*Question:* Coming back to the China question, since the Chinese

occupied Indian territory before and during 1962, the only difference that is made is the time lag. We had taken a certain position in 1962 and 1963. Have you any particular reason why this recent change has come about in the Government at any rate about having a dialogue with China, or the desire of some kind to forget the past.

*The Prime Minister:* I do not think you can forget the past. You cannot ignore it. But how do you solve the question? You do not solve the question by saying, "Here I stand and here I shall remain." You have to find out how it can be solved. . . .

*Question:* Would not India insist on the Chinese acceptance of Colombo proposals now?

*The Prime Minister:* That is now what I meant. What I meant is that we are stuck up in a particular position. That does not solve our problem with China. We should try to find a way of solving this problem. What that way is, I do not know at the moment.

*Question:* You still insist on the Colombo proposals or not? We want a straight answer.

*The Prime Minister:* Unfortunately straight answers are not possible. They come from the wrong ones. . . .

*Question:* Are the Tibetan refugees permitted to take part in political activities?

*The Prime Minister:* They are not, of course.

*Question:* Coming to the China dialogue again, although the language in their broadcasts remains belligerent, there have been some occasions when the Chinese diplomats have appeared in our parties. The Chinese were also present at Kathmandu when the President visited Nepal. Is that a straw in the wind? Have there been any indications of these straws on the part of China?

*The Prime Minister:* Only the future can say which way the straw is leaning.

*Question:* Against this background, how do you view the assistance which China is giving to the Nagas and the Mizos? Is it not more important than the presence of diplomats in our parties?

*The Prime Minister:* That is a part of the present situation and the problem which confronts us. That is what I said. The whole thing has to be viewed in its totality and some effort at least should be made to find a way out. . . .

*Question:* Twenty-one years ago, your father said, "we shall not rest until the last raider is driven out of the soil of Kashmir" I spent one year in prison in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Your father had promised to liberate the remaining areas from Kashmir under Pakistani occupation. Have you any plans to liberate those areas?

*The Prime Minister:* We certainly consider that these areas have been occupied as a result of aggression. But all this, as I said with regard to China, is part of a bigger problem, and one has to see how that problem is to be tackled. I do not think there is only one way of tackling it. There may be other ways. One does not know whether those ways will succeed or not. But all ways, all methods, should be explored.

*Question:* Are you trying any alternative way to solve the problems of China and Pakistan, because you spoke just now about the occupied-Kashmir and about the Colombo proposals. From your answer, it appears that you are not insisting on the Colombo proposals.

*The Prime Minister:* That was not a correct assumption. The point is that if we want to solve something, there is no point in stating very categorical views. Our views are known to these people, and we shall certainly not let them get any wrong impression of our stand. But this kind of discussion or constantly saying "so and so is the greatest enemy" and so on does

not, I think, improve the situation. . . .

**336 "Indian reaction beset with deepening political-economic crisis," *Peking Review* commentary, 31 January 1969 (Extracts)**

The year 1968 saw Indian reaction in great difficulties as the political and economic crises confronting the reactionary Indian ruling classes further deepened.

For years the reactionary Indian Government has lived a beggar's life, relying on foreign handouts, especially those from U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. . . .

Under the reactionary rule of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, India has long been plagued with serious food shortages. Hundreds of millions go hungry and millions die of hunger every year. Serious floods and drought hit many states in 1968. . . .

India's industrial production continued to deteriorate. Unemployment figures rose sharply. . . .

With the aggravation of the economic crisis, the reactionary Indian ruling classes also face a more acute political crisis. Feuds and bickerings have developed with growing intensity. . . .

The Indian reactionaries brutally oppress and exploit the Indian people, and willingly serve as running dogs of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and sell out the national interests. This will inevitably bring them ever deepening political economic crisis and accelerate their doom.

**337 "Parliamentary road in India—a fiasco," *Peking Review* commentary, 31 January 1969 (Extracts)**

In 1968 many genuine Indian Marxist-Leninists went to the countryside to mobilize the peasants for armed struggle. They determined never to join the bourgeois politicians in electioneering.

Indian revolutionaries worked tirelessly to integrate Marxism-Leninism with the Indian revolution in 1968. Mobilizing the masses to take the path of armed struggle, they have marched forward with full confidence. The Indian revisionists, on the

other hand, have stubbornly pursued the “parliamentary road” to undermine the people’s revolution; their counter-revolutionary dealings have become increasingly discredited. . . .

In last year’s struggle against the “mid-term elections,” the Indian revolutionaries made it very clear that in the current, great new era of world revolution, “parliamentary road” is one which betrays the revolutionary struggle and the working people. At a time when the Indian reactionary ruling classes are beset with political and economic crises, the Indian revisionists have energetically peddled the “mid-term elections” for the sole purpose of preventing the sparks of Naxalbari from lighting a prairie fire.

**338 Address by President Zakir Hussain to the Indian Parliament, 17 February 1969 (Extract)**

There is an all-round strengthening and improvement of India’s relations with various nations of the world. It is our firm belief that the stimulated distrust and suspicion of India assiduously spread by Pakistan, and the distorted image of our country which China projects through its ideological prism, will both succumb to the realities of the situation. Government have expressed more than once with frankness and sincerity their desire to have friendliest of relations with both our neighbours consistent with our sovereignty, territorial integrity and on the basis of absolute non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

**339 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet Defence Minister Grechko’s visit to India, 21 March 1969 (Extracts)**

The day the Soviet revisionist renegade clique brazenly staged its March 2 armed provocation against China, its Defence Minister Grechko arrived in India. He spent a week secretly plotting with the reactionary Indian Government to strengthen their counter-revolutionary military alliance against China. . . .

While in India, Grechko made an inspection tour to find out how the Indian reactionaries were using Soviet revisionist military “aid.” The reactionary Indian Government, it was reported, not only demanded early delivery of the arms promi-



sed by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, but also asked for more military hardware, including MIG-23 jet fighters and TU-16 long-range bombers.

This renegade clique has been giving the reactionary Indian Government military "aid" ever since it provoked the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border. In recent years, this "aid" has steadily increased, greatly exceeding that given by U.S. imperialism. It obviously is aimed at making the Indian people serve as cannon-fodder in military adventures against China.

**340 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1968-69, March 1969 (Extract)**

Our relations with China registered no significant improvement during the year. The Government of India have stated on several occasions that they are willing to talk with China on a basis consistent with India's territorial integrity, sovereignty and national honour. The Government of the People's Republic of China have, however, shown no constructive inclination to seek improvement in the relations between the two countries.

The Chinese military build-up across the northern borders of India remains undiminished. There was, however, no armed clash during 1968.

The Chinese authorities continued to disregard the principles of peaceful co-existence and norms of international behaviour. Radio Peking and other Chinese propaganda media persist in interfering in India's internal and external affairs. Chinese official agencies have repeatedly condemned the political institutions of India. What is more, they continue to interfere in India's internal affairs. The Government of India have evidence of Chinese Government's complicity in stirring and abetting some misguided Naga elements and giving them military training and arms.

While the Government of India have made it abundantly clear that the door for peaceful negotiations with China remains open if they respect the principles of peaceful co-existence, we are determined to guard India's territorial integrity and sovereignty and will not tolerate interference in India's internal affairs. We shall remain patient but firm in the hope that the Chinese Government will one day revert to the path of reason, good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence when it may be

possible to improve our relations with that country.

**341 Defence Minister Lin Piao's Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1 April 1969 (Extracts)**

The armed struggles of the people of southern Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, *India*, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America are steadily growing in strength. . . .

The Chinese Government held repeated negotiations with the Indian government on the Sino-Indian boundary question. As the reactionary Indian government had taken over the British imperialist policy of aggression, it insisted that we recognize the illegal "McMahon line" which even the reactionary governments of different periods in old China had not recognized, and moreover, it went a step further and vainly attempted to occupy the Aksai Chin area, which has always been under Chinese jurisdiction, thereby disrupting the Sino-Indian boundary negotiations. This is known to all. . . .

We firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, *India*, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. . . .

**342 Statement by Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh in Lok Sabha, 8 April 1969 (Extracts)**

Much has been said about China and also that there was perhaps some change of policy or there were differences; all sorts of insinuations were made. Therefore, I would like to take a little time of the House in saying a few words about China. Today all eyes are focussed on China. Big internal changes are taking place there which are of tremendous interest to the world outside.

The Red Guard movement, the so-called Great Cultural Revolution and the struggle for power and succession have now culminated in the holding of the 9th Party Congress. We must await the news which will trickle down and will have to be pieced together to make our assessments.

However, our policy towards China is based on certain fundamental principles which have to be applied to situations as they arise and as they affect our national interests and the interests of peace in this region.

Our policy is based on friendship and cooperation. We do not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of others.

We are for rapid changes. China is for changes too. But she wants changes by violent methods. She does not exercise the restraint of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. She believes in a perpetual revolution and is committed to exporting such movements to other countries.

Here is the difference. Development and progress by peaceful methods or by violent methods, interference or non-interference, willing cooperation or compulsion and regimentation.

We are convinced that the people not only in our country but in all other countries are with us. In our own country we are moving forward, perhaps too slowly at times. But in China revolution after revolution has become necessary to compel people to the dictates of the governing group. Party cadres have yielded to military organisations. And yet, uncertainty surrounds the future of their methods.

We have no enmity with the people of China. We wish them well. We also do not wish to interfere in China's internal affairs. But where China violates the recognised norms of international behaviour and threatens our security or when China attempts subversion in our country, we must be ready to meet them.

China's recent attempts to prepare some of our misguided elements for subversion in the country such as the group of hostile Nagas that went to China for training, have been effectively met by us.

The policies of China will have to change one day. China is sailing against the winds of friendship and cooperation blowing all over the world. We cannot say that when it does happen we shall not be found wanting in responding to it adequately.

We believe that even the present rulers of China cannot ignore the feelings for national independence specially among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of some countries have met with stiff opposition and rebuff.

We do not wish to adopt Chinese methods even in dealing with China. We have a long frontier with China. We would like reduce tension along this frontier. But it cannot be at the cost of our national honour, prestige and integrity. . . .

We would wish a peaceful solution of any difference with any country and are prepared to discuss any matter with China, including trade the hon. Member mentioned. But we must be equally prepared to defend our borders. Large Chinese forces are poised against us along the entire length of the frontier and we must be willing to bear the burden of having adequate military preparedness to meet them.

China is also developing nuclear capability. Her aggressiveness constitutes a threat to all countries along her borders. We cannot ignore this threat and it will be our endeavour to take necessary steps in the field of defence and foreign affairs to meet these challenges. In dealing with China it is necessary for us not to get involved in small irritations or verbal duels, but should maintain our unity and strength to act, not when and where the Chinese would wish us to, but at our time and the place of choosing. . . .

The Sino-Soviet border has been the scene of thousands of violations during the last few years. On March 2nd, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed over the Demanski island in the Usuri river. Another clash occurred in the same area on the 15th of March. Judging by our own experience with China, we are not surprised that the Chinese Government is adopting similar postures towards the Soviet Union, the tactic of provoking border incidents in order to reopen the whole boundary question, and these are familiar to us. Our position is quite clear. We are not in favour of altering historically-established borders. Should some grave differences arise, they should be settled peacefully by bilateral discussions. We are against the use of force to change positions unilaterally.

We welcome the latest offer of the Soviet Government to the People's Republic of China to solve this particular dispute through peaceful negotiations. Against this background we support the Soviet stand for upholding respect for historically formed frontiers and for the non-use of force for settling bilateral questions. We had made similar offers to China in respect of incidents at Nathu La and Cho La in September and October,

1967. But, unfortunately, the Chinese Government did not make any positive response.

Hon. Members have raised questions about Tibet. They have given the impression that Tibet was ours to give or to keep. The situation is entirely different. May I remind hon. Members that Tibet was considered a part of China by Britain as well as the United States before India became independent? We inherited a situation which we accepted. . . .

Some Hon. Members wanted to put the blame on the Government of India saying that we gave away Tibet, I had clearly stated that it was never ours to give away or not to give away. It was a situation which we have inherited at the time of independence. . . .

We inherited a situation which we accepted. We had however hoped, as early as 1950, that China would respect the autonomy of Tibet and that the people of Tibet will be able to lead their lives free from outside interference. It was our hope that the Government of China would settle the Tibetan question peacefully. However, our hopes were belied. The Chinese sent their troops into Tibet. A seventeen-point agreement was entered into between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government in May 1951, according to which the Tibetan region of China was assured internal autonomy. As the years went by, the Chinese Government committed large-scale repression and atrocities on the defenceless and peace-loving people of Tibet. They desecrated the monasteries and suppressed human rights. The Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans have taken refuge in India and we gave them asylum. It is a matter of some satisfaction to us that India has done far more for the rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees who had to leave their homes and come away than any other country in the world. We have also supported the resolution against suppression of human rights inside the United Nations. However, we are disappointed that not many other countries have even done so. We had hoped that some countries would sponsor this item last year, but none came forward. Our policy is quite clear. We are against suppression of human rights anywhere in the world. We shall, therefore, consider taking up this question in the United Nations. . . .

So far as the question of supporting Tibet's right to independence is concerned, it would not be proper for us to encourage

this from our soil because it would amount to interference in the internal affairs of another country. . . .

We are against such interference, although China has been interfering in our internal affairs. There is no reason why we should copy their method. We are for the preservation of the rights of the Tibetan people and as I said, we shall be very glad to support any move in this direction either in the United Nations or elsewhere.

Autonomy of Tibet was guaranteed to the Tibetan people by China, not to India. Therefore, it is for the Tibetan people to take up this matter.

### **343 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet support for the Communist Party of India, 16 May 1969 (Extracts)**

For purposes of expanding its social-imperialist influence, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has collected renegades and scabs in Southeast Asian countries to serve as its agents. Flying the banner of "socialism" and in the name of "communists," the Kremlin's new tsars use these dregs of society to undermine from within the people's revolutionary movement and play a vicious role which the U.S. imperialists cannot hope to play themselves. . . .

After Dange's letter of confession was made public and the revisionists in the Indian Communist Party were obliged to part company with the Dange clique organizationally, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique sought to buy over some revisionist bosses in the Indian Communist Party in one way or another by inviting them to the Soviet Union for "recuperation," "medical treatment" and "visits." Upon returning to India, one of them wrote to the Home Minister of the reactionary Indian Government, openly asserting that their (the Indian revisionists) task was to "save parliamentary democracy" and that it was madness to talk about armed revolution and so on. Like the Dange clique, these revisionists have also degenerated into despicable lackeys of U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and Indian reaction.

After India's "general elections" in 1967, they formed state governments in West Bengal and Kerala in partnership with members of the Dange traitorous clique. As a subordinate part

of India's reactionary state machine, these state governments have frenziedly tried to suppress the revolutionary struggles of the workers and peasants. They called out the police to shoot down and beat up many revolutionary peasants in Naxalbari and other places, and threw large numbers of revolutionary people into prison. Working overtly and covertly with the new tsars in the Kremlin, these renegades are savage hatchetmen of the reactionary Indian Government at putting down the people's revolution.

### **344 Indian note to China, 25 June 1969**

The Ministry of External Affairs addresses this note to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and with reference to the further evidence of China's interference in the Indian territory of Kashmir, illegally occupied by Pakistan, states as follows:

2. The Chinese authorities are secretly assisting Pakistan in building a road from Mor Khun in northern Kashmir to Khunjerab Pass on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border. Some 12,000 Chinese military personnel have been inducted in this area for the task. As is well-known, Pakistan continues to illegally occupy this area of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. The construction of this road demonstrates China's collusion with Pakistan to undermine the sovereignty of India and provides proof of China's policy of aggravating relations between India and Pakistan. The Government of India strongly protest against these activities of the People's Republic of China which abet the illegal occupation of Indian territory by Pakistan and create tension between India and Pakistan.

3. This new road from Indian territory illegally under Pakistan's occupation is clearly designed to provide a link with the Chinese network of roads in Sinkiang and Tibet. It is obvious that Chinese authorities intend to develop a strategic network of roads with the connivance of Pakistan to subserve China's ambitions in the region.

4. The Chinese Government have throughout pursued a diabolical policy in regard to Kashmir. They would remember that in the Joint Statement issued by Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Cyrankiwicz of Poland on April 11, 1957 in

Peking, it was stated that the Kashmir question "should be settled by the countries concerned through peaceful negotiations and should not be allowed to be made use of by external forces to create new tensions." China's pronouncements and actions in recent years completely repudiate this statement to which the Chinese Premier had subscribed. It is quite evident from such activities that China, an 'external force' in Kashmir, is wilfully complicating Indo-Pakistani relations and adding new tensions. Kashmir is legally an integral part of India. Pakistan and China have therefore no *locus standi* to undertake construction of roads, etc., in territory lawfully belonging to India.

5. By undertaking such activities that endanger the peace, good neighbourly relations and security of the countries in the region, the Government of the People's Republic of China make it abundantly clear that they are in no way interested in strengthening peace and reducing tensions. Chinese assistance to Pakistan to construct highways in portions of Indian territory under the illegal occupation of Pakistan is a fresh step taken by the People's Republic of China to further aggravate Sino-Indian relations. The consequences of such Chinese actions which can only serve to bring about a further worsening in India-China relations are to be entirely borne by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

### **345 Peking Review commentary on Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Japan, 4 July 1969**

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Japan during June 23-28. This hasty trip took place soon after Soviet revisionism came up with its sinister anti-China programme for setting up an "Asian collective security system." The trip's aim was to make counter-revolutionary contacts with the reactionary Sato Government to help U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in their futile attempt to slap together a counter-revolutionary military alliance in Asia against China, communism and the people.

This act of collaboration between the Indian and Japanese reactionary governments was stage-managed jointly by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. U.S. imperialism has long wanted to see its "general manager in Asia," the Japanese



reactionaries, team up with the Indian reactionaries in serving its policy of aggression. At the same time, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been making greater use of Indian-Japanese collusion to benefit its social-imperialist policy in Asia. The "co-operation" between Gandhi and Sato makes it still clearer that U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism will hereafter take full advantage of the services of the Indian and Japanese reactionaries in opposing socialist China and suppressing the national-liberation movement in Southeast Asia.

Reports say that the primary objective of Gandhi's Japan visit was to take up with the Japanese reactionaries the question of effecting the Soviet revisionists' plot for an "Asian collective security system." In talks with the Japanese Prime Minister, the Indian Prime Minister, speaking as if she were the agent for the Soviet revisionists, had the brass to peddle the Kremlin's plot. Kosygin, she said, had talked about this "proposal" with her during his visit to New Delhi and how its aim is to "contain" China's "influence in Asia." Sato jumped at the Soviet revisionist chieftain's "proposal". After the talks, Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi declared he would visit Moscow in September to discuss the "Asian collective security system" with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique.

During their talks, Sato briefed Gandhi on the activities of the "Asian and Pacific Council," in which U.S. imperialism directed the show and Japan played the star role. The Indian Prime Minister promptly showed a "positive" attitude towards such activities. She told pressmen later that "India is prepared to co-operate with the projected system" even though it is not included in "Pacific Asia."

She also discussed with Sato and other reactionary Japanese politicians the general situation in Asia, including China and Viet Nam. It was reported that during the talks Gandhi and Sato "found themselves in agreement on many basic issues concerning Asia." At a subsequent press conference, Gandhi was very pleased with herself as she announced that Japan and India must "co-operate closely" and "help each other"—that is, in serving the policy of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism to oppose China and commit aggression in Asia. Availing herself of the platform provided by the Japanese reactionaries during her visit, she conducted a hysterical campaign against

China. She maligned and slandered China, standing truth on its head as she sought the favour of her U.S. imperialist and Soviet revisionist masters.

Gandhi left Tokyo for Djakarta on June 28 to make counter-revolutionary contacts with the Suharto fascist military regime. Since the Soviet revisionists' new anti-China programme for an "Asian collective security system" is already being cold-shouldered or opposed by some Asian countries, the Indian reactionaries, by working overtime to peddle the Kremlin's sinister programme, will only further expose themselves as loyal lackeys of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

### **346 Statement by Foreign Minister of India in Lok Sabha, 22 July 1969**

We have received information that the Government of Pakistan have begun constructing a road from Mor Khun in northern Kashmir to Khunjerab Pass on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border. The entire alignment of the road runs in Indian territory which is presently under the illegal and forcible occupation of Pakistan. It is reported that 12,000 Chinese personnel of the People's Liberation Army have been inducted into this area to help build this road and are camped at Mor Khun.

This road will help to extend the Chinese road network in the Tibet-Sinkiang area into northern Kashmir. It will give easier access to Chinese troops from areas under the illegal occupation of China in north-east Kashmir and from Tibet into the Gilgit area in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which lies to the north of the ceasefire line. The military significance of this road is, therefore self-evident.

We have lodged emphatic protests with Pakistan and China over the building of this military road in Indian territory, and pointed out that it is a threat to the peace and tranquillity of the region. Pakistan's willingness to build the road with Chinese help shows that Pakistan's intentions and ambitions in Kashmir equally serve Chinese designs in the area.

The House is well aware of Sino-Pak military collusion against India. The Government is fully alive to the danger posed to our security and is taking necessary steps to safeguard our interests.

**347 “India—A vivid specimen of how Soviet revisionists push social-imperialism,” article by Chang Ou in *Peking Review*, 25 July 1969 (Extracts)**

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique is wildly pushing social-imperialism in the Asian-African region in an attempt to turn it into its sphere of influence. India is a typical case in point. . . .

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique is stepping up its control over India’s heavy industrial departments in the form of “aid” or “co-operation”. It was reported that the Soviet revisionists “aid” to India has totalled 1,350 million U.S. dollars, topping the list of their “aid” abroad. Soviet “aid” enterprises constitute 70 per cent of the total production capacity of the electric generating equipment of India, 80 per cent of the oil extraction industry and 34 per cent of the oil refining industry. At present, the Soviet revisionists control iron and steel, machinery, power and other branches of India’s heavy industry—for instance, one-fourth of the iron and steel industry, half of the oil refining industry, and one-fifth of the power industry. Industries built with Soviet “aid” are under the direct control of the Soviet revisionists, which extends from designing and installation of equipment to the supply of the materials, and from investment and location to management. . . .

Facts show that India has become the biggest sales market, raw material processing plant and investment outlet for the Soviet revisionists in Southeast Asia. This has effectively exploded the myth about the Soviet revisionists’ claim to have strengthened India’s economic “independence.” . . .

**348 “Infighting within Indian ruling circles,” *Peking Review* commentary, 15 August 1969 (Extracts)**

On July 16 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sacked Finance Minister Morarji Desai, old-line pro-U.S. politician, and took over the post himself. With the finance portfolio taken away from him, Desai handed in his resignation as Deputy Prime Minister. . . .

After Desai’s dismissal, Indira Gandhi called an emergency cabinet meeting, which decided to put into force her long-contrived bank “nationalization” programme. This was a

measure to deceive the people and strike at the Desai faction which has always opposed this step. It was also designed to shore up her rickety regime. The "nationalization" programme is in essence a plan to develop bureaucrat-capitalism, in other words, to take the "non-capitalist road" which is advocated by the Soviet revisionists. Revealing the reason for Indira Gandhi's hasty order for the "nationalization" of banks, an Indian paper said that "Under the Prime Minister's stewardship, the country is being deliberately mortgaged to the Soviet Union, whose daily growing influence is perceptible not only in the conduct of our foreign affairs but in the trend of our internal policies, particularly economic."

The Gandhi-Desai feud spotlights the sharpening struggle for power within the Indian reactionary ruling clique which is coming out into the open. It is also a reflection of the bitter rivalry between U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in India, which are collaborating with the Indian reactionaries to oppose China, communism and the people. This dog-bite-dog performance is reaching a climax as the presidential election draws near.

### **349 "Indian revolutionary armed struggle surges forward,"**

*Peking Review* commentary, 31 October 1969 (Extracts)

Firmly taking the revolutionary road of seizing political power by armed force, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) has gone deep into the rural areas, done propaganda work among the masses, organized and armed them, and developed armed struggle with agrarian revolution as its main content, thus bringing on a new vigorous development in the revolution in India.

After the spark of the peasants' armed struggle was kindled by the Indian revolutionaries in 1967 in Naxalbari (West Bengal State), the flames spread in 1968 to Srikakulam District (Andhra Pradesh), Lakhimpur District (Uttar Pradesh) and Muzaffarpur District (Bihar State). This year the peasants' armed struggle has expanded further. . . .

In summing up the experience of armed struggle, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) pointed out that armed struggle is not merely for land but for state power. . . .

The vigorous development of the peasants' armed struggle led and supported by the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) foretells that hundreds of millions of Indian peasants will surely rise to overthrow the four big mountains—U.S. imperialism, social-imperialism, feudalism and comprador-bureaucrat capitalism—which bear down like a dead weight on them.

**350 *Peking Review* commentary on the factional struggle inside the Congress Party, 7 November 1969 (Extracts)**

The struggle between the two factions of India's reactionary ruling Congress Party, which is coming to a head again, has made reactionary Congress rule more wobbly than ever. . . .

The daily sharpening of the factional struggle inside the Congress Party is a reflection of the aggravating class contradictions in the country. Under the heavy blows from the Indian people's vigorous revolutionary armed struggle, Congress rule in the service of the big landlord and big capitalist classes in India is shakier than before. Indira Gandhi time and again cried out in alarm that the "Congress would end its life if a change was not to be made." Jagjivan Ram, Minister of Food and Agriculture, also said apprehensively that if the Congress failed in the "green revolution" (in reference to the so-called "agricultural revolution" which the reactionary Indian Government has put forward to deceive the people), a red revolution would ensue. In these circumstances, the Indira Gandhi group, in an effort to maintain its increasingly shaky rule, put up the signboard of "socialism" and trumpeted about "nationalization" and the development of the "public sector" of the economy. This is actually to step up the development of bureaucrat-capitalism and to further deceive and benumb the people. Her new policy, however, was greeted by a strong rebuff from the "Syndicate" group, which speaks mainly for certain sections of the monopoly capitalists in India. The fight for power between these two factions will surely become more intense with the deepening of the political and economic crisis which today holds the Congress Party in a tight grip.

**351 President V.V. Giri's address to the Indian Parliament,  
20 February 1970 (Extracts)**

With China also our aim has been to conduct our relations on the principles of mutual respect of each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. We expect China to respect our right to pursue our own domestic affairs and foreign policy.

**352 "Indian reactionaries heading for collapse at quicker tempo," *Peking Review* commentary, 27 February 1970  
(Extracts)**

The 1960s saw the Indian reactionaries saddled with inextricable crises both at home and abroad.

In India today, the Congress Party, which represents the big landlord and big capitalist classes, is confronted with the people's strong resentment and rebellion, the like of which has never been seen before. . . .

India's reality shows that the so-called "society of a socialist type" as claimed by the Congress Party is nothing but a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society under the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. More than 20 years of reactionary rule of the Congress Party have wrought havoc to the Indian economy, with the economic arteries tightly held in the hands of foreign monopoly capital.

U.S. imperialism's investment in India increased rapidly through so-called U.S. "aid", and by 1966 has accounted for 60 per cent of the total foreign investments in India. Apart from exercising control over India's agriculture, finance, communication and transportation, oil, and chemical industries, atomic energy and other important departments, it has turned India into a market for dumping U.S. commodities in Asia. From 1951 to 1967, U.S. imperialism dumped into India in the name of "aid" 51 million tons of "surplus" farm products valued at 4,500 million U.S. dollars. By means of such "aid", U.S. imperialism has India's currency under its thumb, to the extent of 50 per cent of the banknotes issued.

In recent years, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, too, has stepped up its infiltration into India, becoming the second

biggest creditor in that country. Through economic and military "aid", it has not only gained control over part of India's iron and steel, oil, power and munitions industries, but has become the biggest supplier of military hardware for the reactionary Indian army, turning India into a base for its expansion into the Indian ocean. . . .

The flames of the peasant armed struggle kindled by the Indian Communist revolutionaries at Naxalbari more than two years ago are raging more and more furiously on the land of India. Today under the leadership of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), the flames of the people's armed struggle have rapidly spread to vast areas in 8 Indian states.

### **353 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1969-70, March 1970 (Extract)**

The year under review did not see any improvement or further worsening in our relations with China. Chinese forces continued to remain in occupation of 14,500 square miles of Indian territory as a consequence of the 1962 aggression. While there were no clashes on the Sino-Indian border, there were a few instances of Chinese aerial and land intrusions in Ladakh and in the Eastern and Middle Sectors.

Chinese troops continued to remain in strength across our borders in Tibet and Sinkiang, and they appear to have constructed and improved roads linking military stations across the India-China, Bhutan-Tibet, Sikkim-Tibet, Nepal-Tibet and Sino-Burmese borders. This improved system of communications is evidently aimed at facilitating the movement of Chinese troops from one part of the border to another.

On the Sikkim-Tibet border the loudspeaker broadcasts directed at Indian troops, which started in mid-1967, still continued. However, there have been no military clashes on the Sikkim-Tibet border since September-October 1967. At that time the Government of India had suggested to the Chinese Government that, for purposes of settling local conflicts and reducing tension at the Sikkim-Tibet border, Sector Commanders of both sides should meet in an attempt to solve such incidents. The Chinese Government did not reply to this constructive suggestion.

The Chinese also continued to interfere in the internal affairs of India. In a note addressed to the Embassy of China in India on 21 April 1969, we protested against the encouragement and aid given by the Chinese authorities to sections of Indian Nagas in their unlawful and antinational activities. It was pointed out by the Government of India that Chinese propaganda organs have also been instigating other sections in India and pursuing an unprincipled policy of inciting and aiding subversion in India.

The general political propaganda against India by Chinese radio and press continued unabated during the period under review. There was a deliberate attempt to discredit parliamentary democracy in India. Chinese professions of "peaceful Co-existence", which have been repeated several times by Chinese leaders during the year 1969 as the basis of Chinese foreign policy do not seem to preclude interference in others "internal affairs".

These facts, unfortunately, suggest that so far there is no basic change in the attitude towards India on the part of the Chinese leadership. On our part, both the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister have declared several times during 1969-70 that India wants to live in peace and friendship with China and that it is prepared to talk with China on a basis consistent with India's territorial integrity, sovereignty and national honour.

**354 Extracts from *India and Nepal: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy* by Shriman Narayan, former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, 1970**

While I was leaving New Delhi for Nepal, Lal Bahadur Shastri and the then Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh were greatly exercised about the construction of a sector of the East-West Highway by China. The presence of hundreds of Chinese technicians and 'skilled' labour in the eastern Tarai posed a real danger to the security of our northern borders. They, therefore, desired me to take up this matter urgently with the Nepal Government and try to get the Chinese out of the Tarai. When I discussed this subject with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Nepal, they expressed their helplessness.



They informed me that His Majesty's Government had requested India to undertake the construction of the East-West Highway (now called Mahendra Raj-Marg), which is of crucial importance to Nepal's economy. Unfortunately, there was no response from India despite repeated requests and, hence, they were obliged to approach the Chinese who responded to their proposal very promptly. Now that an agreement had been formally signed between Nepal and China about the eastern sector of the important Highway, it would be very embarrassing for them to reopen this matter with China. Such a step at this stage would lead to acrimonious discussions and bitter misunderstanding.

I understood their difficulty, but asserted: "I do not know what happened in the past. I am sorry to know that India did not respond in time to your request to take up this project. But you will appreciate that we cannot afford to compromise in this matter. I have now persuaded my own Government to take up a major portion of this road, about 450 miles, and construct it speedily during the next ten or fifteen years in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government." The Ministers were happy to know about India's decision, but they were not in a position to cancel their commitment with the Chinese at their level. I, therefore, discussed the matter with His Majesty. The King also naturally hesitated for quite some time. It was very awkward for him to ask the Chinese to leave the Tarai and survey some other project elsewhere. Even then, he promised to look into the matter.

After several frank discussions, the king conceded that the presence of a large number of Chinese on our borders would imperil India's security. But before he could reopen this delicate question with the Chinese Government, he must be absolutely certain that India had no designs whatever on Nepal. As an acid test of this sincerity on the part of India, the king was very keen that anti-Nepal activities on the southern border must be curbed with a resolute hand by the Government of India and the concerned State Governments. . . .

When there was a tangible improvement in this direction, the King also responded generously. He told me one day. . . . "I and my Government have now decided to request China to abandon the eastern sector of the East-West Highway and

initiate a fresh survey for another road somewhere in the middle regions of Nepal." This was a very welcome decision for India, and when I conveyed it to Shastriji, he, naturally, felt much relieved of the deep anxiety. Senior officers of the Ministry of External Affairs were greatly surprised, and congratulated me in profuse terms.

**355 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's reply to Rajya Sabha debate on foreign affairs, 26 August 1970 (Extract)**

A great deal has been mentioned about China. Some friends have said that we do not fully assess the situation that obtains today between India and China. I would like to assure them that this is one matter about which we give anxious consideration almost constantly, and we review the situation from time to time. There have been some indications, even press reports. And, therefore, it is necessary for me to give our present assessment of the situation. In this connection I would say that we do notice a slight change in the attitude of China towards—and propaganda against—her neighbours, including India, of late; but we have not yet seen any change in the substantive matter so far as Chinese stand towards India is concerned. We are always prepared to settle all matters with our neighbours, including China, peacefully, through bilateral negotiations, on the basis of respect for our territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the non-use of force or threat of force. We hope that China will sooner or later change her hostile attitude towards India and revert to the path of peace and reason.

Neither China nor India can change the geographical fact that both our countries have a long common border. It is in the interest of both countries to settle the border question peacefully and normalise relations in other fields as well. If and when China is willing to take a concrete step in this direction, she will not find us lacking in response. However, should China use or threaten to use force, she will find us ready to defend our motherland. This is broadly our present relationship with China, and I would like you to view this with a certain measure of realism.

**356 "Peasants' armed struggle led by Communist Party of India (M-L) develops steadily," Peking Review commentary, 25 September 1970 (Extracts)**

The Indian peasants' armed struggle led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) is developing without let-up. The Indian bourgeois press deplored that this struggle "has spread unbelievably fast."

Defying hardships and difficulties, the masses of cadres of the Communist Party of India (M-L) have gone deep into the rural areas, the scene of the acutest struggle, to propagate to the peasant masses the great truth of "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and rouse them to take part in the revolutionary armed struggle on a wider scale. At the call of the Communist Party of India (M-L) many revolutionary intellectuals went to the countryside to join peasant guerrilla units. . . .

The great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "*The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.*" With the support of the masses of the people, the peasants' armed struggle led by the Communist Party of India (M-L) will certainly witness a still higher upsurge.

**357 Statement by Indian representative S. Sen in the UN General Assembly on Chinese representation in the UN, 20 November 1970 (Extracts)**

Our support for the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China is based on the principles of the universality of our organisation as also on the provisions of the Charter. India is among those countries which have voted consistently on this matter for the last 21 years and which have taken a logical view of this matter. As recently as October 2 this year, the Foreign Minister of India stated before this Assembly: "We regret that the universality of membership of the United Nations has not been achieved. In particular, there is a general realisation that without the rightful participation of the People's Republic of China, this organisation will continue to face difficulties in solving several basic problems." . . .

The proper representation of China by the People's Republic of China is a right fully established in law, facts and justice

and on consideration of further international cooperation in and through the United Nations.

For more than 21 years the great Chinese people have been denied their rightful place in our organisation. We have always felt that there was no justification for the continuation of that state of affairs. . . . My delegation has always maintained that the proper representation of China by the People's Republic of China is a simple matter, and therefore, should not be subject to the rule of a two thirds majority. My delegation will, therefore, vote against draft resolution contained in document A/L 599 and will support as already indicated the draft resolution contained in document A/L 605.

### **358 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1970-71, April 1971 (Extracts)**

Our relations with the countries of South and South East and East Asia, with the exception of China and Pakistan, saw an increasing measure of understanding during the year. . . .

While China showed some signs of return to the accepted norms of international conduct, we do not yet see any positive concrete move towards a resolution of our differences. We are willing to resolve these differences on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. . . .

Except for a relative lull between the months of May and September, Chinese publicity continued to be critical of India. The main anti-India publicity themes were the alleged armed struggle in rural India, India's alleged collusion with Taiwan and alleged support to the Dalai Lama and his followers. The visit of a Pakistani delegation to China in the month of September, followed by the visit of President Yahya Khan in November, was utilised to put out further items of "news" against India, particularly intended to please Pakistan.

China for the first time also took note of the Farakka issue and expressed appreciation of Pakistan's stand for a peaceful solution of the question.

At the end of the year, Peking publicity media played up the failure of the Indo-Nepalese talks on the Trade and Transit Treaty and blamed India.

India did not allow these publicity stunts to deflect her from her basic policies of her objectives as regards China, as summed up by the Foreign Minister in the Rajya Sabha on August 26, 1970.

**359 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 20 July 1971 (Extracts)**

Some hon. Members have suggested that we should de-fuse our relations with China. I entirely agree that we should not only de-fuse but try to normalise relations with China. . . .

The expression used was de-fuse, also de-freeze, both.

However, normalisation does not depend upon one party alone. There has to be a mutual normalisation. If and when the Government of the People's Republic of China is willing and ready to take concrete steps towards normalisation, we shall be equally ready and willing to do so. It must however, be clearly understood that normalisation can take place only on the basis of mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty and on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. We welcome the change in the style of China's diplomacy which has been in evidence of late and we hope that it will also lead to a change in substance. . . .

While we welcome the rapprochement between Peking and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it means the domination of the two powers over this region or a tacit agreement between them to this effect. We maintain the right of each and every country and people to decide their own destiny without any interference from outside.

This applies as much to Bangladesh as to Vietnam or the Palestine problem. We shall not allow any other country or combination of countries to dominate us or to interfere in our internal affairs. We shall to our maximum ability help other countries to maintain their freedom from outside domination, and their sovereignty. We have no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of their countries but this does not mean that we shall look on as silent spectators if third countries come and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, particularly our neighbours as our own national interest could be adversely affected.

I sincerely hope that any Sino-American detente will not

be at the expense of other countries, particularly in this region. However, we cannot at present totally rule out such a possibility. It can have repercussions on the situation in this sub-continent as well as in this region. We have therefore for sometime been considering ways and means of preventing such a situation from arising and meeting it if it should arise.

In this we are not alone and there are other countries, both big and small, who may be more perturbed than we are. We are in touch with the countries concerned and shall see to it that any Sino-American detente does not affect us or the other countries in this region adversely. . . .

Several observations have been made about the motives that may have been the main spring for the development of the Sino-American detente. Several points have been suggested that one party may be motivated by this aspect and the other country by another motive. Whatever may be the motives this is a very important and every significant development. We shall have to watch very carefully the effects of this and we shall have to take every possible step to safeguard our own interests.

I know that several countries have already given their reactions. Some of them have been critical of these. Some have expressed their fears. But there is no doubt that in the months to come this will be the most important event of the year and a great deal of thought will have to be given to the after-effects of this and how it unfolds itself. We need not rush to any conclusion straight away. We have to be careful and watchful and take adequate steps both political and otherwise in the international field and inside our own country to safeguard our interests.

### **360 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's speech at the AICC Session at Simla, 8 October 1971 (Extract)**

About People's Republic of China, you must have noticed that after the secret visit of Dr. Kissinger to Peking, the United States of America altered their policy which they have been pursuing for all these years to keep the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations, to deny to the Government of the People's Republic of China their rightful place in the United

Nations. When they suddenly reversed their policy, then a large number of countries, who, mainly under United States' inspiration and persuasion, had pursued a policy of endorsing the American line, suddenly found that their original postulates and their original postures had become out-of-date and they started revising their briefs. It is not easy to revise briefs quickly, and even the latest effort that is being made is again a very interesting approach. On the one hand, the United States' effort is to ensure that the rightful place to the People's Republic of China is restored to them not only in the General Assembly but also in the Security Council, with a permanent seat and with the right of veto. Whereas they are in support of this, at the same time, they do want to retain Taiwan as representative of Taiwan. Historically, it is not an easy exercise because all these years the supporters of the United States and the United States were saying that Taiwan Government is the government not only of Formosa and Taiwan but also of the whole of China. And now suddenly to take another line again has caused a certain measure of confusion. So far as India is concerned, notwithstanding our bilateral difficulties in relation to the People's Republic of China, our brief has been straight, and this changing situation has not necessitated the alteration of even a single comma in our attitude in this respect. We have all along been strongly of the view that there is only one China, there is only one Chinese Government, and that is the People's Republic of China; and its rightful place in the United Nations should be restored to it. That has been our consistent line. I am not sure whether during this session the efforts to retain Formosa will succeed, but I have no doubt that the restoration of its rightful place to People's Republic of China will receive overwhelming support. We have always been of the view that in the interest of universality and also in the interest of exposing China to international pressures, the Government of People's Republic of China should take their responsibilities and should play their part in the U.N., and that this is in the long range interests of the international community; we steadfastly adhere to this view.

It has been our view that keeping out China for too long has created several complexities and tensions in the world, and it will take quite some time before the world settles down to a

normal course even after the People's Republic of China is admitted into the United Nations. These are some of the important matters facing the international community.

**361 Statement by Indian delegate Samar Sen in the UN  
First Committee on the admission of China,  
22 October 1971**

We are not discussing the admission of a State to the United Nations, for, if we were, we would have a recommendation of the Security Council under Article 4(2) of the Charter. We are not discussing the expulsion of a Member State for, in that event, we would also have the views of the Security Council under Article 6 of the Charter. Inevitably, those who have, for whatever purpose, chosen not to take full account of these two central facts have found themselves beset with contradictions, unconstitutional propositions, twisted procedure and false dogmas. Many speakers before me exposed and analysed these and I would not repeat their arguments.

We had hoped that after the recent trends that we welcome for greater understanding and co-operation with China by several countries, all thoughts of complicating the question of Chinese representation by various stratagems would be given up. Unfortunately, not only have they not been abandoned, but a gloomy danger of expulsion of Member States has been mentioned, when in fact no such danger exists. Refuge has been taken even behind the phrase "to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" as an endorsement of the view that expulsion is involved. The representative of the Netherlands, as indeed many others, have made short shift of this argument, if indeed it is an argument, by pointing out that this phrase in the draft resolution in document A/L. 630 is merely a step which follows automatically from the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China, and has nothing to do with the expulsion of any Member State. The text is clear enough: it mentions expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, merely because their presence is illegal.

The simple issue before us is that there is only one China—that China is the People's Republic of China. There is only one Chinese seat in the United Nations, and the People's



Republic of China alone is entitled to it. India has recognized this straightforward truth ever since 1949 and has consistently supported the rights of the People's Republic of China to be the sole representative of China in the United Nations. We shall, in accordance with this consistent attitude, vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/L. 630 and vote against all other draft resolutions, amendments and procedural motions which may have the effect, either directly or indirectly, of delaying or confusing the simple issue I have stated. We look forward to the People's Republic of China taking its place among us—a place which it has by right—just as we look forward to better relations between India and China. The sooner these hopes are realized, the better.

Much has been said about realism. In our view, nothing could be more unrealistic than to delay any longer the full participation of China in the United Nations by its proper representatives, that is, the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China. There may be many ways of coming to realistic solutions, but surely they cannot be reached by discussing the nature and the character of different parts of the Chinese State or by attempting to decide what they should or should not do. Ours is an Organization of sovereign States, and our simple duty now is to decide that the People's Republic of China alone can represent China. All other arguments can only introduce confusion, and it is our hope that all delegations will concentrate on the one and only clear question before us.

**362 Statement by the Indian representative, Samar Sen, in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 27 October 1971 (Extract)**

The debate on Chinese representation, which took place in plenary meetings, has shown a common concern for universality in the membership of the United Nations. The result of the vote is satisfactory to the Indian delegation, and we look forward to working in cooperation with China both inside and outside the United Nations.

**363 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's message of greetings to Chou En-lai on the restoration of legitimate right of China in the UN, 27 October 1971**

On behalf of the Government and people of India may I convey to Your Excellency and the Government and people of China our felicitations on the restoration of the legitimate right of representation of China by your Government in the United Nations. This will make the United Nations more representative in character and will give greater weight to Asia's participation in the deliberations and decisions of this organization. We look forward to the People's Republic of China playing its rightful role in the United Nations and working in close co-operation with your delegation in the interest of peace and progress in Asia and throughout the world.

**364 Statement by the representative of India, Samar Sen, in the UN General Assembly welcoming Chinese delegation to UN, 15 November 1971 (Extracts)**

In 1949 the People's Republic of China came to power in the great and ancient land of China after a long and sustained revolution. In 1950 India was the first country to propose that, as a result of this change in China, the Chinese seat in the United Nations should be occupied by the representatives of the People's Republic of China. In spite of consistent efforts by India and an increasingly larger number of States, it has taken the United Nations 21 years to correct a perverse mistake. The fact that we find that today China is fully restored to its lawful rights in the United Nations is therefore a matter of great satisfaction to India.

The United Nations will undoubtedly be more realistic by the participation of the true representatives of China in our deliberations and discussions. We would continue to believe that the major problems of the United Nations and the fulfilment of the Principles and Purposes of the Charter will be easier to handle with fuller membership.

When China was not properly represented there was always the possibility that the Government of nearly 800 million

people, as well as the rest of the world, looked at the problems from their own perspectives and not through the full mutual appreciation of each other's point of view. This deficiency will now be removed. . . .

The two neighbouring countries, China and India, with the largest populations in the world, are bound by thousands of years of civilization and achievement. Since we both became masters of our destiny, we worked together at Bandung to formulate the principles of peaceful coexistence; we devised together Panchshila or the five principles of international conduct; and we have established many bonds of friendship and understanding. Admittedly, clouds have gathered in the development and strengthening of our bilateral relations; it is our hope that these clouds can soon be dispersed and that China and India will perform their common task with fullest co-operation and mutual confidence. It is in this context that we were pleased to receive a message from Premier Chou En-lai to our Prime Minister, which concluded with the words: "*May friendship between the peoples of China and India grow and develop daily.*"

May I, in sharing, on behalf of India, these words of hope and good cheer, say that we look forward to working in close co-operation with the delegation of China to the United Nations. I extend to them our warmest welcome and our sincerest good wishes. A most exciting and hopeful future lies ahead of us and let us hope that all of us, all 131 delegations present, will have the ability and wisdom to work for it.

### **365 Chou En-lai's interview with Neville Maxwell, 5 December 1971**

The draft of the Indian-Soviet treaty had lain for two years in a drawer in the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. After the announcement of Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Union hastily concluded this treaty with India. Its aim is to realize Brezhnev's 'Asian collective security system' which is directed against the countries to which Russia is hostile. . . . If India should brazenly provoke a war, can it benefit from it and can the problem be solved? Once a war breaks out both sides, not just one, will incur losses. You know what our attitude will be if a war breaks out between India and Pakistan. We firmly

support Pakistan against India's subversive and aggressive activities. India would in the end taste the bitter fruit of its own making. And from then on there would be no tranquility on the subcontinent.

**366 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's interview on CBS  
Television (USA), 20 December 1971 (Extract)**

**Q.** What about India's future relations with China, the great neighbour just across the Himalaya Mountains ?

**A.** We have always desired that relations between India and China should normalize, and this will continue to be our policy. A great deal depends on the response that we have from China, but our policy will continue to be to improve our relations with China.

**Q.** The Chinese appear terribly suspicious. At the United Nations, they said that the presence of Tibetan refugees in India might be used to justify an Indian operation against Tibet the way, they said, that the presence of refugees from East Bengal was used to justify military operations into East Pakistan. How do you feel about these accusations ?

**A.** In the first place, there is no parallel between the situation in Bangladesh and the situation in Tibet. In Bangladesh, the democratic wishes and aspirations of 75 million people were ruthlessly suppressed by military atrocities. In the case of Tibet, we have made the position clear that Tibet is part of China. And, as regards the refugees from Tibet who are with us, we have given refuge to them on humanitarian considerations, and we have never permitted them to indulge in any political activity. This suspicion, if it is genuine, is unfounded, and I don't see why any parallel should be drawn between the two.

**367 "U.S.-Soviet scramble for hegemony in Southeast Asian subcontinent and Indian Ocean," *Peking Review* commentary, 14 January 1972 (Extracts)**

U.S. imperialism is planning to reinforce its military power in the Indian Ocean in the wake of the armed invasion and occupation of East Pakistan by the Indian reactionaries with the support of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. There are indications that these two overlords are stepping up their manoeuvres in their scramble for the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. . . .

To turn India into an important base for its expansion in the Indian Ocean, Soviet revisionism has been hard at work bolstering up the Indian reactionaries for years. In 1968, the Soviet Union purchased with a number of aircraft the right for the Soviet Pacific Fleet to sail to Madras and Bombay and, at the same time, gave India several naval vessels in exchange for the right to use some of her naval bases.

To meet its design for expansion in the Indian Ocean, Soviet revisionism, by making use of India's expansionist ambitions, has abetted the Indian reactionaries in constantly carrying out armed provocations against other Asian countries.

Soviet revisionism regarded India's recent war of aggression against Pakistan as a good opportunity to further its control of India and step up its expansion in the Indian Ocean and its contention with U.S. imperialism for hegemony. The Japanese paper *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported that the Soviet Union considers "the prevailing Indo-Pakistan situation a golden opportunity to realize its Indian Ocean strategy," which is to use India as a "pawn" to "ensure a passage through the Indian Ocean for expansion in Southeast Asia." "The Soviet Union has acquired the possibility of establishing political and military operational bases in India," opening a "wide lane" for Soviet fleets in their "expansion from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean," the paper added. A Western news agency noted that Soviet revisionism's backing for India's armed occupation of East Pakistan "could give Moscow a privileged position in the Bay of Bengal."

When U.S. imperialism dispatched an aircraft carrier and other warships from the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, the

Soviet social-imperialists countered by also moving cruisers and other warships from their Pacific Fleet into the bay.

**368 "Soviet revisionism's neo-colonialism in India," Peking Review commentary, 21 January 1972 (Extracts)**

By using so-called economic "aid," Soviet revisionism has taken control of India's economic life-line in recent years. Actually this "aid" is "export of capital" and ruthless exploitation of India's cheap labour power. What is most shameless is that to cover up this fact, Soviet revisionism has even notified one and all that its relations with India are a "shining model" of peaceful co-existence. . . .

Projects built with Soviet "aid" are strictly Soviet controlled from designing, investment, installation of equipment and raw material supply to actual management. . . . So called "industrial co-operation" is in fact a refurbished version of "specialization in production" pushed by Soviet revisionist chieftains in certain East European countries and Mongolia. They used Indian raw material and labour power to produce what they need, further making India their accessory processing factory. . . .

What Soviet revisionism is doing in India today shows that it has completely followed in the footsteps of old-line imperialism. The policy it is engaged in is social-imperialist policy.

**369 President V.V. Giri's address to the joint session of both Houses of Indian Parliament, 13 March 1972 (Extracts)**

The signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in August last year set the seal on a friendship that has been tested by time. It is a treaty of peace against war. It is not aimed against any country.

We welcome the entry, though belated, of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, a step which we had been consistently advocating. We hope that this will promote peace and stability in Asia and the world. . . .

One of the important international developments of the year was the move of the United States of America and China to re-arrange their relations. We hope that this will lead to a true

relaxation of tensions and not to a sharpening of divisions.

The configuration of world forces is changing rapidly. Relations between super powers and between them and other powers, are also undergoing a change. However, there are certain basic points which have to be borne in mind by all States, big and small. There should not be any attempt to carve out spheres of influence by the application of the doctrine of balance of power in this region or to dictate to countries, big or small, regarding their relationships with other countries. India does not seek leadership or domination. Nor will it tolerate domination by any country. We want this sub-continent and indeed the entire South Asian region and the Indian Ocean area to be free from power rivalries or domination and to develop into an area of peace and co-operation rather than one of confrontation. India would also like to encourage and foster greater regional co-operation, particularly in the fields of technology, trade and transit, science and culture, first and foremost between the countries of the subcontinent and then with other countries of South Asia, South East Asia and West Asia.

**370 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Rajya Sabha on reference to Jammu and Kashmir in Sino-American joint communique, 14 March 1972**

The Joint communique issued at Shanghai on the conclusion of President Nixon's visit to China contained the following references to Jammu and Kashmir:

**THE CHINESE SIDE**

It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

### THE U.S. SIDE

Consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favours the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. We have made this position clear in the UN and to the entire international community. Reference by any country inconsistent with this position amounts to interference in our internal affairs. The Chinese stand in the communique is particularly regrettable. It is also unfortunate that the US Government should have acquiesced in a reference being made to Jammu and Kashmir in the communique.

### **371 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1971-72, April 1972 (Extracts)**

For quite some time there were hopes of a favourable response from China towards normalisation of relations with India. However, China's attitude in the recent Indo-Pak conflict has given a temporary setback. We still hope that China, which is a close neighbour of ours, will normalise her relations with us on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. . . .

Consistent with our declared desire to normalise relations with China, we took a number of steps in that direction. In July 1971 the Prime Minister sent a personal letter to Premier Chou En-lai about the Bangladesh problem and India-China relations. We welcomed the restoration of China's rights in the U.N., and both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister sent messages of congratulations to their Chinese counterparts. Speaking at the Press Conference in New Delhi and in Paris on 19 October and 9 November respectively, the Prime Minister mentioned the possibilities of exchange of Ambassadors without discussing substantive issues like the border question. On 25 November, the Foreign Minister declared in Parliament that the



likelihood of India unilaterally sending an Ambassador to China was "not excluded". Our Ambassadors in various capitals in the world also conveyed our desire for normalisation of relations to their Chinese counter-parts. On 26 November, an invitation was conveyed to the Chinese Government to take part in the Third Asian International Trade Fair to be held in New Delhi.

We abstained from anti-Chinese propaganda, in spite of virtuperative attacks made by China during the Bangladesh developments and Pakistan's invasion of India in December. The police posse outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi was withdrawn on 13 September. We raised the level of representation at the Chinese Embassy National Day Reception on 1 October in New Delhi and the Foreign Secretary attended the function.

China on her part showed some response and on our Republic Day in 1971, Premier Chou En-lai sent his "festive congratulations" to our Prime Minister and to "the great Indian People". On 13 November 1971, Premier Chou En-lai also sent a message thanking the Prime Minister for her greetings on China's entry into the U.N., and the message ended with, "May the friendship between the Indian and Chinese people grow and develop daily."

### **372 Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 26 April 1972 (Extracts)**

As for China, geography has placed us as neighbours. The diplomatic missions of each country are functioning in the capital of the other. Whenever any possibility will happen for taking some concrete action to improve relations we shall certainly take such steps as may be possible on the basis of equality, mutual respect and reciprocity. In spite of the hostile and bellicose statements made by China against us in the last conflict with Pakistan, in and outside the United Nations we have deliberately refrained from being provoked in order not to increase tensions.

In this connection, I would like to clarify that the Indo-Soviet Treaty does not stand in the way of our normalising relations with China. It is not directed against China or any

other country. We cannot accept any conditions that the normalisation of relations with any country that may deter us from developing friendship with any other country. The Soviet Union itself has been trying to normalise relations with China and would be happy to see the normalisation of relations between India and China, as we would be happy to see normalisation of relations between China and the USSR.

It is in this spirit that we welcomed the visit of President Nixon to China because we had hoped that it would lead to a relaxation of tension without injuring the interest of any third country.

We can review our attitude in the light of the outcome of that visit. However, we must say that we were shocked and surprised at the references to Jammu and Kashmir in the joint communique of President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai because it amounted to interference in our internal affairs.

**373 Statement by the Chinese representative Wang Jun-sheng in the UN Economic and Social Council, 27 July 1972**  
(Extracts)

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had continued in recent years to provide "assistance" to so-called "Tibetan refugees" and "Chinese refugees" in Macao.

Tibet was a Chinese territory and questions concerning it were internal affairs in which no foreign country or international organization had the right to interfere. After the failure of the serf-owners' rebellion which it had provoked in China's Tibet region in 1959, the Indian Government had coerced tens of thousands of the inhabitants of Tibet into coming to India and had profited from that incident to engage in rapid anti-Chinese activities. The so-called question of "Tibetan refugees" was a result of the Indian Government's interference and of its subversive policy towards China. . . .

In the past few years, at the instigation of the United States of America, the Chiang Kai-shek clique and India, the United Nations had illegally adopted several resolutions on the "question of Tibet" and the "problem of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong", which was not to its credit. UNHCR had

regarded as "refugees" the inhabitants of Tibet who had gone to India under coercion from the Indian Government, and the Chinese inhabitants of Hong Kong and Macao; it had also sought to raise funds and had set up offices and agencies for conducting illegal activities. Such action constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and interference in China's internal affairs.

Despite some amendments to the text, the High Commissioner's report still recorded illegal activities which constituted interference in China's internal affairs. The Chinese Government and people absolutely could not tolerate that situation. His delegation solemnly demanded the UNHCR should cease forthwith its illegal activities concerning so-called "Tibetan refugees" and "Chinese refugees" in Hong Kong and Macao, abolish the bodies responsible for conducting those activities, and delete all those parts of its report which related to those questions.

**374 Statement by the Observer for India, N.P. Jain, in the UN Economic and Social Council, 27 July 1972 (Extracts)**

MR. JAIN (Observer for India) said he had been somewhat taken aback to find that, after a moving discussion on the problems of the Sudanese refugees, the opportunity had been taken for reasons best known to the Chinese representative, to raise extraneous political issues. . . .

In all the UNHCR activities at present being considered by the Council, the emphasis had been placed, as in the past, on the humanitarian aspect of the problem on the sympathy which the report sought to arouse for refugees, on the task of the international community in that sphere and on the measures which should be adopted in order to mitigate the sufferings and distress of refugees.

Throughout its long history, India had always had a humanitarian tradition. The Indian people had never remained unmoved by the distress and sufferings of others, and had endeavoured, despite their own difficulties, to provide assistance to refugees. Such assistance did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of another State, nor could it be construed as such. His country had provided aid to refugees regardless of

the country from which they had come. If a refugee presented himself at its frontiers, it always opened its doors to him.

His delegation would have wished that that question had not been raised in the Council, in order to provoke a discussion which had nothing to do with the subject under consideration. His country wished to reaffirm that it had never interfered in the internal affairs of another country. Those who were used to interfering in the internal affairs of other countries could perhaps wax eloquent on the subject.

**375 Statement by the Chinese representative Wang Jun-sheng  
in the UN Economic and Social Council, 27 July 1972**

The Indian Government had long cherished the aggressive ambition to meddle in the affairs of China's Tibet region.

It was an indisputable fact that India had engaged in a policy of intervention, subversion and expansion against China. Having coerced Tibetan inhabitants to come to India, it was still trying, under cover of "humanitarianism", to interfere in China's internal affairs. But such attempts were completely futile.

**376 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement on India-China  
relations in Lok Sabha, 16 August 1972 (Extracts)**

I have listened with a great deal of interest to the expression of different points of view and different emphasis that has been laid on this question. . . .

We should continuously go on assessing the situation. There is no fixed position and if the international situation changes, then we should also be prepared to adjust our attitudes and our approach to the changing situation. That is the essence of any foreign policy and we should take note of the changes and take appropriate steps in order to keep pace with these changes.

So far as the broad policy of the Government of India is concerned, we have always been of the view that the people of India and the people of China are great people and they are neighbours—geography has placed them together—and whatever may be the differences or disputes between the two countries, I cannot see any escape from the ultimate emergence of

a situation where the people of India and the people of China would live in peace and as good neighbours. In the meantime, we have always been of the view that relations between India and China should improve. There is no doubt that relations between the two countries deteriorated very much; there was an armed conflict between the two countries. After that also, the general attitude of China has not been one of expressing any friendly feeling or friendship towards India. In fact, we have noticed, . . . their support to certain disruptive elements in India. There is also their general propaganda line of trying to project a picture of India as a disintegrating India, highlighting our troubles either on the labour front or on the front of industrial production or food production; this, unfortunately, has been the attitude of China. At one time Mr. Samar Guha used to summarise all these things in an admirable manner and he used to urge us to take a more militant attitude towards China. We had, however, resisted that temptation and always took an attitude which we thought was in our best interests. . . . While keeping our objective to do everything possible to improve relations, our main effort has been not to do anything which unnecessarily exacerbates relations between India and China. But, at the same, we have to take a realistic view of the situation as it is today.

I have made several public statements; I have made statements on the floor of the Houses expressing our desire, our willingness, our readiness, to improve relations with China. Unfortunately, unless Mr. Samar Guha has some inside information, we have not received a good response. Our attitude still continues to be to do everything to improve relations, to remove misunderstanding. But, the latest propaganda blast which China has undertaken in several respects is not a very good development and I do not see any noticeable change in their attitude towards India and their attitude of highlighting our difficulties, and their trying to paint a picture which shows India in unfavourable stance still continues. . . . On the question of Bangladesh, the entire House knows the attitude of the Chinese representatives. We know their attitude when the situation in Bangladesh was developing and also when the Pakistani attack came on us. And also, their attitude in the U.N. These are all facts, known to every one. Surely, even

if you give a most charitable interpretation, you cannot even say that they were unbiased in this respect. Their attitude was tilted in favour of Pakistan, and, unfortunately, in favour of a military regime, Yahya Khan regime, which had unleashed that terror and violence against the people of Bangladesh.

Even today, our neighbour Bangladesh is recognised by four out of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Over 80 members of the United Nations have already recognised Bangladesh, which means that the majority of the membership of the United Nations has recognised Bangladesh. But still the Chinese attitude in the United Nations appears to be to block the entry of Bangladesh. It is all the more, I should say, tragic that a country like the People's Republic of China, whose own entry to the United Nations had been blocked by others is now adopting an attitude against the majority view of the U.N. members and threatening to exercise the exceptional right which permanent members of the Security Council have, to veto her entry into the United Nations. The power of veto is a power which is very sparingly exercised when issues of peace and war are involved. To keep a country of 75 million out and to threaten the use of veto is certainly not a very encouraging feature, which holds out great possibilities of normalisation of relations; in the attitude of China in relation to the countries of the India sub-continent.

I am not quite sure whether President Bhutto is making their attitude more strong or whether it is the Chinese attitude which perhaps is encouraging Mr. Bhutto again to adopt an attitude which, according to our assessment does not appear to be in the best interests even of Pakistan or of President Bhutto. But this is a fact which we cannot ignore and we cannot explain it away and we cannot wish it away by any argument. Whatever may be various axes, whether it is friendly between Peking and other countries or an unfriendly attitude between Peking and third countries, we should carefully assess our own position and our own attitude. We were hoping that relations with China would improve, and to be quite frank, I had a feeling that they were moving though very slowly towards improvement, before the situation in Bangladesh developed. We should take a realistic view, with the Chinese attitude in relation to the events in Bangladesh, in relation to the movement of about ten

million refugees from Bangladesh into India, in relation to the Pakistani attack on us, in relation to their general appreciation of what was happening in this sub-continent where human rights of millions of people were actually trampled under the military pressure and military atrocities; the Chinese attitude was not such as could by any imagination be regarded as impartial. In fact, it was heavily weighted in favour of the military regime which was crushing the urges of the people of Bangladesh for their own independence and for the preservation of their human rights.

This attitude again caused a setback to the slow process of improvement that was taking shape before the events of Bangladesh took the shape which they did.

I am not yet clear as to whether there has been a clear reversal or a change or even a softening of the attitude in this relationship. Whereas our ultimate objective is clear, still we cannot improve the relations unless there is a response from the other side. As they say, you cannot achieve such a thing by unilaterally expressing your viewpoint. After all, there have to be two to strengthen friendship as also there are two if there is going to be trouble. Notwithstanding our willingness to improve relations, at the present moment, I do not see any clear response from the Chinese side.

What should we do in this situation? We should not do anything which unnecessarily exacerbates relations. At the same time, we cannot continue to go on repeating this thing without a proper response. So we must as a mature nation watch the situation and should carefully see as to how the things are emerging. We have to safeguard our interests; we have to safeguard the basic interests of peace in this subcontinent, of our relations with Bangladesh and with Pakistan in this neighbourhood, and it is only in the light of this that we can take further steps to normalise relations.

With your permission, I would like to answer very briefly the three questions put. To the first by Shri Reddy, my reply is that there has been no effort made by any third country to take initiative for bringing about improvement of relations between India and China. Over approach in this respect has always been that whenever the relations between these two great countries, India and China, being neighbours, being large

countries, improve, they will improve only by bilateral effort and any friendly association of friendly move by a third country is not likely to yield any useful result.

The question of sending an ambassador or raising the diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level is only a question of raising the level of representation. We have got a resident mission in Peking and the Chinese have got a resident mission in Delhi. Either country on any occasion can notify the other that it has decided to upgrade the level of representation. No wide or important principle is involved in this. If we find that by upgrading the level of representation our contacts there can be established at a higher level to some useful purpose, we will not hesitate to do so. As I said, there is no question of any wide principle involved one way or the other in this respect.

I have already answered one question asked by Shri Deb. The other is about trade relations. We are prepared to have economic relations with China. If they are prepared to buy anything, we are prepared to sell it to them. If we require something from China, we are prepared to purchase from them. Political differences need not come in the way of economic relations.

Another question asked was about our invitation to them for their participation in the Trade Fair. We did extend an invitation to them, that they should participate in the Trade Fair being organised. We have not got any response from them.

I am glad the CPI (M) member has quoted the example of President Nixon's flight to Peking. As you know, we have always welcomed the relaxation of tension in any part of the world, and between any two adversaries. We have also to remember that behind President Nixon's flight was a long period of informal contacts and most of the things, according to our information, had been achieved even before President Nixon went to Peking, as a result of several contacts, about which the whole world now knows, that were established at a fairly high level between China and the USA.



**377 "India and the world," article by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1972 (Extract)**

I have dwelt at length on Pakistan and the problems of the subcontinent for their impact on us is immediate and deep. But we want better relations with China also. Even when we were fully absorbed in our own struggle for liberty, we supported China's parallel fight against imperialism and sent a medical team to Mao Tse-tung's Eighth Route Army. We have respect for their culture and cherish memories of past contacts. We were among the first in 1949 to welcome the establishment of the People's Republic.

Much to our disappointment, the last two decades have failed to fulfil our initial hope that India and China, both great Asian nations newly independent and faced with similar problems, would learn from and assist each other and so cooperate on the wider international scene. We began, as we thought, with mutual confidence and good will, but the events of the 1950s brought tension and misunderstanding, culminating in the entry of Chinese troops and their occupation of thousands of square miles of Indian territory in 1962.

It would be an oversimplification to regard this merely as the result of a border dispute. Simultaneous or subsequent developments—such as China's systematic support of Pakistan against India, her provocative criticism of India for alleged subservience to the United States and later the Soviet Union, and her persistent though futile efforts to promote internal subversion—leave us no option but to infer that the border dispute was the outcome of a more complex policy which was aimed at undermining India's stability and at obstructing her rapid and orderly progress. After the Cultural Revolution, conditions seem more tranquil, and there appears to be a new orientation of China's policies. We wonder whether this new mood will also be reflected in China's policy toward India. The earlier faint signs of a thaw have receded since China's unreserved support of General Yahya Khan's campaign against Bangladesh and India. We are not engaged in any competition with China, nor have we any hostile intentions. We hope that some day China, will appreciate that cooperative and friendly relations between the 560 million people of India and the 700

million people of China are in our mutual interest.

**378 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's reply to the Rajya Sabha debate on international situation, 30 November 1972 (Extracts)**

Take Asia where the situation is more disquieting, has been more disquieting, as compared to Europe. And there are several sensitive and difficult areas in Asia. But even in Asia, if we have a broad sweep of the situation, things are appearing to be moving in the right direction. The admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations may cause temporary irritation to several countries. This may create some temporary problems. But there is no denying the fact that the international situation, the situation in Asia, has significantly changed by seating the rightful Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

In fact even those countries which do not like the Chinese attitude on concrete issues do feel—and this is commonly said in the United Nations lobbies—that the People's Republic of China had been kept out of the United Nations for too long. It would have been better for the international community and better for China if the legitimate and rightful government of the People's Republic of China had been seated in the United Nations much earlier. The negative attitude of several countries started melting away last year and this has facilitated the seating of the Government of the People's Republic of China. This is a very significant event because the Chinese representatives can put across the Chinese viewpoint to the international community and they have also to listen to what others have to say about the Chinese policies and how they conduct themselves in the international sphere. Under the circumstances, it is all the more surprising that of all the countries China should be the one country which should exercise its veto to keep Bangladesh out. . . .

Apart from the admission of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, President Nixon's visit to Peking also has altered the situation. We are in favour of relaxation of tension in all parts of the world. Any step taken in any part of the world which results in relaxation of

tension is welcome to us. That is in line with our thinking and it is in line with our policy which we have steadfastly pursued all these years ever since our Independence. The visit of President Nixon to Peking has to be evaluated in this context. But it has altered the geo-political situation of that part of Asia, particularly amongst the neighbouring countries of China. Several countries which had formulated and had pursued a policy dependent only on an attitude or atmosphere of confrontation between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America were temporarily swept off their feet. They did not know what to do. Slowly they are recovering and realising the realities of the situation or are reformulating their attitudes and readjusting themselves to the new realities that are taking shape in this context.

A reference has been made to the reconciliation that has been initiated between Japan and the People's Republic of China. This again is a welcome development and we welcome it. So long as all these developments move towards relaxation of tension and are not at the cost of third parties, we always welcome them and it is our hope that none of these moves will be at the cost of any third party. The parties concerned are at pains to tell the world that these moves are not at the cost of any third party. Let us hope so and we would like to believe that they are genuine when they say that. . . .

As for China, geography has placed us as neighbours of this great country. We cannot wish away China any more than China can wish away India. Border problems have existed between neighbouring countries throughout the ages. The countries concerned should settle such matters through peaceful negotiations and not by resort to force.

We see no reason why two great countries like India and China should not be able to do the same. It is our firm belief that India and China can and must normalise their relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence which our two countries were the first to subscribe to. We are glad that China has also given expression to this view. However, to translate this desire into concrete terms, it is necessary that positive steps must be taken by both sides for this purpose. We are willing and ready to hold bilateral discussion with China on the problems that bedevil our mutual relations. Some hon.

Members have referred to the desirability of exchanging ambassadors although mere exchange of ambassadors does not always lead to improvement or normalisation of relations, we are ready and willing to consider this matter also. We would be happy to normalise our economic, cultural and other relations with China if she is willing to do so. For normalisation of relations, it is necessary that there must be a desire on both sides. We hope and believe that the time is not far off when in the interests of the two countries and in the larger interests of peace and stability in Asia, India and China will be able to take positive steps towards normalisation of relations on the basis of mutual respect, equality and reciprocity.

We can assure China that we have no desire or intention to interfere in her internal affairs. We regard Tibet as part of China and any allegation that we are encouraging fissiparous tendencies in Tibet is totally unfounded and baseless. We hope that China will also respect our territorial integrity and sovereignty and not encourage any fissiparous elements in our country. Some people seem to think that our friendly relations with the USSR is an obstacle in the way of our normalising relations with China. This is not correct. Our friendship with any country is not based on enmity against any third country. Our hand of friendship is open for any country to grasp provided there are no conditions attached with regard to our relations with any other country. We want to be friendly with all countries and we will not accept any conditions from any third country with regard to our bilateral relations with any other country. We are glad that the spirit of bilateralism and *detente* is spreading to various parts of the world. There is no reason why India and China—two great countries of Asia—should not be able to solve their mutual problems bilaterally and peacefully in their mutual interests and in the larger interests of peace stability and progress in Asia and the world.

**379 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's speech in the Lok Sabha debate on international situation, 7 December 1972  
(Extracts)**

The general situation at the present moment is this. Whereas

one can say that it has moved towards *detente*, there are several imponderables in the situation, if I may use that expression. The attitudes of countries are shifting from time to time; may be, a number of these shifts are in the positive direction. Who could have said four or five months back, that Japan and China would come closer to each other? Who could have said President Nixon would initiate far-reaching changes in his approach towards China, and who could have visualised that President Nixon's visit to Moscow would result in the conclusion of several agreements in the matter of arms limitation, in the economic field and in several other fields? The consequential effect of these changes in the attitudes of principal powers, has its inevitable effect upon other countries; whether we look at Europe or South-East Asia or South Asia or even West Asia, all these changes that have taken place are having their impact upon several countries and some of the old frozen attitudes are changing. We have to adjust ourselves to these changes and to take action so that our contribution for strengthening the forces of peace is effective and our own national interests are safeguarded. . . .

Regarding our relations with China, I am not sure whether I can give any useful information on that. I will certainly come and report to this hon. House as soon as I see that there is any improvement in the relations.

At the present moment, I can say that we on our side, are desirous of normalising our relations with China. But obviously, this can be brought about only if there is the same desire on the part of China as well. If the strident note that we see in the Chinese speeches in the United Nations on the situation in the Indian sub-continent, if the hostile statements that are made by the Chinese leaders in Peking at the time of visits of several visiting dignitaries, are any indication, then one does get a feeling that the Chinese perhaps are not desirous of improving relations with India. But, so far as we are concerned, we have been more than willing.

I think I am voicing the feelings even of the opposition parties that we are desirous of improving relations with China, and we have made this position clear on a number of occasions. We have avoided being drawn into polemics, but having done all that, it does not appear that China at the present moment

is responding positively to these various suggestions and various statements that we have made. That does not mean we should give up our effort.

I would say, Sir, in all seriousness, that China is our neighbour and geography has placed us together. We have to live as good as neighbours. There are some differences. There are some unfavourable attitudes and postures of China on certain matters which are vital to us. We continue to hope that China will appreciate the desirability and the necessity of normalising relations with India so that the two countries, India and China, can live as good neighbours. We have that objective in view and we will continue to work for that. That, in a nutshell, is our approach towards China.

**380 *Peking Review* commentary on Indo-Pak relations,  
5 January 1973 (Extract)**

The Government of India and Pakistan signed an agreement in Simla last July 2 which stipulated that "withdrawals shall commence with the enforcement of the agreement and be completed within 30 days" and that "in Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the December 17, 1971 ceasefire shall be respected without prejudice to the recognized position of each side." Afterwards, the Indian Government proposed a demarcation of the control line in Jammu and Kashmir as a pre-condition for the withdrawal of troops, thus making impossible the withdrawal within the time-limit fixed by the agreement.

Later, through talks, officials of India and Pakistan signed an agreement on December 11 on the delineation of the control line in Jammu and Kashmir. Aziz Ahmed, Secretary-General of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed at a press conference the same day: "The line of control as now drawn leaves Pakistan's recognized stand completely unaffected."

Yet, the Indian Government has not completely implemented the resolution on the conflict of India and Pakistan adopted at the U.N. Security Council in December 1971. It still detains over 90,000 Pakistan prisoners of war and civilians.

**381 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's address to the Nepal Council of World Affairs, Kathmandu, 9 February 1973 (Extract)**

We also had aggression from China on our soil, but we never viewed our relationship with China in an opportunistic manner or confined it to what was happening just at that moment. Even when the Chinese were fighting against us, our basic stand of supporting China's admission into the United Nations remained unchanged for the simple reason that we felt that it was unrealistic to ignore such a large country and that the United Nations could not function if such a large mass of humanity was not represented there. I am giving this merely as an example that we have always tried to assess matters and events independently and have not changed our stand merely because a person happened to oppose us or to be against us.

**382 President V.V. Giri's address to the joint session of Indian Parliament, 19 February 1973 (Extract)**

We welcome the positive trends in the international situation which have created an atmosphere of *detente*. My Government would like to normalise relations with China. We view the moves towards reconciliation between the United States of America and China, Japan and China, and between North and South Korea as positive steps in favour of the relaxation of tensions.

**383 Peking Review commentary on "India's forcibly taking over administration of Sikkim," 20 April 1973 (Extracts)**

The Indian Government has sent troops to Gangtok, capital of Sikkim, and forcibly taken over the entire administration of Sikkim under the pretext of disturbances there, according to a report from Gangtok. . . .

The Indian Government forced Sikkim to sign an unequal treaty in 1950, turning Sikkim into its "protectorate". The "chief administrator of Sikkim" is actually the premier, and the "political officer" controls Sikkim's national defence, diplomacy and communications on behalf of the Indian Govern-

ment. Both are sent by India.

**384 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1972-73, April 1973 (Extracts)**

The Government continued to seek normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China and this desire was expressed on various occasions by Indian leaders. On 30 November 1972 Minister of External Affairs made a comprehensive statement in the Rajya Sabha where he expressed the Indian attitude in the clearest possible terms. . . .

This was done despite some unjustified outbursts from China in the U.N. in 1972, where China continued to take an unrealistic attitude towards the developments in the Indian subcontinent. Not only was there no appreciation of the initiatives taken by India to seek a peaceful and bilateral settlement of Indo-Pakistan problems, but there was also an attempt to attribute non-existent motives to India. However, India continued to observe an attitude of restraint and maintained its stand of seeking normalisation of relations with China in the larger interest of peace in this area.

. . . By the end of the year, there seemed to be a certain change in Chinese attitude. The Indian Embassy's reception in Peking to mark the Republic Day was attended at a slightly higher level and China did not oppose India's candidature on some of the U.N. bodies as she had done in the past. After a lapse of 1½ years, China also sent in March 1973 a new Counsellor to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi to act as Charge d'Affaires.

**385 Interview with Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister, by a group from the Australian National University, 14 June 1973 (Extract)**

**Q.** When I was in india last year, I was told that several officials were concerded about the growing Soviet influence there, and had recommended an approach to China, but had been informed that this had had no effect. Why ?

**A.** Sino-Indian relations used to be very good in the 1950s, but later because of the exposure of India's expansionist policies we have had to maintain vigilance. The year before



last the Indian Government made some gestures to improve relations, and we gave these serious consideration, and took some steps to respond—for example, we indicated our willingness to exchange ambassadors, but just then the Indo-Pakistani war broke out. No matter what mistakes the Pakistani Government made in East Bengal, we consider this their internal affair. Of course we do not consider the Pakistani policy to have been correct, but India should not have sent troops to dismember the country. That is why at the U.N. Twenty-Sixth General Assembly the issue of Indian aggression caused the greatest repercussions. At that time 104 countries were in favour of a resolution, which was also adopted by the Security Council, for a ceasefire and release of prisoners. India violated this and still keeps 80,000-90,000 Pakistani troops as prisoners. This we can't permit. Since China is in the U.N. and it cast a favourable vote, it will certainly continue to uphold its principles. We just uphold justice in this matter and have no selfish interest.

**386 Peking Review commentary on New Delhi Agreement  
between Pakistan and India, 14 September 1973 (Extracts)**

The Governments of Pakistan and India signed an agreement in New Delhi on August 28 for the repatriation of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians who have been detained in India for over 20 months, and the repatriation of Bengalis in Pakistan and non-Bengalis in Bangla Desh. . . .

The agreement came after talks held between Pakistan Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed and the Indian Prime Minister's Special Representative P.N. Haksar in Rawalpindi from July 24 to July 31 and in New Delhi from August 18 to August 28. After returning to Rawalpindi, Aziz Ahmed said that it is a vital step forward on the road to a subcontinental reconciliation. He expressed the hope that the 195 Pakistani prisoners of war would not be detained for long.

**387 Peking Radio commentary on Soviet aid to India,  
26 November 1973**

For many years Soviet revisionist social-imperialism has cons-

tantly tried to infiltrate India economically and militarily in order to turn India into its dependent country. By their so-called assistance, the Soviet revisionists have carried out economic exploitation and plunder in India and now control Indian economic life. According to statistics, from 1968 to 1972 the Soviet Union provided 1,100 million US dollars' worth of so-called economic aid, which exceeded the total Soviet economic aid to Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. . . . What is particularly significant is that through their so-called assistance, the Soviet revisionists control the important economic lifelines of India. According to Soviet newspapers, the enterprises built with Soviet assistance already control 80 per cent of the Indian engineering industry, 60 per cent of the electrical appliance and equipment industry, 35 per cent of the petroleum processing industry, 38 per cent of the steel industry and 20 per cent of the electric power industry. Projects built by the Soviet Union were strictly under the control of Soviet personnel. The USSR had also asked India to set up enterprises exclusively for the production of items for the Soviet Union.

**388 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet revisionist  
"disinterested aid," 30 November 1973 (Extracts)**

Indian papers and magazines have revealed that the Soviet Union has turned India into its dependency by controlling an important part of the Indian economy and squeezing profits under the signboard of "aid." . . .

Industries built with Soviet "aid" are under the direct control of Soviet technicians from designing and installation of equipment to the supply of materials and from investment and location to management as well. The Bhilai and Bokaro Steel Plants are two such examples. . . .

By holding "decisive sway over the Bokaro project," the Soviet Union forced obsolete machinery and out-of-date technology on India, causing heavy losses to the country." . . .

Boasting of its disinterested and socialist "aid," the Soviet Union is actually pushing a cruel and predatory policy in India.

**389 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Rajya Sabha debate on international situation, 6 December 1973 (Extract)**

I want that our relations with other neighbours should also be good and this is the policy we have been consistently pursuing. I have already touched upon our relations with and our efforts to normalise relations with Pakistan, with China. We have every time expressed our desire to improve relations. Well, we have not got 'Kissingers' in India and you will have to be content with what I am because I have to look after the relationship but I would like to assure you that this is a matter perhaps in which some reciprocity is necessary.

**390 "India's food crisis," article by Kuo Chih in *Peking Review*, 15 February 1974 (Extracts)**

The food problem is what the Congress Party has all along failed to resolve throughout its rule in the last two decades and more. The seriousness of the food shortage and the frequency of famine in India have seldom been equalled in world. . . .

The big feudal lords in India hold large sectors of the land and the peasants are heavily exploited. Feudal and backward relations of production have seriously tied down the development of the productive forces. . . .

The Indian people's battle against hunger and for the right to survive is mounting daily. The broad masses in the city and the countryside continuously staged strikes and demonstrations in protest against the government's food policy, demanding an increase in the grain ration and lower food prices. In Kerala students were forced to seize grain by violence and the Indian Government closed all universities and colleges at the end of last July. . . .

Having failed to solve the food problem, the Indian Government has no alternative but to rely on large imports. Between 1972 and the first half of 1973 grain imports reached 4 million tons and in the latter part of last year more than 4 million tons had to be imported. Foreign exchange reserves which are already nearly exhausted continue dwindling. India begged Soviet revisionism to lend it some of the wheat the latter had

imported, to be returned in two or three years. This was rejected.

However, on the eve of Soviet revisionist chieftain Brezhnev's visit to India last year, Moscow suddenly offered to lend India 2 million tons of grain. The Soviet revisionists themselves had an acute grain shortage and had to import annually huge amounts from the west. So why this "generosity"? The British newspaper *Daily Telegraph* provided the answer. The loan, it seemed, had a political motive behind it, the paper said. Both the offer and Brezhnev's visit were nothing but an attempt to make India further serve the Soviet revisionist policy of aggression and expansion.

This loan of 2 million tons of grain Soviet revisionism offered can in no way help India solve the food crisis. On the contrary, it will only make India more dependent on Soviet revisionism and cause the Indian economy to deteriorate further. India's serious grain shortage will inevitably continue and grow still worse.

**391 "Ruthless plunder of India by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism," *Peking Review* commentary, 29 March 1974 (Extracts)**

Using "assistance" as bait, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is plundering India economically through gross inequality in trade. . . .

From the time the Soviet Union became India's creditor by means of selling outmoded machinery and equipment on credit, it has plundered more and more of India's important resources, forcing her to supply the Soviet Union with great quantities of agricultural and side-line products, industrial raw materials and light industrial products. . . .

Under the pretext of "co-operation," the Soviet Union is exploiting India's cheap labour by getting Indian factories to do for it the labour-intensive processing work and by making India build a number of factories which produce only things needed by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union and India signed a 15-year economic and trade "co-operation" agreement late last November which aroused grave concern among many Indians of various circles.

### **392 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1973-74, March 1974 (Extract)**

There was no significant change in India's relations with China. While India continued to seek normalisation of relations, there was little response from China.

China's anti-Indian propaganda continued apace. Through public statements and publicity media, the Chinese sought to give a wrong impression of our relationship with our neighbouring countries like Nepal and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese also made representations about Dalai Lama's visit to Europe in 1973, on the ground that the visit was meant to expand "the scope of anti-China activities." The Government of India had pointed out to the Chinese that the visit was a purely personal one, with no political implications. And this was more than borne out by the facts of the visit.

Despite this lack of positive response, India continued to adopt an attitude of friendship and restraint. In April 1973, India waived visa requirements for Chinese passengers in direct transit through India (with permission to stop for a period of 24 hours). India also brought the propaganda war on the border to an end by stopping the radio broadcasts at the border passes of Nathu La, Jelep La and Cho La in February-March 1973.

### **393 Peking Review report on Tripartite Agreement between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, 19 April 1974**

An agreement providing for completion of the repatriation of the remaining Pakistan prisoners of war and civilian internees held in India by the end of April 1974 was signed in New Delhi on April 9 by the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh who met for talks on April 5.

Under the agreement the 195 Pakistan POWs Bangladesh had threatened to try for "war crimes" will be repatriated to Pakistan.

With Soviet support, India dismembered Pakistan by force in November 1971. Indian troop withdrawal from the occupied Pakistan territories took place one year after the adoption of resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security

Council by an overwhelming majority demanding a ceasefire, troop withdrawal and repatriation of prisoners of war by both sides. And repatriation of the Pakistan POWs detained in India only began last September.

**394 “Who’s ‘fishing in troubled waters’?”, commentary by  
Hsinhua correspondent, 18 May 1974 (Extract)**

Since the Soviet Government itself in the past approved of the Kashmir people exercising self-determination, why has TASS accused the Chinese Government and people of “crude intervention” and “fishing in troubled waters” for supporting the Kashmir people’s struggle for the right to self-determination as though this was the worst thing possible?

The answer is quite simple. Power in the present-day Soviet Union has been usurped by a group of revisionists, a pack of social-imperialists who have entirely discarded the previous correct stand of the Soviet Government. Since 1955, Khrushchov, Brezhnev and their like have more than once openly asserted that “Kashmir is a component part of the Union of India,” that “the whole of Kashmir belongs to India,” and even truculently declared that “the Kashmir question simply does not arise.” In this manner, they consider themselves the supreme judge over the Kashmir people in deciding the latter’s fate as they please. Now they are attacking China’s support for the Kashmir people’s struggle for the right to self-determination as engaging in “a crude intervention in a matter relevant to the exclusive competence of two countries, India and Pakistan.” This is as preposterous as it is shameless.

It can be recalled how the Soviet revisionist leading clique had also cried out for “the principle of national self-determination” on the South Asia question. Two years ago, under the pretext of “the principle of national self-determination” it flagrantly instigated a war to dismember Pakistan by force, and then took this as an opportunity for its naval presence in Chittagong, stayed right there, and actually made it a Soviet naval base. And when there is really a need to apply the principle of national self-determination on the question of Kashmir, the Soviet revisionist clique simply denies the existence of the Kashmir question and the right of the Kashmir people to rid

themselves of outside interference and realize national self-determination. When talking about “the principle of self-determination” at the time of dismembering Pakistan by force, Soviet revisionism was obviously attempting to use this principle as a fig-leaf to cover up its social imperialist infiltration and expansion in South Asia. In frantically opposing “the principle of self-determination” on the question of Kashmir, its evil intention is to make the solution of the question more complicated so as to use and intensify the Indian-Pakistan dispute to further its social-imperialist designs in this area.

Facts show very clearly that it is precisely the Soviet revisionist clique itself that “quite deliberately is fomenting a provocative and blatant campaign” over Kashmir in order that it itself can “fish in troubled waters.”

**395 “India’s economy in serious trouble,” *Peking Review* commentary, 21 June 1974 (Extracts)**

Despite the economic troubles India faces today, the Delhi government is jacking up military spending and keeps supporting itself by borrowing. The evil consequences resulting from this have worsened an already difficult economic situation and added to the hardship and poverty of the Indian people. Under these circumstances, it is no accident that India has witnessed large-scale mass struggles. . . .

*200 Million Go Hungry.* India’s economic difficulties are first of all manifested in serious food shortages. . . .

*Price Hike Overtakes Japan.* Soaring prices are another problem defying solution in the economy. Wholesale prices were increased by 26 per cent last year. The rise of prices of food grains and daily necessities was even faster. . . .

*40 Million People Jobless.* . . .

*Military Spending—A Record High Since Independence.* . . .

To make up its financial deficit, maintain its huge military spending and repay foreign debts, the Indian Government has borrowed from abroad year after year. Up to March 1973, unpaid foreign debts amounted to 14,697 million U.S. dollars. Gross foreign aid of over 8,730 million rupees was budgeted for the current fiscal year. . . .

*Poverty and Struggle.* Hunger, unemployment, rising prices,

exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies make the Indian people poorer and poorer. . . .

The Indian people have repeatedly launched large-scale mass struggles for the right to live and against food shortages and soaring prices since the beginning of this year. The number of people involved and the duration of the struggle have rarely been seen since India's independence. This state of affairs is by no means fortuitous.

**396 "Intolerable bullying," article by *People's Daily* commentator, 3 July 1974 (abridged)**

The Indian Government has recently intensified its suppression of Sikkim's demand for national independence in an attempt to deprive the King of Sikkim of his powers and realize its ambition to fully control and annex Sikkim. This Indian government action has again revealed its ugly expansionist features and aroused strong opposition among the Sikkimese people.

Last April, the Indian Government manipulated an election in Sikkim, thus putting the Sikkim Assembly in the grip of the pro-Indian elements. Moreover, on June 20, India manufactured a "constitution" bill through the assembly, which, on the pretext of "reform," would reduce the King of Sikkim, who stands for independence, to a titular "head of state" and put all power in Sikkim in the hands of the "chief executive" nominated by India. The "constitution" bill even flagrantly stipulates that the Government of Sikkim "may seek participation in political institutions of India" and "the development of Sikkim may be brought within the ambits of the Planning Commission of India." This actually is designed to deprive Sikkim of its every right to independence and reduce it to a colony of India.

India's naked expansionist action against Sikkim has aroused indignation among all justice-upholding countries and people the world over. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution. This is an irresistible trend of history in today's world. Since World War II, scores of colonies, protectorates and trust territories in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania have freed themselves from the imperialist and colonialist shackles and declared their independence. Among them, however, only India has inherited since



independence the British colonial policy in the 19th century by making Sikkim its protectorate and carrying out colonial rule over it. India has not only sent troops to Sikkim to control its internal, external political and economic affairs, but also has tried to go further by dethroning the king of Sikkim and annexing the country. The Indian Government's gross trampling on Sikkim's sovereignty is an outright act of colonial expansion running completely counter to the historical trend in the present-day world.

Engels pointed out: "No one can enslave a nation with impunity." History has proved, and will continue to prove, that all policies of national oppression can only arouse national resistance. The Indian expansionist who are bullying others intolerably will inevitably eat their own bitter fruit.

### **397 Commentary by *Hsinhua* correspondent on the "constitution" for Sikkim, 13 July 1974 (Extracts)**

As is known to all, the "constitution" was drafted by Indian officials in Sikkim which was under Indian military occupation and was imposed on Sikkim after the Sikkimese people's resistance was put down by Indian troops and police. That the constitution of a country should be drafted by a foreign country which takes another's job into its own hands is what the Soviet revisionists call "democratization of political life". .

A Sikkimese personage, who did not want to be identified, went right to the heart of the matter when he recently described the Indian action as a "mini-Czechoslovakia incident." In 1968, the Soviet revisionists despatched troops to occupy Czechoslovakia under the pretext of aiding "a fraternal country" and "defending the fruit of socialism." Now the Indian Government has sent troops to occupy Sikkim under the pretext of aiding it in "democratization." In short, the two incidents are the products of the power politics of big countries bullying small ones. One is a superpower, the other is a sub-superpower. One takes over the mantle of the old tsars while the other steps into the boots of the colonialists. One carries out expansion in all parts of the world while the other expands in South Asia. This is the basic reason why the Soviet revisionists have praised India's annexation of Sikkim.

**398 Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in Rajya Sabha initiating debate on international situation, 30 July 1974 (Extract)**

With China, our offer to hold unconditional, bilateral dialogue stands but alas, we have not so far seen a positive and dependable response.

**399 Swaran Singh's reply to the Rajya Sabha debate on international situation, 1 August 1974 (Extract)**

I would like to say very categorically that on our border with China it is mostly Tibet and for Tibet we have to deal with China and whether we like it or not it is the Government of China and the Chinese soldiers whom our soldiers face all along the border. So one should not live in a dreamland, and there is no use raking up matters on which we have taken a very clear stand.

We have given asylum to Dalai Lama. We have never recognised his political position vis-a-vis Tibet, and I would not like this to be a matter on which China can protest to us. So I want to make it clear that there is no doubt about our attitude on Tibet.

**400 *People's Daily* commentator on India's "annexation" of Sikkim, 3 September 1974 (Extract)**

By adopting a so-called bill on August 29, the Indian Government openly revealed its intention to annex Sikkim. This flagrant act of colonialist expansion is on a par with the deeds of old-line colonialists. All justice-minded countries and people have been shocked and filled with anger by this grave incident. The Chinese people strongly denounce this despicable act of the Indian Government. . . .

The so-called Sikkim's "request" for joining India is nothing but a scenario written and staged by the Indian Government itself.

India's expansionist and aggressive ambition is by no means limited to annexation of this tiny Himalayan kingdom. Regarding itself as a sub-superpower, it dreams of lording it over in

South Asia. The Nehrus, father and daughter, have always acted in this way, and Indira Gandhi has gone farther. Three years ago, the Indian Government with the support of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism dismembered Pakistan by force. Recently it blasted a nuclear device to make nuclear blackmail and nuclear menace in the South Asia region. At the same time it plans to set up a “so-called South Asian countries” group with itself as overlord in an attempt to drag other nations into its sphere of influence. Simultaneous with the annexation of Sikkim, some Indian newspapers even frenziedly clamoured for amending the Indian constitution in such way as to enable neighbouring countries to be “represented” in the Indian Parliament. This fully shows that India can do to other neighbouring countries tomorrow what it has done to Sikkim today.

It must be pointed out that this expansionist act of India’s has been instigated and supported by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. . . .

Facts have shown once again that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism and Indian expansionism constitute a serious threat to the independence and sovereignty of the South Asian countries, and are the main cause of the unstable situation in the South Asian subcontinent.

**401 Article in *People’s Daily*, 8 September 1974 (Extract)**

Everything India had done against Sikkim “is aimed at robbing her of . . . the sacred right” to independence and sovereignty. “The Indian expansionists are not only annexing a small nation but, worse still, they are wantonly trampling on the inviolable sacred principle that a nation, whether big or small, has independent sovereignty—a principle firmly held and defended by the peoples of the Third World. Thus, the Indian government has completely cast off its disguise as a supporter of the national liberation movements and opponents of imperialism and colonialism, and has instead fully exposed its wild ambition to become a ‘sub-superpower’.”

**402 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on Sikkim, 11 September 1974**

Recently, in disregard of the resolute opposition of the people of Sikkim and world public opinion, the Indian Parliament brazenly adopted a constitutional amendment making Sikkim an "associate state" of India, thus annexing the Kingdom of Sikkim in a colonialist way. This is another act of outright expansionism committed by the Indian Government after dismembering Pakistan with the backing of Soviet Union. The Chinese Government and people express great indignation at this act and strongly condemn it.

Inheriting the mantle of imperialism, India has since independence pursued a colonialist policy towards Sikkim. She sent troops to invade and occupy Sikkim, turned Sikkim into her "protectorate" and seized control of Sikkim's national defence and internal and external affairs. The Indian Government probably felt its hand strengthened after first nuclear test in May this year, allegedly for peaceful purposes, and thought it could do whatever it pleased with its neighbours. So in June it imposed on the people of Sikkim a so-called "the Government Sikkim Bill" entirely of its own making. India's colonial rule over Sikkim aroused the strong resistance of the Sikkimese people. They staged many demonstrations, demanding the annulment of the India-Sikkim treaty and the ouster of Indian troops. The Chogyal of Sikkim repeatedly wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, protesting against the Indian Government's incorporation of Sikkim into India and demanding the maintenance of Sikkim's "separate identity and international personality." Now the Indian Government has flagrantly annexed Sikkim. This is a provocation to the justice-upholding peoples of the world and a challenge to the historical trend of national independence. The Chinese Government solemnly states that it absolutely does not recognize India's illegal annexation of Sikkim and that it firmly supports the people of Sikkim in their just struggle for national independence and sovereignty and against Indian expansionism.

The Indian Government's shameless act of annexing Sikkim has been strongly condemned by all countries and people that uphold justice. The Soviet Union alone, however, has blatantly

cheered India and expressed support for Indira Gandhi's government. This is another proof that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is the boss behind the scenes as well as the abettor of Indian expansionism.

Expansionists never come to a good end. The Indian Government will be no exception. It must not think that it can enslave a nation and annex a state without getting due punishment. The crime of the Indian Government's annexation of Sikkim is bound to arouse the Sikkimese people and the people of the whole world, including the Indian people, to even stronger resistance. It can be said with certainty that the Indian Government, which starts with injuring others, will end up by ruining itself.

#### **403 Peking Review report on Bhutan, 20 September 1974**

The Royal Government of Bhutan, to maintain its independence, has refused to accept administrative advisers newly appointed by India.

*The Hindu* reported on September 5 that in an effort to assert its independence, Bhutan had told India that it would not agree to the appointment of any new administrative advisers by India. The Bhutanese Government wanted no replacement of the present Indian advisers by any new ones when their assigned terms in Bhutan came to an end. . . .

The police adviser had finished his tenure in Bhutan a few weeks ago, but no new appointee has been accepted by Bhutan. The police adviser occupied a key post, forming part of the military mission. He served as the eyes and ears of the Indian Government.

Bhutan has telephone and telegraph communications with India but now it is impossible to telephone anyone at Thimpu from Calcutta without a special category certificate from the Indian External Affairs Ministry. This is an act of infringement by the Indian Government on the sovereignty of Bhutan.

#### **404 Speech by Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in the UN General Assembly, 2 October 1974 (Extract)**

The dismemberment of Pakistan by India with the backing of

the Soviet Union gave rise to turbulence and unrest on the South Asian subcontinent. Great efforts have been made by the Government of Pakistan to promote normalization of relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. By April this year, the Indian Government had finally implemented in full the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council of 1971 on the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the withdrawal of troops and the repatriation of prisoners. This ought to have created favourable conditions for the relaxation of the situation on the South Asian subcontinent. But a new wave arose when the previous one had barely subsided. In May India exploded a nuclear device allegedly for peaceful purposes. In June the Indian Government imposed on the people of Sikkim the so-called "Government of Sikkim bill", with it had concocted single-handedly. And more recently, the Indian Parliament adopted a constitutional amendment, making Sikkim a so-called "associate state" of India. To put it bluntly, this is the annexation of Sikkim. It is another naked act of expansionism perpetrated by the Indian Government after dismembering Pakistan by armed force.

The Indian Government's annexation of Sikkim has aroused the opposition of the Sikkimese people as well as the Indian people and met with condemnation by India's neighbours and world public opinion. The Soviet propaganda organs alone sing praises of India. This shows that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is the boss behind the scenes of Indian expansionism.

**405 *Peking Review* commentary on "India's expansion in South Asia with the backing of Soviet social-imperialism,"  
22 November 1974 (Extracts)**

The Indian Government's recent annexation of Sikkim is another revelation of the Indian ruling clique's aggression and expansion against its neighbouring countries. . . .

What are the Indian Government's actions towards its neighbours, "good neighbourliness" or aggression and expansion? One only has to look back at the train of events in the last few years for a clear answer.

With its expansionist ambitions boosted by Soviet social-

imperialist backing, India in recent years has been riding roughshod over the South Asian subcontinent, bullying the small and the weak, openly interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbours, bullying and even carrying out armed aggression against them.

*Against Pakistan.* Backed by Soviet social-imperialism, India launched an armed aggression to dismember Pakistan in 1971 soon after the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty. This stirred up upheavals which have continued in South Asia to this day. Since then, the Indian Government, in co-ordination with the Soviet revisionists, has been plotting further dismemberment of Pakistan. . . .

*Against Nepal.* While shouting about “non-interference in the internal affairs of others,” the Indian leaders have openly sheltered the Nepalese anti-national elements who fled to India. Besides setting up camps for them, the Indian Government provides them with arms, helps them in military training, and instigates them to carry out armed harassment, subversion and destructive activities against Nepal. . . .

*Against Sikkim and Bhutan.* The Indian Government also has direct control over the internal affairs of some neighbouring countries by sending officials or “advisers.” For many years, the chief administrator India sent to Sikkim held supreme power in that kingdom. The Indian Government has been plotting recently to depose the Chogyal of Sikkim and intensifying its suppression of the Sikkimese people’s just struggle to protect their national independence. India has taken over control of the defence and foreign affairs of Bhutan, another independent state. The Indian ruling clique has gone so far as to connive with rebels from China’s Tibet, whom it has groomed and fostered, to try to assassinate the King of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuck. . . .

Using various means to control the economy of India’s neighbours, the Indian expansionists have made enormous profits. . . .

*Against Bangladesh.* The Indian Government also pursues its

selfish ends in its economic relations with Bangladesh. About one million tons of foodgrain have been illegally shipped this year to India from Bangladesh which is in a serious grain shortage. Disregarding the sufferings of the Bangladesh people, Indian authorities are even trying to block the flow of water from the Ganges to Bangladesh. When the Indian Farakka Dam project on the Ganges is completed and goes into operation, agriculture, navigation and power generation in Bangladesh will be seriously threatened and 8 of the 19 districts in that country face the danger of becoming barren land.

Despite serious domestic economic difficulties and the people's dire poverty, the Indian Government, aided and abetted by Soviet social-imperialism is stepping up its arms building with a view to carrying out expansion abroad. Military expenditures now account for more than 21 per cent of India's budgetary outlay. The Indian Government exploded a nuclear device in Rajasthan on the border of Pakistan last May. This was followed by an inspired statement making a splash about India's capability to make delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons at any time, carrying out nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat in South Asia.

The Indian expansionists forcibly annexed Sikkim after the nuclear explosion. At the same time they came forward with a plan for a "South Asian countries' bloc." Creating public opinion for an amendment to the Indian constitution, they clamoured wildly that it will be so revised as to have other countries "represented" in the Indian parliament as has been done with Sikkim.

It has become evident that almost every expansionist move by the Indian Government was inspired, encouraged and supported by the Soviet social-imperialists, who have even been directly involved in India's expansionist actions. India's nuclear explosion was condemned by public opinion all over the world. The Soviet social-imperialists alone were beside with joy and spoke up for India with great enthusiasm. . . . By supporting the Indian expansionists, the Soviet social-imperialists want to use India to prepare the ground for their own infiltration and expansion in South Asia and to contend with the other superpower for hegemony in the region.

The South Asian people, who have suffered long years of



enslavement by imperialism and colonialism, however, will not put themselves at the mercy of the Indian expansionists and their backers, the Soviet social-imperialists. . . .

The Nepalese people demonstrated to protest India's annexation of Sikkim. Public opinion in Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries in South and Southeast Asia strongly condemned the annexation. All this is a powerful warning that Indian expansionists and Soviet social-imperialism cannot escape being punished by history for their aggression and expansion in South Asia.

**406 *Peking Review* commentary condemning India for damaging Nepal's interests, 3 January 1975**

Indian authorities' act of building the Kosi project at the expense of Nepal's interests has been exposed and condemned by the Nepalese National News Agency (R.S.S.) and the press.

Flowing through gorges into India, the Kosi, Nepal's biggest river, used to cause floods and waterlogging to India's Bihar State. In accordance with an Indian-Nepalese agreement, a barrage was built in 1954 on the river in Nepalese territory by the Indian side to control the flow of water into India. An eastern irrigation canal was constructed southward from the dam to Indian territory.

A recent R.S.S. article said: "During the last 15 or 20 years, beneficial schemes under the Kosi project have all been centred on the Indian side. Irrigation of 1,834,000 acres of land in Bihar from the eastern canal of the Kosi project started some years ago. This has increased the income of Bihar to a considerable extent." Compared with the area irrigated in India, however, the irrigation facilities that Nepal enjoys have been negligible since the building of the barrage and the irrigation canal.

The Chatara canal in Nepal has been constructed in a very weak and undependable way. Work did not proceed according to schedule, and moreover, completed earthen construction had collapsed or had been damaged in several places before it could be turned over to Nepal. Nevertheless, the Indian side has all along been trying to hand the canal over to Nepal. If it is accepted in its present condition, Nepal will have to spend

millions of rupees a year for operation and maintenance. This would be a permanent burden on Nepal.

The weekly *Everest* said that since the construction of the Kosi barrage, Nepal has lost some 60,000 tons of grain yearly from floods, in addition to the loss of some 10,000 tons of grain from the land occupied by the project. On the other hand, India not only has got rid of floods, but grain output in the area has increased greatly every year.

**407 Peking Review commentary on Grechko's India trip,  
7 March 1975 (Extracts)**

Soviet Defence Minister Andrei Grechko at the head of a high-ranking military delegation made up of chieftains of the Soviet army, navy and air force visited India from February 24 to 27. This was a new step by Soviet social-imperialism to intensify contention with U.S. imperialism for hegemony in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.

Peering through the smokescreen of "relaxation," "peace" and "stability," as the Soviet and Indian Defence Ministers portrayed it in their joint communique, one can see the dark clouds of the arms race hanging over the sub-continent. The joint communique said that they "have expressed their grave anxiety at the actions taken by certain quarters to step up arms race." It is self-evident that this referred to the actions by the U.S. Government in this area, first of all, its announcement on February 24 about the decision to lift the 10-year-old U.S. arms embargo to India and Pakistan. *Izvestia* said on February 26 that the U.S. move was intended to strengthen its military presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Clearly, the Soviet paper was trying to find a pretext to cover up the Soviet arms race at a higher level in this area, sell more arms and carry out military expansion there.

Everybody knows that in the last 10 years, the Soviet revisionists have made strenuous efforts to help India expand its armaments. They have supplied India with over 2,000 million dollars worth of arms in the past seven years alone in addition to assistance in building a MiG-making plant and other war industry items for India. Grechko's recent trip was designed to serve the purpose of equipping the Indian army with up-to-date weapons and using more advanced equipment to strengthen

India's arms productions capacity. . . .

U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said that the U.S. Government had taken into consideration the Soviet Union's massive supply of arms to India in making its decision to end its arms embargo to the subcontinent.

The Soviet revisionists have extended military aid to India and equipped its munitions industry on a big scale for the purpose of contending for hegemony with the United States in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It was disclosed that Grechko and Indian leaders had discussed, in addition to co-operation in the military field, the situation arising from the U.S. establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean.

In recent years, the Soviet revisionists have greatly boosted their naval strength in the Indian Ocean, with more than 30 ships cruising there most of the time.

#### **408 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1974-75, March 1975 (Extract)**

Despite India's consistent efforts to seek normalisation of relations with China, from the Chinese side there was no response. Consequently there was no significant change in India's relations with China.

Besides reiterating in public statements its desire to normalise relations with China, the Government of India came forth with certain positive gestures towards this end. Thus it allowed the members of the Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee to visit China in May 1974. India also played the host, *inter alia*, to a Chinese team at the World Table Tennis Championship held in Calcutta in February 1975.

Although the Chinese Vice-Premier, Teng Hsiao-ping, went on record in his expression of Chinese readiness to "develop good neighbourly relations with the countries of the sub-continent," Chinese actions *vis-a-vis* India did not match such professions. The Chinese publicity media kept up their anti-Indian campaign making critical reference to India's internal developments. China also tried to belittle India's explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974 and raised a spectre of nuclear blackmail by India, in order to create suspicion and mistrust between India and her neighbours.

Despite this continuing unfriendly and even hostile posture on the part of China, India's policy continued to be one of restraint and desire to normalise relations.

**409 "Naked annexation," *People's Daily* commentary on Sikkim, 13 April 1975 (Extracts)**

Without a shred of conscience, the Indian Government let loose its troops on April 9 and forcibly disbanded the palace guards of Sikkim's Chogyal. The very next day, Sikkim's cabinet and national assembly, manipulated by the Indian Government, adopted "resolutions" demanding the removal of the Chogyal and the turning of Sikkim into a constituent state of India. Immediately afterwards, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent a message pledging "full support." This act of depriving at bayonet point the Chogyal of his authority and blatantly annexing Sikkim once again reveals the Indian Government's ugly expansionist features. With deep indignation, the Chinese people strongly condemn this Indian action. . . .

As in the case of the dismemberment of Pakistan and the annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir, it is Soviet Social-imperialist backing that has made the Indian expansionists so arrogant as to commit the recent outrage.

**410 Indira Gandhi's Government: Fierce features fully exposed,' article by Jen Ku-ping in *Peking Review*, 4 July 1975**

The Indian Government flagrantly sent large numbers of troops and police early in the morning on June 26 to make massive arrests of opposition party leaders across the country and at the same time imposed an overall press censorship. Then, Indira Gandhi and company declared a national "state of emergency" on the pretext that the security of the state was "threatened." Instantly, police cars were cruising the streets as though confronted by a formidable enemy, and an atmosphere of tension and terror prevailed.

What has so "threatened" India's security that the Gandhi government did not hesitate to adopt such suppressive measures ?

The cause is not far to seek. Since the verdict of the Indian High Court in Allahabad on June 12 found Indira Gandhi guilty of corrupt practices in the 1971 elections and disqualified her as member of parliament, the voices demanding her resignation had mounted in various parts of India. In addition to the strong demand for her immediate resignation by Indian opposition parties and public opinion, more and more people had taken to the street and staged demonstrations demanding that she step down. In the face of an imminent "nationwide struggle" to throw Gandhi out of office, the sanctimonious Gandhi government did not scruple to discard the last shred of the fig-leaf of "democracy" and fully bare its fierce features.

In the past decade since Gandhi assumed the premiership, she has done her utmost to defend the interests of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie of India and pursued a reactionary domestic and foreign policy. However, in her broadcast speech proclaiming the "state of emergency," she had the effrontery to describe herself as a defender of the "democratic system." The fact shows the very opposite. Domestically, the Gandhi regime has all along exercised dictatorial rule, frenziedly suppressed the revolutionary movements, ruthlessly persecuted the toiling masses demanding democratic rights and better living conditions and unscrupulously suppressed progressive people and public opinion advocating justice. In a word, "Indira is India and India is Indira," those who bow before her survive and those who resist perish.

In the same speech, she also boasted that she had introduced "certain progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India." This is an even more deceitful talk. Everybody knows that as a result of the Gandhi government's "benevolent rule," the Indian economy is in a mess. Production stagnates, commodity prices skyrocket, the grain shortage is acute and famine stalks the land. These are the "benefits" the Gandhi government has brought to the Indian people. Internationally, moreover, it has thrown itself into the lap of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, and this has brought increasing colonialization of India's economy. It also has committed aggression and expansion on the South Asia subcontinent, dismembering, annexing and bullying other countries. It not only has brought instability to its neighbours but also misfortune to the

country and the people. Where is a shadow of the “benefits”? The reactionary rule of the Gandhi regime has already aroused strong indignation and resistance from the Indian people. The present political turmoil is an expression of India’s daily deepening political and economic crisis.

Gandhi has all along been backed by the lords of the Kremlin. All the Gandhi government’s reactionary measures and criminal acts at home and abroad have won the plaudits and support of Soviet revisionism. On this occasion, it is again the Soviet revisionists who have impatiently stepped forward to defend Gandhi, alleging that the corrupt election practices were only “fabrications by the opposition.” In short, the Soviet revisionists sometimes give advice to her behind the scenes and sometimes openly come out to whitewash her in a vain attempt to help her tide over a crisis.

The sole purpose of the Soviet revisionist social-imperialists in trying so painstakingly to prop up Gandhi is to continue their control of India so as to contend for hegemony with the other superpower in South Asia. And Gandhi wants to become the junior hegemonic lord in this area under the patronage of Soviet revisionism. However, India belongs to the Indian people who will not long tolerate the reactionary rule of the Gandhi regime or allow anybody to sell out their country to a superpower. All those who hire themselves out to imperialism, no matter how rampant they may be for a time, will never come to a good end, just as their behind-the-scenes bosses will never either.

**411 *Peking Review* commentary on India, 8 August 1975  
(Extracts)**

Mass resistance activities are spreading in India as the people give expression to their resentment of the fascist measures taken by the government of Indira Gandhi.

The crackdown has become increasingly severe since the “state of emergency” was proclaimed on June 26. On July 24, the Indian Parliament, manipulated by Indira Gandhi passed a constitutional amendment to put curbs on the judiciary. . . .

The new legislation also extends press censorship to cover newspaper advertisements, bans strikes and interdicts assemb-

lies of more than five persons.

Twenty-six organizations have been proscribed. Moreover, police and police hounds have been detailed to shadow, search and arrest Indira Gandhi's opponents. Tens of thousands of people from all walks of life have been thrown in jail. . . .

The draconian measures taken by the Government of Indira Gandhi are meeting with strong resistance. Protest rallies and demonstrations by the people against the fascist suppression were held recently one after another not only in Gujarat and Tamilnadu where the opposition parties are in power and the control of the National Congress Party is weak but also in New Delhi and in Bihar and Kerala States.

**412 Peking Review commentary on famine in India,  
15 August 1975 (Extracts)**

Famine is stalking India as food becomes increasingly short all the time and in many places. . . .

Foodgrain production in India has been unstable. In recent years, the per hectare yield has been decreasing. Official quarters admitted that grain output per hectare in 1974-75 was 4 per cent less than in 1970-71.

Forty per cent of India's population are struggling on the starvation line and 80 per cent of the children are in a state of malnutrition.

In recent years about half of the states in India were hit by grave food shortage. In famine-stricken areas, peasants subsist on bark and grass roots. Large numbers of peasants were forced to leave their home villages, some becoming beggars, others abandoning their children and still others starving on the road. . . .

India has very good natural conditions for grain production. But because of the government's economic policy, which relies on food imports at the expense of agricultural development, India has become known as a "nation of famine" in the world. Food shortage exacerbates resentment among the Indian people. It constitutes one of the important causes of the turbulent political situation in India.

**413 Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on border incident with India, 3 November 1975**

On November 1, 1975 the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of India made a statement asserting that Chinese personnel ambushed an Indian patrol and killed four Indian soldiers in an area which he claimed was 'well within Indian territory.' His statement was a sheer reversal of black and white and confusion of right and wrong. In order to set forth the truth, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China makes the following statement upon instructions:

At 13:30 hours on October 20, 1975 a group of Indian troops crossed the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 at Tulung Pass on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary and intruded into China's territory of Tibet. Personnel of the civilian checkpost at Chuna in Tibet, China, repeatedly warned the Indian soldiers that they had crossed the line and told them to withdraw immediately. Ignoring this, the Indian soldiers made continual provocations and even opened fire at the Chinese civilian checkposts personnel, posing a grave threat to the life of the latter. The Chinese civilian checkpost personnel were obliged to fire back in self-defence.

Against the above-mentioned intrusion and provocation of Indian soldiers, a responsible member of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China handed a note of protest to the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Indian Embassy in China on the morning of October 22, 1975. He also orally notified the Indian side that the Chinese civilian checkpost personnel had, in the course of firing back in self-defence, killed four Indian soldiers and that the Chinese side was ready to let the Indian side collect their bodies at any time. On the afternoon of October 25 the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Indian Embassy in China called on the responsible member of the Asian Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and expressed the desire of the Indian side to collect the bodies of the Indian soldiers and their weapons and ammunition. At 14:00 hours, Peking time, on October 28 a representative of the Indian side came to the Chinese side of the line of actual control at Tulung Pass in



Tibet, China to collect the bodies of the four Indian soldiers and their weapons and ammunition and signed a receipt. The above facts are most revealing : While in plain fact Indian troops had crossed the line of actual control and intruded into China's territory of Tibet, the Indian side, flying in the face of the fact, alleged that the Chinese personnel had crossed into Indian territory; while in plain fact Indian troops had opened fire in provocation, the Indian side spread the slander that Chinese personnel laid an ambush.

The stand of the Chinese Government on the Sino-Indian boundary question is known to all. In order to avert border conflicts and preserve peace along the border, the Chinese Government has always stood for the maintenance of the status quo on the border pending a settlement of the boundary question. To this end, the Chinese Government on its side has taken a series of measures on its own initiative. Over the years, the personnel of the Chinese civilian checkpoints performing their duties on the Chinese side of the line of actual control along the Sino-Indian boundary have always strictly abided by this principled stand of the Chinese Government. We hope that the Indian Government will take effective measures to ensure against the recurrence of similar incidents in future.

**414 "India's act of tyranny," *People's Daily* commentary,  
19 February 1976**

In South Asia, incidents of the Indian expansionists bullying small and weak nations have taken place continuously. Foreign news agencies recently reported that India is now inflicting a new disaster on Bangladesh by diverting the waters of the river Ganges.

The Ganges is an international river. It is a universally accepted principle that the water resources of such a river should be rationally distributed and utilized by countries in both the upper and lower reaches. However, India is trying to make exclusive use of the river, disregarding the life and death of the people living in the lower reaches. Such an overbearing behaviour is rarely seen in international relations.

The water issue is but one of the many instances in which Bangladesh is bullied by India. Since the political situation

changed in Bangladesh last year, the India authorities and press, in coordination with the Soviet social-imperialist propaganda machine, have incessantly raised a hue and cry to intimidate and exert pressure on Bangladesh. They have gone so far as to attack Bangladesh for making a legitimate decision within its sovereignty to improve relations with its neighbours. What is more serious is the fact that the Indian authorities have connived at India-based armed bandits' harassments and attacks against Bangladesh across the border, thus threatening the security of the latter.

South Asia now remains in a state of turmoil because of the daily intensified contention between the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean. Under the instigation and support of the Soviet revisionists, the Indian rulers have pursued a policy of expansionism in the area, rendering the international relations there all the more tense. But the people of the South Asian countries are not to be bullied. They will become ever stronger and more awakened in the course of the struggle against superpower hegemonism and Indian expansionism. They are resolved to be the master of their own destiny. Neither superpower hegemonism nor sub-superpower expansionism will come to a good end.

**415 "The truth about Soviet-Indian 'economic cooperation',"**  
*Peking Review* commentary, 19 March 1976 (Extracts)

A look at the reports and statistics about Soviet-Indian trade in Indian newspapers and publications reveals that behind the smokescreen of the much-vaunted Soviet-Indian "economic co-operation" are infuriating facts of Soviet social-imperialist exploitation, plunder and oppression of India. . . .

History will show that the Brezhnev clique's unscrupulous exploitation and bullying of India will eventually arouse resistance among the Indian people.

**416 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1975-76, March 1976 (Extract)**

Chinese media continued hostile propaganda against India during the year. The Chinese government issued a statement on 29 April 1975, calling the Sikkimese attainment of statehood

within the Indian Union “illegal annexation”. Since this was an internal matter of no concern to any other Government, the Government of India issued a short statement on 1 May 1975, pointing out China’s interference in India’s internal affairs. China continued to claim that India had “hegemonistic and expansionist ambitions” towards her neighbours and aspired to become a “sub-super-power” with the support of the Soviet Union. Despite all these Chinese distortions, India desisted from any kind of a propaganda campaign.

The Indian Government followed a consistent policy of seeking to normalise relations with China. A Chinese Table-Tennis team came to India in February 1975, at the invitation of the Indian Table Tennis Federation to take part in the World Table Tennis Championships. Similarly, the Indian Government also agreed to the Chinese request to instal a general telex link at its Embassy in New Delhi on a reciprocal basis. India also supported China’s candidature in international organisations like the Asian Development Bank.

On 20 *October* about 40 Chinese soldiers crossed the Indian border in the eastern sector and ambushed and killed 4 of India’s soldiers, in Indian territory. The Government of India lodged a strong protest with the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi against this incident.

#### **417 Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan’s statement in Lok Sabha on relations with China, 15 April 1976**

The House is aware that our tradition and policy is to endeavour to develop amicable relations with all countries, notably with our neighbours. The House will recall that while replying to the debate on the budget estimates for the Ministry of External Affairs last week, I had mentioned that we were making an effort in this direction with the People’s Republic of China. In pursuance of this policy, representatives of the two Governments in Delhi and Peking discussed the question of restoring the level of diplomatic representation in both countries to the Ambassadorial status.

It is proposed to appoint Shri K. R. Narayanan, at present Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, as our Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. He is an able and distingui-

shed member of the Foreign Service. The Chinese Government have conveyed their agreement to this nomination. Shri Narayanan will be taking up his new assignment in about two months.

On the basis of the discussions which have taken place, it is our understanding that this initiative for raising the level of our diplomatic representation in Peking will be followed by a similar move by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

**418 *Peking Review* commentary on India's national election, 25 March 1977 (Extracts)**

The national election showed the unpopularity of the internal and external policies of the Congress Party government. With the backing and connivance of Soviet social-imperialism, the Congress government for years pursued a policy of expansionism, thus isolating itself not only in South Asia but in the whole world. It subjected the Indian people to fascist suppression. Especially after it declared a state of emergency throughout the country in June 1975, tens of thousands of opposition members and people were arrested and detained. . . .

TASS released a host of despatches and commentaries in connection with the Indian election, describing the internal and external policies of the Congress Party as "progressive" and saying that "there is no alternative in the country to the Indian National Congress." In commenting on the debate over whether the Indian-Soviet treaty should be annulled, TASS termed the treaty, which is in fact a means in Moscow's hands to oppress, exploit and control India and create unrest in South Asia, "an inseparable part of India's foreign policy" and "in the interest of the Indian people." Facts have shown that the Kremlin's attempt to influence the Indian election was futile.

**419 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's congratulatory message to Premier Morarji Desai on his assumption of office, 30 March 1977**

On the occasion of your assumption of the office of Prime Minister of the Republic of India, I wish to extend congratulations to you on behalf of the Chinese Government and people. May the traditional friendship between the peoples of China

and India develop.

**420 Chinese commentary entitled, "Indian general election and Soviet setback in South Asia," 8 April 1977 (Extracts)**

The Indian general election returns drew worldwide attention. The National Congress Party which ruled India for 30 years, suffered a heavy defeat and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was compelled to step down from office. This significant change in the Indian political scene will have an important bearing on the situation in the South Asian subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean. . . .

The results not only declared the bankruptcy of the internal and external policies pursued by Indira Gandhi who had tailed after the Soviet Union, policies which harmed the country and brought suffering to the people, they also marked a serious setback to Moscow's expansionist scheme in the South Asian region.

India occupies an important strategic position in Asia and the Indian Ocean. To realize their fond dream of dominating the world, the new tsars curried favour with the Indira Gandhi government and tried to drag India into the orbit of their counter-revolutionary global strategy. This was especially so in the years after the conclusion of the Indian-Soviet treaty of "Peace, friendship and cooperation" in August 1971, which is in essence a treaty of military alliance. During this period, while they supported and abetted the Gandhi government in redoubling its efforts to carry out an expansionist policy against its neighbours, the Kremlin rulers tied India to their rickety chariot of social-imperialism to make it an important bridge-head for extending Soviet spheres of influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean and contending for hegemony with the other super power. The Soviet Union provided India with large quantities of military equipment, sent "military advisors" there and trained Indian military personnel. Through "military aid," it gradually controlled India's arms production and military supplies and obtained the privilege of building military bases in India.

Capitalizing on India's economic difficulties, the new tsars steadily increased their control and plunder of India. In the

last few years, under the pretext of "economic aid," the Soviet Union made fabulous profits through loans and export of capital; by setting up "public-owned enterprises," it meddled in India's heavy and basic industries and controlled the key economic lifelines; by flaunting the banner of "mutual benefit in trade," it pushed sales of surplus products and plundered raw materials and cheap manpower; in the name of "cooperation in production" and "co-ordination in planning," it tried to control India's national economy plans. Soviet control and plunder have brought untold suffering to the Indian people.

The internal and external policies of the Gandhi regime, which steadily weakened the position of the Congress Party Government, have long been strongly opposed by the Indian people. For many years, Moscow has energetically supported those in authority in the Indian Congress Party, lauding them as "progressive leaders" "inclined more and more to socialism." The Kremlin bosses went to India time and again to shore up the Gandhi government. Supporting the "state of emergency" Indira Gandhi declared in June 1975 to maintain her fascist rule by violence, the Soviet Union said it was an "indispensable measure" for "safeguarding the people's interests against unbridled attacks by Rightist forces." This fully unmasked the ugly features of the Soviet Union which is hostile to the Indian people.

The new tsars energetically supported the Congress Party government in the general election in an attempt to help it continue its rule. At the beginning of the election, the Soviet Press carried consecutive reports, and commentaries, lauding the "marvellous achievements" of the Gandhi government's domestic and foreign policies and beat the drums for her in the election campaign. The Soviet Press sharply attacked the withdrawal of some political figures from the Congress Party, saying that it "complicated the political situation in the country." Such Soviet actions only further bared the features of the Gandhi government as a retainer of the Soviet Union and increased the Indian people's disgust for it.

Stunned by the election results, the Kremlin bosses found themselves in an awkward position. What deserves attention, however, is that they have quickly changed their tune and are trying by hook or by crook to hold on to India, which holds an

important position, so as to continue their expansion in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. Faced with this sinister scheme, the people of the South Asian countries will certainly continue to heighten their vigilance, strengthen their unity and push ahead their struggle in defence of national independence and state sovereignty. The results of the Indian general election show precisely that superpower attempts to control and use other nations as tools for achieving world hegemony are bound to be opposed by their people and will eventually end in failure.

**421 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha,  
29 June 1977 (Extract)**

The House is familiar with the ups and downs of the story of our relations with China and the problems still remaining unresolved which complicated our relations. However, our Government welcomed the normalisation of our diplomatic relations and took the initiative to resume the severed trading links with that country. Based on the old Five Principles, we must have as our goal the forging of beneficial bilateral relations as is appropriate between two large Asian countries like India and China.

**422 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the  
year 1976-77, June 1977 (Extract)**

Informal exchanges between the two countries at official level on restoration of diplomatic representation to the Ambassadorial level took place in early 1976. These talks proved fruitful and were followed by the announcement in April 1976 of the nomination of Shri K.R. Narayanan as India's Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. China, making a positive response to India's initiative, announced, in July 1976, the appointment of Mr. Chen Chan-yuan as its Ambassador to India. The Indian Ambassador presented his credentials in July 1976. The Chinese Ambassador, while presenting his credentials in September stated that the normalisation of relations through joint efforts was in full accord with the interests of the people of the two countries. India considered the restoration of

channels of communication at the Ambassadorial level, after a lapse of 15 years, as a first step towards the normalisation of relations and for developing constructive and meaningful bilateral relations with China.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs sent messages of sympathy to the Chinese leaders following the earthquake in North Eastern China in August 1976. The offer to assist in the relief of earthquake victims was greatly appreciated by the Chinese Government. The Prime Minister also sent felicitations to Chairman Hua Kuo-feng on his appointment to the office of Chairman of the Communist Party and expressed the hope that relations between India and China would develop further in the years to come.

The visit of the Chinese badminton team to India in October/November and the visit of an un-official Indian delegation to China in December 1976, on the inauguration of the Dr. Kotnis Memorial Hall, reflected hopeful trends towards increasing [contacts] between the two countries.

A non-official Trade Delegation from India, including representatives of State Trade organisations, visited the Canton Spring Fair in April 1977. Preliminary agreements have been signed and it is hoped that these will lead to some substantial progress in renewing the commercial relations between the two countries

**423 "Superpowers' economic expansion in India," article by  
Chih Shi-ya in *Peking Review*, 1 July 1977 (Extracts)**

Soviet-U.S. rivalry in India is a component part of their contention for global hegemony. They are now engaged in economic expansion there, stepping up their economic control and plunder of the country. . .

By 1975 U.S. economic "aid" to India totalled 10,300 million U.S. dollars; making up 37.1 per cent of the total foreign "aid" the latter received. U.S. private direct investments in India were 364 million U.S. dollars, accounting for about 18 per cent of the country's total foreign private investments. At the same time, there were close to 400 U.S.-Indian joint-stock companies in the country. All this shows that the expansion of U.S. economic power in India has been considerable.

The Soviet Union started penetrating into India in 1955 and



quicken<sup>d</sup> its pace in the mid-60s. By 1976, the Soviet Union provided India with approximately 2,000 million U.S. dollars in economic "aid," or 6.4 per cent of the total foreign "aid" the latter received. Thus, the Soviet Union ranked fifth among India's "aid" suppliers after the United States, the World Bank and the International Development Associations, Britain and West Germany. Soviet-Indian trade expanded so rapidly that the Soviet Union became India's No. 1 trading partner by 1976, leaving Britain and the United States behind. At the same time, the Soviet Union held a safe lead in military "aid" to India by providing it with over 2,000 million U.S. dollars, far greater than the U.S. figure of 340 million dollars.

Soviet and U.S. economic expansion in India exhibits the following features:

First, Soviet economic "aid" is concentrated on the state-owned heavy industry, namely, India's bureaucrat-capital. . . .

The projects built with Soviet "aid" are in the main a number of eye-catching big heavy industrial enterprises. This is deceptive to a certain extent because it has created a false appearance of having helped India's industrialization.

The U.S. economic "aid" has infiltrated into every sector of the Indian economy and half of it was to dump farm products on the country under the American PL 480 provisions. By 1975, India had imported more than 65 million tons of U.S. food grain as authorized by the law. The rupees received by the United States from its grain sales in India have been used to build the U.S.-controlled counterpart fund. This huge fund is an important means by which Washington steps up its political, economic and cultural infiltration. The United States has also extended large sums in "aid" to the departments of transportation, electricity, oil chemicals, mining and water conservancy in India, far exceeding those of the Soviet Union in these fields.

Second, apart from its economic "aid" the United States also has made huge private direct investments in India and strongly supported its private monopoly capital through loans. . . .

Third, Soviet Union predominates in military "aid" and the United States in economic "aid". The former provides about 5.7 times as much military "aid" as the latter does. The Soviet Union, therefore, has a certain amount of control over India's production of munitions and military supplies. India still depends

on the Soviet Union to supply some of the weapons it needs, heavy and sophisticated ones in particular.

Fourth, the Soviet Union is greedier than the United States and other Western countries in exploiting India economically through the exchange of unequal values in trade. . . .

Since the 60s, the Soviet Union has stepped up economic expansion in India. It has exerted influence upon the Indian Government through its backing of Indian bureaucrat-capital. Since the Soviet emphasis on "aid" to heavy industry and in the military field dovetailed with the ambitions of the Indian big bourgeoisie to dominate South Asia, it gained the upper hand for a time in its contention with the United States in India.

However, in the first place, Soviet "aid" has made Indian economy more lopsided by overemphasis on the development of heavy industry. . . .

Second, Soviet "aid" has intensified the contradictions between the Soviet Union and India's private consortia. . . .

Third, because the Soviet Union did not provide big sums in economic "aid" to India and has practically provided no new loans since 1967, the arrears India owes the Soviet Union stand at only 510 million U.S. dollars. . . .

Fourth, the Soviet Union's plundering of India by pressure and trickery through "aid" and trade has gradually betrayed its own social-imperialist features. . . .

The U.S.-Indian relationship turned cold after the Indian-Pakistan war in 1971 and U.S. "aid" to India was stopped for some time. But the United States still exerts strong influence both politically and economically in India, because its activities in the country have covered a long period of time, reached many quarters and struck deep roots. The Indian big bourgeoisie has innumerable ties with the monopoly capitalists of the United States, Britain and other countries. It depends greatly on the United States and other Western countries for the capital, technology, equipment, raw materials and food grains it needs. This situation will persist; on the basic problem of food-grain in particular, the United States will remain in a dominant position.

It seems certain that the rivalry in India between the two hegemonic powers will go on developing no matter what chan-

ges take place in India's economic relations with either power.

**424 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's interview with Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 21 July 1977 (Extract)**

India's relations with the People's Republic of China have seen many ups and downs. Still some difficulties continue, the border question is one of them. After the exchange of Ambassadors, India took the initiative to establish trade ties. A modest beginning has been made. Some journalists have visited China. Some doctors are going there. We would like these exchanges to grow. If any initiatives are taken, then India would not be found wanting in making adequate response to these initiatives. Our relations would be based on the five principles. Both China and India are big countries of Asia. We are neighbours and we should build our relations on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual interests, and we would solve all problems in accordance with the spirit of Panchsheel.

**425 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's message to Neelam Sanjiva Reddy congratulating him on his assumption of the office of President of India, 27 July 1977**

On behalf of the Chinese Government and people, I would like to extend to you our congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of India and wish that the traditional friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples develop continuously.

**426 Chinese protest to India for extending support to Dalai Lama, 4 August 1977 (Summary)**

While repeating its desire to improve relations with China since it came to power, the new Indian Government, however, has connived at the traitorous activities of the Tibetan rebel bandits on many occasions. Dalai's reactionary call for "independence of Tibet" was reported again and again in the Indian newspapers. The issue became graver still when leaders of the Indian Government recently personally "received" the chieftain of the rebel bandits. Such open encouragement and support given by the Indian Government to the Tibetan rebel bandits in their

traitorous activities constitute an interference in China's internal affairs and an obstacle to the improvement of China-India relations. This cannot but arouse the concern and indignation of the Chinese people.

**427 Vajpayee's statement to the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, 30 September 1977 (Extract)**

With our neighbours and near-neighbours, we are attempting to develop relations on the basis of beneficial bilateralism; wherever possible, we would attempt to add an other dimension that of regional and multilateral cooperation. With the USSR and other socialist countries, we have the same approach of bilateral cooperation which is strengthened by a common desire to promote peace and stability. With the People's Republic of China, we would continue our endeavour to normalise and develop relations on the basis of the five principles of co-existence and good neighbourliness.

**428 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's message to Indian Prime Minister Desai expressing sympathy over India's suffering from cyclone in its southern coasts, 4 December 1977**

Learning of the destructive cyclone which hit India's southern coasts and caused heavy losses of life and property to the people, I wish to express to you our deep sympathy and solicitude on behalf of the Chinese Government and people and through you to the people of the afflicted area.

**429 President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy's address to Parliament, 20 February 1978 (Extract)**

Although differences relating to the border remain unresolved, we are gradually improving bilateral relations with China on the basis of the Panchsheel.

**430 Premier Hua Kuo-feng's report at the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress, 26 February 1978 (Extract)**

The Chinese people have always cherished feelings of friendship for the Indian people. The people of both countries wish to see an increase in friendly contacts and an improvement in their relations. There are questions pending between China and India nevertheless, relations can be further improved provided serious efforts are made on both sides.

**431 Vice-President B.D. Jatti's speech at the luncheon given in honour of Wang Pin-nan, President of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 13 March 1978 (Extract)**

India and China are two neighbouring Asian countries with a history that stretches back to nearly two thousand years. The splendour of the civilisations that flourished in our two countries is something that the people of India and China can be justly proud of. As heirs of two of the greatest civilisations of the world, India and China also have a long history and tradition of friendly contacts with each other.

In modern times too, the struggle of the Indian people for Independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and the struggle of the Chinese people for liberation under the leadership of the late Chairman Mao Tse-tung were contemporaneous and inspired by the similar desire to create a new society in keeping with the genuine desire of our respective peoples. After India became Independent and China attained liberation, our two countries established friendly relations under the leadership of the late Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and the late Premier Chou En-lai who jointly initiated the Five Principles as the basis of our relations. We believe that these old Principles form a good basis for discussions between our two Governments and the improvement of mutually beneficial relations.

Our two social systems are different but we are both striving in our own different ways, towards the common goal of development and material prosperity. In this great endeavour, there is much that we can learn from each other.

This process of exchanging experience in various developmental fields is going smoothly since 1976 when we posted Ambassadors in each other's capitals. Over the last two years or so, some of our compatriots have travelled to your country and some of your compatriots have travelled to our country. We hope that this number will increase manifold in the days to come, and would contribute to the emergence of a better understanding and appreciation of each other's aspirations.

Your Excellency, your visit is but a brief one of two weeks in India, but I am confident that you will be able to see for yourself the friendly feelings that exist in our country for China and the Chinese people. It should be the joint endeavour of our two sides to create an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation in which relations between us can be further developed to mutual benefit.

#### **432 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's statement in Lok Sabha on Chinese delegation's visit to India, 16 March 1978**

As the House is aware, various occasions have occurred since 1976 resulting in the improvement of contacts and relations between us and the People's Republic of China. The process commenced with the exchange of Ambassadors. Since then various steps based on the principles of reciprocity and mutual benefit have been taken, including the resumption of trade and shipping links, exchange of expert-level delegations and officials in diverse functional fields.

In September 1977, the all India Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee sought Government's permission to invite a delegation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries to visit India in the winter months of 1977-78. The Indian Committee had visited China on the Chinese side's invitation on two occasions in 1974 and 1976. The present visit of the Chinese delegation led by Mr. Wang Pin-nan, who is the President of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and a seasoned diplomat of long standing, is in response to this invitation by the Indian Body. Government had facilitated the visit and extended due courtesies.

Having regard to the standing of the leader of the Chinese

delegation, H.E. Mr. Wang Pin-nan and reflecting our willingness to improve relations with China on the basis of the Five-Principles, I decided to receive him and the members of the delegation. The meeting took place on 11th March 1978. Earlier, the Minister of External Affairs received Mr. Wang Pin-nan and the members of the Chinese delegation on 8th March 1978.

During my meeting with Mr. Wang Pin-nan, I reiterated Government of India's consistent policy to develop friendly relations with all countries particularly our neighbours. In this context, we reviewed the development of relations in diverse fields between India and China. We agreed that exchanges between India and China in various fields should be expanded. I also took the opportunity to recapitulate the history of our relations since India achieved independence, the consistently friendly attitude of the Indian Government and people towards China and the strains that developed in India-China relations owing to past Chinese actions. In this context, the border question came up briefly for discussion and I stated, and Mr. Wang agreed, that all outstanding matters, including the border question, could be solved through negotiations and only through peaceful means on the basis of Panchsheel. I also made it clear that full normalisation of relations, of course, cannot be attained till the main outstanding issue—the border question, is resolved to our mutual satisfaction by negotiations and peaceful means. . . .

While agreeing to the desirability of a peaceful solution for the sake of friendly relations between the two countries, no further discussion on the border question has taken place.

Our policy, is of course, as has been stated frequently by the Minister of External Affairs and by myself, to seek an improvement of beneficial bilateral relations with China, as is appropriate between two big Asian neighbouring countries, on the basis of the Five Principles, which, it may be recalled were founded by India and China as early as in the fifties and the adherence to which was also emphasized by Mr. Wang.

**433 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1977-78, March-April 1978 (Extract)**

Progress was maintained towards normalisation of relations

with China. The resumption of direct trade after nearly 15 years promoted banking facilities and movement of cargo ships between the two countries. Representatives of Indian public sector organisations participated in the bi-annual Canton Trade Fair and two-way trade transactions amounting to approximately Rs. 3 crores were made at the Fair. There were also exchanges in a variety of fields such as agriculture, mining, forestry, medicine, public health and sports. A Chinese trade delegation visited India in February 1978. These demonstrated the readiness of the two countries to profit from each other's experience in various fields of developmental activities. An unofficial Chinese goodwill delegation led by Mr. Wang Pin-nan, President of the Chinese Peoples' Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, visited India in March 1978 at the invitation of the All India Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee whose delegation had earlier visited China in 1976. Mr. Wang extended an invitation from the Foreign Minister of China to the Minister of External Affairs to visit that country. Shri Vajpayee accepted the invitation in principle and the visit could take place at an appropriate time after careful and adequate preparations.

Notwithstanding the fact that the border question with China remains unresolved, India believes in seeking step-by-step normalisation of relations with China on the basis of the five principles of co-existence. It was India's hope that through the pursuit of such a policy, an atmosphere would be created which might help towards solving unresolved problems between the two countries through bilateral negotiations.

**434 Inaugural address by Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at the Seminar held by the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 13 May 1978 (Extract)**

We want to further improve and normalize our relations with China. This can be done, as the Chinese leadership itself says, on the basis of the five principles of *Panchsheel* and consistently with our dignity and national honour.

Some visible improvements have taken place in this relationship. Trade has been resumed, and trade delegations are being exchanged. There have also been exchanges in the field of



culture and sports. Indian journalists have been visiting China. In short, there is now a more relaxed relationship between the two countries.

But some major issues remain unresolved. It would be unrealistic to expect that full normalization or friendship can be restored while these problems remain. We have stated our desire to resolve all major issues peacefully through bilateral negotiations, and we believe this is the desire of the Chinese leaders also.

We would continue to make efforts and take initiatives where possible to expand and diversify our bilateral relations and co-operation with China.

**435 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha  
on reported construction of Karakoram Highway,  
21 July 1978**

As the House is aware, a road called "Karakoram Highway", linking Pakistan with China, and passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir, was inaugurated on June 18, 1978, by Pakistan's Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia-ul-Haq and Chinese Vice-Premier Keng Piao, at Thakot. Plans for this road were mooted some time around 1963, soon after China and Pakistan entered into an agreement in accordance with which 2100 square miles of Indian territory in Jammu & Kashmir, under Pakistan's illegal occupation, was handed over to China. Construction of the portion of the road between Gilgit and More Khun was undertaken in accordance with an agreement reached in 1966 and was completed in 1969. The portion of the Highway from Mor Khun to Khunjerab has been built following an Agreement between the two countries which was signed on 21.10.1967. The road became fully operational on June 18, 1978.

According to reports, the 800 kilometer long Highway starts from Havelian Rail-Head, 60 miles north of Islamabad, and follows the general course of the River Indus from Thakot to Gilgit. From Gilgit onwards, it runs along the Gilgit, Hunza and Khunjerab rivers upto the Khunjerab Pass which is 15,800 feet above sea level. Beyond Khunjerab Pass this Highway is connected with the Chinese road network in Western Tibet

which links with Kashghar in the Sinkiang Province. The elevation of this Highway varies from 2000 to about 15,000 feet.

The Government received confirmed news about the construction of the road in June 1969. A strong protest was accordingly lodged on 25th June, 1969 with both Pakistan and China. To Pakistan, we pointed out that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir was part of Indian territory and neither Pakistan nor China had any *locus-standi* in Kashmir, and, therefore whatever, action the two countries were taking singly or jointly against this territory of India was wholly illegal. In our protest note to the Chinese Government, we questioned their undertaking construction of a road in a territory lawfully belonging to India.

Neither Pakistan nor China formally replied to our protests. However, an official spokesman of Pakistan Foreign Office stated on 11th July 1969 that India's complaint was based on premises which were not acceptable to them. The question was raised in the Parliament and a statement was made by the then Minister of External Affairs on July 23, 1969.

When we came across press reports, stating that the Highway was inaugurated on 18th June 1978, the Chinese Ambassador and Pakistan CDA in New Delhi were called to the Ministry of External Affairs and apprised of our position on the illegal construction of the road in a territory which is an integral part of India. It was made clear to the two envoys that India cannot acquiesce in the legal implications of the construction of this road.

In reply, the Government of Pakistan have stated that consistent with their position on Jammu and Kashmir, they could not accept the validity of our protests. As regards China, while there has been no response so far from Peking, the Chinese Ambassador referred to his country's position in response to India's protest against the conclusion of the Agreement between China and Pakistan on 2nd March 1963, ceding 2100 square miles of Indian territory in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir to China. He recalled that the Chinese Government had stated at that time that the boundary agreement was a "provisional" one and hence the construction of the road would have no bearing on the status of Kashmir. It may be pertinent to recall that this agreement does include a provision according

to which the boundary question is open to re-negotiation. I may mention here that the Karakoram Highway does not pass through the territory in Kashmir ceded by Pakistan to China.

Apart from the illegality of the construction of this Highway, this development also has serious strategic implications for this region. While we are fully alive to these implications, I would like to express the hope that our these neighbours, with both of whom we are trying to normalise our relations, would see to it that this communication link is not used in a manner that runs counter to the search for good neighbourliness and stability in this area.

**436 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's interview on his forthcoming China visit, 22 July 1978 (Extracts)**

Vajpayee, hopes that his forthcoming visit to China would contribute to the "taking of initial steps" to solve the outstanding differences between India and China. . . .

Vajpayee noted that his Chinese visit would be the first such high-level contact between the two countries in 17 years. While it did symbolize India's desire to improve relations with China, the basic hope was that it would lead to a solution of the old differences.

"It goes without saying that complete normalization of relations can occur if outstanding differences, including those relating to the border, are resolved."

He was glad to note that the Chinese had also said that the border differences should be settled peacefully and through negotiations but "such a mutually acceptable solution can only be on the basis of the Five Principles (Panchshil)."

**437 A.B. Vajpayee's interview with Japanese correspondents in New Delhi, 13 August 1978 (Extracts)**

We are endeavouring to normalize our relations (with China) on the basis of the five principles. We want to build up beneficial bilateral relations with China as is appropriate between two large Asian neighbouring countries. Contacts are already taking place in diverse fields to the mutual benefit of our two peoples. . . . I have tried to clarify in all my dealings with my

counterparts and in public that we do not regard our bilateral relations with any country as something that should affect the development of relations with any other country.' . . .

'We have made it clear that we wish to resolve it [India-China border issue] peacefully and through negotiations. We certainly have no intention of using force in support of our case. If, as we believe they do, the Chinese leaders have a similar approach, then there is no reason why this or any other issue between India and China should not be resolved by peaceful bilateral negotiations.

**438 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha on his visit to Japan, 22 August 1978 (Extracts)**

My visit to Tokyo coincided with the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China, with Foreign Minister Sonoda having returned to Tokyo only a day prior to my own arrival there, after having signed the Treaty in Peking on August 12, 1978. Mr. Sonoda gave me a background to the negotiations and the Treaty. We noted from his remarks that it records the pledge of the two countries to establish friendly relations between Japan and China on the basis of the well-known principles of peaceful co-existence and the U.N. Charter. He also drew my attention to the specific Article in the Treaty laying down that the Treaty shall not effect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries. The Japanese side particularly explained to us that the controversial clause relating to hegemony should be read in this context. . . .

I expressed the hope that the Treaty which is a bilateral matter between Japan and China would contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability and will not become the cause of any new tension in the region. Further, our hope is that it is implemented in a manner which removes misgivings expressed in certain quarters.

**439 *Peking Review* commentary on Soviet attempts to harm Sino-Indian relations, 6 October 1978**

TASS has put out a story about a Chinese helicopter flying

over Indian territory, a fabrication designed to stir up ill feeling between China and India. Lies have short legs. The TASS canard is exposed by the following facts.

On September 23, an Indian paper carried a fabricated report, alleging that "a Chinese helicopter crossed into Indian territory early this month, hovered over Nanda Devi for a couple of hours and disappeared into distance over other side."

The following day, India officially denied the report. A PTI dispatch from New Delhi said: "A spokesman of the Indian Defence Ministry said here today that there was no truth in a newspaper report that a Chinese helicopter has crossed into Indian territory early this month in the Nanda Devi area." "There had been no such incident."

The Indian Defence Ministry's denial should have clarified the matter. However, TASS deliberately repeated the lie once again on September 25. Furthermore, it alleged that this was "another Chinese provocation against India." adding: "These Chinese actions arouse the just indignation of the Indian people."

It is well known that China is making efforts to improve relations with India, a move which has received active response from the Indian Government. And yet here we find TASS spouting slanders about China harbouring "hostile intrigues" against India.

People can only put a big question mark over the TASS story and keep their wits about Moscow's sinister designs.

#### **440 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's news conference at Ahmedabad, 23 October 1978 (Extracts)**

The stand taken by the Parliament on the vacating of Indian territory by China should not come in the way of improving relations with that country. . . . the Chinese government had expressed its desire to strengthen relations with India. 'We are following it up. As a matter of fact, it was the former Indian government which had started the reconciliation process by restoring diplomatic relations with China.'

**441 Indian notification on import and export trade with Tibet Region of China, 7 November 1978**

The Govt. vide notification No. 78-ITC (PN)/78 dated 26th October, 1978 have rescinded the notification No. 15/4/61-El dated 15-12-1962 regarding prohibition on import and export trade with Tibet Region of China. It has been also clarified by another Public Notice No. 78-ITC (PN)/78 dated 26-10-1978 that although import and export trade with Tibet Region of China will hereafter be regulated in accordance with the normal import and export policy of the country the border trade (i.e. frontier trade) between India and Tibet region of China will not be allowed.

**442 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement in Lok Sabha on Sino-Indian relations, 23 November 1978 (Extracts)**

'On the basis of preparatory discussions it is expected that the talks during [his] visit [to China] will cover all questions of mutual interest including bilateral questions and matters of international concern. The Sino-Indian boundary question will figure in the discussions and, consistent with the government's stand, views will be exchanged for its peaceful resolution.' . . .

'Since India took the initiative of appointing an ambassador to Peking about two years ago there has been an improvement in the climate of relations between India and China. Trade relations have been resumed and exchange of delegations in diverse fields, including a visit by a cultural troupe, have taken place. In keeping with this process it was decided to respond positively to the invitation issued to the Foreign Minister to visit China. It is hoped that when this visit takes place a dialogue to explore the possibilities of further improvement of relations between India and China would ensure, as well as the initial steps taken towards the settlement of outstanding issues including the boundary question between India and China. It will provide an opportunity to exchange views on matters of mutual concern and to reiterate the well-known stand of the government of India on the Sino-Indian boundary question.'

**443 Premier Hua Guofeng's message to Prime Minister  
Morarji Desai on India's Republic Day, 26 January 1979**

'On the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the Republic of India, I extend warm greetings and best wishes to Your Excellency and the government and people of India on behalf of the Chinese Government and people and in my own name. During the past year the exchanges between our two countries in all fields have been strengthened and mutual understanding has increased. This is in the interest of the people of the two countries. It is our hope that the bilateral relations between our two countries will continue to be expanded through our joint efforts.'

**444 Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's interview with PTI  
Correspondent, 11 February 1979 (Extracts)**

In developing its relations with neighbouring countries, China has always been guided by the following five basic principles : mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. In practice China has followed these principles for nearly three decades in solving many major issues in its relations with neighbours, and maintaining and developing ties of friendship, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations with most of its neighbours.

For instance we have resolved boundary and territorial disputes and delimited permanent boundaries with most of our neighbours, we have solved the question of the nationality of Chinese residents and people of Chinese origin with a number of countries where such people live in great numbers and reached agreement with the countries concerned on choosing a single nationality by these people and on doing away with the bad effects of dual nationality.

As a country bordering south Asia and concerned about peace, stability and security of this region China supports the south Asian countries in this just struggle to safeguard national independence and territorial integrity and oppose the interference of outside forces. We support and appreciate all the efforts of these countries to improve their mutual relations.

*Question* : How do you assess the present state of relations between India and China and their future ?

*Mr. Huang Hua* : We are happy to note that there has been an initial improvement in Sino-Indian relations over the past two years and more. Trade and cultural educational and other contacts have been resumed between the two countries. Exchange of visits has increased.

Last year, a delegation of the Chinese people's association for friendship with foreign countries headed by its president, Mr. Wang Bingnan, visited India and was warmly and cordially received. We in China had the pleasure of receiving an Indian dance troupe which gave the Chinese people an opportunity to enjoy the magnificent art of Indian dance. To show their appreciation, the Chinese people gave them a warm welcome. In addition, there have been some other visits.

All these activities have undoubtedly helped to enhance the friendship and mutual understanding between the two peoples. We are sure that through our joint efforts, the friendly cooperation between the Chinese and Indian peoples in a variety of fields will grow deeper and expand. . . .

We will warmly welcome the external affairs minister. Mr. Vajpayee, during his visit to China. We shall exchange views on major international issues of common concern, particularly on major issues in our region. Our discussions will also cover outstanding issues in our bilateral relations.

*Question* : Are you hopeful that discussions with Mr. Vajpayee will lead to an amicable settlement of the boundary issue ? Are there any proposals for the solution of the issue ? Without speedy steps to resolve the border issue do you think that the two countries can settle down to a steady improvement in the relations ?

*Mr. Huang Hua* : The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complex one left over by history. At present the two sides do not yet see eye to eye on this question. We have always held that bilateral issues, no matter how complex, can be solved satisfactorily through peaceful consultations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and in the spirit of



mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. These are the very principles we followed in solving the boundary questions with most of our neighbours.

It is our wish that the Sino-Indian boundary question, too, may be settled as soon as possible. The impending visit to China by Mr. Vajpayee will provide an opportunity for our two sides to exchange views on the boundary question. This will be important for the eventual friendly settlement of the question. Mr. Vajpayee had stated that the boundary issue should not constitute a hindrance to the improvement of our bilateral relations. We appreciate and agree with this attitude.

Facts in the past two years have shown that if the two sides shared the desire to improve their bilateral relations, this could be achieved even if the boundary question should remain unsettled for a time. Improvement in bilateral relations will in turn create favourable conditions for the resolution of the boundary question. On the boundary question and on the improvement of our bilateral relations, we take a forward-looking approach, and we are optimistic. . . .

Over the past two years and more, trade between China and India, which started from scratch, has witnessed a fairly rapid progress. However, the total volume is still not big. We are ready to further expand our bilateral trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and helping to supply each other's needs. It is our belief that there will be a greater expansion of trade between China and India with an increase in the variety of import and export commodities. . . .

#### **445 Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's statement on his arrival at the Beijing airport, 12 February 1979 (Extract)**

It is for the first time in more than 20 years that a member of the Council of Ministers of the Government of India is visiting China.

No one would deny that the problems between our two countries are difficult and complex. I am however hopeful that a beginning would be made to explore the possibilities of resolving these problems on the basis of the well known principles of Panchasila. . . .

**446 Statement by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the banquet given in honour of Vajpayee, 13 February 1979 (Extract)**

China and India have been friendly neighbours since ancient times, and many records about friendly contacts between our two peoples can be found in old Chinese books.

“Relations between our two countries were good following the independence of India and the liberation of China. Subsequently, there was a period of setback, but it was after all only a short episode in the long history of our friendly relations. For China and India to live together in amity is in the fundamental interests of the two peoples and accords with their common desire. We are pleased to note that in the past two years or so the relations between our two countries have gradually improved through our joint efforts. Trade has resumed, and exchanges in various fields are gradually increasing.”

“The current visit of His Excellency the External Minister is of great significance, being the first high-level contact between our two governments in the last decade or so. We are very pleased with these developments.

“Today, our two sides have started talks on the international situation and on bilateral issues. A candid exchange of views will enhance mutual understanding. There is no reason at all why our two countries, which share similar historical experiences and are faced with the arduous tasks of national reconstruction, should not be friends with each other. Although there are differences between our two sides, we believe they can be discussed, and they should not be an obstacle to the development of relations.”

“The Chinese Government has always stood for the settlement of all disputes through negotiations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the Chinese Government believes that all differences and disputes can eventually be resolved if the two sides make earnest efforts in the spirit of seeking truth from facts and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. We also believe that, while working to iron out our differences, we should, moreover, bend our efforts to identifying our common ground so as to constantly develop the relations between our two countries.

“Pancha Sheela—the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-

tence—which were initiated and laid down by China and India together, have today become international principles guiding the relations between states. It is only proper that our two countries should jointly endeavour to make these principles shine in greater splendour.”

“We need a peaceful international environment in which to build up our country. We wish to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries, and neighbouring Asian countries in particular, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”

However, “the superpowers and hegemonists are poking their hands everywhere in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, seizing positions of strategic importance and spheres of influence, causing turbulence in these areas and posing grave threats to world peace and security. A case in point is the recent invasion of Kampuchea brazenly launched by its neighbour, a regional hegemonist state backed by a superpower. However the people of the world have strongly condemned the aggressors and are following the developments in Indochina with sharp alertness.”

“We appreciate the efforts of the Indian Government to improve its relations with neighbouring countries. We hope that the South Asian countries will settle all their disputes in a fair and reasonable way, live together in harmony and contribute to the stability and unity of the region.”

**447 Atal Bihari Vajpapee’s speech at the banquet,  
13 February 1979 (Extracts)**

I appreciate your warm words of welcome. It has already been my privilege to have met you in New York. However, this is the first opportunity I have had to visit your historic and beautiful capital and see something of your great and dynamic country. I must apologise for the last-minute cancellation of my scheduled visit in October-November last year. The postponement was ordered, much to my personal disappointment, by my medical, and not political, advisers.

It is 18 years since your distinguished Prime Minister Chou En-lai, accompanied by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, visited Delhi and 21 years since our late President, S. Radhakrishnan then Vice-President, came to China. I am aware that this visit of

mine as Foreign Minister of India to the People's Republic of China and the resumption of ministerial-level dialogue between our countries; after all these years (and what transpired during the period), is being watched by the people of India with keen interest. The international community also looks upon the resumed highlevel contact between China and India as of far-reaching significance.

Our two countries belong to Asia. We also share the majestic Himalayas along which runs our common border. Our two nations comprise two-fifth of the human race. We are heirs of two of the ancient civilizations in the world. India has been second to none in its recognition of the contribution of Chinese civilization to the world. We pay tribute to the role which China and its innovative and diligent people have played in the long history of the continent of Asia.

The cultural contacts between India and China go back to time immemorial. The great scholar and traveller Hiuen Tsang was the chronicler of India. The message of the Buddha travelled from India and was adopted by millions of people in China. Both countries experienced the humiliation of imperialist domination, and now both India and China, in their political rebirth are marching in a determined manner towards modernisation to fulfil the aspirations of their peoples. The world recognises that both India and China, in keeping with their individual historical traditions and their different national personalities, are destined to play a momentous role in world affairs when they fully develop their potentials.

The independence of India symbolised the new era of the end of imperialism. It was followed soon afterwards by the establishment of the great People's Republic of China. These events together represented the resurgence of a new political vitality in the old continent of Asia. Both countries in this political rebirth faced identical challenges of development and progress. We chose different paths, but we succeeded in establishing a relationship of warmth and friendship which we held to be to our mutual advantage and dignity. More than that, it was our belief that India and China could play a vital role in uprooting the old colonial system and usher in an era of complete independence and dignity to Asia and Africa.

Our relations developed and grew for a decade. But this

trend received a sharp setback by the events of 1959 and the events that followed. The boundary question caused us surprise and dismay and the hopes of friendship so assiduously fostered by us and notably by the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and, we believed, by China, suffered a reversal. The vision of an emergent Asia, diverse but at peace, suffered a severe blow. Indeed at that time I myself, from the opposition benches of our Parliament, gave expression to the deep hurt which was felt throughout our country.

Naturally, therefore, my visit has aroused mixed feelings of apprehensions in some quarters and expectations in others. It would not be realistic to claim that these unfortunate events, the story of expectations and disappointments in our relations, can be easily forgotten. I have come, nevertheless, undaunted by any hesitations because I am convinced that the establishment of a new relationship of friendship, respect and cooperation is imperative in the interest of both our countries. Success in the effort to restore such a relationship can strengthen the fabric of peace in Asia. Failure can only be a comfort to those who want Asian nations to remain a plaything of international power politics.

Our task is no doubt immense because of the magnitude and complexity of the problems which confront us. It is a challenge to our sagacity to resolve them and to create and maintain the climate of confidence to enable us to do so. I believe that through a frank exchange of views, we can, and must, make purposeful efforts to explore the possibility of restoring mutual confidence in our relationship.

Your Excellency, just as even a subject nation, India, under Mahatma Gandhi, raised the banner of non-violent defiance against racial discrimination, the Indian national independence movement proclaimed its sympathy and admiration for the Long March of China towards liberation. The Dr. Kotnis Mission from India was sent to join and share the travails of your heroic struggle from the caves of Yen-an. India took the lead to demand—and never relented from the position—that China (and only one China, the People's Republic of China) must take its rightful place in the comity of Nations.

India and China, it may be recalled, cooperated to bring peace to war-torn Korea and for the end of imperialism in Indo-

China. At Bandung we worked together to express the aspirations of emergent Asia and Africa. We never severed our diplomatic ties with China, even when the bonds of friendship were strained. We can, in brief, recall that India never hesitated to underline China's importance or defend its legitimate interests, even when many nations were hostile or hesitant about the People's Republic.

As we resume this dialogue after a long interregnum, we may recall that we proclaimed our commitment to basic principles in international relationship. It was India and China who were the first to affirm the Five Principles of Co-existence as the foundation for good relations between nations. Let us recapitulate those abiding principles which have subsequently been almost universally acclaimed. . . .

India never wavered in its faith in or the practice of these principles. In fact, as the international community comes to recognise the imperative of international interdependence, these principles, or Panch Sheel as we call it, gather greater validity and relevance. I sincerely believe that, notwithstanding the vicissitudes of our history, these same basic Principles can provide the key for the resolution of our own bilateral problems and guide us in the search for improved relations in the future.

In the history of her struggle against imperialism, and, indeed, in the thrust and adherence to our independent non-aligned foreign policy, India has had to face aggression and unsolicited conflicts. Attempts have been made, through direct threats or indirect pressures, to weaken and deflect us from our internal goals or our independence of judgement in external relations. We have not flinched—and whatever the odds, we will not flinch in self-defence or hesitate to follow the path of peace and persuasion and the search for dignified and cooperative relations with all countries, whatever their size or strength. India has never believed in the inevitability of war or abandoned its faith in the diplomacy of dialogue and the wisdom of peaceful resolution of problems between nations.

The world situation today presents a more complex picture compared to the times of our early friendship. It provides a new mix of hopes and apprehensions and calls more earnestly for cooperation between nations. With the triumph of national liberation movements in Asia and Africa, colonialism and impe-

rialism are on their last legs. We rejoice today that the United Nations has been strengthened by the representation of the peoples of these great continents.

The non-aligned and the developing world commands a majority in the councils of nations, giving these world bodies a new character and rich diversity of peoples and cultures. Though some may be weak, all nations have pride in their nationalism and determination to oppose interference and resist external pressures and are against all forms of subjugation and domination.

The old bipolar philosophy of ideological and military blocs has withered away and, if I may say so, the approach of non-alignment and independence of judgement and action has been vindicated and confirmed. We believe that the growing fraternity of the non-aligned movement has contributed to international stability and has helped bolster nations against the dangers of multilateral militarism and malevolent interference. We have welcomed the process of *detente* which has eased tensions and defused explosive situations, notably in Europe. But the umbrella of the balance of terror has to be replaced by saner cooperative relations between great powers as an extension of the principle of peaceful co-existence.

We have persistently advocated general and complete disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. We have demanded that the steps to ease the arms race must achieve universal disarmament and total prohibition of nuclear weapons, so that the vital productive resources of the world be released for international economic development. We are firmly of the view that disarmament, like peace, must be a collective responsibility of all nations. We welcome China's decision to participate in the Disarmament Commission set up by the United Nations, and hope that the combined effort of the countries of the world today will achieve progress towards its declared purpose.

In the spirit of non-alignment, we shall continue to raise our voice against blocs and foreign military bases and the extension of great power rivalries on land, in space and in the oceans. India will never cease opposing policies and counsels of confrontation and escalation of conflicts. We believe that the strands of independently determined beneficial bilateral relations can be woven into a tapestry of international peace and a cooperative

world order. What is essential is true respect for the national personality of all nations, big or small, weak or strong. . . .

In the external field, we have consolidated and enlarged well established and mutually advantageous friendships and sought, with some success to build bridges of confidence where there had been gulfs of indifference and even suspicion. We do not seek to take advantage of differences between nations. We exercise our independent judgement on international relationships but we are convinced that the quest for friendship must neither offend nor obstruct mutually beneficial cooperation with others. We have given positive vigour and content to economic and technical cooperation with fellow developing countries so that in partnership with them and the world community in general, we may help fashion a new international economic order.

From the very beginning, we recognised that the credibility of our policies of peace and cooperation would depend on the success we achieve in translating these principles into reality in our immediate neighbourhood. The countries of the Indian subcontinent are inexorably linked by geography, culture and history. We face similar and common challenges in the husbanding and development of the potential and resources of our respective nations. Our vision is based on the recognition that while each nation must choose its own path to progress, the interests of all countries south of the Himalayas could be promoted through economic cooperation based on equality and dignity.

It is only too well known that many problems of South Asia were precipitated or aggravated because of mutual differences which were exploited by outside powers. A stable South Asia, committed to genuine independence, peace and cooperation, will be an asset to the entire world. We are determined to resist forces which may debilitate us through conflicts and divert us from constructive endeavours. We expect, and indeed ask, all powers to refrain from the temptation of temporary or imagined advantage and look upon the demonstrated quest of South Asia for stability and cooperation as serving regional and global peace.

I have dwelt at some length and with candour on our approach to international relations. It would be evident that



these perceptions and policies are in no way repugnant to China's true and legitimate interests. We expect nothing more and nothing less than corresponding understanding of our objectives. On this basis, I believe, we can make a purposeful beginning at resolving our bilateral problems and restore the quality of our relations.

In the short period of two years, since we resumed diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level, we have already made some headway in this direction. We have exchanged delegations and, I believe, discovered that there is scope for developing our trade and sharing our experience in the technical and developmental field. After all, both nations were thwarted by imperialism and today face similar economic problems. Both seek to modernise their agriculture and adopt new and appropriate technology for their respective industrial and scientific advancement. Both countries have also taken great strides on their path to progress, which go beyond what our critics or even our friends expected three decades ago.

We fashioned our own strategy of self-reliant development, which did not exclude foreign collaboration or technological cooperation. China has now adopted a new approach to modernization of its national economy which, in some ways, has similar features to our own. There is no reason why we cannot benefit from each other's experience and expertise in a manner that would enable our bilateral economic cooperation to fit into the larger framework of a cooperative world order. The Government which I represent does not hesitate in positive and mutually advantageous economic cooperation with any country as long as such cooperation has no other motivation. Nor are we interested in the accentuation of any differences or disputes which may exist between other nations.

I started by saying that my mission and my task are of momentous significance. It is no doubt difficult and delicate, but I believe there need be no failure in our combined efforts if our approach is based on mutual respect, as befits two proud peoples. If, through patience and perseverance, we succeed in carrying further a constructive and fruitful dialogue, we can not only serve and safeguard the national interests of our countries and peoples, but also the enlightened goal of world peace and stability. It is in this spirit that I pay tribute to the People's

Republic of China and ask my guests to raise their glasses to the friendship between the Peoples of our two countries; to the prosperity and welfare of the People's Republic of China; to the health of His Excellency Premier Hua Kuo-feng; to the health of His Excellency Foreign Minister Huang Hua; and to the health of the distinguished hosts present here this evening.

**448 Statement by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping at a press interview with Indian journalists, 14 February 1979 (Extract)**

Answering the question of how China and India could improve their relations, Vice-Premier Deng said : "They can shelve those issues on which there actually are differences and take their time in talking them over, and do some practical things to develop their relations. China and India are the two most populous countries in the world. How can they afford to be unfriendly toward each other!"

"The international situation is by no means tranquil and so is the situation in Asia. Hegemonism is now vigorously pushing its policy of southward advance and we are very much concerned over this. The developments in Indochina are causing serious anxiety, and it takes the joint efforts of all the Asian peoples to resolve these problems. Without such joint efforts, it would be difficult to achieve peace, security and stability in Asia and the world as a whole."

Both China and India needed a peaceful international environment in which to carry on their national reconstruction. It was China's hope that no world war would break out again within this century.

Asked about the restriction imposed by the nuclear powers on non-nuclear countries in developing nuclear weapons, Vice-Premier Deng said : "We stand for destroying all nuclear weapons completely. However, the nuclear powers have no right to prevent non-nuclear countries from possessing nuclear weapons unless these powers commit themselves to destroy their nuclear weapons completely or guarantee not to be the first to use them."

Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping reiterated the Chinese Government's consistent position of supporting the Kampuchean

people in their just struggle against Vietnamese aggression. He also stressed the need for China to learn with an open mind from what was advanced in other countries in the course of achieving the four modernizations.

**449 Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's (Teng Hsiao-ping) statement at a meeting with Foreign Minister Vajpayee, 14 February 1979 (Extracts)**

"We should now lose no time in improving relations between our two countries."

"We should seek common ground while reserving our differences." "As for the boundary question between our two countries, we can solve it through peaceful consultations. This question should not prevent us from improving our relations in other fields." China and India had much in common on international issues. "Leaders of our two countries should have more contacts so as gradually to enhance mutual understanding."

**450 Xinhua report on Sino-Indian talks, 15 February 1979**

"The Sino-Indian talks are positive and beneficial," Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua told a Xinhua correspondent after the third round of talks with Indian counterpart Atal Behari Vajpayee.

"The talks have enhanced our mutual understanding and are helpful in developing friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Both sides have agreed to keep in contact on various matters," he said.

For three successive mornings, the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers held talks in a sincere and frank atmosphere. They exchanged views on the present international situation and on bilateral relations. Indian External Affairs Minister Vajpayee invited his Chinese counterpart to visit India at a suitable time. Minister Huang Hua accepted the invitation "with pleasure."

Discussions were also held between Chinese and Indian officials on the promotion of friendly exchange and cooperation in trade, culture, science, technology and other fields. Both

sides agreed to maintain contacts to realize such exchanges.

**451 Premier Hua Guofeng's statement at a meeting with  
Foreign Minister Vajpayee, 15 February 1979 (Extracts)**

The Chinese Government and myself give our regard to Prime Minister Desai and invite him to visit China at a time he thinks appropriate.

“More contacts between leaders of China and India will help deepen mutual understanding and friendship between our two countries.”

“China-India relations will grow splendidly so long as both sides abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. We have broad prospects for expanding cooperation in many spheres. China is willing to develop actively friendly relations and cooperation with India.”

**452 A.B. Vajpayee's speech at the return banquet given by him  
in honour of Huang Hua in Peking, 15 February 1979  
(Extracts)**

While sight-seeing was limited, the depth of our conversations was extensive. The conversations which I had with Premier Hua Kuo-feng, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and the three long sessions with you have enabled us to cover in detail and with utmost frankness, the vast ground of international problems, regional questions and above all vital issues affecting our bilateral relations. Though such ministerial level talks were taking place after so many years, we both recognised that these conversations were characterised by cordiality, frankness and a purposeful effort to understand each other's viewpoint. I was happy to find that on many issues our views were close or similar. There are no doubt questions on which there are differences of perception. With due respect to each other's viewpoints, we recognised that our bilateral relations can and should improve.

On the boundary question our discussions were necessarily exploratory. Both recognised that the resolution of this question is important to our relations and that serious efforts must be made and this should be done sooner rather than later. In the

principles of Panch Sheel, we agreed, we can find the guidelines for our future relations. In this spirit, I believe we can continue our exchanges in diverse fields. Indeed in the same spirit all relations must be strengthened to enable all countries, big and small, to fulfil their national aspirations of progress in an environment made secure for peace and cooperation. . . .

The world contains too many dangerous tensions. The scope of easing these tensions and improving relationships is a challenge for the community of nations, Faithful to the broad concept of our foreign policy of non-alignment and independence of judgement, we shall continue to seek to promote stability in our region and contribute to the solutions of international problems in a constructive way. We wish to bend every effort towards building a world which is safer, more stable and more peaceful.

**453 Huang Hua's speech at the banquet, 15 February 1979**  
(Extracts)

During Minister Vajpayee's stay. . . . "we had the pleasure of having a sincere and candid exchange of views with His Excellency on the international situation and issues in our bilateral relations. Premier Hua Guofeng and Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping met and had friendly conversations with His Excellency the Minister on separate occasions. Our two sides also exchanged views extensively on ways to increase contacts and cooperation in the trade, cultural, scientific and technological and other fields."

"The current visit of His Excellency External Minister Vajpayee to China is a significant event in our bilateral relations and a good beginning for further developing the friendly relations between our two countries and solving unsettled bilateral questions.

"In the past few days, we have exchanged views and enhanced mutual understanding, which is, no doubt, very important and beneficial. We are convinced that, along with the increase of contracts between our two countries and through sustained efforts of our two sides, we will further develop the friendly relations between our two countries in accordance with the common desire of our two peoples.

**454 Statement on Sino-Vietnamese conflict issued by Indian Prime Minister's Office, 18 February 1979**

The Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, has expressed his profound shock and distress at the outbreak of hostilities on the northern borders of Vietnam. This has created a situation endangering international peace and security.

“The Prime Minister expressed his earnest hope for the immediate restoration of peace and, as a first step, stressed the urgent need for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam.

“India has always urged the settlement of disputes between the two countries through peaceful, bilateral negotiations.”

**455 President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy's address before Parliament, 19 February 1979 (Extract)**

Steps have been initiated towards the normalisation of our relationship with the People's Republic of China on the basis of 'Panchsheel'. Hon'ble members are aware of the recent visit of the foreign minister to China.

We are gravely concerned at the latest development on the Sino-Vietnamese border which carry the potential to endanger international peace and stability. Fighting should end immediately and, as a first step, Chinese forces should withdraw from Vietnam.

**456 Xinhua correspondent Zhao Cipu's commentary on Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visit to China, 19 February 1979**

The week-long visit to China by Indian Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the first high-level contact between the Chinese and Indian Governments after a lapse of nearly 20 years, has aroused much interest among the people of the two countries and the world public.

Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng met with the Indian Minister on February 15 and praised the latter for his contributions to reviving and developing China-India friendship. The Chinese Premier said the visit “is a successful one.”

Speaking at the reciprocal banquet given by the Indian Minister the same day, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua

described the visit as “a good beginning for developing friendly relations between our two countries and solving unsettled bilateral questions.”

On that occasion Minister Vajpayee also pointed out that India and China “recognized that our bilateral relations can and should improve.”

China and India had been good neighbours from time immemorial and friendly ties between the two peoples can be traced as far back as two thousand years ago. Some untoward events occurred between the two countries in the last two decades owing to causes known to all. That, however, was just a brief twist and turn in the long history of friendly relations between China and India.

Both peoples wish to renew their friendship and live in amity. Their wish becomes stronger today because hegemonists are stretching out everywhere in a bid for greater spheres of influence, causing much turbulence in this world of ours. To frustrate their designs for aggression and expansion and preserve world peace, security and stability, China and India who constitute two-fifths of the world’s populace should unite, and all the countries in the world subjected to hegemonist threat, intervention and aggression should unite.

On the other hand, China and India are both developing countries, and both peoples are facing the arduous task of building up their countries and making them prosperous and strong as soon as possible. They badly need a peaceful environment characterized by mutual trust and cooperation.

Minister Vajpayee put it well the day after his arrival in Beijing: “The establishment of a new relationship of friendship, respect and cooperation is imperative in the interest of both our countries.” It is precisely in the spirit of removing differences and promoting friendship that the two governments resumed direct dialogue.

Talks between the Chinese and Indian Foreign Ministers took up three whole mornings during Minister Vajpayee’s stay of three whole days in Beijing. Besides, Premier Hua Guofeng and Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping had separate meetings and wide-ranging conversations with him. During these meetings the Chinese and Indian sides exchanged views on their bilateral relations and on current situation in Asia and the world. While

frankly setting forth their divergences, the two sides explored common grounds and similar point of views and discussed concrete measures to revive and develop friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries. All this points to the sincerity of both parties to improve bilateral relations.

The boundary question, naturally, figured prominently in the talks. This question was left over from the past when the people of China and India were in a powerless position, being subjected to aggression and enslavement by imperialism and colonialism. As is known to all, one of the tricks frequently used by imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism to control and deal with Third World countries is to create boundary disputes and fan up border conflicts so as to fish in troubled waters. The Third World countries, many of which have learned this lesson at the cost of blood, must not allow themselves to fall prey to such trickery.

The resolving of this complex question requires sincerity and patience on both sides as well as a spirit of mutual accommodation and an attitude of seeking truth from facts. History shows that peaceful consultation is the only way to iron out border differences and establish a friendship boundary. During Minister Vajpayee's stay in China, both the Chinese and the Indian sides made it clear that they would seek an appropriate solution to the boundary question and other bilateral questions in the spirit of "Pancha Sheela"—the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Reaffirmation of these principles as the guidelines for future Sino-Indian relations was one of the important results that emerged from Minister Vajpayee's visit. Guided by these principles, it is expected, all differences and disputes will be resolved reasonably through negotiation, thus carrying forward the friendly relations between China and India that go back some 2,000 years.

Yet another important result of the visit was that both sides agreed to revive and expand friendly contacts and cooperation in many areas while working to solve the boundary issue. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping told Minister Vajpayee that the boundary question "should not prevent us from improving our relations in other fields," and that "we should now lose no time in improving relations between our two countries." Minister



Vajpayee said at his reciprocal banquet: "I believe we can continue our exchanges in diverse fields."

Settlement of the boundary question will no doubt lend an impetus to the growth of friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries. On the other hand, an extensive development of these relations will help create the necessary conditions and a salubrious atmosphere for resolving the boundary issue.

Premier Hua Guofeng stated explicitly that China and India "have broad prospects for expanding cooperation in many spheres. China is willing to develop actively friendly relations and cooperation with India." These statements clearly indicated the Chinese Government's willingness to join the Indian Government in actively preparing the conditions for an eventual, appropriate solution to the boundary question between the two countries.

It was in this spirit that Chinese and Indian officials went into extensive, concrete discussions and agreed to keep in close touch on the expansion of friendly exchanges of personnel and of friendly interchange and cooperation in trade, culture, science, technology and other areas.

Minister Vajpayee's successful visit signified that Sino-Indian relations once again proceeded along the broad road of dialogue and friendship. The two sides agreed that sincere meetings and frank and amicable exchanges of views contributed to mutual understanding and friendly cooperation. Both China and India strongly felt the need for increased exchanges and contacts.

On behalf of the Chinese Government and in his own name, Premier Hua Guofeng extended an invitation to Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai to visit China. Foreign Minister Huang Hua accepted with pleasure an invitation to visit India and meet Minister Vajpayee again later this year. Other exchanges of visits are being studied. The greater number of friendly exchanges and deeper and wider contacts that will follow in the wake of Minister Vajpayee's visit will certainly carry the friendship between China and India and between the two peoples to a new, higher level.

Minister Vajpayee compared Sino-Indian friendship to a young tree while he was in Shanghai. This young tree of

friendship would grow sturdily with careful watering by both sides, he declared.

**457 Foreign Minister Vajpayee's statement in Rajya Sabha on reported attack by China on Vietnam, 20 February 1979**

After the reports of the massive attack by the Chinese troops across the Sino-Vietnamese border, the Prime Minister had, on February 18, issued a statement of our reactions to these developments. The Statement expressed our profound shock and distress at the outbreak of hostilities which could endanger international peace and security. It also made an earnest plea for the immediate restoration of peace and, as a first step towards cessation of hostilities, underlined the urgent need for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the Vietnamese territory.

I myself heard of these developments late in the evening of February 17, when I was in Hangchow, through a news agency report and the international radio network. As I was not near any of our diplomatic missions, I tried to gather as much firm information as possible. When reports confirmed these grave developments, I decided immediately to cancel the remaining programme of my stay in China and sought the help of the Chinese authorities to get to Hong Kong and to return to India the same day.

Our serious concern at these developments was conveyed to the Chinese authorities in Peking through the Chinese Ambassador to India, who was accompanying our party on the tour in China early on February 18 before we left Hangchow.

The situation in Indo-China has been tense and inflamed for the last few months. This had caused set back to the process, which at one time looked hopeful of co-operative relations being developed in the South East Asian region. Being already a serious focus of tension, the situation in Indo-China figured at some length in my discussions with the Chinese leaders in Peking. The Chinese side, in explaining their viewpoint, had mentioned that there were provocations and threats along their border with Vietnam. From my side, I had even then expressed our concern at the possibility of deterioration of the situation and its dangerous consequences. I sought to impress on the Chinese leaders that any escalation would be serious and urged

that the problem should be solved peacefully through negotiations. I added that the aggravation of tensions in an already complex situation could be a set back to stability in South-East Asia and endanger international relations in general.

According to the Vietnam official statement conveyed to the Ambassadors of various countries in Hanoi on February 17, China had used troops, tanks, long range artillery and war planes for the attack along the entire length of the border. They had occupied border posts along the border in the Vietnamese provinces of Long Son, Hoang Lien Son, Lai Chau, and Quang Ninh.

In any case, as stated by the Prime Minister, we are distressed and shocked at these developments. The present aggravation of the situation is—and must be—a matter of grave concern to the entire international community. This escalation, with massive armed incursion across the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, must be arrested and reversed as soon as possible, lest there should be further widening of the conflict and danger to world peace.

The Vietnamese Government has appealed to the United Nations Secretary-General to take remedial measures in the face of the present situation. The Secretary-General has also called for maximum restraint to arrive at a peaceful settlement.

It is well known that we in principle are opposed to the use of armed force across established frontiers and interference in internal affairs of other nations. We consider that respect for the independence of nations is fundamental, since that alone can ensure stability and peace in any region of the world. We are against punitive military action in international relations. We would, even at this stage urge, powers involved or interested in peace and stability, and especially great powers which may have influence with the parties to the conflict in the region, to exercise caution and restraint. Armed forces must be withdrawn before the problem becomes graver through a further escalation in the dangerous chain of reactions. The problem must be returned to the negotiating table in a climate of peace.

I should like to add that India has long admired Vietnam for its heroic struggle against the heaviest possible odds for its national independence which culminated eventually in victory against imperialism and intervention. We had responded as

generously as to any country and as quickly as any non-aligned nation, to take a hand in the gigantic task of economic rehabilitation and national reconstruction which faced the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. We remain as committed as ever to develop friendly relations with Vietnam.

We want to eventually see peace and stability made secure so that nations in their independence can resume economic cooperation in the region. India had no ulterior interest in South East Asia, but as in the case of the Indian sub-continent, we would like to see the chapter of outside competitive involvement come to an end.

#### **458 Foreign Minister Vajpayee's statement in Parliament on his visit to China, 21 February 1979**

I wish to report to the House on my visit to the People's Republic of China, which had to be postponed at the last minute in October 1978 because of medical advice. The mutually convenient dates for the visit had been fixed over six weeks ago. The House will recall that I had made clear that I was accepting the invitation of Foreign Minister Huang Hua to visit China in the spirit of adherence to our Government's policy of non-alignment and to explore the possibilities of improving bilateral relations with all countries without jeopardising well-established friendships. My visit and my conversations were entirely in keeping with this declared policy and objective. While exchange of views on international issues were always intended to figure in the discussions, the primary focus of my visit was on the difficult and complex questions which beset relations between India and China.

Our foreign policy and its endeavours and successes in promoting positive improvements in bilateral relations and India's national strength gave me a measure of confidence in my mission. My anticipation that these resumed ministerial-level bilateral contacts at this time might prove worthwhile in securing a better understanding of each other's viewpoint, has been borne out from my visit.

It was my first visit to China. From my brief stay in Shanghai and Hangchow I got vivid impressions of the very strong cultural and historical links between our two large and

ancient Asian countries and the similar problems confronting them. The Temple in Hangchow which I visited is a beautiful historical monument to the message of the Buddha which went from India to China. In Shanghai, I got some idea of the achievements of China as well as the similarities of our developmental problems.

Of primary importance, however, were the conversations which I had with the Chinese leadership in Peking. The three sessions of talks I had with Foreign Minister Huang Hua and a long conversation with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and finally the meeting with Premier Hua Kuo-feng were all characterised by an atmosphere of cordiality. The discussions were wideranging in content and both sides were frank in the presentations of their respective viewpoints. In these talks, all major issues of common concern to the two countries were covered. In dealing with the international political and economic scene, we focussed on problems in Asia, Africa and Europe and exchanged respective assessments on the prospects of war and the difficulties which cast their shadow on world peace and stability. We discussed in detail the situation in and around the Indian sub-continent and, most important, the issues affecting India-China bilateral relations.

Both sides agreed on a few issues, such as the vital importance of supporting the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa and the need for a comprehensive settlement in West Asia which must include the fulfilment of Palestinian rights. We agreed that for the progress of the developing countries, it was necessary to create an international environment of peace and tranquillity. However, both sides clearly recognised that we had differing assessments on the inevitability of war, the logic of disarmament and the prospects of *detente*. I naturally affirmed our well-known positions on such subjects.

I explained in detail how, in keeping with India's traditional and continuing policy of non-alignment, our Government had made strenuous efforts and, with gratifying success, in preserving well-established friendships and at the same time in improving relations with others. I explained that, in our view, the world order with its enlarged membership of nation States, must be made safer and stabler so that independent nations may be able to exercise their right to progress in their own way.

A new economic order must be fashioned which would correct the dangerous imbalances which have developed and made more just so that impediments faced, notably by the developing world, are removed and international economic relations are re-structured.

On the subject of the situation in the sub-continent, which was discussed at considerable length, I explained that, with full deference to the independence of our neighbours, we have sought assiduously to resolve outstanding problems. I spoke of our attempts to create a climate of confidence between the nations south of the Himalayas, which on the one hand, would lead to an optimisation of our respective national development and cooperation between neighbours, and on the other, could reduce and, hopefully, end, the long story of great power involvement and competition in the problems of our region. A stable and cooperative South Asia, I urged, can be an example and an asset to the world.

Against this background, I described in detail our strict and scrupulous policy of non-interference in internal problems and the steps taken to improve relations with Pakistan. Even while we do not object to normal bilateral relations between Pakistan and China, the prospect of improvement of India-China relations would be impeded if their relations adversely affect our legitimate interests.

In this context, I summarised the origin and the long history of our differences with Pakistan on the question of Jammu and Kashmir. I informed the Chinese leaders that under the Simla Agreement, to which both countries are parties, we are committed to the final settlement of the Kashmir question through bilateral discussions. It has been the considered view of the Government and all sections of the people in India that, unlike the stand taken by Chinese in the fifties, the attitude adopted by the People's Republic of China in the last decade and a half had been an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino-Indian relations. In this connection, I also reiterated our concern at the construction of the Karakoram Highway across a territory which formed part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Chinese Government showed understanding of our policy towards Pakistan and our neighbours and expressed, both

in public and in our conversations, appreciation of our efforts, and indeed, the rationale and success of the policy. The Chinese leaders noted the facts of improved bilateral relations between the countries in this region and the propitious climate of co-operation which now prevailed in the sub-continent.

I come now to the major bilateral issues between India and China. I underlined to the Chinese leadership the fundamental importance attached by the Government and people to a satisfactory solution of the India-China boundary question. Parliament and public opinion in India consider that its resolution is vital to the restoration of confidence and full normalisation in the climate of our relations. There was recognition of the importance of this issue amongst the Chinese leadership.

As the House is aware, the India-China boundary question is an old problem. While the cartographic positions of the two countries are well-known, the discrepancy in the effective control on the ground and the diplomatic position has remained where it was since 1962. I had made it clear that mine was an exploratory mission. It was not my purpose, nor was it, indeed, the expectation on the Chinese side, that my visit to Peking could resolve this difficult problem which concerns differences between the two countries involving approximately 50,000 sq. miles of territory.

Our conversations did provide an opportunity for the first time in 19 years to have a frank exchange of views on this complex and politically vital issue. I made clear that the unresolved boundary question must be satisfactorily settled if relations of mutual confidence are to be established between India and China. These exploratory preliminary contacts have at least unfrozen the issue and both Governments are agreed on the need to reflect further on the possible ways to resolve this crucial question. The common willingness to recognise it as such, is not an insignificant step forward.

My conversations with the Chinese leaders also covered other past irritants to our relations. I drew attention to the fact that rebels or disaffected elements from Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur, who had managed to reach China, had received moral and material support for their insurgent or anti-constitutional activities inside our country. I was glad to learn from Chinese leaders that such support which may have been given

—the last instance was some time ago—was looked upon as a thing of the past.

When the question of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans was referred to, I informed the Chinese leaders that we had made it clear that it was in deference to the Dalai Lama's spiritual position and in recognition of the needs of the Tibetan refugees, who voluntarily came to India, that asylum and resettlement facilities were extended by India. If the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans consider that the conditions are suitable for their return to the places of their origin we, from our side, would not stand in their way in doing so.

I also invited the attention of the Foreign Minister of China to the fact that millions of Indians looked upon Kailash and Mansarovar as sacred and that the devout have for centuries visited the places on pilgrimage. No one from India has been able to go to Kailash and Mansarovar for nearly two decades. It is true that the Agreement between India and China pertaining to Trade and Intercourse with the Tibet Region expired in 1962 and has not since been renewed. Nevertheless, it was our hope that the Chinese Government would consider facilitating pilgrimages to these holy places. Should such facilities be granted, I have no doubt that the people in India would look upon it as symbolic of the improved relations between the two countries. We, on our part, are ready to consider similar facilities for pilgrimage to India.

From this brief account, Hon. Members will observe that international problems and specific questions of concern to the two countries figured squarely in our discussions. Our relations with other countries, which did not in any way affect our relations with China, did not come up in our discussions. Where there was a reference to differences between great powers and areas of tension, I expressed the hope that they would be resolved peacefully.

I might add in this connection that there was a discussion on the situation in Indo-China. The Chinese leaders expressed their viewpoint on the deterioration of their relations with Vietnam. I clearly expressed my concern at the prevailing tension and stressed that each of the countries in the region must be enabled to maintain their independence and were entitled to respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This



required adherence to the principle of non-interference. I cautioned that there should be no further developments which could lead to a dangerous deterioration of the situation. It is a matter of regret that in the course of our frank exchanges, where we clearly recognised that we had differing perspectives on the international situation, the Chinese leaders did not inform me of the possibility of developments on the China-Vietnam border.

Tranquillity has existed along our border and this, we agreed, in any case, should be maintained. Following the restoration of our diplomatic representation to Ambassadorial level in 1976, restrictions on trade, banking and shipping had been removed and functional contacts and exchange of delegations had already started. Since the present Government assumed office, this process has continued and the scope for possible bilateral functional cooperation has been identified. The Chinese Government are now embarked on a gigantic programme of modernisation. The Chinese leaderships hinted that in many fields it would be of reciprocal advantage for the two countries to share each other's experience and expertise. Trade could improve further and scientific and technological know-how in various branches could be exchanged. It remains for the officials and experts of the two sides to study more closely and work out areas and forms of advantageous co-operation, where real bilateral complementarity exists.

Mr. Speaker, we have not slurred over set-backs of the past or the outstanding problems which remain. India and China have different perspectives on internal and external policies. We are confident of India's strength and need not be diffident of our ability to safeguard our interests in our diplomacy. It is not too far-fetched to believe that neither China nor India can profit from an attitude of hostility or even detachment of a kind which characterised our relations for many years. I believe there is a new respect for our policy of genuine non-aligned and independent rationale in our judgement on international issues and notably for our policy towards South Asia as well as economic and technological progress of India.

We, for our part, cannot but equally recognise the importance of the People's Republic for its ancient past and its achievement in the last 30 years, and its position in the world. Given mutual respect based on equality and dignity, India-

China relations can also improve bilaterally and fit into the web of positively oriented and advantageous relationships, which is the essence of our foreign policy. Just as I would caution against euphoria, I would also urge a measure of self-confidence that any effort at improvement in relations need not mean the sacrifice of our national interests and aspirations. We have made a beginning and I come back satisfied with the decision to undertake the mission. But, I also know it would be a long haul which will demand maturity and reciprocal efforts by both Governments if, in the path ahead, satisfactory results are to be obtained.

I must acknowledge that the official delegation and the large party of journalists who had decided at their own expense to cover the visit were shown great hospitality and courtesy.

I have extended an invitation to Foreign Minister Huang Hua to visit India at his convenience to enable us to continue the dialogue. Premier Hua Kuo-feng asked me to convey an invitation to our Prime Minister to visit China at a mutually convenient time in the future.

I went to China with the confidence that I had the broad support of a national consensus. I know for every Indian, whether in Government or outside, national interest and honour must be supreme. I vividly remember that in the late fifties and early sixties, I gave expression to my strong feelings when the hopes of India-China friendship suffered a serious setback. With the burden of responsibilities I now carry, my concern for national interest and honour remains the same. All those who were alarmed at the fear of adverse consequences and almost cautioned against my undertaking the visit should rest assured that our dignity, independence and our national interests have not been allowed to suffer damage in any way.

India and China are not only two important members of the international community, they are also neighbours. With full respect to each other's personality and guided by the principles of peaceful co-existence, the two countries must strive for the goal of full normalisation and work for a world order which is just and equitable and where all nations big and small can, in peace, develop in their own way.

**459 Beijing Review report on increases in India's industrial and agricultural production, 23 February 1979**

Indian industrial and agricultural production went up last year and built up the country's foodgrain and foreign exchange reserves and mitigated price rises.

Agriculture registered an increase of 11 per cent, with food-grain output reaching a record 125.6 million tons. Output of major cash crops including oilseed, cotton, sugarcane and tobacco also showed large increases in the 12 months ending June 1978.

Though 6 million hectares of cultivated land were affected by floods last summer, the autumn yield equalled the previous year's 77 million tons, thanks to the efforts of the Indian Government and its people. However, the per-hectare yield was low, being only 1,125 kilos in 1977-78.

Indian industrial growth rate in 1977-78 was 3.5 per cent with the production of steel, crude oil and chemical fertilizers showing substantial increases. The production of steel was 8.04 million tons in 1977-78, (7 million tons in 1976-77) and crude oil output reached 11 million tons (8.6 million tons in the previous year).

The total value of India's foreign trade in 1977-78 was 114,400 million rupees, which is 12 per cent better than in the previous year. Foreign exchange reserves reached 50,000 million rupees last December, an increase of 25 per cent compared with the previous corresponding period.

**460 Statement by Indian representative Jaipal in the UN Security Council on Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 24 February 1979**

The Council was doubtless aware of the statement of our Secretary-General, issued on 18 February, expressing his deep concern about the current hostilities and his warning that the vicious circle of violence could have unforeseeable consequences. The Secretary-General called for an end to the hostilities and for a peaceful settlement with full respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all the States involved. My delegation would like to congratulate the Secretary-General for his prompt and timely reaction of seven days ago. His

appeal should have been immediately reinforced by the Security Council. Article 24 of the Charter envisages prompt and effective action by the Council.

Mr. President, why has it taken the Security Council so long to convene to discuss a situation that the Secretary-General felt obliged to take notice of immediately? Perhaps you know the answer. Non-members of the Council have a right to know the answer, because this delay is indeed a sad reflection on the functioning of the Council. Quibbling over the formulation of the agenda at a time like this cannot fail to remind one of the historic fiddling when Rome was burning.

My country is deeply committed to the fundamental principles on which the policy of non-alignment is based and which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. I refer, in particular, to the principle of respect for and preservation of national independence and sovereignty and to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. States Members of the United Nations are also obliged by the Charter to settle their disputes by peaceful means in a manner that does not endanger international peace and to refrain in their relations from the threat or use of force. These are the principal reasons why newly independent countries have sought the sanctuary of United Nations membership. Indeed, the United Nations itself might not have come into being but for the universal acceptance of these principles. My delegation would emphasize that these principles are of universal applicability, that there are no exceptions, and that no deviations from them may be permitted to any Member State or any group of States.

Strict and scrupulous adherence to these basic principles is vital to the maintenance of international peace and, *ipso facto*, their violation must necessarily pose a serious threat to world peace. It is for these reasons that my country has consistently opposed the use of armed force across established frontiers as well as interference of any sort in the internal affairs of other States.

The last few days have seen a flagrant violation of these principles. The unfortunate victim is a non-aligned country, which is once again gallantly defending itself against tremendous odds. The Prime Minister of India expressed his profound shock and distress at the outbreak of hostilities between China

and Vietnam, hostilities that could escalate and endanger world peace. He called for the immediate restoration of peace and, as a first step towards peace, he urged the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnamese territory. The President of India, at a joint session of Parliament, also expressed his grave concern at these developments, which also have the potential for endangering international peace and stability. He too called for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of China's armed forces, as a first step.

The Foreign Minister of India, by an unfortunate coincidence, happened to be on a visit to China, and he took the opportunity immediately to convey personally his serious concern to the Chinese authorities and underlined the overriding need to solve the problem peacefully through negotiations. Similar concern has been expressed all over the world by so many countries and peoples that it is regrettable that the response so far has been a steady deterioration of the situation, despite the obvious danger of escalation that is implicit in the continuation of the conflict.

It is a well-known axiom of peace that the aggressor shall not retain the fruits of aggression, and therefore peace cannot be restored unless there is total and complete withdrawal from all occupied territory. China is reported to have declared its intention of withdrawing, and we see no reason why there should be any delay in translating this intention into reality. It is imperative that the withdrawal should commence before the concerned Powers are relentlessly drawn into the tangled web of a chain reaction.

My country is totally opposed to the concept of punitive military action which is fraught with great peril for stability and international relations. As my Foreign Minister stated in the Indian Parliament, the days of punitive expeditions and gunboat diplomacy are over. It is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations for one State to take punitive action against another and to usurp the powers and functions of the Security Council when the Council is inhibited by the veto from taking action. If such punitive action is condoned, international law and order will be in the hands of self-appointed policemen, and that would be the end of the Security Council. The system of collective security envisaged by the Charter does

not permit unilateral punitive action, and the exercise of the right of self-defence cannot possibly extend to punitive measures.

The present conflict has been going on for nearly a week, and the casualties are reported to be heavy. It has now become a matter of grave and urgent concern for the entire international community. The Security Council should meet this challenge to peace and take decisive and meaningful steps to end the hostilities immediately and demand the total withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnamese territory, to be followed by the establishment of a negotiating process for settling the problems in a climate of peace. In this connexion we hope that the Council will take into account the offer of good offices by the Secretary-General.

Stability and co-operative relations in South-East Asia can be maintained only on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Viet Nam Laos and Kampuchea belong to the non-aligned group of nations and are all sovereign States Members of the United Nations with independent and distinctive personalities of their own. They have the right to fulfil their legitimate aspirations in their own way free from any external interference. The history of outside involvement in the internal affairs of the States of Indo-China should be brought to an end if there is to be enduring peace with honour. It cannot but be a matter of concern and regret that Viet Nam and Kampuchea should have been subjected to armed conflicts involving outside forces. We hope the Security Council will take steps to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the States of Indo-China, free from external interference.

A carefully balanced draft resolution—calling on the parties involved to observe a cease-fire; to vacate foreign territory occupied during the conflicts; to observe mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States concerned; to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other States and to accept the good offices of the Secretary-General for the purpose of establishing a process for a negotiated settlement of outstanding disputes in an atmosphere of peace—could conceivably form an appropriate basis for the restoration of peace in stages. But a decision of this kind by the Council will be an empty gesture unless the States concerned can be persuaded

to implement it in good faith. The Powers gathered around this horse-shoe table possess the capacity to persuade them in the direction of peace. They have stopped active hostilities in the past, and we believe that they have both the political will and the practical capacity to do so again now.

**461 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's television interview on Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 27 February 1979 (summary)**

Morarji Desai said that India had told Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea. He ruled out any changes in India's foreign policy in view of developments in Vietnam and Iran. Desai said that Chinese actions in Vietnam amounted to aggression and India did not want to improve her relations with China at the cost of not telling the truth, but added that efforts to improve relations should continue. India had done its duty by protesting but did not want to quarrel with anyone. He did not think that India's stand on Vietnam would harm relations with China.

**462 Chinese Ambassador's representation to India's External Affairs Ministry on Soviet Premier Kosygin's attack on China during his stay in India, 13 March 1979**

According to Indian press reports, during his stay in India between March 9 and 15, Kosygin accused China of committing "aggression" against Viet Nam and tried to sow discord between China and India on the platform provided by the host, such as in Parliament, at the banquet in his honour, at the reception given by Delhi citizens and in television studio.

The deterioration of the Sino-Vietnamese relations and the consequent escalation to such a serious border conflict are sheerly because Viet Nam has the support of the Soviet Union. The motive of Kosygin's abusive charges against China are to divert the attention of the public and cover up the fact that the big and small hegemonists—the Soviet Union and Viet Nam are committing aggression and expansion in Indo-China.

On March 5, Soviet Ambassador to India Vorontsov, together with the diplomatic envoys of the Soviet bloc in India, held a joint press conference at the Polish Embassy to vilify

China and even made personal abuse against Chinese leaders. It is a violation of established international diplomatic practice to virulently attack a third country on the territory of a host country.

**463 Indo-Soviet joint communique, 15 March 1979 (Extract)**

Having reviewed the situation which has developed in South East Asia in connection with the massive armed attack by China on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, India and the Soviet Union demanded an immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam.

**464 Vajpayee's statement at a New Delhi television interview, 16 March 1979 (Extracts)**

While speaking of the successful outcome of Mr Kosygin's visit Mr Vajpayee told a questioner that there was no leaning towards the Soviet Union nor away from it.

The External Affairs Minister acknowledged that the Chinese action in Vietnam and the manner in which it had made references to the 1962 attack on India in this context, had dealt a blow to the process of normalisation between India and China.

"Old memories have been revived which create hurdles in the path of normalisation," Mr Vajpayee said, adding, however that he hoped that when the situation became normal, the normalisation process can be continued.

Mr Vajpayee pointed out that the efforts at normalisation of relations with China had been on for many years. The first concrete step had been taken when the previous government had decided to send an ambassador to Peking. Later, China had invited him.

When the dates for his China visit were fixed, the Kampuchean question did not exist. No one could say with certainty before he left for Peking that a Sino-Vietnamese conflict would take place. Therefore he had decided to go there, marking the second concrete step in the normalisation process.

Mr Vajpayee expressed the hope that after China withdrew from Vietnam and when it realised that it had no right to



punish any country for doing something to a third country, the normalisation process might restart.

When a questioner spoke of some infiltration from across the Burmese border, Mr Vajpayee said that Burma had been co-operating with India in such matters. He had no report that Chinese hand was behind this infiltration. Chinese leaders had assured him that help to such people was a matter of the past and he hoped that it would be so.

**465 Vajpayee's interview with Kewal Varma, correspondent of Sunday (Calcutta), 18 March 1979 (Extracts)**

On Kashmir, they [the Chinese] did say something in Pakistan but that has been their old stand. There is pressure from Pakistan that China should not change its stand. In our talks, we discussed this question very frankly, very cordially. We told them that they had changed their position. In 1957 there was a joint communique between the late Prime Minister Zhou En-lai and the Prime Minister of Poland; there was a reference to Kashmir in it. It was said that the Jammu and Kashmir question was a question between India and Pakistan. They have changed their stand. Under the Simla Agreement, we are committed that the final solution to the Kashmir problem was to be found by India and Pakistan. If a third party intervenes or encourages Pakistan, the problem would become more complicated.

*Question:* Then how do you say that you have unfrozen the question ?

*Answer:* For the last 19 years there were no talks about the boundary question. (The problem) was in cold storage. When the Government decided in 1976 to send an ambassador to Peking, the boundary question was not broached. For the first time after the visit of Zhou Enlai in 1960 the boundary question has come to the fore. And India's views have been expressed in unequivocal terms.

*Question:* But they are sticking to their original position, that a salubrious atmosphere should be created first for resolving the

boundary issue.

*Answer:* We are sticking to our position that the solution of the boundary issue is fundamental. When I persisted, Mr Deng said that, yes, the boundary question is important, it will have to be solved. He then said that if it cannot be solved now, we might postpone it. He talked of the next generations, for (he said) the present generation is stupid, we are stupid people. Let the next generation solve it. I said no; The Chinese leaders and the Chinese people are very wise people. They can solve the problem. For us, the solution of the boundary question is a must. . . .

I said that the visit was going to be exploratory in nature. Boundary questions would be discussed. But there are other irritants and we could make some progress in removing those irritants, that would be a good beginning. All the time I was saying that there should be no euphoria. . . . What happened during the last so many years cannot be set right in three days. I wanted to talk to the Chinese leaders face to face. It is not a coincidence that we are new here and they are also new (in Peking). The past is there, but we have to find solutions in the present and we have to look to the future—whether there is any meeting of mind, whether it is possible or not. We talked to them. The question of the visit being a success or a flop does not arise.

*Question:* Why is the Chinese side not confirming your assertion on the question of the boundary, and of Nagaland.

*Answer:* There is mutual appreciation of the fact that the boundary question is fundamental to our future relations. The Chinese side informed us that whatever may have happened with regard to the underground elements in Nagaland and Mizoram, it is now a thing of the past.

*Question:* What about Sikkim? They have not been recognising Sikkim as an integral part of India.

*Answer:* We informed them that Sikkim has become a part of India.

*Question:* What did they say?

*Answer:* They kept quiet.

*Question:* You have admitted that there was a setback to your mission to Peking. What do you think, how soon will you be able to pick up the thread of dialogue with China again?

*Answer:* Very difficult to say.

*Question:* Can you sell to our public opinion any border settlement where by even an rich of land in Aksai Chin, now under the Chinese occupation, is conceded to China?

*Answer:* I am not a salesman. The national interests are supreme and the question of surrendering any Indian territory to China does not arise. The Janata Government stands committed to the 1962 resolution of Parliament.

*Question:* Do you think that if you do not move an inch from that resolution, and if you have no flexibility you can ever solve the border problem with China?

*Answer:* We will discuss this problem when the right stage comes.

*Question:* It means you will cross the bridge when you come to it.

*Answer:* Yes.

*Question:* What is your assessment of China's global designs in the context of the Chinese attack on Vietnam?

*Answer:* China is a big country and if it has global interests, it is not surprising. However, all big countries have to realise that the world has changed and they can no longer order it about according to their whims. We have already deplored the massive Chinese attack on Vietnam and called for the immediate withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam. The Chinese say that

their object is limited, that it is to punish Vietnam. This is a dangerous concept of a big country wanting to punish a smaller country, which we emphatically reject.

*Question:* There is talk that China has become an oriental arm of NATO. The Chinese attack on Vietnam is reminiscent of 1962 and shows that they want the overlordship of the region. How do you assess Chinese policies?

*Answer:* All powers have global ambitions. But they should realise that three or four countries in the world cannot order about other countries. Those days have gone. The new world order has become democratic in character. The sooner they realise this the better.

*Question:* Why is China trying to improve its ties with India? As part of its global policy of tightening the so-called "hegemonists"? Would you too play the Chinese card?

*Answer:* I think the talk of countries playing this card or that is puerile and dangerous. As I said in my speech in the U.N. General Assembly last year, "doubts that new alignments are being forged against old adversaries and that preparations are being made to play a new card to outwit the opponents, have introduced an unexpected dimension in the international scenario". There is no question of our playing the Chinese or any other card. Efforts to improve ties with China should be viewed in the bilateral context, and we have made it amply clear that such improvement cannot be at the cost of established friendships.

*Question:* The Xinhua statement which I have referred to earlier indicates that China's objective to seek improvement in relations with India is to rope us into their fight against 'hegemonists'—which means Russia. They also gave the impression that there is a price tag on the border settlement, that is, they would settle the border problem to our satisfaction if India could join China to oppose the USSR. What have you to say?

*Answer:* We are against all foreign domination, whether it

comes from the East or from the West, whether it is political or economic, whether it is technological or cultural. There is no question of joining any particular country against any third country. We would like all big powers to shed all ambitions to dominate others. At the Belgrade Conference a new term was coined—dominationism.

*Question:* Is there any evidence of dominationism on the part of the Soviet Union?

*Answer:* No. All big powers want to have some influence. It was for the newly-emergent nations to guard against foreign domination.

#### **466 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1978-79, 21 March 1979 (Extracts)**

Notwithstanding the existence of the unresolved boundary question, the process of normalising relations with China started in 1976 when the Ambassadors of the two countries took up their posts in Peking and New Delhi respectively. In the last two years, small but significant steps have been taken to facilitate trade and permit delegations to exchange visits, to identify the fields where bilateral, functional or economic cooperation could be of reciprocal advantage. The Foreign Minister accepted the invitation from the Chinese Foreign Minister to visit China and seek to explore the potential of fuller normalisation. At no stage was the complexity or importance of the issues between the two countries sought to be minimised. The visit itself, which was delayed for a few months, was marked by exchanges on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The endeavour was to see if some irritants in the relations could be removed and to assess whether major problems could be tackled in a climate of dignity and mutual respect. The visit did lead to a full discussion on all problems and there was ground for satisfaction that it improved understanding of each other's viewpoints. India hopes that the process of normalisation of relations with China will continue so that outstanding problems, including the boundary question, can be resolved. . . .

During the year, there were promising beginnings for the

restoration of trade and cooperative relations between ASEAN and Vietnam. The process, however, received a serious setback after the developments in Kampuchea. The situation became even more serious with the deterioration of relations between Vietnam and China culminating in the massive attack into Vietnam by Chinese forces. Consistent with our respect for the principle of territorial integrity, India could not but deplore this action. India has affirmed that the integrity and the national sovereignty and independent personality of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos like those of all nations, must be respected, so that the search towards regional cooperation and stability in South-East Asia could be resumed.

**467 Statement by Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee at the opening of the National Seminars on Contemporary China and Japan organized by the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, University of Delhi, April 1979 (Extracts)**

China with its massive military strength and daunting dimensions, has been something of a strategic riddle to its neighbours and others in Asia. China's recent behaviour in Indochina had served only to reinforce such apprehensions. . . .

The determinant of our national perception of that country, the most populous of Asia and indeed the world would be China's own view of the world, the attitudes and policies it adopts towards its neighbours and its responses to the global urge for co-operation and interdependence.

**468 Vice-Foreign Minister He Ying's interview with S. Nihal Singh, correspondent of *The Statesman*, 6 April 1979 (Extracts)**

"China has all along maintained that the boundary question should be settled through negotiations. But if conditions are not ripe we can put it aside and look forward to improving relations. Mr Vajpayee's visit has played a positive role in improving understanding."

Although Mr He Ying did not elaborate, a Communist functionary told me [Nihal Singh] at a separate meeting in the

Chinese capital that Mr Deng Xiaoping had offered Mr Vajpayee a border settlement involving the acceptance of the McMahon Line by China in exchange for India accepting Chinese claims in the western sector. The middle sector in the Chinese view, poses few problems.

This source said that such a package deal, as he put it, would be advantageous to India because the eastern sector was rich and relatively heavily populated while the western sector was barren land. Mr. Vajpayee had rejected the Chinese offer.

Although Mr Vajpayee's speech at a recent Delhi seminar questioning China's foreign policy objectives was described by the Communist functionary as a setback in improving relations, the impression one gets on all sides in the windswept Chinese capital is that the Chinese authorities are eager to improve relations with India. The word seems to have been put out is that India is a friendly country. This impression was confirmed during my talk with Mr. He Ying.

Mr He Ying maintained that friendly and normal relations between the two countries were in the interest of both the peoples. He added: "China and India should be friendly for generations to come. Some of the unhappy things that happened will pass. We are close neighbours, Chairman Mao and Chou paid much attention to Sino-Indian friendship. If India would become strong and prosperous she would be no threat to China and a strong China will not be a threat to India."

Would China now apply for membership of the non-aligned club? I asked. "We have not applied so far," he answered with a laugh. "We have not considered the question but we support the non-aligned movement because it is fighting against big nation hegemonism and is defending its members' sovereignty."

**469 *Beijing Review* report on Communist Party of India (M-L) protest against Soviet support for Vietnamese aggression, 6 April 1979**

More than 2,000 members of the Communist Party of India (M-L) held a demonstration on March 26 outside the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi to protest [against] Soviet support of

Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea.

The demonstrators shouted: "Down with Russian imperialism!" "Vietnamese aggressors, hands off Kampuchea!" "Scrap the Indo-Soviet military treaty!" "End Russian interference in India!" and "End Russian exploitation of India!"

Addressing the demonstrators, Satya Narain Singh, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (M-L), flayed the Soviet Union for adopting a "calculated plan for world hegemony" and for instigating and aiding Viet Nam. A circular distributed by the demonstrators said: "Russian imperialism has turned Viet Nam into a new 'Cuba' of the East to create trouble in the region. These Vietnamese hirelings of Russian imperialism want to turn the Indochinese countries into a 'federation' under their rule with the intention of fulfilling their local expansionist ambitions."

The circular went on to say: In Laos there are still over 50,000 Vietnamese troops; in Kampuchea, more than 100,000 Vietnamese troops. This not only has endangered the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Laos and Kampuchea, but also all the countries in Southeast Asia. This constant threat posed by Russia and Viet Nam has particularly caused anxiety to patriotic Indian people, rousing them to realize the need to unite and fight against Russian-Vietnamese imperialism on our subcontinent.

The circular also pointed out that day by day the people of the world have come to realize that the two superpowers are the source of world war, and of the two, Russian imperialism is the chief source of war today. The most dangerous troublemaker and the hotbed of war today is Russian imperialism.

**470 Statement by Chinese Ambassador Chen Zhao-yuan at the Institute of Comporary Chinese Studies, New Delhi, 12 April 1979 (Extracts)**

External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit had restored the contact between the two countries which had remained suspended for the past two decades.

The visit was a success and had furthered the relations between the two countries. . . .

There were, however, some questions which were com-



plicated and could not be solved overnight but by constant contact. The vistas of development were broad, but some countries were not in favour of good relations between India and China.

**471 Prime Minister Morarji Desai's interview to the London business monthly, *Director*, May 1979 (Extracts)**

If India solved its problems with China its relations with Peking would not be at the cost of Moscow. "But our relations with them [the Soviet Union] also cannot be at China's cost". . . .

Asked what was the Janata Government's policy towards China on trade and politics, Mr Desai said, "We had the best of relations with China until 1959-60. Then the relations were spoiled by them. China has occupied a large area of our land in the north-east or in the north, and unless that is satisfactorily solved, we cannot be complete friends, because we do not want to go to war."

"We don't believe in solving problems by war, I told them. Then they said they are prepared for discussions. So we decided to respond. They have made an advance and we have accepted it. The Chinese were apprehensive about our relations with the Soviet Union. Both are total enemies."

**472 "India press exposes Soviet exploitation of India," commentary in *Beijing Review*, 15 June 1979 (Extracts)**

The March 9 issue of the Indian weekly *Organizer* published an article exposing the Soviet exploitation and control of India.

The article by Markanday Katju, President of the All-India Democratic Lawyers Association, says, "The refinery built by the Soviets at Barauni cost India a huge 76 million dollars. The capacity of this refinery was 2 million tons annually. The 2.5 million ton refinery built by Philips Petroleum of the USA cost only 36 million dollars". . . .

"Regarding Indo-Soviet trade, it may be stated generally that it is of the traditional neocolonial type," the article says. It notes that Indian primary products which are sold at cheap prices to the Soviet Union, are resold at higher prices to Western Europe. Moreover, goods are generally sold by the Soviet

Union to India at prices 15 to 20 per cent higher than Western prices.

An article carried in the Indian *Economic Times* of May 12 says that India has politely declined the offer of aid to the development of some of the critical sectors of its economy made by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin during his recent visit to the country. According to informed sources, India's reluctance stemmed from the following main reasons: "It is felt in official circles here that Soviet aid is costlier than aid from other sources. While Western loans are repayable on an average over 32 years, with an interest rate of just over 2.5 per cent per annum and a grace period of ten years, Soviet aid seldom extends beyond a period of 15 years and invariably carries an annual interest rate of over 2.5 per cent." In addition, Soviet goods are over-priced by international standards.

Moreover, the article says, "It is felt here that most of the items offered by the Soviet Union are at least one generation removed from similar goods and technology available in Western countries."

**473 Premier Hua Guofeng's message of greeting to Charan Singh, on his assumption of the office of Prime Minister of India, 31 July 1979**

I wish to extend warm congratulations to Your Excellency on your assumption of the Office of Prime Minister of the Republic of India. May the relations between China and India develop further on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

**474 "India: political unrest," *Beijing Review* commentary, 3 August 1979 (Extracts)**

Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai stepped down on July 15, precipitating acute political turbulence.

The current political crisis in India stems mainly from the sharpening contradictions and subsequent open split within the ruling People's Party. . . .

The social turmoil in India to a certain degree added fuel to the factional struggle within the People's Party. There were

continual strikes this year. Desai's power was particularly eroded when he ordered army troops to put down a police strike which involved reserves of the central police, formerly a pillar of the Indian Government and the central industrial security troops.

**475 "India: unstable political situation," *Beijing Review* commentary, 21 September 1979 (Extracts)**

Indian President Sanjiva Reddy on August 22 dissolved the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and ordered a mid-term election for November in an attempt to pull the country out of its gravest political crisis since independence. . . .

The fall of the Singh government is not accidental, as he had no solid base. When he formed his government on July 28, it is said that he had the support of Indira Gandhi's Congress Party on certain conditions he and Indira Gandhi had reached in a "secret agreement." Its main points were: to repeal the charges against her during her emergency rule, and not to include in the council any of the former ministers who had opposed her. But pressure from Deputy Prime Minister Yeshvantrao Chavan made it impossible for Singh to abide by the above agreement. He allowed the special court to question Indira Gandhi and also had to appoint people who had been hostile to her as new ministers. So the lady did not keep her end of the bargain and withdrew her support at the crucial moment.

Opposition from the Janata Party also played a role in forcing Singh to resign.

**476 Premier Hua Guofeng's message of greetings to Mrs. Indira Gandhi, on her assumption of the office of Prime Minister of India, 15 January 1980**

I wish to extend warm congratulations to Your Excellency on your assumption of the Office of Prime Minister of the Republic of India. We are happy to see that the relations between China and India have improved and developed over the last few years, and we hope that this trend will continue to develop in the interest of peace and stability in Asia. May India enjoy pros-

perity.

**477 Foreign Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao's statement in Rajya Sabha on the supply of arms aid to Pakistan by the United States and China in the wake of Russian intervention in Afghanistan, 24 January 1980 (Extract)**

According to reports that have come to the attention of Government, the US Government has decided to expedite military supplies to Pakistan worth \$150 million as part of cash sales already in the pipeline. The US Government has further announced a package aid of \$400 million for the next 20 months—\$200 million in economic aid and the other \$200 million in military aid. Further, following the recent visit to Peking by the American Defence Secretary, Mr. Harold Brown, and the just concluded visit to Pakistan of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Government have seen press reports that China also may be considering increasing the supply of military equipment to Pakistan.

Government fully shares the serious concern of this House over the moves to augment Pakistan's military capability. It is our apprehension that induction of arms into Pakistan could convert the South Asian region into a theatre of great power confrontation and conflict and threaten the security of India. Government have also expressed their concern that the induction of arms has a potential of decelerating the process of normalisation which the Governments of India and Pakistan have fostered in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. These views have been impressed upon the Governments of USA, China, Pakistan and other concerned countries.

**478 Speech by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the Indian Embassy reception on India's Independence Day, 26 January 1980 (Extracts)**

The present turbulent and tense international situation places a greater obligation on both China and India to promote mutual understanding and co-operation.

“Bilateral exchanges between our two sides have increased to some extent in recent years, thanks to the efforts of both

parties. We believe that our Indian friends share with us the conviction that to promote mutual understanding and co-operation between the two great neighbouring countries of China and India is not only the common desire of our two peoples, but beneficial to peace and stability in Asia.”

He expressed his belief that Sino-Indian relations and the friendship between the two peoples would be continuously consolidated and enhanced.

**479 Speech by India's *Charge d'Affaires*, Ranjit Sethi, at the reception, 26 January 1980 (Extracts)**

“We are committed to improving relations with our neighbours. China is one of our great neighbours.” . . .

Relations between India and China were improving and their exchanges in different fields continuing and expanding. He said that the Indian Government was committed to the process of improving and developing relations with China on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and for the benefit of both India and China.

“We are also committed to seeking solutions to all our outstanding problems.”

**480 Xinhua commentary on Soviet Foreign Minister**

**A. Gromyko's visit to India, 14 February 1980 (Extracts)**

A short joint statement was issued at the end of the visit. . . .

The joint statement, however, did not mention the Afghanistan problem, though many facts showed it was the centre of the talks.

An Indian government spokesman said yesterday, as AFP reported, India and Soviet Union differed from each other on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and on the steps to defuse the tension. The spokesman said India stood for efforts to defuse the tension, particularly through a troops' withdrawal. However, during his talks with Indian leaders, Gromyko only reiterated the stand “inherent in the statements made by the Soviet leaders previously on the situation.” Gromyko did not indicate when the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan though the Indian side made a request for it

during the talks, the Indian spokesman said.

A commentary by the Japanese Kyodo Correspondent in New Delhi says today, "talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and other Indian leaders concluded before reaching an unanimous view on the Afghanistan problem." It adds, "the Soviet Union centred Gromyko's visit on strengthening of relations with the sub-continent big-power India and mentioned no indication to quit a basic step backward from Afghanistan. It can be said that the views of India and the Soviet Union have not been drawn nearer."

*The Hindustan Times*, in an editorial today also revealed that India and the Soviet Union differed in their appreciation of the situation in Afghanistan. The paper said that while India favours an early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Russians clearly have no such intention. The paper said that in such a situation a declaration of intent to continue consulting each other is the only kind of public pronouncement possible since a strident emphasis on differences may seriously damage Indo-Soviet relations.

#### **481 Another Xinhua commentary on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to India, 16 February 1980**

Soviet mass media have for days been playing up Andrei Gromyko's "official and friendly" visit to India and invested it with importance". A commentary released by the Soviet Novosti Press Agency said that Andrei Gromyko is well-known in India as its "good friend".

What, then, this self-styled "good friend" has done during his visit to India?

The first thing Gromyko did when he set foot on Indian soil was to justify the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He stressed that in the present conditions "joint efforts by the USSR and India can play a major part in the normalisation of this situation". It is obvious that Gromyko wanted India to help Moscow get out of the heat of universal condemnation, consolidate its position in Afghanistan, thereby enhancing its threat to the sub-continent. That is what the Kremlin termed "normalization of this situation."

It is, however, surprising to see that Gromyko should take advantage of the forum given by his Indian host to attack on and intimidate India's neighbour Pakistan. Gromyko alleged that there were "intrigues directed at turning Pakistan into a seat of tensions, a base for further unfolding aggression against Afghanistan". He warned that "If Pakistan further proceeds along this path, it will gain nothing good from this."

Gromyko's unveiled threat is not directed against Pakistan alone; he evidently had in mind those countries which denounce the Soviet invasion and support Pakistan to stand up to the Soviet threat.

Gromyko accused Pakistan of "spoiling its relations simultaneously with several states" meaning Afghanistan, India and the Soviet Union. He pretended ignorance of the successful visit to Pakistan by India's Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe, alleging that "India's proposals to Pakistan are also not meeting with a positive response".

It is too crude an attempt at estranging India from Pakistan.

What Gromyko did in the Indian capital defies elementary diplomatic courtesy. The nations on the sub-continent want tranquility and stability. They certainly can judge whether those are really their good friends, who go out of their way to provoke discord among them, set them one against another and even try to bring some onto its path of war.

**482 "Indian-Pakistan talks: mutual understanding of great significance," article by *People's Daily* commentator, February 1980**

Indian Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe paid a three-day visit to Pakistan beginning from February 4 for talks with Pakistan Foreign Secretary S. Shah Nawaz on the Soviet dispatch of troops into Afghanistan, India-Pakistan relations and other topics. Pakistan President Zia-Ul-Haq also met with Sathe.

For reasons known to all, relations between the two countries had been cool or even strained for some time. There were still differences after the recent talks. However, from Sathe's Pakistan visit it can be seen that India and Pakistan, taking the overall situation into account and seeking common grounds while reserving differences, are making efforts to improve bilate-

ral relations and safeguard peace and stability in the subcontinent. This is why the visit has aroused wide attention.

It should be noted that Sathe's visit took place at a time when the Soviet Union was continuing its aggression against Afghanistan and the peace and security of South Asia was being directly threatened. Reports indicated that both sides expressed their desire for friendship in the talks. In Sathe's words, this is a mutual understanding of great significance. It is certain that the talks will exert a positive influence on the development of the situation in South Asia.

When the lips are gone the teeth will be exposed to the cold, as a Chinese saying goes. Pakistan, a close neighbour of Afghanistan, is the gateway from Western Asia to the Indian subcontinent. With Soviet troops at the threshold of Pakistan, the Soviet threat to the country is now very real. The way Moscow is carrying out aggression and expansion shows that it regards the invasion of Afghanistan as an important link in its global strategy and will not stop there. The dispatch of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, which was in the past regarded as "the gateway to India," constitutes also a menace to India which cannot be neglected.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has said that the situation in Afghanistan has brought danger closer to India. Therefore, with large numbers of Soviet troops, tanks and military aircraft being deployed closer and closer to Pakistan borders, it is clear where the menace to both India and Pakistan comes from and what is the biggest and most pressing problem confronting the two nations.

With this understanding, the Indian side stated in the talks that if anything occurs to endanger Pakistan's security India would feel concerned. At the February 6 press conference Sathe explicitly pointed out that both sides had identical views at least on this point: no force or interference in the internal affairs of other countries will be tolerated. He also said that India does not object to Pakistan accepting U.S. aid in order to strengthen its defence capability.

The Soviet Union, of course, is unhappy to see relations improving between India and Pakistan. People have noted that Moscow is trying to foment discord between India and Pakistan by making a big fuss over U.S. assistance to Pakistan and pro-



claims itself to be a “long-tested old friend” of India. But has not the deceptiveness of these high-sounding words been much blunted by the thunder of artillery in Afghanistan? People with the interests of the Indian nation and the peace and security of South Asia in mind will distinguish right from wrong. They will see that the support and assistance rendered by many countries to the threatened Pakistan is not directed against India and creates no threats whatever to that country. On the contrary, it will only help to check the hegemonists in their aggression and expansion. Therefore, it is beneficial to India. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said recently that India would not support any country sending troops into another country. She also noted that the Russians would build up its forces in this area, not only in Afghanistan, but also in the whole of South-east Asia. This is very dangerous, she said. These propositions and views are very conducive to the strengthening of relations among the countries in South Asia, to opposing hegemonism and to maintaining peace in Asia and the world as a whole.

**483 Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s answers to questions in Rajya Sabha, 21 March 1980 (Extracts)**

India would take “the most appropriate steps” to improve relations with China on the basis of the “Panchashila” and “reciprocity.” . . .

The new Chinese ambassador in Delhi had expressed the hope for an improvement of relations between the two countries. . . .

“India remains willing to discuss all issues with China including the border question, in search of a peaceful solution based on equality. We hope to progress also as regards bilateral exchanges.”

He said the Chinese government had reiterated through diplomatic channels that they were not providing any training for underground Nagas, Mizos and others in China. . . .

In February 1979, the Chinese foreign minister gave an assurance that such support as might have been given earlier could be “looked upon as a thing of the past.”

**484 Chinese Ambassador Shen Jian's speech at a reception given in his honour by the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, New Delhi, 15 April 1980 (Extracts)**

In the present, "unstable world situation" friendly relations between India and China were essential for peace and stability in Asia and the world. . . .

The new Chinese ambassador stressed the need for the two countries to resolve their outstanding problems under the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Simultaneously, better efforts should be made to improve commercial, scientific and cultural relations.

He said both the countries had a lot in common and they understand each other better. "Therefore, we have every reason to be friendly and cooperate with each other," he said.

Mr Shen recalled how he had come to India 30 years ago as the first charge d'affaires of his country to set up the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. He said he was happy to be back in India.

**485 Press release on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's meeting with Chairman Hua Goufeng issued in New Delhi, 9 May 1980**

The Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, had a meeting with Chairman Hua Guofeng of China in Belgrade on May 9, 1980 evening. Both of them agreed that better Sino-Indian relations were essential to peace and stability in Asia. It was felt that bilateral problems could be solved only if they avoided confrontation and resorted to mutual consultation.

Smt. Gandhi said that India was a strong believer in Non-Aligment, which did not mean being neutral. It only meant judging each issue on its merit. Chairman Hua Guofeng said that China was keen on having better ties with India. He suggested that both countries should concentrate on the present and the future and put aside past differences. He also said that China had been a consistent supporter of the Non-Aligned Movement. He expressed his happiness at the emergence of a strong government in India after the recent poll and said it would help India play a more useful role in international affairs.

**486 Speech by Chinese Ambassador Shen Jian at a reception given by India-China Friendship Association in New Delhi, 17 May 1980 (Extracts)**

Shen Jian. . . urged both China and India to lose no time in strengthening relations with one another through “practical” steps. . . .

He believed that Sino-Indian friendship and unity based on the five principles of coexistence could contribute to peace in Asia and the world.

He said that the meeting of the two leaders in Belgrade was the first meeting of its kind in two decades and was “an event of great significance in our relations”. He noted that the two leaders had expressed the desire to further improve and develop relations between their countries. . . .

India and China were developing countries and it was important that the tasks of national reconstruction and improvement of standards of living in both countries were carried out in an environment of mutual trust and cooperation.

He said that friendship between India and China was a common aspiration of the peoples of both countries. His country was pleased that in recent times cultural and trade exchanges had increased between them.

**487 Statement by Shankar Bajpai, Ambassador-designate to China, at a news conference, 30 May 1980 (Extracts)**

The negativism which had clouded the process of normalisation of Sino-Indian relations was less of a “brake” than it had been in the past.

Mr. Bajpai noted the expression of goodwill forthcoming from the Chinese leadership and said his main task in his new assignment would be to explore whether “positive inputs” could be infused into these expressions.

Mr. Bajpai denied there was hesitancy on the part of India to respond to these expressions of goodwill and said that there was no “lack of reciprocation.”

In reply to another question, Mr. Bajpai saw no reason why India’s relations with third countries should affect its ties with China. Asked whether China’s relations with Vietnam would be

a factor in the development of Sino-Indian relations, Mr. Bajpai said that this was a much larger issue and depended upon several other factors on which he did not want to speculate. . . .

Mr. Bajpai said, India had noted that Chinese leaders had not responded to Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq's references to Kashmir during his recent China visit.

There were certain "historic memories" which had to fade. The biggest stumbling block in Sino-Indian relations was the "experience the two countries had of each other at a particular time" which has left physical and other scars.

**488 Speech by Ji Xianlin, Vice-President of Beijing University and a noted historian, at a seminar on South Asian studies in Beijing, 12 June 1980 (Extracts)**

Surveying the past and future Asian studies in China, Ji Xianlin listed half a dozen academic organizations in China devoted to the study of South Asia, including the Institute of South Asian Studies, which is under the joint administration of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Beijing University. He said some 200 professional researchers are involved in the study of South Asian countries.

Ji Xianlin also outlined the 1979-1985 plan for the study of South Asia which includes 152 projects—more than one-third concerning language and literature.

Aims of these studies are:

—Further comprehensive investigation into the South Asian countries, especially political and economic development and foreign relations (particularly with China);

—To collect, edit, translate and publish literature on the history of relations between China and South Asian countries, especially the vast amount of valuable literature written in the Sanskrit and Pali languages in Tibet and the ancient languages of Xinjiang;

— To strengthen traditional friendship and develop cultural and commercial exchanges between China and South Asian countries. . . .

Friendly contacts between the Chinese and South Asian peoples began in pre-historical times.

"According to ancient Chinese history books and ancient

Indian epics, exchange of envoys as well as cultural interflow between China and the South Asian sub-continent had already taken place as early as over two thousand years ago.”

Chinese imperial annals contain special sections devoted to South Asia as a whole and to particular countries of the region. Also, many history books and treatises on South Asia were written on the basis of first-hand information by Chinese who travelled great distances. . . .

In addition, many important religious and philosophical writings from South Asian countries have been preserved in China. Ancient Sanskrit works which have been lost in India, for instance, still exist in Chinese versions.

China and South Asian countries are among the most ancient civilizations in the world, and the Yellow, Ganges and Indus Rivers have all given birth to splendid cultures. In modern history, these countries have supported each other in their common struggle against colonialism and imperialism and for independence and freedom. “By learning a lot from the peoples of South Asia and combining our own national characteristics, we Chinese people too have grown wonderful flows in the world garden of science, art, ideology and culture.”

**489 Interview of Wang Bing Nan, President of the Association of Chinese People's Friendship with Foreign Countries, to Krishan Kumar, editor of New Delhi's defence journal *Vikrant*, 19 June 1980 (Extracts)**

China claims that a “historic document” discovered recently disproves India's stand that the Simla agreement of 1914 confirms McMahon Line as the traditional Sino-Indian boundary in the eastern sector, reports UNI.

The chairman of the foreign relations committee, Mr. Wang Bing Nan, said that the British representative at the Simla conference, Mr McMahon, had merely suggested a boundary line. The British government later prepared a “fake document” saying that the boundary had been decided at the conference.

Mr. Wang stressed the need for resolving the boundary problems and said that negotiation in the past had failed because of India's stand.

“The Indian government claimed too much. According to

the so-called McMahon Line, about 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory was claimed by India. Apart from that, the Indian government claimed another 40,000 sq km in the western part which was under our control, that is Aksai Chin.

“This region has been practically under Chinese control. We built a lot of highways in this area and even the Indian government did not know about that.

“If the Indian government insists on its claim both in the eastern and western sectors then the question cannot be solved.”

Mr Wang referred to the 1962 war and said: “our troops crossed the McMahon Line but we withdrew behind the line of practical control. If both sides could face the reality cool-mindedly then the question can be solved.”

He said China was aware of the influence the two countries could wield if they remained together.

“We are very glad that Mrs Indira Gandhi regained power in the general elections. We sincerely hope that during her tenure in office she will peacefully solve the problems between India and China.”

He said Foreign Minister Huang Hua met Mrs Gandhi at Salisbury and again Prime Minister Hua Guofeng met her at Belgrade. “This shows there is no big obstacle in the way of our developing friendly relations.”

“The only obstacle is the border problem. So long as both sides have sincerity and a spirit of making concessions, this problem can also be solved through negotiations.”

In reply to a question on Afghanistan, Mr Wang said that “we were all apprehensive” about Mrs Gandhi’s initial stand on the Soviet intervention. “But very soon Mrs Gandhi changed her tone in speaking about this problem.

“As a major non-aligned country, India should not speak on behalf of the Soviet Union. We are very glad that the attitude and position taken by Mrs Gandhi in the recent times is different from those in earlier days.”

Asked why China was not accepting Kashmir’s accession to India, Mr Wang said “Well Kashmir is a question between India and Pakistan.” India and Pakistan should resolve this through peaceful negotiations. “We will not interfere in this question. We always adopt a policy of non-interference” towards bilateral disputes between nations.

When it was pointed out to Mr Wang that the question of Kashmir was being brought up every time a Pakistan leader or delegation visited China, he replied that when leaders of one country visited another, it was but natural that they should exchange views on various topics.

“Our leaders have never stated publicly that Kashmir belongs to this country or that.”

**490 Speech by Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Han Nianlong, at the banquet given in honour of Eric Gonsalves, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 20 June 1980 (Extracts)**

China and India, as two big nations on Asia, are shouldering the important responsibility of safeguarding Asian and world peace. For China and India to coexist in peace and friendship is not only a long-cherished aspiration of the two peoples, but also a sincere desire of all peace-loving peoples in the world.

Both China and India hope for a peaceful international environment in which to build up themselves and they need especially to maintain good relations with their neighbours. Together we initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for handling state relations in the world, and it is certain that we can make contributions in translating these principles into reality.”

**491 Eric Gonsalves’ speech at the banquet, 20 June 1980 (summary)**

Mr. Gonsalves said in reply that they had come to China in an effort as far as possible to remove the abnormal state of affairs between India and China and develop their relations. India and China, he added, “have every reason to cooperate as much as possible.”

Referring to the current international situation, Mr. Gonsalves noted that India also was keenly aware that the situation in the world was becoming more and more tense because certain events happened around India. “Our area should become an area of peace, stability, cooperation and friendship,” he stressed.

He added that big powers outside this area should not come to aggravate the tension there and that India did not want to see foreign troops stationed in any country of this area.

**492 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's interview with Krishan Kumar, editor of New Delhi's defence journal *Vikrant*, 21 June 1980 (Extracts)**

"We noticed that the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, expressed on several occasions recently her willingness to improve and develop relations with China. Improving and developing China-India relations is a common desire of our two peoples."

Chinese leaders have the same "serious positive and active" attitude towards improving bilateral relations as Mrs. Gandhi. . . .

"I think you can pass this message to Mrs. Gandhi". . . .

There have been points of difference between the two countries in the past but these were now narrowing.

"There will be differences even in a family but this should not hinder improvement of our relations. Anyway there will be no obstacle from the Chinese side," Mr Deng said.

He said after a lapse of time both countries came to realise that "both of us are in Asia and both of us are the most populous countries in the world. There is no reason why we should not develop friendship, realizing the responsibility we have in international affairs."

He said he did not think there were any serious differences between the two countries. There was some "divergence" on the border problem.

"If we take an attitude of understanding and accommodation this can be easily solved."

He suggested that the border problem be solved on the basis of the present line of actual control. If the two sides could not agree on this, the issue could be put aside so that it might not hinder improvement of relations.

Though India and China were poor "but we are big countries. We realize the weight we exert in international affairs". So cooperation and also coordination of action between the two was bound to influence the course of world



affairs.

He said the two countries had many common aspirations and desires. The two had “very good relations” for years after the People’s Republic of China was founded.

“Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai often exchanged visits. Mr Zhou was very warmly received in India.”

“Unfortunately there was one episode in history. That was a small-scale war between us, an incident which should not have happened.”

“Khrushchev (Soviet Prime Minister) instigated this relations between us in 1959”, Mr Deng said.

Mr Deng welcomed recent exchange of views between leaders of the two countries. “Mutual understanding between us is very important.”

“Our Foreign Minister, Mr Haung Hua, will soon visit India. He will extend invitation to Mrs Gandhi to visit China and our leaders can also visit India”.

Asked why China was not recognizing Kashmir as a part of India, he said: “I am sorry I do not have time to explain our position on this question. We think this is a question only between India and Pakistan. This should not come in the way of our relations.”

About the merger of Sikkim in India, he said “we are opposed to the elimination of one sovereign State by another country. But we are not in a position to raise this question now.”

“I think the border problem between India and China can be solved in a package deal.”

In the eastern sector, China can recognise “the so-called McMahon line” which was left over by history.

“While we can recognise the present line of actual control in the eastern sector, India should recognise the status quo in the western sector.”

If the two sides could not accord on this problem, “then we can put it aside.”

This problem should not hinder development of relations between our two nations.”

There were no serious differences between the two countries on any international issues.

He said he was aware that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

was keen to solve all disputes with China.

On the Kashmir issue Mr Deng said: "This is a problem between India and Pakistan and should be settled amicably."

**493 Xinhua report on Vice Premier Ji Pengfei's meeting with Eric Gonsalves, Secretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 23 June 1980**

The visiting Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Mr. Eric Gonsalves and his party met with Vice-Premier Ji Pengfei here this evening.

Vice-Premier Ji told the Indian guests that constant contacts between China and India were conducive to mutual understanding and the development of relations.

With an aggregate population of 1,600 million, he said, China and India would play an important role in contributing to stability in Asia and world peace if they enjoyed friendly relations. He believed that the two countries could reach understanding on questions involving their relations provided they took the overall situation into consideration, he said.

Mr. Gonsalves noted that he had exchanged views with the Chinese side in all friends of bilateral relations. He said: "We have opened our minds to each other and this is beneficial to the deepening of our understanding and the development of relations between our two countries."

**494 Commentary by Xinhua Correspondent Zhou Cipu on Sino-Indian relations, 24 June 1980**

When they met last month in Belgrade, both Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng and Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi expressed the desire to improve bilateral relations. This was followed by a visit to China by Indian Foreign Ministry Secretary Eric Gonsalves on June 20 for negotiations with Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Han Nianlong on many aspects of relations between the two countries, including strengthening exchange and cooperation in the fields of science and technology, culture and trade. During their talks both sides held that the negotiations were conducive to understanding and improving relations between the two countries.

During his visit, Mr. Gonsalves delivered a letter from Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, inviting him to pay an official visit to India, and the invitation was accepted. The fact that China and India maintain direct contacts and dialogue, observers here believe, shows that both governments are willing to restore good state-to-state relations as soon as possible and are now moving toward this goal.

The improvement and development of relations between the two countries conforms with the fundamental interests of the both peoples and are their common aspiration. China and India are both big Asian countries with undeveloped economies. It has become pressing issue for both countries to build up their economies so as to end the backwardness of their countries as soon as possible and to raise the living standards of their peoples. To reach this end, both countries need to develop neighbourly relations and strive for a peaceful international environment.

Improved and extended Sino-Indian relations also conform to the needs of the current world situation and are sincerely desired by all peace-loving people and countries in the world, particularly in Asia. Currently more and more unrest and turbulence have developed in the world due to the aggression and expansion by the hegemonists. Recent tense events in Asia have clearly revealed that Asia has become a hot spot of aggression and expansion by the hegemonists. Located in Asia, China and India are duty-bound to play a role in maintaining stability and peace in the world, especially in Asia. The development of Sino-Indian relations in such a serious situation will undoubtedly exercise positive influences in the world affairs, Asian affairs in particular. Such positive influences should by no means be neglected. There is no reason for China and India not to develop their relations.

Is it possible for China and India to restore and develop their good relations? The answer is yes, of course. There are no conflicts of fundamental interest between the two countries. The key problem in the Sino-Indian relations is the boundary question, this is a historical problem left over by the colonialists at the time when neither peoples had the right to decide their own destiny. In order to solve such questions

that are legacies of history, mutual understanding and concessions are called for. Speaking to an Indian journalist a few days ago, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping said : "So long as both sides are sincere, respect the present state of the border, and are tolerant towards each other, the Sino-Indian boundary question can be solved through peaceful negotiations " As a matter of fact, ever since negotiations on the boundary question began, China has never asked for the return of all the territory illegally incorporated into India by the old colonialists. Instead, China suggested that both countries should make concessions, China, in the east sector and India in the west sector, on the basis of the actually controlled border-line, so as to solve the Sino-Indian boundary question in a package plan, thus fully demonstrating the spirit of mutual understanding and concession.

In the early period after the founding of the People's Republic, China and India enjoyed very good relations. The late Premier Zhou Enlai and the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru exchanged visits on a number of occasions and contacts between the people of the two countries were frequent. China and India jointly laid down the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, in handling relations between different countries. In fact, although the boundary question was not even solved then, China and India were still able to establish friendly and harmonious relations in the spirit of the above Five Principles.

Observers hold that the boundary question can be settled in conformity with the interests of the people of the two countries, as long as both sides practise the spirit of the Five Principles. Until the boundary question is settled, both sides can maintain the *status quo* along the border while simultaneously developing friendly cooperation in all fields. This has been done before and there is no reason for two countries not to do so again today when there is so much global unrest. However, the development of friendly cooperation and an atmosphere of harmony and friendship are indispensable for solving the boundary question.

Negotiations are necessary, but even more important are actual deeds. It is expected that the two countries will assuredly

take new and firm strides along the road to improve their relations and develop friendly cooperation.

**495 Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong's interview with Sun,  
24 June 1980**

For many years we have repeated that we should improve Sino-Indian relations. We have no reason not to do so. We think all the questions and disputes have to be solved through consultations. There is nothing that cannot be solved. Both sides should have the same sincerity. Indian leaders have repeated India would like to improve relations with China. Recently, Chairman Hua Guofeng met with Mrs Gandhi in Belgrade. They talked of Sino-Indian relations.

But I should also tell some leaders of the Indian government not to speak unfriendly words which are not conducive to improving Sino-Indian relations. This is not right to do. We raised this with the Indian government. We think one's words should be in conformity with one's deeds.

**496 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs for the  
year 1979-80, June 1980 (Extracts)**

Both India and China have expressed desire to improve relations between the two countries on the basis of the Five Principles. To a considerable extent the substantive tasks of translating mutual desire into concrete realities for the mutual benefit of both countries still remain to be undertaken. . . .

The year was marked by functional exchanges between India and China in a number of fields with a view to develop cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit, reciprocity and equality.

China participated on a fairly big scale in the Indian International Trade Fair held in New Delhi in November-December 1979. At the same time, a Chinese Trade delegation led by the President of the Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade, visited India for two-weeks as guests of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The visit is expected to give a further stimulus to trade between India and China which continued to increase in volume. The main item of India's export to China consisted of 30,000 bales of cotton

while India imported a sizeable quantity of antibiotics from China.

A five-member Chinese Press delegation visited India in October. This, as well as the Trade delegation, were in response to an Indian invitation and were in reciprocation of the visits to China in 1978 of their Indian counterparts. The Chinese delegation particularly emphasised scope for cooperation in the fields of family planning and agriculture between the two countries. Later a Chinese Agriculture delegation, invited by International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) toured India as a guest of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research.

A number of leading Indian journalists visited China during the year. They were told by the Chinese officials of China's continued desire to develop friendly relations with India. Hope was expressed that differences about certain recent developments in the international scene would not affect the evolving India-China relations.

Several Indian experts in various fields visited China during the year under the auspices of concerned United Nations agencies. Many Chinese delegations also came to attend international conferences in India.

While India welcomed the progressive development of functional exchanges, the Government of India, through diplomatic channels, reiterated its view that the full normalisation of relations required a satisfactory solution of the border problem. The Chinese Government, on its part, stressed its desire to improve relations with India on the basis of the Five Principles.

On the occasion of the constitution of the new Government, Premier Hua Guofeng and Foreign Minister Huang Hua sent congratulatory messages to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Minister of External Affairs, Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, respectively. The message from the Chinese Premier expressed happiness that relations between China and India had improved and developed over the last few years and hoped that this trend would continue to develop in the interest of peace and stability in Asia. In reply, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi hoped for cooperation between India and China on the basis of the Five Principles. . . .

The Prime Minister met the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr.

Huang Hua, in Salisbury and the Chinese Premier, Mr. Hua Guo Feng in Belgrade. The Chinese Foreign Minister is due to visit India later this year. Preliminary discussions were held in mid-June when Shri Gonsalves, Secretary (East), visited Beijing. India has made it clear that the quest for normalised relations with China is not at the cost of our friendship with any other country.

**497 Statement by Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha on China's initiative, 2 July 1980**

Vice-premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China met an Indian journalist on June 21, 1980, according to the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, on the settlement of the border problem. Following is an extract of his statement:

“So long as both sides are sincere, respect the present state of the border, and are tolerant towards each other, the Sino-Indian boundary question can be solved through peaceful negotiations. As a matter of fact, ever since negotiations on boundary question began, China has never asked for the return of all the territory illegally incorporated into India by the old colonialists. Instead, China suggested that both countries should make concessions, China in the east sector and India in the west sector, on the basis of the actually controlled border line so as to solve the Sino-Indian boundary question in a package plan, thus fully demonstrating the spirit of mutual understanding and concessions.”

Similar suggestions have been made to us on earlier occasions by the Chinese government. This time it is somewhat more precise. The government of India has never accepted the premise on which it is based, namely, that the Chinese side are making a concession in the eastern sector by the giving up of territory which they allege is illegally incorporated into India. Nevertheless we welcome the prospect of the eastern sector being settled without any particular difficulty.

As the House is aware, the India-China boundary question is long-standing and complex. After a considerable lapse of time, our two governments have only just begun to come to grips with it once more. This itself is a positive step. It may be that ways other than the package solution suggested by the

Chinese government could prove more effective. In any event, I am sure the House will agree that we should proceed forward meaningfully while also keeping our best interests in mind.

It is our hope that we can settle the border question in the spirit of five principles of peaceful co-existence consistent with the national honour and interest on both sides and on a basis of equality.

In the course of the same interview vice-premier Deng Xiaoping had also indicated a strong desire for the improvement and extension of relation between India and China as this would undoubtedly exercise positive influence in world affairs and Asian affairs in particular. We fully reciprocate these sentiments.

**498 Statement of the Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on India's Recognition of Heng Samrin Regime of Kampuchea, 9 July 1980**

The fact that India as a major non-aligned country should choose to recognize a puppet regime fostered by Viet Nam by force of arms cannot but play the objective role of conniving at the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and thus harm India's own image.

This move of the Indian Government is especially regrettable when the ASEAN nations and all other peace-loving countries are demanding the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and denouncing its invasion of Thailand.

**499 *People's Daily* commentary on India's decision to recognize Heng Samrin regime, 9 July 1980**

It is stupid for the Indian Government to announce its recognition of the Vietnamese-installed, world-renounced puppet Heng Samrin in Kampuchea when Viet Nam has further revealed its ambitions for aggression and expansion by military incursion into Thailand.

The Heng Samrin regime, the common enemy of the Kampuchean people, is a tool of Hanoi for aggression in Kampuchea, for rigging up an "Indochina federation" and expansion in Southeast Asia. The recognition of such a regime created by the Vietnamese aggressors means an acknowledgement of the *fait*



*accompli* of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and a support to Vietnamese aggression and expansion.

As a big nation in South Asia and the whole Asia, a member of the non-aligned movement and an initiator of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, India should draw an appropriate lesson from the Kampuchea crisis at a time when the Soviet expansionists have come to its doorsteps after the invasion of Afghanistan. India should oppose all kinds of interference in other nations' internal affairs and encroachment upon other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and defend the established principles governing international relations, thereby supporting the struggle of the government of Democratic Kampuchea against Vietnamese aggression and expansion. But on the contrary, the Indian government supports the Vietnamese authorities by recognizing the Heng Samrin regime and is willing to join the ranks of a puppet regime. Such perverse action is indeed inglorious.

The Indian Government's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime is obviously linked with the Soviet promise to give India 1,600 million US dollars worth of military hardware. It repays the Soviet Union and serves the Hanoi authorities with the above-mentioned recognition. In so doing, India has forsaken its nonaligned stand and sided with the aggressors.

However, the development of the Kampuchean situation is decided by the struggle of the government and people of democratic Kampuchea against the Vietnamese aggressors and not by the Indian government's recognition or non-recognition of the puppet Heng Samrin regime.

Soviet weapons and the Heng Samrin puppets have not brought the victories expected by the Vietnamese authorities. How could the Indian government's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime help extricate Vietnam from its predicament in Kampuchea ?

#### **500 Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao's answer to a question on Tibet in Lok Sabha, 17 July 1980**

It has been the consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet was an integral part of China. The Government of India has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of

any other country.

**501 Statement by Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha, 17 July 1980 (Extract)**

India believes the supply of US and Chinese arms to Pakistan and the new arrangements for the supply of military hardware by the former would have its inevitable impact on the security environment of Asia and India in particular.

All such developments were kept under constant review by the government with a view to taking such steps as might be necessary to safeguard India's security interests

The government had already conveyed its concern to the US at the highest level on its intentions to supply arms to Pakistan.

Similarly, China had also been apprised of India's apprehensions. But the Chinese reply was that their assistance to Pakistan was not directed against India. They had further expressed the hope that Indo-Pakistan and Sino-Indian relations would improve.

**502 Statement by Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha, 31 July 1980**

According to Press reports, the concerned Indian journalist has issued a clarification to the effect that his interview with Mr Wang Bingnan, president of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, took place on June 19, 1980, two days before his interview with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping at which Mr Wang was also present.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the later and more authoritative interview with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping has already been the subject of a calling attention notice in Lok Sabha on 2-7-80. According to the report of that interview carried by the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, it was said, "Ever since negotiations on the boundary question began, China has never asked for the return of all the territory illegally incorporated into India by the old colonialists." This by necessary implication, reiterates the well-known Chinese view about the legal status of the McMahon Line. Therefore, there is no essential difference in this regard between the two interviews. While dealing with this aspect,

I had, in my statement of 2-7-80, clearly stated that the Government of India has never accepted this premise.

Sir, I would like to submit to the House that my statement in response to the earlier calling attention notice thus covers both the interviews. Therefore, I have nothing more to add to that statement substantively, except to say that the Government, who keep abreast of all important research on the subject, are fully convinced that the alignment shown in our maps conforms to the true international border.

Sir, the Government with the support of the Parliament is engaged in the task of seeking to improve our relations with China. While assuring the House once again that I would always be prepared to take the Parliament into confidence on any matter relating to this process, I would respectfully submit that a delicate question like the boundary question does not lend itself to examination, and much less to solution, through repeated recourse to the medium of newspaper interviews.

May I, in conclusion, note that even the interview of Mr Wang Bingnan read as a whole does indicate Chinese desire to have friendly relations with India and this sentiment we fully reciprocate.

### **503 Statement by the spokesman of India's Ministry of External Affairs on the postponement of Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to India, 6 August 1980**

It was essential to look at the reported postponement of Mr Huang's visit to India in terms of chronological perspective.

The Chinese side had suggested that alternative dates might be discussed later.

Referring to the report that the Chinese response was in some way linked with India's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea, the spokesman said "It is well-known that India and China have different views on the Kampuchean situation, as indeed on many other international issues."

"It is, however, the Government of India's view that normalisation of Sino-Indian relations does not require identity of approach on all issues."

Similarly, the Chinese, while describing India's decision on

Kampuchea as being “exceptionably regrettable,” have “during the recent discussions with our new ambassador in Beijing expressed the hope that regardless of differences, Sino-Indian relations would continue to develop.”

This view was expressed at the senior officials' level in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. It was stated by the Chinese side that though India and China might have different views on some questions, they should continue to develop bilateral relations and mutual understanding.

The former External Affairs Minister, Mr. A B Vajpayee had visited China in February last year at the invitation of the Chinese Government. Mr. Vajpayee extended invitation to the Chinese counterpart to pay a return visit.

The spokesman said that since Mrs. Gandhi's assumption of office India received “repeated indications” from the Chinese side that Mr. Huang in line with the policy of normalisation would like to visit India.

In line with the Government's policy of normalizing relations with China, the invitation was renewed when Mr Eric Gonsalves, Secretary, visited Beijing last June.

The invitation was accepted and precise dates for the visit were to be fixed through diplomatic channels. India had indicated certain dates (known to be any time after September) as being convenient. The Chinese had now said that their Foreign Minister's schedule was very full for the rest of the year because of internal and external commitments.

In the light of the official explanation given by the Chinese side, the Government of India “will now await further communication from the Chinese Government for determining mutually convenient dates for the visit of their Foreign Minister.”

#### **504 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's reply to a question in Rajya Sabha, 7 August 1980 (Extract)**

It was true that in an earlier period there were people who were going across the border and getting certain training and coming back with Chinese arms.

“It is also true that some of those who were trained earlier are now settled outside India's borders and we have reasons to suspect that they do get involved in some of our border

tensions.” But the Government had no information about the supply of Chinese arms to anybody in the country.

**505 Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's statement in Rajya Sabha on postponement of Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to India, 7 August 1980 (Extracts)**

India sincerely desired normalisation of relations with China but it was in no hurry and it would rather leave the pace to china and respond accordingly.

He saw nothing abnormal in the postponement of the visit of the Chinese foreign minister, Mr. Huang Hua, to India and said that China would suggest suitable dates for his visit later. . . .

No date or month had been fixed for the Chinese foreign minister's visit and if he found it difficult to come to India in October or November because of internal or external commitments as he had stated, “we do not have to interpret it.”

He said that such postponements were quite normal and, for example, he himself had to postpone his visit to Lagos because the dates were not found convenient to the two parties.

Mr. Rao said there were many differences between India and China but since there were signals of their desire for normalisation of relations, India also responded. India had already stated that normalisation would mean removal of the factors that created an abnormal situation during the last 18 years.

**506 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's message to Zhao Ziyang on his assuming the Office of Prime Minister of China, 14 September 1980**

Your excellency on behalf of the people and government of India, I would like to convey our felicitations on the occasion of your assuming the high office of premier of state council of Peoples Republic of China. I wish all success to your government on its efforts to bring even greater economic progress and prosperity to the Chinese people.

Both our governments are committed to further improve bilateral relations. This is in the interest of our two peoples.

It is also important for peace and stability in Asian region and the world.

I am confident that even greater efforts will be made by our two countries to further this objective.

**507 Interview of Tan Zhen Lin, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC to the United News of India (UNI), 18 October 1980 (Extracts)**

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has taken a resolute step to improve relations and the Chinese leadership welcomes this. . . . (he) recalled the friendly relations between India and China during the days of Jawaharlal Nehru and said that relations had become sour for sometime. . . .

He called for more frequent contacts between Indians and Chinese in various fields, exchange of visits by professionals alone was not enough. . . .

Because of the "terrible disorder it (Cultural Revolution) caused" Chinese economy is in many respects far more underdeveloped than India's.

Consequently, the Chinese are interested in learning from whatever India has to offer towards our economic development.

**508 Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong's interview with Press Trust of India, 14 November 1980 (Extracts)**

Sino-Indian border question can be resolved through negotiations based on respect for each other. . . . "We must be friendly to each other and not unfriendly to each other. Prospects of our relations, I think, are very optimistic about it. But I must add that it depends on the common efforts from both sides. We should all work hard to promote this friendship." During the past two or three years there had been many developments in bilateral relations. Apart from exchanges in trade, economic and cultural fields, this visit of correspondents demonstrated that "our relations have been improving." "I think there is bright prospect in trade and economic relations between our two countries". . . .

*Question:* Charges have been made that some of the secessionists in the north eastern of India are trained and armed by China.

*Answer:* I do not think it is based on facts. I think your government knows better in this respect.

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# Appendices



## Appendix 1

**Exchange of Visits between China and India, 1949-1980**

[Note: C stands for Cultural, E for Economic,  
M for Military, and P for Political]

- 1 India recognizes People's Republic of China 30 Dec 1949 P
- 2 Indian ambassador presents credentials in Peking 20 May 1950 P
- 3 Chinese ambassador presents credentials in New Delhi 20 Sep 1950 P
- 4 A 15-member cultural delegation led by Vice Minister for Cultural Affairs Ting Hsi-lin in India Oct-Nov 1951 C
- 5 Official cultural delegation led by Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit in China Mar 1952 C
- 6 Indian delegation led by Ambassador N.Raghvan in China to negotiate on matters concerning Tibet Dec 1953-Jan 1954 P
- 7 Technical delegation led by Kanwar Sain in China to study flood control measures May 1954 E
- 8 Trade union delegation in China 5-8 May 1954 P
- 9 Chou En-lai in India 25-28 Jun 1954 P
- 10 India-China Friendship Association delegation led by Mrs. Uma Nehru in China Sep 1954 P
- 11 Trade delegation in India Oct 1954 E
- 12 Women's delegation led by Ammu Swaminathan in China to attend China's National Day celebrations Oct 1954 C
- 13 Trade union goodwill mission led by K.P. Tripathi in China Oct 1954 C
- 14 Prime Minister Nehru in China 19-30 Oct 1954 P
- 15 67-member cultural delegation by Vice Minister of Culture Cheng Chen-to in India 4 Dec 1954-20 Jan 1955 C
- 16 Madam Soong Ching-ling, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in India 16 Dec 1954-2 Jan 1955 P
- 17 Delegation led by Kuo Mo-jo in India to attend Asian countries conference Apr 1955 P
- 18 Nehru and Chou En-lai meet at Bandung Apr 1955 P
- 19 Indian linguist Prof. Raghu Vira, Member of Parliament, in China Apr-May 1955 C

- |    |   |                  |
|----|---|------------------|
| 20 | Trade union delegation in China at the invitation of All-China Federation of Trade Unions   | Apr-May 1955 C   |
| 21 | V.K. Krishna Menon in China to discuss the situation in the Far East and the Formosa question with Chou En-lai                                    | 11-21 May 1955 P |
| 22 | A 5-member medical delegation in China  | Jun 1955 C       |
| 23 | Cultural delegation led by Deputy Minister of External Affairs A.K. Chanda in China   | Jun 1955 P       |
| 24 | Indian engineer Dr. B.N. Dey in China at the invitation of China Federation of Scientific Societies   | Jun 1955 E       |
| 25 | Achaecologist N.P. Chakravarti and his wife D.K. Deb Barman of Vishvabharati University in China at the invitation of Chinese Ministry of Culture | Aug 1955 C       |
| 26 | Member of Parliament R K. Velayudhan in China as guest of Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs   | Aug 1955 P       |
| 27 | Lawyers' delegation in China  | Sep 1955 C       |
| 28 | National volleyball team led by F. C. Arora in China at the invitation of All-China Athletic Federation   | Sep 1955 C       |
| 29 | A 33-member delegation of professors and students led by C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyer in China  | Sep-Oct 1955 C   |
| 30 | Film delegation led by Prithvi Raj Kapoor in China  | Sep-Oct 1955 C   |
| 31 | Health Minister Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur in China  | Oct 1955 C       |
| 32 | A 5-member delegation in India at the invitation of Indian Health Ministry  | Nov 1955 C       |
| 33 | Madame Soong Ching-ling, Vice Chairman of NPC Standing Committee, in India  | Dec 1955 P       |
| 34 | Women's delegation in India   | Jan 1956 C       |
| 35 | 3-member Planning Commission delegation led by Pitamber Pant in China to study Chinese economy  | Jun-Jul 1956 E   |
| 36 | A 6-member agricultural delegation led by Deputy Minister M. Krishanappa in China to study Chinese agricultural planning and techniques           | Jul 1956 E       |
| 37 | A 7-member Planning Commission delegation led by K.K. Patil in China to study   |                  |

Chinese agrarian cooperatives	Jul-Aug 1956	<b>E</b>
38 Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker M.A. Ayyangar in China	Sep-Oct 1956	<b>P</b>
39 Vice President S. Radhakrishnan in China	Oct 1956	<b>P</b>
40 Defence services delegation led by General J.N. Chaudhri in China	Nov 1956	<b>M</b>
41 Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in India to attend 2500th Buddhajayanti celebrations	Nov-Dec 1956	<b>P</b>
42 Chou En-lai in India	28 Nov-10 Dec 1956	<b>P</b>
43 Chou En-lai in India	30 Dec- 3 Jan 1957	<b>P</b>
44 Chou En-lai in India	24-26 Jan 1957	<b>P</b>
45 Vice President S. Radhakrishnan in China	Sep 1957	<b>P</b>
46 Professor Mahalanobis in China	1957-58	<b>C</b>
47 Women's delegation in China	1957-58	<b>C</b>
48 Teachers and writers delegation in China	1957-58	<b>C</b>
49 Dance troupe of Uday Shanker in China	1957-58	<b>C</b>
50 Salt study mission in India	1957-58	<b>E</b>
51 Hydroelectric and water conservancy delegation in India	1957-58	<b>E</b>
52 Military delegation in India	1957-58	<b>M</b>
53 M.A. Ayyangar, Speaker of Lok Sabha, in China	Nov 1958	<b>P</b>
54 Minister for Cooperation Punjab Rao Deshmukh and Bombay Minister for Agriculture V.P. Naik in China to study measures employed in China for improvement of agriculture	1958-59	<b>E</b>
55 Jagdish Shankar attends the opening ceremony of China's first atomic reactor	1958-59	<b>E</b>
56 Water conservancy and irrigation delegation led by M. Prasad in China	Jan-Feb 1959	<b>E</b>
57 Three Chinese artists in India	Jan-Feb 1956	<b>C</b>
58 Vice Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu in India	18-28 Feb 1959	<b>P</b>
59 N.S. Raghupati, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, in China to study China's experience in small blast furnaces and machine building plants	Mar 1959	<b>E</b>
60 Chinese agricultural exhibition in India	Feb 1960	<b>E</b>
61 Chou En-lai in India for border talks	19-25 Apr 1960	<b>P</b>
62 Border delegation in China	15 Jun-25 Jul 1960	<b>P</b>

- 63 Border delegation in India 19 Aug-5 Oct 1960 P
- 64 The third and final series of talks between Indian and Chinese border officials held in Rangoon Nov 1960 P
- 65 R.K. Nehru, Secretary General in the Ministry of External Affairs, in China on his way back from Mongolia Jul 1961 P
- 66 Ambassador G. Parthasarathi recalled from China 21 Jul 1961 P
- 67 Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon confers with Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Geneva 23 Jul 1962 P
- 68 Indian table tennis team in China on invitation to participate in the Afro-Asian Table Tennis Tournament (This was first official Indian delegation to visit China in nearly ten years) Oct-Nov 1971 C
- 69 President of Indian Table Tennis Federation, Ranga Ramanujan, in China for Asian Table Tennis Championships Aug-Sep 1972 C
- 70 Indian businessmen visit Canton Trade Fair Oct-Nov 1972 E
- 71 Dr. Bijay Kumar Basu, President of Dr. D.S. Kotnis Memorial Committee, in China at the invitation of Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, to study Chinese medical system, including acupuncture Apr-Jul 1973 C
- 72 A delgation of Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee led by its Secretary-General Daniel Latifi in China May-Jun 1974 C
- 73 Table tennis team led by Vice Minister for Physical Culture and Sports Commission, Chao Cheng-hung, in India to participate in the 33rd World Table Tennis Championship Jan-Feb 1975 C
- 74 Chinese Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien stops over in Calcutta on his way back from Nepal 22 Feb 1975 P
- 75 A 9-member delegation of the All India Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee in China to attend inauguration of Dr. Kotnis Memorial Hall Dec 1976-Jan 1977 C
- 76 Indian trade delegation visits Canton Fair May 1977 E
- 77 Shipping services resumed after over 15 years Jul 1977 E
- 78 Barun Kumar Sengupta, correspondent

- of *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, in China Jul 1977 C
- 79 Indian trade delegation visits Canton Fair Oct 1977 E
- 80 Chinese medical delegation in India to participate in the International Congress of Paediatrics Oct-Nov 1977 C
- 81 Chinese badminton team in India to participate in 4th Asian Badminton Confederation Championship 26 Oct-7 Nov 1977 C
- 82 A delegation of the Chinese National Mining Commission led by Wang Hsun in India to attend the World Mining Congress 7-30 Nov 1977 E
- 83 Vice Chancellor of Mysore University D.V. Urs and R.P. Misra in China Dec 1977 C
- 84 12-member trade delegation led by Liu Shing in India 8-22 Feb 1978 E
- 85 12-member goodwill delegation led by Wang Pin-nan, President of Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, in India 7-11 Mar 1978 P
- 86 Narsimhan Ram, Associate Editor of *The Hindu*, in China May 1978 C
- 87 A delegation of the Association of Indian Engineering Industry in China to attend Guangzhou Fair May 1978 E
- 88 5-member journalist delegation in China May-Jun 1978 C
- 89 A 9-member Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) delegation led by its Chairman, P.V. Gandhi, in China 7-17 Aug 1978 E
- 90 Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Liu Hsi-wen in India to attend the Conference of Foreign Trade Ministers of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Aug 1978 E
- 91 Subramanian Swamy, Member of Parliament, in China Aug-Sep 1978 P
- 92 All-India Dr. D.S. Kotnis Memorial Committee delegation led by Bijay Kumar Basu in China Aug-Oct 1978 C
- 93 Agriculture study team led by Li Chi-chen in India Sep 1978 E
- 94 Foreign Minister Vajpayee meets Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the UN 27 Sep 1978 P

- 95 A six-member delegation of small- and medium-scale industrialists led by Murli S. Deora, former Mayor of Bombay and Chairman of the Maharashtra State Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation in China Oct-Nov 1978 E
- 96 CPI (M) delegation led by P. Ramamurti in China 21 Oct-8 Nov 1978 P
- 97 A 40-member Indian dance ensemble led by Mrs. Mrinalini Sarabhai in China Oct-Nov 1978 C
- 98 A 4-member mining delegation led by S. Bagchi, Chairman of the Indian National Committee to the World Mining Congress and Director of the Central Mining Research Station, in China 27 Nov-9 Dec 1978 E
- 99 A joint MMTC/SAIL delegation in China Dec 1978 E
- 100 A 3-member delegation of the STC subsidiary, Chemicals Corporation, in China 10-24 Dec 1978 E
- 101 Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in China 12-18 Feb 1979 P
- 102 A 6-member delegation of the Association of Indian Engineering Industry (AIEI) in China after attending Canton Spring Fair May 1979 E
- 103 Dr. Bijay Kumar Basu in China Jun 1979 C
- 104 Three Indian journalists (N. Ram, Assistant Editor of *The Hindu*, Aneek Sarkar, Chief Editor of *Anand Bazar*, and Barun Sengupta, correspondent of *Anand Bazar*) in China Jul 1979 C
- 105 A delegation of the All-India Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee led by Jyotirmoy Bosu in China Sep-Oct 1979 C
- 106 Xinhua News Agency delegation in India Oct 1979 C
- 107 A 5-member journalist delegation in India Oct 1979 C
- 108 A 5-member women's delegation led by Mrs Huang Ying, Vice-President of the All-China Women's Federation, in India to participate in a ESCAP conference Nov 1980 C
- 109 Chinese pavilion at International Trade Fair in New Delhi Nov-Dec 1979 E
- 110 6-member trade delegation led by President of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Wang Yaoting, in India Nov-Dec 1979 E



- 111 Chinese agricultural delegation in India      Jan 1980 **E**
- 112 Janata MP Subramanian Swamy in China 7-11 Apr 1980 **P**
- 113 Table tennis delegation led by Li Furong  
in India      May 1980 **C**
- 114 Trade delegation in India      Jun 1980 **E**
- 115 A delegation of India-China Chamber  
of Commerce and Industry (ICCCI) led  
by Santosh Chatterjee in China to parti-  
cipate in Canton Fair      9-18 Jun 1980 **E**
- 116 Secretary (East) Eric Gonsalves of the  
Ministry of External Affairs in China      20-24 Jun 1980 **P**
- 117 Krishan Kumar, Chief Editor of the  
defence journal *Vikrant*, in China      Jun 1980 **C**
- 118 A 7-member delegation of the Orissa  
branch of the Sino-Indian Friendship  
Association in China      Jun 1980 **P**
- 119 A 5-member delegation of the Tamil  
Nadu branch of the Sino-Indian Friend-  
ship Association in China      Aug 1980 **P**
- 120 Secretary of the Department of Science  
and Technology, M.G.K. Menon, in  
China      25-29 Aug 1980 **E**
- 121 Indian dancer Sonal Mansingh in China      Sep 1980 **C**
- 122 A 4-member All-India delegation led by  
General Manager (Sales) S.V.N. Ranga  
Rao in China      11-14 Oct 1980 **E**
- 123 G.G. Mirchandani, General Manager of  
United News of India (UNI), in China      13-21 Oct 1980 **C**

*Appendix 2***Agreements Signed between China and India, 1951-1980**

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| 1 Agreement concerning Indian supply of 37,000 bales of jute in exchange for 50,000 tons of rice from China                    | 3 Jan 1951  |
| 2 China's offer for one million ton of food-grains to relieve India's food crisis  | Mar 1951    |
| 3 Contract on supply of grain by China to India  | 23 May 1951 |
| 4 Agreement for the supply of 100,000 metric tons of rice by China to India  | 26 May 1952 |
| 5 Contract on sale of 50,000 tons of Chinese rice to India   | 13 Oct 1952 |
| 6 China-India agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet and India   | 29 Apr 1954 |
| 7 Indian government waives payment by China for Indian communication lines in Tibet  | 30 Apr 1954 |
| 8 First trade agreement for two-year period (1954-56)  | 14 Oct 1954 |
| 9 Agreement about Indian export of 90 million pounds of tobacco to China and import of 90 tons of raw silk from China annually | 19 Oct 1954 |
| 10 Telephotographic service formally opened between Shanghai and Bombay  | 19 Oct 1954 |
| 11 Agreement on the exchange of students   | 1 Nov 1954  |
| 12 Contract for the import of 90 tons of raw silk from China   | 15 Dec 1954 |
| 31 Direct Delhi-Peking communication service inaugurated   | 3 Jan 1955  |
| 14 Protocol on handing over communication services and selling twelve resthouses in Tibet to China for Rs. 316,828             | 1 Apr 1955  |
| 15 Chinese Red Cross donates Rs. 95,785 (50,000 yuan) for relief of flood-affected people in India                             | 7 Nov 1945  |
| 16 Renewal of trade agreement of 1954  | 25 May 1957 |
| 17 Exchange of notes on return of released estate in Yatung  | 7 Jun 1957  |
| 18 China gifts relics of Hiuen-Tsang along-with a gift of approximately Rs. 575,000 for construction of a memorial hall in     |             |

- |   |             |
|---|-------------|
| Nalanda where the relics would be enshrined and which would promote Sino-Indian studies   | Mar 1958    |
| 19 Agreement for exchange of Indian shellac worth Rs. 15 mn (about £ 1 mn) for Chinese antimony, zinc, and mercury  | 19 May 1977 |
| 20 Contract for the export by India of \$7 million worth of iron ore, chrome ore, and pig iron to China   | Dec 1978    |
| 21 Contract for the purchase of 75,000 bales of cotton worth Rs. 110 million from India   | Apr 1980    |
| 22 Tentative agreement between Birla group of industries and China National Technical Import Corporation on setting up a rayon project worth Rs. 1 billion in China                 | Jun 1980    |
| 23 Another agreement for purchase of 20,000 tons of barytes worth Rs. 7 million (\$800,000) from China signed with China National Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corporation | Jun 1980    |
| 24 Inter-line traffic agreement between Air India and Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)   | Oct 1980    |
| 25 Agreement on exchange of news between UNI and NCNA   | Oct 1980    |

*Appendix 3*

**China's Trade with India, 1947 to 1978-79**  
(in million rupees)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports to India</i>	<i>Imports from India</i>
1947	24.2	109.7
1948	12.1	55.8
1949	5.1	23.4
1950	6.7	34.6
1951	158.9	67.7
1952	131.8	4.1
1953	9.9	8.0
1954	20.3	29.6
1955	43.8	65.4
1956	83.3	38.1
1957	48.6	36.9
1958	52.8	34.2
1959	48.6	78.1
1960	25.7	52.6
1961	15.1	1.9
1962	9.9	1.4
1963	0.6	0.0
1964	0.3	0.0
1965 to 1976	n.a.	n.a.
1977-78	9.5	19.3
1978-79	11.7	264.3

Source: United Nations, *International Yearbook of Trade Statistics*, 1950, 91; 1952, 163; 1955, 267; 1958, 284; 1963, 329; 1968, 370; *Times of India* (New Delhi), 26 July 1980.

# Index



- Acheson, Dean, 12  
 Afghanistan, 91, 166, 197, 322, 352, 530, 532-3, 551  
     Soviet intervention in, 531-5, 540  
 Afro-Asian Conference (second), 313-4, 325, 332, 334  
 Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation, 313  
 Afro-Asian Workers' Conference, 313  
 Aichi Kiichi, 399  
 Aksai Chin, 148, 199, 206, 226, 392, 521, 540  
 Aksai Chin road, 176, 199, 203, 272  
 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 60  
 Amtogar, 101  
 Anderson, Robert, 457  
 Ari, 75, 163  
 Asian and Pacific Council, 399  
 Asian collective security system, 398-400, 417  
 Asian Conference (Mar 1947), 119  
 Asian Development Bank, 465  
 Asian Women's Conference, 16  
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 524, 550-1  
 Austin, Warren R., 10  
  
 Bajpai, Shankar, 537-8  
 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 95, 251, 316  
 Bandung Conference, 93, 96, 99, 209, 230, 263, 492  
 Bangladesh, 411, 422-3, 428-9, 432, 443, 453-5, 464  
 Barahoti, 75, 100, 108, 110-1, 148, 227, 239, 244, 247, 348  
 Basavapunniah, M., 324  
 Belgium, 261  
 Berlin, 286  
 Bhagat, B.R., 379, 381  
 Bhilai steel plant, 166, 385  
 Bhutan, 7-8, 32, 34, 84, 100, 129, 139, 143, 148-50, 152, 160, 168, 218, 351, 353, 405, 451, 453  
 Bhutto, Z.A., 291, 359, 428  
 Birla, G.D., 284  
  
 Bokaro steel plant, 386  
 Border  
     Burma-China, 103, 185  
     Bhutan-Tibet, 148-9, 178, 195  
     Kashmir-Sinkiang, 397, 400  
     Sikkim-Tibet, 149, 158, 178, 370-1, 405  
 Brezhnev, L.I., 377, 404, 417, 442  
 Britain, 10, 15, 17, 19, 30, 34, 45-6, 48, 120, 140-1, 155, 236, 284, 290, 292-3, 308, 336, 364, 377, 395, 471-2  
 Brown, Harold, 530  
 Burma, 3, 9, 13, 15, 19, 33-5, 53-4, 75, 77, 85, 91, 97, 103-4, 107-8, 148, 166, 179, 181, 183-6, 195, 219, 228, 231, 247, 254, 322, 342-3, 352, 368, 383, 392, 405, 519  
     border with China, 103, 185  
     boundary agreement with China (1 Oct 1960), 181, 183-4, 195, 228, 231, 254  
  
 Cambodia, 247, 344  
 Canada, 15, 286, 288-9, 336  
 CENTO, 312  
 Chagla, M.C., 311, 340, 361, 365  
 Chakravarti, B.N., 212  
 Chang Chenmo Valley, 168  
 Chang Chi-cheng, 5  
 Chang Chu, 8-9  
 Chang Han-fu, 64, 67, 170  
 Chang Kuo-hua, 116  
 Chang Ou, 401  
 Chang Wen-chin, 438  
 Chavan, Y.B., 465, 529  
 Che Dong, *see* Thagla Ridge  
 Chen Han-seng, 81  
 Chen Yi, 144, 170, 253, 261, 313, 333, 351, 359, 489  
 Chen Zhao Yuan, 469, 526  
 Chiang Kai-shek, 8-9, 12, 37, 55-6, 97-8, 125, 289, 314, 345-6, 355, 414, 424  
 Chiao Kuan-hua, 451  
 Chih Yi, 333  
 Chin Keh-mu, 97

## China

- and Bhutan, 7, 352-3, 451
- and Colombo Conference proposals, 251-3, 259-62, 280, 287, 296-8, 318, 324, 328
- and CPI, 10, 186-7, 295, 307, 325, 376, 378
- and disarmament, 321, 325-6
- and Farakka Barrage issue, 410, 454, 463-4
- and Kashmir, 94-5, 198, 201, 205-6, 436, 444-5, 519, 540-1, 543
- and McMahon Line, 103-4, 106, 145, 392, 539, 552, 556
- and non-alignment, 220, 233, 268, 285, 332, 344, 346, 536
- and return of Pak POWs, 436, 439, 443-4, 452
- and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 534-5, 540
- on India's PNE, 452, 454, 457
- on Indian action in Goa, 86-8, 190-1
- on Indo-Nepal relations, 452, 455-6
- on Indo-Pak relations, 436, 453, 533-4
- on Indo-Soviet relations, 84-5, 87-8, 90, 166, 347, 456-7, 540
- on Indo-Soviet treaty, 417, 453, 467
- on Indo-US relations, 49-50, 286-8, 306-8, 319-20, 346-7
- on India's domestic situation
  - economic situation, 223, 389, 445-6
  - food shortages, 333, 341-2, 353-4, 369, 441-2, 446, 461
  - on elections
    - 1957, 222-3
    - 1962, 191-2
    - 1967, 355-6, 372
    - 1977, 466-9
  - on emergency (1975), 458-61, 466, 468, 529
  - on factional struggle in Congress Party, 401-3

- on Nehru's socialism, 273-5
- political unrest (1979), 528-9
- Sikkim as Indian state, 437-8, 446-53, 458, 464, 543
- proposal for world summit conference on disarmament, 321

## China, notes to India

- 21 Feb 1961, 183-4
- 3 Dec 1961, 188-90
- 31 May 1962, 200-1
- 2 Jun 1962, 203-4
- 13 Sep 1962, 207
- 14 Mar 1963, 267-8
- 9 Oct 1963, 296-8
- 2 Jan 1966, 340
- 4 May 1966, 347-8
- 12 Jun 1967, 358-9
- 4 Aug 1977, 473-4

## China-India

## agreements

- India-Tibet trade and commerce agreement (29 Apr 1954), 61-4, 69, 72, 76, 102, 106, 109, 112, 128, 153, 161, 188-9, 192, 201-2, 310-1, 367, 510
- and China, 67-8
- exchange of notes on, 64-7
- trade (14 Oct 1954), 77-80

## joint communiques

- 28 Jun 1954, 73-5
- 25 Apr 1960, 170-1

## repatriation of detainees, 269-71, 283

## China-India boundary question, 138-40, 144-7, 163, 174, 203, 209, 211, 227, 230-1, 237, 247, 251, 266, 272, 317-9

## eastern sector, 147, 289-9, 292, 324, 328, 405, 462, 539, 543, 549

## geographical characteristics, 157

## historical delineation, 105-6, 138-9

## middle sector, 210, 227, 230, 237, 239, 248, 251, 267, 405

## NPC Standing Committee resolution (13 Sep 1959), 146-7

## report of Chinese officials (Dec 1960), 180-1



- report of Indian officials (Dec 1960), 178-80  
and China, 193-6  
settlement by arbitration, question of, 276, 281-2  
western sector, 161, 174, 210, 226-7, 229-30, 232, 237, 247, 250-1, 267, 272, 292, 299, 326, 405, 543, 549
- China-India War, 208-41  
and CPI, 224  
three-point proposal (24 Oct 1962), 208-10, 232, 244  
and India, 210-2, 225-30, 244, 246-7  
implications of, 225-30
- Chinese Common Programme, 20, 51-2
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 6, 186-7, 265, 313, 392
- Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade, 547
- Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 475-6, 478
- Chip Chap River Valley, 239, 242
- Cho La, 371-2, 443
- Chogyal of Sikkim, 450, 453, 458
- Chou En-lai, *see* Zhou Enlai
- Chu Teh, 37, 145
- Chuje, 161, 231
- Chuji-Geltseng, Erdeni Panchen, 112
- Chuna, 462
- Chung Ho-min, 287
- Chusul, 227
- Chuva, 161
- Colombo Conference, 15, 82, 257
- Colombo Conference proposals, 247-8, 262, 267, 276, 279-82, 284, 292, 296-7, 299-302, 313, 315-6, 323-4, 326-8, 348, 387-8  
clarifications, 250-1
- Cominform, 35
- Commonwealth of Nations, 5, 13, 15
- Communist Party of India (CPI), 10, 14, 33, 189, 191, 224, 307, 324, 366, 372-3, 376, 396  
resolution on Chinese aggression (1 Nov 1962), 224
- Communist Party of India—Marxist (CPI-M), 430
- Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), 402-3, 409  
and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 525-6
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 302, 304, 306, 311, 313, 335, 341
- Congo, 219, 249, 285, 330-1, 334
- Congress Party, 461, 466
- Cuba, 128, 219, 285
- Cultural Revolution, 392, 431, 556
- Cyprus, 331
- Czechoslovakia, 58-9, 447
- D-chu, 181, 183-4
- Dalai Lama, 30, 52, 109, 112, 115-8, 121-3, 128, 130, 133-5, 137, 140, 151-2, 154, 167-8, 339, 365, 395, 410, 448, 473, 510  
appeal to UN Secy-Gen, 140-2  
visit to Europe (1973), 443
- Dange, S.A., 223, 295, 307, 325, 358, 372-3, 376, 396
- Dantzen-Jaltso, Lama, 11
- Daulat Beg Oldi, 226-7
- Dehra, 243
- Demchok, 239
- Deng Xiaoping, 457, 496-9, 501-2, 507, 520, 525, 542, 544, 546, 549-50, 552  
on India-China boundary question, 496-7, 542-3, 546  
on Kashmir, 543-4
- Denmark, 155
- Desai, Morarji, 170, 356, 358, 370, 401, 474, 476, 483, 485, 498, 500, 503, 517, 527-9  
on border question, 483  
on Chinese invasion, 223
- Devi, Amita, 16
- Dhola post, 254
- Diem, Ngo Dinh, 125
- Diphu Laka Pass, 186
- Dominican Republic, 331
- Dulles, John Foster, 86-7

- Dutt, Subimal, 132
- East-West Highway, 406-7
- Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 60, 346
- Eden, Anthony, 9
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 265
- El Salvador, 47
- Faisal, King, 218
- Far Eastern Commission, 12
- Faruque, Ghulam, 359
- Feng Chih-tan, 83
- France, 19, 45, 141, 366
- Galwan River Valley, 239, 242
- Gandhi, Indira, 344, 346, 349, 356-7, 373, 380, 383-4, 398-9, 401-3, 416, 431, 437, 449, 451, 458-61, 467-8, 529, 532, 534-6, 540, 542-3, 547-8, 554-6  
on border question, 387-8  
meets Hua Guofeng in Belgrade, 536, 547, 549
- Gandhi, M.K., 69, 475, 491
- Gartok, 61-2, 65, 162, 202
- Geneva Conference on Indo-China (1954), 70-1, 73, 85, 204
- Germany, Democratic Republic of, 286
- Germany, Federal Republic of, 471
- Ghana, 247, 250, 282, 300
- Gilgit, 400, 479
- Giri, V.V., 404, 420, 437
- Gizenga, 220
- Goa, 86, 88, 190
- Gonsalves, Eric, 541, 544-5, 554
- Gopalan, A.K., 324
- Gould, J.B., 120
- Grechko, Marshal, 390, 456-7
- Gromyko, A., 531-3
- Guha, Samar, 427
- Guinea, 219, 334
- Gyantse, 29, 34, 42, 61-2, 64-6, 202
- Haji Langar, 101
- Haksar, Aziz Ahmed, 439
- Han Nianlong, 541, 544, 547, 556
- Hanle, 227
- Haq, Zia-ul, 479, 533, 538
- Hatta, Mohammad, 5, 16
- He Ying, 524-5
- Henderson, Loy, 19
- Ho Hsu-ching, 6
- Hong Kong, 425
- Hoti Plain, 76
- Hsia Yen, 54
- Hsiao Leng, 187, 191
- Hsu Ching-lin, 295
- Hu Chin, 6
- Hua Guofeng, 466, 470, 473-5, 485, 496, 498-501, 503, 507, 512, 528-9, 536, 540, 547-9
- Hua Kuo-feng, *see* Hua Guofeng
- Huang Hua, 485, 488, 497-8, 500, 503, 506-7, 512, 530, 540, 543, 545, 548-9, 553, 555  
on boundary question, 486-7
- Humphrey, Hubert H., 340-1
- Hunza, 479
- Hussain, Zakir, 390
- Hyderabad armed revolt, 14, 50
- India  
and Asian collective security system, 398-400  
and Bangladesh refugees in India, 425-6, 428-9  
and Bhutan, 352-3  
and Burma, 13, 34-5  
and Burma-China boundary treaty, 181-3, 185-6  
and China-Pak boundary negotiations, 196-8, 200-1, 204-5, 249, 265-6  
and China's nuclear explosions, 320-1, 348-9, 363  
and Chinese "liberation" of Tibet, 25-6, 48, 50  
and Colombo Conference proposals, 253-7, 266, 275-6, 281-3, 298-302, 312-7, 323, 326-7  
and Japan, 12, 342, 360  
and Kampuchea, 550-1, 553-4  
and Karakoram Highway, 479-81  
and Korean War, 50, 60, 70-1, 82,

- 89, 218  
 and McMahon Line, 147-8  
 and Sino-Soviet relations, 394-5  
 and Sino-US *rapprochement*, 411-2, 421-2, 430, 432  
 and Sino-Vietnam conflict, 507, 504-6, 510-1, 513-9, 521-2, 524, 537-8  
 and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 531-2, 534  
 and Tibetan revolt (1959), 118, 122-4, 132-3, 167-8  
 and US, 11-2, 16, 265, 344, 357, 360  
 and USSR, 35, 344, 527  
 and Vietnam, 329-31  
 National Defence Council, 235-6  
 points out discrepancies in Chinese maps, 100-5  
 policy on Tibet, 16, 35-6, 170, 201-2, 337-9, 349-50, 361-2, 365-6, 374, 395-6, 418, 426  
 recognition of China, 14-6  
 representation of China, question of, 20-5, 30, 34, 55, 92-6, 98-9, 137-8, 176-7, 212, 361, 409-10, 412-7, 432, 437  
 trade with China, 90, 470, 484, 487, 547-8  
 trade with Tibet, 184, 201-2, 310-1, 484  
 treatment of Indian diplomats by China, 358, 362-3
- India, External Affairs Ministry  
 Annual Reports  
 1948-49, 4  
 1949-50, 18  
 1959-60, 167-8  
 1960-61, 184-5  
 1961-62, 201-2  
 1962-63, 271-3  
 1964-65, 326-9  
 1966-67, 359-60  
 1967-68, 378-9  
 1968-69, 391-2  
 1969-70, 405-6  
 1970-71, 410-1  
 1971-72, 422-3  
 1972-73, 438  
 1973-74, 443  
 1974-75, 457-8  
 1975-76, 464-5  
 1976-77, 469-70  
 1977-78, 477-8  
 1978-79, 523-4  
 1979-80, 547-9
- India, notes to China  
 30 Dec 1960, 181-2  
 15 Dec 1961, 188  
 10 May 1962, 197-8  
 14 May 1962, 199  
 30 Jun 1962, 204-6  
 22 Aug 1962, 206-7  
 31 Dec 1962, 249  
 26 Mar 1963, 6-71  
 3 Apr 1963, 275-6  
 16 Oct 1963, 298-302  
 13 Jan 1964, 310-1  
 12 Feb 1965, 325-6  
 30 May 1966, 349-50  
 19 Apr 1968, 380-1  
 25 Jun 1969, 397-8
- India-China Friendship Association, 537  
 Indian-Canadian report on Laos, 336  
 Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 547  
 Indian Custodian Force, 55-6, 58  
 Indian Information Service, 340  
 Indian Ocean, 419, 456, 464, 467, 469  
 Indo-Nepal Trade and Transit Treaty, 410  
 Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, 359  
 and China, 335, 351  
 Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), 417, 423, 466-7  
 Indo-US Foundation, 347  
 Indonesia, 3, 5, 9, 19, 53-4, 91, 166, 219, 247, 392  
 Inner Mongolia, 129  
 International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 82, 89, 204, 286, 377  
 International Commission in Laos, 288-9, 336

- International Commission of Jurists, 377  
 International Court of Justice, 247, 276, 282  
 Iraq, 218  
 Italy, 141
- Jain, N.P., 425  
 Jaipal, Rikhi, 513  
 Jana Sangh, 125, 192  
 Janata Party, 521, 528-9  
 Japan, 9, 12, 19, 53, 136, 219, 341-2, 357, 385, 399, 433, 437, 445  
 Jatti, B.D., 475  
 Jelep La, 443  
 Jen Ku-ping, 458  
 Jessup, Philip C., 10  
 Jha, C.S., 137, 366  
 Ji Pengfei, 544  
 Ji Xianlin, 538  
 Jigme, Ngapo Ngawang, 169  
 Johnson, Lyndon B., 320, 329-30, 347, 351, 384  
 Jones, Mervyn, 20  
 Jordan, 218
- Kalimpong, 61, 65, 97-8, 115, 123  
 Kampuchea, 489, 524, 526, 550-1, 553  
 Karakoram Highway, 479, 481, 508  
 Karakoram Pass, 178, 195, 197, 266  
 Kashgar, 480  
 Kashmir, 11, 94-5, 100, 197-8, 200, 205-6, 241, 262, 265, 333, 350, 359, 381-2, 388, 397-8, 400, 421-2, 424, 436, 444, 479-81, 508, 519, 538, 540-1, 543-4  
 Katju, Markanday, 527  
 Katzenbach, 384-5  
 Kechilang river, 239, 241, 244  
 Keng Piao, 479  
 Kennedy, John F., 263, 285, 288, 307, 335  
 Khampa revolt, 113, 124-8, 152  
 Khan, Ayub, 196  
 Khan, Yahya, 410, 428, 431  
 Khinzemane, 158, 161, 168, 244  
 Khitai Dawan, 101  
 Khrushchov, N.S., 166, 294, 303-5, 320, 331-2, 335-6, 444, 543  
 Khunjerab Pass, 266, 397, 400  
 Khurnak, 168, 226  
 Kilik Pass, 266  
 Kim Il Sung, 57  
 Kissinger, Henry, 412  
 Kongka Pass, 162, 174, 226  
 Korea, 3, 54, 218, 334, 491  
 Korea, South, 3, 19, 125, 135, 346, 437  
 Korean War, 22, 34, 50, 60, 89  
 Kosi project, 455-6  
 Kosygin, Alexei, 340-1, 347, 376, 399, 517  
 Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee, 457, 476, 478  
 Kuen Lun, 180  
 Kukis, 382-3  
 Kumar, Krishan, 539, 542  
 Kuo Chih, 441
- Ladakh, 35, 100-1, 110, 150-1, 158-9, 162, 174, 203, 206, 208, 212-3, 224, 244, 246, 272, 315, 323-4, 326-8  
 demilitarized zone, 347-8  
 Lall, Arthur S., 92, 95, 98  
 Laos, 144, 286, 291, 336, 392, 516, 526  
 Laphthal, 161, 231  
 Lat-te, 181, 183-4  
 Lebanon, 218  
 Lee Sang Cho, 55-6  
 Lenin, V.I., 3, 8, 20  
 Li Chi Po, 60  
 Lieh Tung, 285  
 Lin Piao, 392  
 Liu Shao-chi, 3, 359  
 Lohit Frontier Division, 148  
 Longju, 147-8, 158, 161, 182, 252, 260, 266
- Lumumba, 220  
 Macao, 86, 424-5  
 Mahendra King, 407  
 Mahendra Raj Marg, 407  
 Malaviya Commission, 222

- Malaya, 9, 53, 392  
 Malaysia, 314, 320, 331-2, 335, 346  
 Mali, 219  
 Manipur, 509  
 Mao Tse-tung, 10, 20, 35, 37, 51,  
 136, 169, 365, 369, 373, 376, 378,  
 384, 409, 431, 475, 525  
 Marx, Karl, 20  
 Masani, M.R., 302  
 Maxwell, Neville, 417  
 McMohan Line, 31, 34, 103-4, 106-7,  
 139, 143, 145, 147-8, 151, 156-8,  
 163-4, 168, 174, 181, 203, 224,  
 227-33, 237-41, 251, 254, 261,  
 290, 298, 305, 317, 322, 328, 374,  
 392, 525, 539-40, 543, 552  
 Menon, Krishna, 71, 151, 177, 286  
 Migyitun, 228  
 Miniaka Pass, 266, 381  
 Mizo National Liberation Front, 342  
 Mizos, 342-3, 358, 360-1, 368, 373,  
 382-3, 388, 535  
 Mongolia, 179, 322, 420  
 More Khun, 479  
 Morocco, 219  
 Nagaland, 509, 520  
 Nagas, 32, 358, 360-1, 368, 373, 382-  
 3, 388, 391, 393, 406, 535, 556  
 Namboodiripad, E.M.S., 373  
 Nanda Devi, 483  
 Narayan, Shriman, 406  
 Narayanan, K.R., 465, 469  
 Nathu La, 370-1, 394, 443  
 National People's Congress, 12, 121,  
 142, 144-6  
 1st, 85, 117-8, 124  
 2nd, 117-8, 124, 146, 169  
 3rd, 322-3  
 5th, 96, 475  
 Nawaz, S. Shah, 533  
 Naxalbari, 366, 369, 373, 376-8, 390,  
 397, 402, 405  
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3, 5, 16, 29, 36,  
 41, 48-50, 69, 71, 73, 81-2, 84,  
 92, 94-5, 97, 103, 105, 110, 113,  
 115, 122, 125-7, 129-31, 134-5,  
 137-8, 143-5, 156, 160-1, 169-70,  
 173, 176, 183, 196, 203, 208, 213-  
 23, 225, 231, 235, 242, 246-8, 250,  
 253, 257, 259, 262-6, 268-9, 273-  
 6, 280-1, 283, 314, 320, 327, 331,  
 335, 375, 475, 491, 543, 546, 556  
 letters to Chou En lai  
 14 Dec 1958, 103-5  
 22 Mar 1959, 110-2  
 26 Sep 1959, 147-51  
 16 Nov 1959, 156-60  
 1 Dec 1962, 242  
 1 Jan 1963, 250  
 5 Mar 1963, 266-7  
 1 May 1963, 281-3  
 on Tibet,  
 41-3, 46, 48-9, 125-6, 131  
 Nehru, R.K., 88, 136  
 Neo Lao Haksat, 336  
 Nepal, 17, 32, 34, 120, 160-1, 179,  
 195, 231, 310, 322, 352, 387, 405-  
 6, 408, 410, 443, 453  
 boundary agreement with China,  
 195  
 Nepal Council of World Affairs, 437  
 Nepal-Tibet border, 405  
 Netherlands, 155  
 Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-  
 mission (NNRC), 55-8, 71  
 New Delhi Agreement, 439  
 Ninghsia, 129  
 Niti Pass, 75-6  
 Nixon, Richard M., 424, 430, 432-3,  
 435  
 Non-aligned Conference  
 Belgrade, 220, 316  
 Cairo, 315, 327-9  
 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
 (NATO), 522  
 North East Frontier Agency (NEFA),  
 100, 150, 152, 168, 208, 246, 258,  
 272  
 Norway, 155  
 Ofori-Atta, Kofi Asante, 282  
 Okinawa, 19, 357

- PL-480, 471**  
**Pakistan, 11, 32-3, 44, 53-4, 77, 95, 136, 155, 195-8, 200, 205-6, 249, 312, 320, 322, 328-9, 334-5, 350, 352, 359, 363, 374, 379, 381, 388, 390, 397-8, 400, 410, 417, 421-3, 428, 443, 454-5, 458, 508, 534**  
**Palestine, 392**  
**Panchen Erdeni Chuji-Geltseng, 114, 118**  
**Panchen Lama, 116, 339**  
**Panchen Ngerhtehni, 51-2**  
**Pandit, Vijaya Laxmi, 55**  
**Pangong Lake, 239, 242**  
**Panikkar, K., 40**  
**Pant, G.B., 165**  
**Parigas, 161, 231**  
**Patel, D.V., 314**  
**Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 13, 29, 41**  
     **on danger from China in north-east, 31-2**  
     **on recognition of China, 14-5**  
     **on Tibet, 13-4, 29-34**  
**Peng Teh-huai, 57**  
**People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 539, 552**  
**People's Liberation Army (PLA), 6, 26, 37, 39-41, 51-3, 109-10, 112, 120, 163, 322**  
**Philippines, 3, 19, 136**  
**Pirzada, Shariffudin, 359**  
**Point Four Programme, 16, 19, 50**  
**Poland, 58-9, 204, 336, 397, 519**  
**Portugal, 86**  
**Praja Socialist Party (PSP), 125, 192**  
**Prasad, Rajendra, 91, 182**  
**Prisoners-of-war, Pakistan, 436, 439, 443-4**  
**Puling Sumdo, 161**  
  
**Qizijilga, 243**  
**Quirino, 11-2**  
  
**Radhakrishnan, S., 288, 307, 355, 489**  
**Raghavan, N., 64**  
**Raghunath, K., 358, 362**  
**Ram, Jagjivan, 403**  
**Ramamurti, P., 324**  
**Ranga, N.G., 49**  
**Ranganathan, C.V., 362**  
**Rao, M.S., 362**  
**Rao, P.V. Narasimha, 530, 535, 545, 548-9, 551-2, 555**  
     **on border question, 549**  
**Rau, B.N., 20, 41, 46**  
**Red Guards, 362**  
**Reddy, Neelam Sanjiva, 473-4, 500, 526**  
**Reischauer, Edwin O., 342**  
**Rhee, Syngman, 55-6, 125**  
**Rumania, 359**  
  
**Sabri, Aly, 282-3**  
**Samrin, Heng, 550-1**  
**Samzangling, 244**  
**Sangcha, 161, 231**  
**Sathe, R.D., 599-4**  
**Sato Eisaku, 399**  
**SEATO, 19, 136, 312**  
**Sen, Samar, 409, 414-6**  
**Sethi, Ran it, 531**  
**Shanghai Peace Committee, 54**  
**Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 312, 316, 319-20, 323-4, 329-31, 406, 408**  
**Shelvankar, K.S., 68**  
**Shen Chien, *see* Shen Jian**  
**Shen Jian, 40, 536-7**  
**Shenoy, B.R., 274**  
**Shih Yen, 332**  
**Shinglung, 243**  
**Shipki Pass, 161, 231**  
**Sikkim, 8, 32, 34, 129, 139, 143, 148-50, 152, 158, 160, 168, 195, 353, 370-1, 385, 437, 446-50, 452-3, 458, 520, 543**  
**Simla Agreement (1914), 228, 539**  
**Simla Agreement (1972), 508, 519, 530**  
**Singapore, 335**  
**Singh, Dinesh, 315, 392**  
**Singh, S. Nihal, 524**  
**Singh, Satya Narain, 526**

- Singh, Swaran, 313, 315, 319, 334, 348, 354, 363, 370-1, 374, 406, 408, 411-2, 418, 421, 423, 426, 432, 434, 441, 448  
 Sinkiang, 18, 106, 129, 163, 176, 200, 249, 267, 380, 397, 405  
 Sinkiang-Tibet Highway, 101  
 Soanamchiatso, Kanchung, 109  
 Sondhi, M.L., 379  
 Spanggur, 148, 151, 168, 226, 242, 244, 255  
 Sri Lanka, 60, 77, 95, 219, 247, 250-1, 257, 259, 282, 297-300, 302, 310, 315, 327  
 Ssu Mu, 11  
 Stalin, Josef, 35  
 Subramaniam, C., 306  
 Sudan, 425  
 Suharto, General, 400  
 Sukarno, President, 5  
 Sumdo, 231, 255  
 Sonoda, Sonao, 482  
 Surjeet, H.S., 324  
 Suslov, M.A., 311  
 Swantra Party, 192, 302  
 Sweden, 155  
 Swell, G.G., 343  
  
 Tagore, Rabindranath, 175  
 Taiwan, 10, 19, 88-90, 135, 191, 289, 314, 357, 360, 374, 410, 413  
 Talu Pass, 181-3  
 Tamaden, 151  
 Tan Kuan-san, 135  
 Tan Zen Lin, 536  
 Tanzania, 334  
 Tashigang area, 100  
 Tashkent Agreement, 347, 359, 361, 379  
 Telengana uprising, 33, 360, 366  
 Teng Hsiao-ping, *see* Deng Xiaoping  
 Thagla Ridge, 254, 258, 266  
 Thailand, 3, 19, 136, 286, 357, 392  
 Thakin Nu, 16  
 Thakot, 479  
 Thimayya, K.S., 55, 57  
 Thorez, 263-5  
 Tibet, 6, 9-10, 49, 51-2, 65, 113-5, 118-9, 221, 276, 310-1, 332, 337, 357, 361, 395-7, 400, 405, 418, 424, 434, 462-3, 551  
     and Britain, 6-7, 17, 106, 118-20  
     and China, 26-9, 37, 124-5  
         17-point agreement (1951), 51-3, 109, 116  
     and India, 41, 47-8  
     and UN, 153-4, 349-50  
     and United States, 6, 17, 19, 97, 99  
     appeal to UN, 46-7  
     Chinese notes on  
         30 Oct 1950, 26-7  
         16 Nov 1950, 39-41  
         17 Jul 1954, 75  
         10 Jul 1958, 97-8  
         3 Nov 1958, 102-3  
     handing over of Indian communication facilities in, 83  
     Indian notes on  
         21 Oct 1950, 23-5  
         23 Oct 1950, 25-6  
         1 Nov 1950, 27-9  
         27 Aug 1954, 76  
         2 Aug 1958, 99  
         8 Aug 1958, 100  
         21 Aug 1958, 100-1  
         18 Oct 1958, 101-2  
     rebellion in, 98, 112-4, 115-7  
         and China, 113-5  
         seventeen-point agreement, 51-3  
 Tibet Military Area Command, 109-10, 112  
 Tibetan refugees, 387, 424  
 Tiang Chuan, 341  
 Ting Hsi-lin, 97  
 Tito, Marshal, 221-2, 289, 330, 353  
 Tripartite Agreement on Pakistani POWs, 443  
 Truman, Harry S., 11-2  
 Tsewong Reutzen, Sampo, 109  
 Tsao Po-han, 49  
 Tsari Sarpa, 228  
 Tsayul, 242  
 Tsungsha, 161, 231  
 Tulung Pass, 228, 462  
 Tulung Pass incident (1975), 462-3

- U Thant, 357
- UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), 11
- United Arab Republic, 3, 219, 47, 250, 282-3, 300, 353, 360, 367
- United Nations, 55, 88, 92-3, 95-6
- United States, 5, 17, 30, 34, 45-6, 50, 71, 82-7, 91-2, 95, 120, 128, 130, 135-6, 141, 154-5, 186-8, 191-2, 218-20, 241, 263, 274, 278, 284-92, 295-6, 306-10, 316, 318-20, 329-33, 335-6, 340-1, 351, 354, 356-7, 363-4, 370, 375, 377, 383-6, 389, 395-6, 403-4, 411, 413, 420-2, 430-1, 437, 470-2, 530, 534
- air defence agreement with India, 290-2
- and China, 11, 19, 89, 91
- and Cuba, 285-6
- and Goa, 86-7
- and India
- economic aid to, 50, 187-8, 218-9, 233-4, 265, 274-5, 330, 364, 384, 404, 470-1
  - food aid to, 333, 342, 347, 356
  - investments in, 470
  - military aid to, 19, 50, 234, 268-9, 306-7, 309-10, 320, 331-2, 335, 385-6
- and India-China War, 278
- and Indian Ocean, 456
- and Kashmir question, 4
- joint air exercises, 290-1, 308-9
- lifts arms embargo to India and Pakistan, 456-7
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 424-5
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 153-4, 339
- US-Japan Security Treaty, 219
- US-Commonwealth mission to India 260
- USSR, 32, 34-5, 45, 51, 84, 87-90, 97, 130, 218, 220-1, 279, 289-91, 293, 302-3, 305-7, 311, 318, 320, 329, 332-3, 335, 344, 346, 351, 354-7, 360, 363-4, 370, 377, 385, 386, 401-3, 441-3, 450, 467, 470-2, 517, 522-3, 527-8, 531-2, 534
- and CPI, 396-7
- and India
- economic aid to, 84-5, 87, 294, 306-7, 335, 354-5, 363-4, 370-1, 385-6, 401, 404-5, 420, 439-40, 442, 464, 467, 471
  - grain loan to, 441-2
  - military aid to, 306, 308, 320, 332, 350, 354, 377, 390-1, 456-7, 467, 471, 551
- and India-China boundary question, 303, 311-2
- and Indo-China War, 303-5, 311-2
- and Indian Ocean, 457, 467
- intervention in Hungary, 218
- Vajpayee, A.B., 469, 473-4, 478-9, 481-2, 484, 486-9, 496, 504, 518-9, 524-5, 534
- on China-Japan peace treaty, 482
  - on Chinese support to insurgents, 509-10
  - on India-China boundary question, 509, 519-21
  - visit to China, 481, 484
- Varma, Kewal, 519
- Vietnam, 3, 9, 53-4, 304, 329-30, 334, 341, 347, 377, 392, 399, 411, 505-6, 510-1, 515-7, 521-2, 534, 537, 550-1
- Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 286, 288, 336
- Vikrant, 539, 543
- Voice of America, 291-3
- Vorontsov, 517
- Wang Bingnan, 475-8, 486, 539, 552-3
- Wang Jun-sheng, 424, 426
- Wang Pin-nan, *see* Wang Bingnan
- Wang Yu, 14
- Wangchuk, Jigme Singye, 453
- Warangal, 33
- World Bank, 471



*World Culture*, 5-6, 11, 14, 108, 285  
 Wu-je, *see* Barahoti

Yang Kang, 5

Yangpa, 101

Yatung, 29, 34, 61-2, 64-6

Yi Li-yu, 108

Yuan Chung-hsien, 40

Yugoslavia, 318, 330, 353, 360

    and India-China relations, 221-2

Zhao Cipu, 500, 544

Zhao Ziyang, 535

Zhou Enlai, 53, 68-9, 72-3, 75, 77, 80-3, 85, 88, 91-2, 94-6, 100, 102-5, 110, 113-4, 117, 123, 138, 142-3,

146-7, 155, 161, 169-71, 175, 198-9, 202, 205, 225-8, 220, 241-2, 247, 250, 266, 280-1, 299, 320, 322-4, 359, 397, 416-7, 422-3, 475, 489, 519, 525

letters to Nehru

    23 Jan 1959, 105-8

    8 Sep 1959, 138-40

    7 Nov 1959, 155-6

    17 Dec 1959, 161-4

    20 Apr 1963, 280-1

on India-China boundary question, 142-3, 322

on SEATO, 80-1

six points of proximity, 171-3, 175-6